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THE HIBBERT LECTURES

SECOND SERIES

THE REACTIONS BETWEEN DOGMA & PHILOSOPHY

ILLUSTRATED FROM THE WORKS OF

S. THOMAS AQUINAS

LECTURES

DELIVERED IN LONDON AND OXFORD

OCTOBER–DECEMBER 1916

BY

PHILIP H. WICKSTEED, M.A., LITT.D.

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PREFACE

My very special thanks are due to the Hibbert Trustees, in the first place, for the characteristic generosity of conception which enabled them to sanction the choice of a subject that lay, in appearance at least, somewhat out of line with the general scheme of the Hibbert Lectures; and in the second place, for the unfailing patience and consideration they have exercised during the long delays in preparing this volume for the press, delays caused in part by the nature of the work, but in part by a protracted period of illness, during which all work had to be suspended.

I have further gratefully to acknowledge the kindness of Dr Estlin Carpenter in looking through my proofs; courtesies from the staffs of the Bodleian and British Museum libraries; and resourceful support and suggestion from a much-tried publisher.

As for "works consulted," I should like to render a tribute of respectful admiration to Dr Ludwig Schütz's *Thomas-Lexicon*,* a work which I have

* *Thomas-Lexicon. Sammlung, Übersetzung und Erklärung der in sämtlichen Werken des h. Thomas von Aquin vorkommenden Kunstausdrücke und wissenschaftlichen Aussprüche.* Von Dr Ludwig Schütz. Zweite, sehr vergrösserte Auflage. Paderborn, 1895.

found faultlessly accurate, and, within its prescribed limits, almost unfailingly complete.*

Other obligations (which, owing to the nature of the work, are not numerous) are recorded as occasion arises.

The lectures on which this book is founded were orally delivered in the autumn of 1916 in University Hall, London, and at Manchester College, Oxford, and in preparing them for the press I have preserved the form of direct address and the essentially popular treatment of the subject-matter. I fear I must add that, in spite of many efforts, I have failed to eliminate repetitions which are less tolerable in a printed volume than in addresses to a partially fluctuating audience.

In the notes and citations added to each lecture† I have not aimed at popularity, but have tried to be of some service to students. It has been my wish to substantiate every important statement as to the teaching of Aquinas by direct citation of his own words, and I have followed the same rule as far as possible with regard to other authors that lie on the direct line of comparison or illustration. I am not without hope that these citations, and especially those in the two *Excursus* at the end of the volume, may, if carefully read, be found a useful introduction to the study of Aquinas, and may

* *Cf.* first footnote on p. 205.

† The figures in brackets, (1), (2), *et cet.*, refer to those notes at the end of the several lectures. Footnotes on the page are indicated by the usual signs, *, †, *et cet.*

smooth out by anticipation certain difficulties in the conceptions and in the technical language of the Schoolmen which are likely to give trouble to the beginner if he attacks the text of S. Thomas without any special preparation.*

The English student however, even if his knowledge of Latin is elementary or non-existent, is recommended not to neglect the notes, since he will often be able to find material in them which interprets or supplements the text. In particular I hope he will not fail to note the references to the Poet Laureate's *Spirit of Man*. I chanced (in accordance with the Poet's invitation) to be faithfully "bathing" and "not fishing" in the waters of that unique anthology when this book was going through the press, and I found so much in it which I thought would help my readers that I could not but direct them to it. The Poet may be sure that they who come to fish will return to bathe; and meanwhile he will forgive me for seeking to use in fragments what is born to be enjoyed as a whole.

A word must be added on the relation of this work to my previous essay on *Dante and Aquinas*.† I have not been able to avoid some overlapping, but in the main the two are supplementary to each other. In especial I must refer the reader to *Dante and Aquinas* for some general account of S. Thomas

* Should this volume fall into the hands of any established Thomist scholar I may perhaps invite him to glance at the treatment of the *principia individuantia* on pp. 465–475.

† Dent & Sons, 1913.

and quotations advanced against the conclusion finally reached. They were given concisely as separate *objecta*, or points in opposition (commonly but inaccurately styled *objectiones*). These *objecta*, though arranged in some system, need have no connection with each other, might even contradict each other, but they had in common that each of them presented some objection to the conclusion which had been reached. The arguments on the other and victorious side were usually represented, at this stage, merely by the citation of some high authority (which need not, however, be in itself higher than the authorities that had been cited in the *objecta*), such as Scripture, Aristotle, a decree of a Council, or a liturgical or other formula of the Church. This was labelled *sed contra*. Sometimes, however, the arguments urged on the right side of the question (or, if the final answer is qualified, on the preponderatingly right side) go too far, or otherwise need adjustment, and in that case all such arguments are set out successively under the *per contra* as though they were another set of *objecta*. Then follows the summing up of the presiding teacher, constituting the body (*corpus*) of the article. It consists in a neat, systematic, and constructive argument, essay, or miniature treatise, answering the question under consideration in a positive and expository rather than a polemical spirit. Then, finally, comes the special refutation or treatment of such points in the *objecta* (or under the *per contra*) and such explanations or parryings of the authorities there cited as may

seem necessary, so far as they have not been incidentally deflated or made irrelevant in the *corpus* or systematic answer.

All this was done to the best of his ability by the reporter, whoever he might be; and sometimes, as in the case of a great body of the teaching of Duns Scotus, this was as far as the redaction of the discussion ever got. But in the case of Aquinas we are more fortunate. The *reportata*, or reports, were submitted to him, and were revised for what we may call publication by his own hand. Amongst these *Quaestiones disputatae* are many works of great importance and of great bulk. On the ground they cover they are fuller and often more searching than the *Summa Theologiae* itself. Amongst them are the *De potentia*, the *De malo*, the *De veritate*, and the *De anima*. They fill two volumes of the collected works of Aquinas, if we include the *Quodlibeta*.

These *Quodlibeta* form a kind of variant on the *Quaestiones disputatae*. A professor undertook, on a certain day, to give his answers to any questions which anyone chose to ask him. The questions were on points raised without notice by those present, and need not have any connection with each other. There seems to have been no discussion, and in their published form the *Quodlibeta* simply gave the questions and the answers.

The *Summa Theologiae* is a textbook, and not a record of actual discussions. But it is throughout thrown into the form of a discussion, and the general

arrangement of the articles is precisely similar to that in the *Quaestiones disputatae.**

The abbreviations employed in this volume are as follows:

q. = *quaestio.*
a. = *articulus.*
ob. = *objectum.*
contra. (See above.)
c. = *corpus*, or body of the article.
ad 1^{m} *et cet.* = special answer to the first *objectum* et cet.

Thus

Sum. Theol., i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 79: a. 4. ad i^{m}
= fourth article of the seventy-ninth question in the first division of the second part of the *Summa Theologiae*, in the answer to the first *objectum.*

Sum. Theol., iii^{a}. q. 61: a. 3. c.
= the body of the third article of the sixty-first question of the third part of the *Summa Theologiae.*

De potentia (or *Quaest. disp. de pot.*), q. 3: a. 6. ad 4^{m}
is to be interpreted on the same system.

The arrangement of the commentary on the *Sententiae* of *Petrus Lombardus* is more complicated. Peter's work itself is divided into *Libri*, which are subdivided into *Distinctiones.* Aquinas takes each Distinction as the basis for a series of *quaestiones*,

* On all these matters consult the works of Mandonnet referred to in the notes on pp. x and 5.

subdivided into *articuli*, and treated on the same principle as has been expounded above, except that the *corpus* or substantive answer is called the *Solutio*. Very often, however, the article itself is again subdivided into *quaestiunculae*. In such a case the *objecta* are grouped successively under the headings of *quaestiuncula* 2, 3, *et cet.* (the heading *quaestiuncula* 1 being "taken as read," without being written), after which follow the *solutiones* 1, 2, *et cet.*, each solution being followed by a refutation of the special group of *objecta* which concern it. There may also be references to the *prologi* prefixed to the several books by Aquinas, or to the *divisio textus* which opens his treatment of each distinction, or his *expositio textus* which closes it.

Any system of reference will probably be found extremely bewildering by the unpractised student, but if he is handling the Parma edition, which is the most widely diffused, he will find some relief in the page references to that edition which I have supplied.*

> 4 *Dist.*, xlviii. q. 1 : a. 3. sol. c. and ad 1^{m}, 4^{m} = the body of the solution of the third article of the first question under the forty-eighth distinction in the *Commentum in quartum Librum sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, and also the special answers to the first and fourth *objecta* under the same article.

* On editions of Aquinas and the page references employed in this volume in general see the note on p. 67.

4 *Dist.*, l. q. 2 : a. 3. sol. 2.
= the solution of the second *quaestiuncula* under the third article of the second question under the fiftieth distinction, *et cet.*

The references to the commentaries, the *opuscula*, and the works that are arranged in lectures, or in books and chapters, will present no difficulties; but it should be noted that the references in square brackets to the sections of the Aristotelian commentaries, such as [§ 48] on p. 467, are to the division into sections, running continuously through each *book* of an Aristotelian treatise, which were current in the Schools. They will be found convenient for cross reference to Averrhoes or Albertus Magnus.

In citations I have as a rule followed the punctuation, orthography, and variations of type of the edition to which in each case I give the reference; and as the editions are not consistent with each other, nor always with themselves, this has resulted in a want of symmetry which I must beg the reader to condone.

The printed texts of most of the works of Aquinas are so bad as to necessitate frequent correction or emendation. I have exercised some freedom in this matter, but this need give the reader no sense of insecurity, for I hope I have erred in excess rather than in defect in the matter of giving him warning of departures from the actual text of the edition cited.

∴ The brief *conclusio* that appears at the head of the *corpus* of each article in most editions of the *Summa Theologiae* is editorial, and not from the hand of Aquinas.

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CORRIGENDA

Page 178, note, and page 222, lines 4, 5, *for* 'Excursus ii.' *read* 'Excursus i.'

Page 413, line 28, *for* 'composition' *read* 'constitution.'

THE REACTIONS BETWEEN DOGMA AND PHILOSOPHY

ILLUSTRATED FROM THE WORKS OF

S. THOMAS AQUINAS

LECTURE I

THE TASK OF AQUINAS

i. *Introductory*

THE conditions under which S. Thomas Aquinas undertook his great synthesis of dogma and philosophy, combined with the special characteristics of his genius, constantly invite us to step beyond the limits of his own Creed and Church; for his works present us with luminous examples of phenomena common to all advanced religious evolutions. They teach us to recognise the same underlying problems, and analogous attempts to solve them, under the widest diversity of technical expression. They perpetually provoke us to deeper and more fearless thought, and they are as rich in impressive and even terrible warnings as they are in guidance and stimulation. The general title of this course of lectures indicates that it is quite as much from this comparative point of view as under their more obvious significance as an historical monument in

the development of Christianity, and as a *corpus theologicum* of almost unrivalled influence in the Schools, that I approach the works of Aquinas; and I must ask my courteous hearers to accept both the limitations and the digressions that this treatment will carry with it.

The thirteenth century is characterised by that alliance between Aristotelianism and Catholic theology, which was prepared by the learning and intellectual curiosity of Albert of Cologne (*c.* 1193–1280), and was cemented by his yet more illustrious pupil, Thomas of Aquino (*c.* 1226–1274); and to speak of it as an "alliance" is already to give some hint of the special significance of the Thomist synthesis. Reactions between Christian teaching and systems of thought more or less independent of it, or even alien to its essential spirit, present themselves to us at every stage in the development of the Church. We have only to mention the Rabbinic tradition, Paulinism, the Greek Mystery religions, Gnosticism, Neoplatonism and the schools of Alexandria, or, at a later date, Nominalism and Realism, or Humanism, to remind ourselves of the continuous transformations through which Christian thought has passed, under the influence of its intellectual environment. But, in the Christian "Peripatetics" of the thirteenth century, and pre-eminently in Aquinas himself, we see the process that is always going on incidentally and half unconsciously coming out into the clear daylight as a deliberate and fully conscious construction.

Thomas knows perfectly well what he is doing, and he has not the least desire to conceal it. Thus it often happens that what, in other cases, we have to conjecture or detect is in his case deliberately set out before us, and that too by an intelligence of which lucidity, order, and fearless integrity are no less characteristic than profundity. Aquinas arranges a formal alliance, as between two high contracting parties, in which frontiers are determined, principles laid down, relations defined, and rights safeguarded with admirable precision; but the whole is inspired by an *entente cordiale* in marked contrast with the lurking suspicions or repudiations with which, in many other cases, Christian teachers have attempted to fence or to disguise their indebtedness to Ethnic thinkers or practices. (1)*

The Christian Peripatetics accepted Aristotelianism on its own merits; and, as a system, Aristotelianism was an innovation in the thirteenth century. It is true that as early as at the turn of the fifth and the sixth centuries the logical treatises of Aristotle had been translated into Latin by Boetius, and thenceforth it had become impossible for the Western Church to enter upon any close process of consecutive reasoning without employing the Aristotelian "Instrument" or Organon. But from the substantive teaching of Aristotle, from his views on cosmography, psychology, ethics, sociology, and the ultimate nature of knowledge and reality, the

* The figures in brackets refer to the notes at the end of each lecture.

Western world was almost entirely cut off for the next seven hundred years. And when at last this vast body of systematised thought found its way to the Occident, it came upon the Christian theologians from outside, much as the doctrine of Evolution came upon the theologians of the nineteenth century. The Church looked upon it with a not unnatural suspicion, and repeatedly forbade the public delivery of lectures on Aristotle at the University of Paris. The channels through which the fuller knowledge of Aristotle first reached Europe were enough in themselves to rouse the suspicious vigilance of the guardians of ecclesiastical orthodoxy; for it came in the shape of the paraphrases of Avicenna († 1037), or accompanied by the commentaries of Averrhoes († 1198); and these two Mussulman scholars (who were in different degrees suspect as heretics in the eyes of the orthodox theologians of Islam itself) emphasised the pantheistic side of Aristotle's teaching, and combined it with emanational doctrines, elaborated under Neoplatonic influences which had been definitely repudiated by the Church. Moreover, Averrhoes flatly denied the personal immortality of the soul, and expounded Aristotle in this sense. (2) It is easy to see, therefore, that the alarm of the Church was not unreasonable when teachers at the universities took to lecturing on Aristotle's philosophy (as apparently some of them did) without any reference to its bearing upon Catholic truth, or any warning against the danger of some of its doctrines. But at the same time such men as

Albert and Thomas, who were perfectly sincere and loyal sons of the Church, accepted the new light with enthusiasm. They were conscious that it enlarged their horizon, deepened and clarified their thought in every direction, laid open the secrets of nature to their gaze, and furnished them with an invaluable instrument of precision in the pursuit, consolidation, and propagation of systematic knowledge, whether secular or spiritual.

Officially, the Church was far from taking up a merely reactionary and obscurantist attitude towards this fresh influx of intellectual life. Her precautionary measures did not contemplate the suppression of private study, teaching, or discussion of the works of Aristotle, but the suspension of public lectures on Aristotle to the miscellaneous body of students in the universities until such time as a duly appointed commission should have defined the points at which his system was at variance with Christian truth. The commission was appointed, but it never reported. The prohibitions were never withdrawn, but neither were they enforced, and it was tacitly assumed that Albert and Thomas had actually performed the necessary task and had effectively shielded students of the new learning from the dangers it seemed to threaten.*

Naturally, all this was not accomplished without

* The admirable monograph on Siger de Brabant, by Pierre Mandonnet, O.P. (vols. vi. and vii. in the series *Les Philosophes Belges*), Louvain (vol. vi. *étude critique*, 1911, preceded by vol. vii. *textes inédits*, 1908), is the one repository of accurate and reliable information on this whole question.

opposition; and the vigilance of that opposition may explain the almost nervous emphasis with which Albert repeatedly declares that he is responsible only for expounding Aristotle, and must never on any account be held to be committing himself to the truth of the doctrines he is expounding. (3) But it was Thomas rather than Albert who practically met the requirements of the Holy See by determining the relations between Aristotelianism and the Christian faith. He had a perfectly clear and precise conception of the conditions of his task. He saw that the whole articulation of the systematic exposition of Christian dogma must be transformed by the new body of thought and knowledge, though the ultimate data and the final conclusions of theology alike had been settled once for all. There could be no conscious give and take between Catholic truth and any other system whatever. Thomas himself never compromises his rigid orthodoxy and, even at his utmost intellectual need, he will not bate a jot or ease off a corner of the authoritative creed.

Here, then, we have a systematised *corpus theologicum* on the one hand, with some points, to be sure, open to discussion and investigation, but with no possibility of concession where a decision has been pronounced by the due authority; and a *corpus philosophicum* on the other hand, that, without possessing any abstract authority of an external nature, is so inherently convincing that it practically stands as another unchallenged body of truth. This second body of truth comes from outside the Church

and in complete external independence of it. On what terms were the two *corpora veritatis* to be brought into harmonious relations? Albert had developed them both, and had brought them into friendly relations, but it was Thomas who cemented and defined their formal alliance.

The feat is the more interesting and instructive, because on many points the Aristotelian philosophy appears to be alien alike to the history and the genius of Christianity, whereas there is a natural affinity between Christian thought and Platonism. I shall touch later on (p. 262) upon some aspects of the close interactions between the doctrinal developments of Neoplatonism and Christian theology in the formative period of the Church, but it is enough to note here that Augustine, whose thought dominated the Western Church, was thoroughly imbued with Platonism, and that, on almost every point in which Platonism and Aristotelianism are divided, it was the former that had been hitherto assimilated by Christianity.

The two terms of the synthesis we are to examine, therefore, are the Aristotelian philosophy and the body of Christian doctrine that bore, in its very birth-marks, the evidence of its Platonic affinities.

To justify these statements, it will be necessary to touch upon some of the most general characteristics of Aristotle's teaching, though time will hardly allow me to attempt, even in briefest outline, a general exposition of his system. In this survey, such as

it is, the points alike of contrast and of contact between Aristotelianism and the teachings of Plato, of Neoplatonism and of Platonised Christian thought, will sometimes be pointed out and must always be present to our minds.*

ii. *The Aristotelian Philosophy*

To begin with, Aristotle had perfect faith in the ultimate validity of the data of the senses. Indeed, the human mind or consciousness is nothing else than a capacity for receiving sense impressions and dealing with them by certain processes of its own, which constitute our mental life; and of these processes the most essential is the power of abstraction, which man alone of animals possesses. Man can compare his impressions and experiences of every kind with each other, can trace the resemblances and differences between them, and can concentrate his attention upon this or that aspect of a concrete thing to the exclusion of all its other aspects. It is thus that he can build up an abstract science upon the basis of concrete experiences or familiarity with concrete things. This is admirably expressed by Aquinas himself when he says, "It is the function of our reason to distinguish between things which in actual experience are combined; and to unite, under certain aspects, by comparing them with each other, things that are diverse."†

For instance, we have no cognisance of anything

* *Vide* pp. 66–68, for notes (1)–(3), in illustration of points in the foregoing section.

† *Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}.–ii^{ae}. q. 27 : a. 2. ad 2^{m}.

that is long without being broad and deep also; but we can, if we choose, make abstraction of a single dimension in a number of real things which exist in three dimensions; we can compare them with each other solely in regard to this one dimension, rigidly excluding from our consideration everything that depends on their thickness or depth, and so we can arrive at a geometry of the line which is perfectly valid, and may have its very practical applications, though there are no such things as lines in nature. For a line is defined as length without breadth, and length without breadth nowhere exists. All our knowledge is based on the consideration of such abstractions; for it is by the "abstraction," or "consideration-apart," of certain properties possessed in common by a number of individual beings, each one of which beings also possesses properties of its own which are *not* shared by all the rest, that we can form the *groups* and *classes* upon which all scientific and philosophical thought is built.

Some of these groups seem to be "natural," that is to say, each group consists of beings obviously like each other and unlike others; and such groups may spontaneously acquire group-names of wider or narrower range, such as "plants," "stones," "lions," or may suggest themselves to thinkers and students only, though recognised as "natural" when once perceived, such as "vertebrates." But other groupings are felt to be "logical," "technical," "formal," "artistic," or in some way dictated by our own tastes, emotions, or intellectual convenience, rather

than as indicating "natural" groups. Thus we may think of the group of "beautiful things," including men and women, thoughts, mathematical demonstrations, poems, actions, desires, sword hilts, and I know not what; or we may consider the group of "courageous" or "parsimonious" individuals or actions, or we may think of "round" or of "soft" things, and in all these cases we may try to define to ourselves exactly what it is that we call "beauty," "courage," and so forth. When we do so we shall become aware that we are but endeavouring to carry further a process of spontaneous abstraction which has already made us attend to some subtle characteristic felt, but not analysed, which is common to all the things that we qualify as "beautiful" (or whatever it may be), and is absent from all others. Now these abstract qualities of "beauty" and so forth no more exist apart from the things from which we have abstracted our conception of them, than length exists apart from long things or leonicity apart from lions. There is no "absolute beauty," existing apart, which is beauty and nothing else, by participation in which things are beautiful, any more than there is an absolute "man" who is just humanity and nothing else, by imperfect resemblance to which "man" we are "human." Whether we are dealing with "quiddity"—the answer to the question, "*What* is it?"—or with "quality"—the answer to the question "*What like* is it?"—and whether our question be answered by "stone," "tree," or the like, or by "round," "beautiful," or the like, in any case the concrete object

is given us by our senses and our experience, while grouping and abstraction are arrived at by processes of the mind. And, consequently, the concrete is the practically familiar and accessible, but the abstract is the intellectually luminous and intelligible.

Thus the whole doctrine of the illusory character of the world of sense is foreign to the Aristotelian system. The world of abstractions and ideals is not a world of prototypes of which the actually existing things are a kind of reflection or distortion, but is a conceptual world, sublimated from the world of sense and experience, not existing in itself apart from things, but existing for the mind in things.

From this it will be readily understood that Aristotle concerns himself little with problems of the ultimate origin of things. He does not philosophise on creation, but demonstrates, to his own satisfaction, the eternity of the existing order of nature ; and he is not so much interested in the question of whence things came, as in the examination and analysis of how they exist, the attempt to understand their connections and sequences, and the examination of their relations to human life and purposes. It is true that he takes a deep interest in all historical and organic developments (in embryology, or in the growth of social institutions, for example), so far as they come under actual observation, historical record or even intelligent conjecture, but the ultimate origin of things is practically outside the range of his speculation. He takes the universe as he finds it, and attempts to understand it rather than to account for it.

This characteristic of Aristotle's philosophy becomes especially conspicuous in his Ethics. He is never troubled by what we call "the problem of evil." He has not to account for the failure of actual humanity to realise our ideal of what humanity should be, or for the lack of correspondence between the world as we would have it and the world as it is. He is indeed perfectly aware of these discords, and they do present a "problem" to him, and a problem of supreme importance; but it is not, primarily at any rate, the problem of how they come to be here, but the problem of how to deal with them and as far as possible to get rid of them, or at least reduce and control them. He "accepts" them as the starting-point of fact, and in this sense does not care to go behind them; but he does not "accept" them in the sense of being content to leave them just where they are. Thus his great treatise on Ethics is reared not upon any abstract sanction, such as "life in accordance with nature," or "in accordance with the precepts of the Deity," or in obedience to the "categorical imperative" of the conscience, but simply on the observation of the type of conduct which, as a matter of fact, we admire and wish to cultivate and propagate. He tries to give precision and system to our ideas about this, and then to devise methods of education and political institutions calculated to imbue our children and our citizens with wholesome moral prejudices, so as to make them contract good habits and hence acquire good sympathies, which will

afterwards justify themselves to reflection and so consolidate and strengthen themselves. From first to last, it is an education of the sense and feeling for admirable conduct, and a training in its practice. The ultimate basis of it all is simply the fact that there *is* a type of conduct and of intellectual, emotional, and æsthetic aptitude and experience that we admire, that we aspire to, and that we wish to spread.

It is clear that, as far as we have yet gone, this philosophy, whatever its merits or demerits, is neither Platonic, Neoplatonic, nor Christian. And we are to remember that for our present purposes these three systems of thought, though not identical, form a single group, with the common characteristics of which we may contrast the fundamental traits of Aristotelianism. Something equivalent to the doctrine of the "fall of man," for instance, is common to them all, and is essentially alien to Aristotle's teaching. And since the philosophic side of Christian speculation had been, in all its deeper essentials, under continuously Platonic and Neoplatonic influences, right up to the period of the Aristotelian revival of the thirteenth century, we can already see how much there is to explain the natural suspicion with which orthodox upholders of the Christian tradition might be expected to look upon the Aristotelian philosophy.

But we have not yet examined the point at which Aristotelianism, in actual fact, impinged most violently upon Christian thought, and yet at the same time

found its closest attachments to it. I refer to the Aristotelian doctrine of "vitality," including what we are compelled to speak of under the hopelessly misleading title of his "theory of the soul."

We have seen that, in considering the fundamental problem of the relation of the particular to the general, the concrete to the abstract, the sensible to the intelligible, Aristotle assigned a commanding position to the power of abstraction or generalisation. But we must now turn to the question of his treatment of this power of abstraction itself, not as an instrument we use in thinking but as becoming, in its turn, an object of our thought and speculation. What place did he assign to it in the whole scheme of things which philosophy must examine and try to give an account of?

Thought is a special form of vital energy, and, from many points of view, all the phenomena of "life" must be regarded as constituting a single group. This "life" or "vital principle," *anima* or ψυχή, in its generality, is the subject of Aristotle's treatise, *De anima*, or Περὶ ψυχῆς. Our usual rendering of this title is "Aristotle on the Soul," but Aristotle reproaches his precursors with confining their attention, when speculating on the subject of the "soul" (if we must so translate it), too exclusively to the human "soul." He himself is careful to note that there are living things whose "life" or "soul" consists exclusively in the lowest order of vital functions, namely, those of nutrition and reproduction. For plants are alive, but have no senses, and therefore

no susceptibility to pleasure or pain, and still less any proper consciousness. Higher than this vegetable "soul," or vitality, stands the animal "soul," which has all the functions that constitute the vegetable life, but combines with them sense perceptions, and therefore sensitiveness to pleasure and pain, in various degrees of elaboration. This involves the capacity for forming desires, and for the most part it is accompanied by powers of locomotion assistant to the realisation of these desires. Some animals too have memory and the power of utilising experience in the pursuit of their desires; and others, such as bees, have an instinctive sagacity independent of experience. But man alone has the power of abstraction, and therefore of reasoning, or of pursuing and contemplating truth or beauty for their own sakes.

Now it is not usual to think of the life or "soul" of a plant or even of an animal as a separate entity distinguishable and separable from the living creature itself. We can, of course, by abstraction, concentrate our attention upon the function alone, or upon the physical organ alone, or more generally upon the "life" alone, or the "organism" alone; but what we actually encounter is the "living organism," which ceases to be an organism when it ceases to function as such. And when Aristotle passes to that special and characteristic functioning of the human vitality or "soul," which we may speak of as "mentality," or the "mind," he finds that it is nothing else than a capacity to deal in a certain way with the data supplied by the senses, and that it is wholly dependent

upon these data for its development from a potentiality into an actuality.

Body and soul, then, are to Aristotle an organic whole, and he is never troubled by certain questions that perpetually haunt the Platonist. For the Platonist, thinking of the "soul" as the essential man himself, and of the body merely as its abode, or perhaps its prison, is constantly asking himself why the soul is placed in the body at all, and whether it would not get on much better without it; whereas Aristotle was perfectly convinced that, without the body, the soul would not get on at all, for it would not be there any more than the cutting power of an axe could get on, or could be, without the steel.

It seems, then, as if Aristotelianism were leading us to a point at which the question of the immortality of the soul could not be so much as entertained, and as if, in Aristotle's view, mind were a mere function of matter. And yet it is really at this very point that we find the bridge by which the Christian Peripatetics could cross from their Aristotelian science to their Platonised religious philosophy, escorted by no other than Aristotle himself.

For Aristotle was in truth as far as possible from being a materialist. No thinker distinguishes more explicitly between states of consciousness and the physical modifications of the organs that accompany them, between "a ferment of blood around the heart," for instance, and the desire to be avenged.* The earliest Greek philosophers had indeed taken

* *De anima*, lib. i. cap. i. sec. 16 (403^a. 30 *sq.*).

it as an axiom that "like knows like," and had therefore assumed that the "soul" which can take cognisance of the material world must itself be material. But Anaxagoras, an earlier contemporary of Socrates, maintained that νοῦς, or mind, was obviously something entirely *unlike* anything else, and he recognised it as the principle that brought order into the chaos of the elemental world on the one hand and constituted the intelligence of man on the other. Aristotle accepted this principle without qualification; for whatever it is that "knows" fire, for instance, or water, it certainly is not fire or water itself. They are the known, and whatever it is that knows them knows them in virtue not of being like them but in virtue of being something which is completely unlike them, and completely distinct and different from anything in them. Many of our states of consciousness, it is true, are accompanied by physical changes in our organs. Our emotions sometimes even seem to be provoked by such changes, as when a man feels depressed because his liver is working badly. Sometimes it is the other way, as when a man turns pale because he has heard distressing news. And, on the mental field, processes of thought are conditioned by the sense data from which they start. But consciousness itself, however connected with the material organs, is not itself material. What is more, Aristotle, differing herein from most modern thinkers, believed that the highest forms of human consciousness were not even connected with any change in a material

organ. For he knew nothing to speak of as to the functions of the brain, and he believed that the intelligence, though dependent on the organs of sense for all that it had to work upon, was itself without any material organ at all. He found evidence of this in the fact that whereas an excess of light may unhinge the organ of vision and so render us incapable for a time of seeing inconspicuous things distinctly (and so too with the other senses), yet the perception of a great truth at once quickens our power of apprehending the minutest intellectual distinctions, thereby indicating that no material organ of thought has been thrown off its balance by excess of stimulus. Intelligence, then, though it develops in man in connection with a physical history, is not itself material, and the fact that the intelligence, when developed, finds itself in the presence of an intelligible world, indicates that there is a principle of intelligence active in the world too. In virtue of his mind, man is akin to the cosmic *νοῦς* no less than he is akin to the material universe in virtue of his physical frame.*

Even the lower forms of animal (and perhaps vegetable) life have, in their vital organism, a "diviner" something that severs them from the inorganic elemental world, and Aristotle finds it in a kind of "warmth" which is distinct from fire and akin to the celestial "fifth element," as it was afterwards called. But this quintessence was inseparably united with the whole organism, was transmitted by natural

* *Vide* pp. 438 *sqq.*, 478 *sq.* *Cf.* p. 400 *sqq.*

propagation, and was present in the fœtus and even in the "gametes" (as we should now put it) from the first. Whereas, in the intelligence of man there is something diviner yet, for the different grades of "life," or ψυχή, rest upon more or less exalted forms of the principle of life; and the intelligence, or νοῦς, of man can only be regarded as a divine something that "comes from outside" to the fœtus, and is separable both from it and from the organism into which it develops.

On a distinct but convergent line Aristotle establishes, to his own satisfaction if not to that of modern science and philosophy, that the material universe itself is not a closed and self-maintaining system, but implies some immaterial and non-spatial principle of movement and life. He argues that physical motion always rests upon antecedent physical motion and therefore gives no ultimate account of itself. It is true, indeed, that living things do in a sense originate motion, and, when they do so, they are always actuated by some kind of desire. But the conscious desires of all the animals on earth, including man, are intermittent, and seem to be stimulated and appeased by material changes within or about them. Is there any conscious desire anywhere that is continuous and expresses itself in continuous motion, subject to no change? Aristotle answers "Yes." In common with his age, he believed that all physical changes and movements in the elemental world are initiated by the movements of the heavenly bodies, and since he believed the spheres or "heavens" that bear these bodies to be animated (a belief, we are told

by the historians, which survived in a modified form into the times of Kepler, and was accepted by him), the question of the ultimate source of cosmic life and movement resolved itself into the question of the movement of the spheres and the nature of that object of desire which inspired it.

Now, since the heavens have no sense organs, their desires necessarily must be of the intellectual order ; so it follows that it is intellectual desire which makes them move and which constitutes their life. And intellectual desire must primarily be the desire for some kind of communion with, or access to, something more worthy than the being that desires it. The highest heaven, then (the heaven of the stars, with its diurnal movement from east to west), is animated by a desire for something worthier than itself, and that can only be the Supreme Intelligence, immaterial and unmoving, self-knowing and self-completing, stirred by no desire for that which is beyond itself, broken by no change, enjoying continuously and in an unimaginable intensity the joy of contemplating the absolute truth, which truth indeed it itself is. And the highest and divinest life of which man is capable is the pursuit and enjoyment of such truth as he too, in his measure, can reach. Thus the immaterial principle of movement which is implied in the physical universe reveals itself as identical with the νοῦς to which our own consciousness is akin.

The supreme heaven, then, is inspired by love of the Supreme Being ; and all the other spheres obey

this prime impulse, and are dependent upon it for their underlying movement. "On this Principle all heaven and nature hang."* But the subordinate heavens have also proper motions of their own, and thus we are led to a belief in the existence of other immaterial beings, definite in number, standing in a relation of dependence on the one Supreme Principle, and animating the several spheres with special yearnings, in addition to the one common longing which they all obey. To this conception of the animated heavens and its crucial significance in the Peripatetic synthesis we shall have to return (p. 33), but we have already followed it up far enough to serve our immediate purpose. (4)

iii. *The Ecclesiastical Tradition*

(*a*) *Dogma*

Such, then, was the Aristotelian philosophy (with its points of marked contrast to the Christian tradition, but also with its notes of resonant affinity to it) which swept over the greatest minds of Europe in the thirteenth century. We must now turn to the other *corpus* of truth, namely, the Christian tradition; but our treatment of it will necessarily be still more imperfect than our treatment of Aristotelianism has been.

In all essentials Aquinas found Christian dogmatics a closed system. Even as late as the eleventh century, Anselm had been able to revolutionise so central a doctrine of Christianity as that of the Atonement; but this was the last great constructive

* *Metaphysica,* lib. xi. (xii.) cap. 7 (1072^b. 13, 14).

effort of the genius of the Christian Church on the dogmatic field. In the twelfth century it was already too late for the bold and liberal spirit of Abelard to succeed in reviving any plastic quality in Christian dogmatics. The era of systematising, defining, and harmonising had definitely arrived; and the file was all that was left to represent the shaping and moulding instruments commanded by the earlier centuries. Even Abelard himself, in his *Sic et Non*, had incidentally given a powerful impulse to this crystallising movement—or rather arrest of movement. But it is in the *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard, the representative dogmatist of the twelfth century, that the spirit of systematising finds its classical expression. After the example of Abelard's *Sic et Non*, Peter collected, weighed and if possible harmonised, the typical utterances of the most authoritative Fathers on every point of dogmatic theology, taken in regular sequence, under the main heads of God (or the Mystery of the Trinity), Creation, the Incarnation and the Sacraments. His work became the established text-book in the theological schools. The first great synthetic treatise of Aquinas himself consists in his elaborate lectures on the *Sentences*; and both his master Albert and his Franciscan contemporary Bonaventura composed bulky volumes in the same form. But Peter the Lombard left many questions open, or gave more or less confused answers to them; nor was his authority above challenge. The systematising and harmonising genius of Aquinas still found much on which to exercise itself. That

genius was ennobled by a moral and spiritual insight that often raises it to a high plane of interpretative beauty, but the limits within which it might reshape its material were narrowly defined.

Everyone knows what the main outline of the dogmatic system so defined was and is, and Aquinas accepted it with uncompromising sincerity and good faith. That is all that need be said here, though we shall have to deal more closely with certain points of dogma later on (p. 259). But the Christian tradition was not only dogmatic. It had its intimately connected mystic and philosophic sides also; and though we have defined the task of Aquinas as consisting in the drawing up of the terms of an alliance between a *corpus dogmaticum* and a *corpus philosophicum*, yet we must never forget that the *corpus dogmaticum* had itself been formed under philosophical or speculative impulses; and, moreover, in the Christian consciousness it was surrounded by and bathed in a more or less independent stream of mystic philosophy, with which it remained in continuous relations.

(*b*) *Natural Theology. Philosophy. Mysticism.*

The distinction here drawn must be developed a little further. It is a matter of common knowledge, to which I have already referred, and to which we shall have to return, that in the early and formative centuries the actual dogmatic scheme of the Church was moulded under Platonic influences, and therefore, so far as those influences were actually embedded

and incorporated in the beliefs that had become formally or traditionally authoritative, Aquinas had no option but to accept them in unqualified loyalty. But, independently of this definite incorporation in dogma, the Platonic influences had continued to flow alike through the thought and the devotions of Christian men; and Aquinas would meet them, on the field of natural theology, of philosophic speculation, and of mystical devotion, all down and all across the stream of Christian thought and experience. If this Platonic way of thinking and feeling had too far coloured the minds of Christian writers whom Aquinas was not bound to consider authoritative, he could freely ignore or refute them; but it complicated his task by its visible presence in writers such as Augustine, whose opinions he hardly felt free to dismiss, but whose expressions he could not possibly relish. Within certain limits, however, it had entered deeply into his own Christian consciousness, and he must find terms between it and his Aristotelian convictions on his own account.

It is to these Platonic influences in their several modes of operation that we must now turn our attention.

Hebraism is, of course, the matrix of Christianity, but, apart from Greek influence, pure Hebraism can hardly be said to have had any formulated philosophy at all. And though the development of doctrine in the apostolic age under Paul (still unfathomed and enigmatic as I confess it appears to me) was decisive

in raising Christian thought out of a purely personal, historic, and apocalyptic atmosphere, into that of abstract, cosmic, and properly "theological" speculation, and mystic experience, it nevertheless remains broadly true that, whenever Judaism or Christianity sought to find or frame a philosophy, it was to some form of Platonism that they turned. The successive steps of the resultant development are marked by the later forms of Hebrew "Wisdom," by Philo Judaeus, the contemporary of Jesus; by the Fourth Gospel, at the beginning of the second century; by Clement of Alexandria, at the turn of the second and third centuries; by his disciple Origen, in the early third century; and (for our purposes) by Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa, in the fourth century.

Side by side with this Jewish and Christian Platonising ran the speculations of the Ethnic school that found its highest exponent in Plotinus, in the third century; and to this non-Christian school the term Neoplatonic is usually confined, though some of the Christian thinkers should by rights be included in it; for they took an independent share, and sometimes probably took the lead, in the transformation of the old Platonic tradition. The reactions of the two schools upon each other were indeed of the most intimate nature. Each alike, in its developed form, of which Clement (died early in the third century) and Plotinus († 279) may be taken as the best single exponents, started from the thesis that the First Cause, being all-embracing, cannot be defined, but

can only be approached philosophically by the negative process of removing limitations, and saying that the Absolute Unity is *not* anything whatever which the phenomenal world of relativity and multiplicity *is*. Hence the profound philosophic "agnosticism" of both schools and the attempts of both to build a bridge of some kind between unity and multiplicity, by means of mediating emanations or manifestations from the side of the Uncreated, to which corresponded, on the human side, either a faculty of faith, receptive of definite revelations, or a capacity for direct vision of the indescribable, in favoured moments here, and perhaps normally hereafter (p. 129). Both sought, by a system of allegorising, to rationalise and spiritualise the crudities of writings and legends sanctioned by antiquity and tradition in their respective environments, and both alike developed a definitely trinitarian dogma, which on the Ethnic side remained purely philosophical, whereas on the Christian side it was connected with the doctrine of the Incarnation, and so with the historic appearance of the Word made flesh. In both, the Trinity was graded. Thus Clement, after applying a string of superlatives to the "nature of the Son," ends with "closest of all to the only Omnipotent."* And Plotinus more expressly: "What then shall we say of the Absolute? That nothing comes from it save what is next greatest to it. Now next greatest after it, and second to it, is νοῦς, for νοῦς sees the Absolute and needs it, though needing nothing else; but

* *Stromata*, vii. 2. *Cf.* p. 342.

the Absolute does not need νοῦς in any way." And again, in comparing the gradations of the phenomenal to those of the noëtic order he declares, "For even in the supernal order the ψυχή is inferior to the νοῦς, as is the νοῦς to that other." *

But this grading, always far more pronounced in the Ethnic than in the Christian school, was gradually eliminated from the latter (p. 348); and after the Council of Nice (A.D. 325), in which the doctrines of the coeternity, coequality, and consubstantiality of the Son with the Father were definitely established, there could be little room for the growth and expansion of direct Neoplatonic influences on the main stream of dogmatic development within the Christian Church. But the allied philosophic agnosticism and mysticism of Platonic thought retained its hold upon Christian thinkers, and it is significant that the great preacher, Gregory of Nazianzus, while expressly defending the full Nicene doctrine (thereby winning the title of "the Theologian," conferred upon him "first after the Apostle John"), was at great pains, in so doing, to give an uncompromising exposition and justification of the philosophic agnosticism inherited from Clement and Plotinus.

In our further progress we shall have to return to this very point, and to others now barely indicated. We shall have to attempt a closer definition of what is to be understood by "mysticism" (pp. 128 *sqq.*); to go into more detail concerning the Neoplatonic agnosticism or "theology of negation" (pp. 236, 287); and to

* *En.*, v. 1, 6; ii. 9, 13. *Cf.* p. 341.

note how, under the abiding influence and unexhausted force of the Hebrew ethical monotheism, this agnostic creed was practically qualified, in its Christian form, not only by revelation, but also by the doctrines of the footprints (*vestigia*), the likeness (*similitudo*), and the image (*imago*) of God in his creatures, implying a certain similarity between effect and cause (pp. 295, 352). But meanwhile an enumeration of some of the main sources and authorities upon which Aquinas drew, and upon which he relied for the Christian tradition with which he had to bring his Aristotelianism into working alliance, will show how deeply that tradition was imbued with Platonism old and new, and all that it implies.

To begin with, we have already noted (p. 7) that Augustine was still the chief quarry from which Thomas, like all the other theologians of the Western Church, drew his materials; and Augustine was saturated with the teaching alike of Plato and of Plotinus. On the mystic side, some of the best known passages of the *Confessions* directly echo phrases of Plotinus. And on the philosophic and dogmatic side Aquinas has constantly to disarm, in one way or another, expressions of Augustine's that, as they stand, will not fit his Aristotelian scheme. (5)

Again, Thomas's chief, or at least his most frequently cited, authority from the Eastern Church is the eighth-century compiler John of Damascus, who wrote a treatise on *The Orthodox Faith.* No one has ever claimed great originality or profundity for this work, but it was a convenient summary; it

was translated into Latin, and it had a wide influence in the West. Now, its opening section contains an uncompromising exposition and enforcement of the agnostic "theology of negation"; and the editor of the standard edition * is fully justified in constantly referring us, in the margins, to Gregory of Nazianzus as the chief authority for this portion of the Damascene's construction. Side by side with him, in the same margins, appears the name of Gregory of Nyssa, whose elaborate treatise on the *Creation of Man* insists that the "image of God," in which man is made, may be recognised in the fact that no one knows or can know either "what God is," or "what the human soul is." Both alike are inscrutable and inconceivable in their essence, and are known only by their effects and manifestations.

We have yet to note another author whose name constantly appears on the margins of these opening chapters of *The Orthodox Faith*, namely, the Pseudo-Dionysius. Somewhere about the end of the fifth century, probably, certain writings gained currency under the name of Paul's Athenian convert, Dionysius the Areopagite. They are the work of a Christian Neoplatonic mystic, and both the mysticism and the agnosticism of the school reach their highest, or at least their extremest, expression in them. The elaborate angelology of these writings,

* Sancti Patris Nostri Joannis Damasceni, Monachi et Presbyteri Hierosolymitani, *Opera Omnia*, etc. *Opera et studio*, P. Michaelis Lequien, Morino-Boloniensis, Ordinis F.F. Prædicatorum, Parisiis, 1712.

their parade of a higher initiation, and a certain strange spiritual beauty that flashes through them, all clothed in an elaborate but precise and not unintelligible mystic jargon, fascinated the teachers and students of the West. Albert was lecturing on the *Celestial Hierarchy* of Dionysius when Thomas first heard him at Cologne; and Thomas himself has left a volume of lectures on *The Divine Names.* The whole collection of the Dionysian writings established itself firmly in the reverent admiration of the Christian world, and in it Aquinas would feel that he was drawing his material (which, as a matter of fact, was scarcely diluted Christian Neoplatonism) almost direct from S. Paul himself.

These Dionysian writings had been introduced into the West, in the ninth century, by the Latin translation of Scotus Erigena,* of whom we shall have to speak presently in another connection (p. 45). Erigena himself, who drives the theory of negation to its very furthest limits, was never admitted by the orthodox theologians as an authoritative teacher. His book was condemned and burned in A.D. 1225, but it is clear that he had been widely influential. Now, his favourite authors are Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus, and his follower and interpreter, Maximus the Confessor (*circ.* 580–662).

This Maximus lies in the direct succession of the Christian Neoplatonists, and is surpassed by none of them in the fervour of his spirit or his devotion to the exponents of the theology of negation. One

* More correctly Eriugena.

of the most glowing passages in Bernard's treatise *On loving God* contains phrases and images that seem to echo Erigena's citations from Maximus. It would seem then that his influence, too, must have penetrated into the West. (6)

Finally, the vitality and wide diffusion in the thirteenth century of this "negative theology," and the mysticism that accompanied it, is illustrated by the introduction to the popular *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais († 1262), which is a brief and undiluted exposition of the theology of the Areopagite.

A summary, in chronological order, may at this point conduce to clarity. Clement (end of second century) and the school of Alexandria belong to the formative and plastic period, before the Council of Nice (A.D. 325). Gregory of Nazianzus (fourth century) is at once the typical defender of Nicæan doctrine and the tactful and popular exponent of Platonic agnosticism. The Pseudo-Areopagite (fifth century) is the greatest of the Christian Neoplatonic mystagogues. Maximus († 662) is at once himself a true mystic of profound and direct insight, the apostle of the Areopagite's teaching, and the revering expounder of the Gregories. John of Damascus (eighth century) carries the theology of negation into the central stream of authoritative Christian teaching; while Erigena (ninth century) develops it with singular boldness and subtlety along his own lines, constantly quoting Origen, the Gregories, the Areopagite, and Maximus. By his translations of the Areopagite he establishes him in the Western

schools, though he is never himself recognised as an authoritative writer. And lastly, Vincent of Beauvais, Albert, and Thomas show us how firmly the Dionysian theology was established, alike in the schools and in a popular cyclopedia in the thirteenth century. (7)

Enough has been said to show how completely Neoplatonism, in its Christian transformation, had established itself in the Western Church. Thus there was a Christian philosophy already in possession, and Aristotelianism would not find the field clear.

iv. *Neoplatonism of the Arabian Aristotelians*

But in order to understand the situation that thus arose, and the way in which Aquinas met it, we must touch on the Arabian medium through which Aristotelianism first reached the West. It will help to explain why the Neoplatonic agnosticism continued to dominate all the philosophical presuppositions of Aquinas, and lay at the basis of his whole system of natural theology, whereas all the other characteristic features of Platonism, notably the doctrine of ideas, were formally, and as far as possible, substantially, superseded by Aristotelianism.

The philosophy of Avicenna (*circ.* 978–1037) and of Averrhoes (twelfth century) is a curious blend of Aristotelianism and Platonism, though it presents itself in the form of a paraphrase or epitome of Aristotle's own teaching in the one case, and as a commentary on the actual text of his works in the other.

To understand this, we must go back to the point

at which we left Aristotle (p. 21). We cannot stay to trace the strange fortunes by which his writings passed into the East and then, in their Arabic form, travelled through the Moslem world to Spain, and thence in Latin translations "sailed into the ken" of the Western Church;* but we must note that the Arabic paraphrasts or commentators had a wide acquaintance with Greek philosophy and science outside the works of Aristotle, and especially that the authority of Plato stood high in their minds. Nor had they any clear perception of the distinction between what Plato himself was responsible for and what passed as Platonism in the later schools. It is even doubtful whether their purely consonantal script enabled them to distinguish between Plato and Plotinus. Their genius, moreover, was acute but uncritical, and they were quicker at seeing conformities between different schools of philosophy than at grasping their characteristic and distinctive principles. Thus it happened that both Avicenna and Averrhoes introduced or retained a strong Neoplatonic element in their Aristotelianism, even when they believed themselves to be reproducing the direct teaching of Aristotle himself. The chief point of contact may be found, as is natural, in Aristotle's doctrine of the animated heavens and the immaterial beings who inspired them with love and movement. These beings were to Aristotle as real and as objective as material and earthly beings, but they were of a higher order of stability. They were in them-

* See my *Dante and Aquinas*, chap. iii. London, 1913.

selves simpler as well as more exalted than anything of which we have directer cognisance, but for that very reason harder for us to understand. As all material movement and change was conceived as ultimately dependent upon them, they came first in the order of nature, though last in the order in which we can approach them from the starting-point of our own experience; and there was an obvious sense in which our dependence upon the supreme Principle of the universe was mediated by them and by the varied but harmonious movements which they caused in our lower elemental world. Now in all these respects they suggest analogies with the "ideas" of Plato himself, (8) but much more closely with the successive emanations by which the Neoplatonists sought to bridge the chasm between the unity of the unfathomable reality and the multiplicity of the illusory world of phenomena. So Avicenna had no difficulty in treating Aristotle's hierarchy of subordinate spiritual beings as a mere development of the Neoplatonic graded Trinity. And thus the purely Platonic conception of emanations found hospitality in Arabian Aristotelianism. A work of the late Neoplatonist Proclus, or Proculus (fifth century A.D.), was ascribed by the Arabians to Aristotle himself, and passed current under the name of "The theology of Aristotle." The unity of the teaching of Plato and Aristotle was a kind of dogma with them. A complete "harmony" of the two was regarded as the goal of philosophic teaching, and an immense step in this direction had been almost

unconsciously made in this identification of the Neoplatonic emanations with the Aristotelian spirits of the spheres. In this system the Aristotelian νοῦς, or principle of intelligence, is equated not with the Platonic "Absolute," but with the lowest of the celestial emanations from it, and it is expressly identified with the Spirit or "Intelligence" that gives motion to the sphere of the moon.* But Averrhoes goes further than this, for he regards the intelligence of man himself as a single spiritual entity, apparently standing in a relation to the earth analogous to that which the higher emanations hold to the heavenly spheres. This was his celebrated doctrine of the "unity of the intellect" against which Albert and Thomas fulminate. It is by some kind of contact with this Intelligence that individual men can think at all; and it is by rising in their thought to union with the higher Intelligence of the sphere of the moon that they can begin the mystic journey which, if carried by the philosopher to its furthest goal, leads him to his true home in the noëtic world.†

Now, Thomas was far too good a critic to accept all this as Aristotelianism. He knew that the "Theology of Aristotle" was really the work of Proculus; and he recognised a treatise known as the *De causis*, and also generally ascribed to Aristotle, as an epitome of the "Theology." He supposed it to be the work

* On this point and other features of the Arabian Aristotelianism, see *Dante and Aquinas*, chap. vi., and note (9) to this lecture.

† *I.e.* brings him into direct and intimate perception of immaterial realities (Platonic ideas, such as self-existent beauty, etc.) and purely spiritual beings.

of some Arabian author who had no Greek original before him.* He knew Plato directly from a Latin translation of part of the *Timæus* and indirectly from references in Aristotle, and he was sensitive to the danger of anti-Christian forms of Neoplatonism being foisted into European thought under the mask of the Arabian Aristotelianism. Moreover, the doctrine of the "unity of the intellect" was anathema to him. No small part of his task, therefore, was to dissociate his own Aristotelian teaching, and that of his master Albert, from the Arabian admixture of alien and dangerous ingredients. Is it possible that a suspicious attitude towards the Arabian *tendenz* reinforced the scholarly instinct which induced him to get his friend William of Moerbeke to revise or replace by direct reference to the Greek text the current translations of the whole of the works of Aristotle? (9)

v. *Closer Determination of the Task of Aquinas, and of his Relation to Precursors*

We have now a fair conception of the general task of S. Thomas, and of the special aspect of it with which we are chiefly to concern ourselves in these lectures. He had, in the first place, to deal with the whole body of theological truth as recognised by the Church. He had to carry on and complete the systematic exposition of it which his precursors had already begun, clearing up still doubtful points,

* See his commentary on the *De causis*, lec. i. (in vol. xxi. 718a of the Parma edition).

explaining divergences amongst the recognised authorities, and, where necessary, arbitrating between them. And this involved the philosophical task of examining and expounding such truths, especially of the Negative theology, as are accessible to the uninspired mind of man. But, in doing all this, he had new light and wielded a new instrument of precision in the treasures of learning and philosophy which the recovery of Aristotle's works had made accessible. In substance no established tenet, conviction, or practice of the Church must be changed; but in modes of presentation and formulating, much must be revised and recast. And this made it necessary closely to determine the relations between the old *corpus ecclesiasticum* (in its wider sense including a philosophy of natural theology) and the new *corpus philosophicum* contained in the authentic works of Aristotle. And this again involved the systematic consideration of the whole question of the relation of human reason to revelation.

Let us first consider briefly his attitude towards the characteristic doctrines of Platonism and the Platonised Aristotelianism of the Arabians, in the field of natural theology and philosophy, where he was more or less free; and then go on to the ultimate question of the relation of his system of natural religion and philosophy, however arrived at, to definitely revealed and authoritative truth.

S. Thomas's enthusiasm for Aristotle's philosophy, on its own merits, was genuine and overmastering; and though it is true that his Christian faith often

made him unconsciously give a Platonic or Christian tinge to Aristotle's teaching, yet to the central Platonic doctrine of the "ideas" as actual existences he is uncompromisingly opposed. Nothing can be clearer or more explicit than his utterances on this subject; and they are inspired by disinterested philosophical and scientific conviction. It is true that the Platonic "ideas" (which can hardly be said to have attained a position of stable equilibrium, even in Plato's own teaching) had entered under various transformations and combinations into the very tissues of Christian thought, where they were no longer recognised or suspected by Aquinas. (10) He had never drawn out the pedigree of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, or realised the emanational perils of its youth. Nor did he understand how much of his own elaborate angelology was ultimately due to Plato and Plotinus, and how little, relatively speaking, to "Moses," or even to Paul. But where, as in Aristotle's references, confirmed by the *Timæus*, he met the "ideas" in their undisguised philosophical purity, he rejected them, respectfully and without animosity indeed, but quite decisively. And where, as in the Arabian Aristotelians, he met them transformed into Emanations, and therefore in connection with the doctrine of the eternity of the phenomenal world, and in opposition to the fundamental Christian dogma of the creation of the material universe, and of men and angels, "out of nothing," he attacked them as deadly foes of the truth. Hence his secondary task, secondary as it appears to us, but hardly as it appeared

to him, of purging Aristotelianism from the Platonic taint of the Arabians; and even (with due deference and respect) protecting the Christian student against the influence of dangerously Platonic modes of expression in the works of the great Fathers of the Church. In this matter he has to deal faithfully even with the revered Augustine. All his own teaching on such subjects as the Trinity, or the Will of Man and Predestination, is indeed built upon Augustinian foundations, but nevertheless he is often compelled to depart from Augustine's teaching in detail; and his general contention is that Augustine was educated as a Platonist, and therefore not only used the Platonic phraseology, but adopted philosophic opinions, or at least indulged in speculations, which are not sound, but that he never really allowed himself to be misled in matters of faith. (11)

Further points, especially with reference to the Arabians, will present themselves in due course; but we are already in a position to begin our examination of the cardinal problem of the formal relations of reason and revelation, or more broadly of reason and authority, as it presented itself to Aquinas and to such of his precursors as are generally recognised as the "fathers of scholasticism."

In one form or another this question must have faced every generation of Christian thinkers; for all of them used their reasoning faculties, and all of them accepted revelation. More than that, whenever they were in face of unbelievers they naturally felt the

necessity of finding a ground in reason for recommending the acceptance of revelation. In other and less direct ways, too, the problem presented itself. For instance, one of the most perverse pieces of reasoning that ever issued from the brain of a great thinker is surely the treatise on the *Literal Meaning of Genesis* by Augustine. It had enormous influence, especially in an indirect way, upon the development of angelology, for it tortured the plain words of Genesis into references to the difference between the evening light in which the angels saw creation when they contemplated themselves, and the morning light in which they saw it when they contemplated God. Now, in this treatise Augustine is much concerned to save the credit of the Scriptures; for he saw that the account of creation cannot be accepted as it stands, and that unless it could be explained as having some hidden meaning and as not being intended as a literal account of creation, it would bring discredit upon the Scriptures and "faith would totter." Here, then, is a distinct, though implicit, recognition of the necessity of basing faith upon something that at least is not in open contradiction with reason; but the very naivety of Augustine's confidence in the truth of Scripture blinds him to the fact that he is really allowing the science of the Pagans to "command the manœuvring" and to force the Scripturalist to take his stand upon ground that he would never have chosen save under compulsion. His occupation of it is an unconscious acknowledgment of defeat. (12)

Again, the earlier apologists, in defending Christianity against attacks or in pursuing their propagandist purposes, were of course under the necessity of urging some grounds on which their Scriptures should be accepted as containing revealed truth. And this they did by appealing to the fulfilment of prophecy and to miracles.

But when Christianity had ceased to be in contact with any system of thought or culture equal to or superior to its own—that is to say (in the West at least), roughly from the sixth to the eleventh and early twelfth centuries inclusive—the question of establishing the authority of the Scriptures does not seem to have presented itself. The missionaries found rival superstitions and traditions but no philosophic doubts amongst the peoples they encountered, and the superiority of their own civilisation was the essential though unrecognised "argument" for the truth of the revelation they proclaimed. It was not till times approaching those of Thomas himself that contact with the high culture of Islam again compelled the Christian thinkers explicitly to face the necessity not only of finding a base for their belief in any divine revelation at all, but also of vindicating, by an appeal to the common ground of human reason, the credit of the actual revelation that they accepted, against the scepticism of believers in a rival.

Now, it is during this intervening period, when there was no thought of defending Christianity against any other established system, that the thinkers rose who are generally regarded as the precursors of the

Schoolmen, in the attempt to find terms between reason and revelation. The names that are usually given as those of the fathers of scholasticism are Scotus Erigena (ninth century), and Anselm († 1117), and to these is often added Abelard* (1079–1142), and sometimes, as of one born before his due time, Boetius († 524). It is noteworthy that not one of these four ever takes the trouble formally to vindicate the authenticity and authority of the Scriptures themselves, or the truth of the Christian dogmatic system. They all take these revelations or revealed truths for granted, and confine themselves to the attempt to define the relations in which human reason stands to the truths revealed.

The claim of Boetius can hardly be maintained, for he never expressly deals with the problem at all. But it is perfectly true that he occupies a special and very interesting position with regard to it, for he actually handles from a purely philosophical approach several dogmatic points that engaged the earnest attention of his contemporaries. He is generally known as the author of the great prison book, *The consolation of Philosophy*. This noble treatise, which has been called "the light of a thousand years," was perhaps second only to the Scriptures as a source of strength and consolation during the whole period of the Middle Ages. It was accepted with little or no misgiving as the work of a Christian, but, as a matter of fact, it has not even a tinge of the specifically Christian doctrines. Its main thesis

* More correctly Abailard.

is that, by the pure light of reason, and judging by the actual experience and observation of this life, every thoughtful man may convince himself that virtue is to be prized above all else; that the good man cannot really fail in things that matter; that the bad man cannot possibly succeed in getting what he wants, even if he gets what he tries for; that Providence is therefore on the side of virtue, not of vice; and that the good man, whatever his fortunes, is truly blessed, and the evil man to be pitied. Boetius maintains all this without any reference to specific Christian doctrines, without any appeal to the Christian Scriptures or to revelation, and without laying any stress on future rewards or punishments. This book was written when Boetius, after a brilliant public career and a life of great domestic happiness, fell under the suspicion of Theodoric, and was awaiting his death in captivity. All attempts to detect a Christian tinge or Christian reservations in it have conspicuously failed.

But, though this is the only one of the works of Boetius that has survived in the general consciousness, it is far from exhausting his significance to his own times and to the Middle Ages. He was the translator of the logical treatises of Aristotle, and so was largely influential in determining the permanent form which the technical language of logic assumed in the Western World. He intended to translate the whole of the works both of Aristotle and of Plato, and to establish a complete harmony between them. In addition to commentaries on philosophical

works of Cicero, he wrote elementary treatises on arithmetic and music, the former of which, especially, was a standard text-book down to the times of the Renaissance. He was a statesman as well as a student and philosopher, and it was a general aim of his life to mediate between the vigour of the Gothic masters of Italy and the Græco-Roman culture, which they reverenced but needed much help in assimilating.

Now, certain short treatises were current under his name which dealt, in a purely philosophical spirit, with the doctrine of the Trinity and of the two natures in one person of Christ; and recently discovered documents have established their authenticity beyond dispute in face of the persistent and most natural suspicion under which modern criticism had thrown them.

The outstanding fact that, in his hour of need, Boetius fortified his soul exclusively by the higher Paganism, or Ethnic philosophy, did indeed seem to exclude the idea that he was a Christian believer at all. But a more careful examination of the Christian tracts—for they are hardly more than that—goes far towards removing the apparent contradiction. For in them too we find no references to Scripture, no indication even that the writer had any acquaintance with it. Nor do we find any appeals to the authority of the Church or to revelation. From beginning to end the questions are treated purely as problems of philosophy. On the other hand, it is quite certain historically that Boetius was the intimate friend and associate of the great Christian scholars and high

ecclesiastics of his day, and we may, without much doubt, accept the interesting conclusion that, while his intellectual interests were exclusively scientific and philosophic, and while his spiritual life was fed exclusively from Ethnic sources, he had sincerely accepted Christianity, without ever having been much moved by it. We may suppose that, when he heard controversies as to the nature of the Trinity and the person of Christ clashing around him, he was struck by the inconclusiveness and philosophic clumsiness of the arguments adduced, even on the orthodox side. He had given these questions some passing consideration, and had put them in his own mind into satisfactory philosophical form, without reference to Scripture or to authority, and he threw off these short essays by way of a service to his ecclesiastical friends, much as a skilled mathematician might throw into convenient or elegant forms the results gained by a friend on some branch of physical research with which he himself had little acquaintance and in which he took no more than a general interest.

The practice of Boetius, therefore, may have a special interest for us, but he has no theory on the relation of reason and revelation. (13)

This leaves Scotus Erigena, in the ninth century, as the first of the alleged fathers of scholasticism who directly concerns himself with our problem. He constantly distinguishes between authority and reason, and it is his main thesis that, whereas reason must always precede and authority follow, yet the

two must always coincide. "Let no authority ever scare you out of the conclusions to which reason, after sound reflection, leads you. For true authority never opposes sound reason, nor sound reason true authority, inasmuch as, beyond a doubt, they both flow from a single source, to wit, the divine wisdom. . . . Authority is derived from true reason, reason by no means from authority. For any authority which is not confirmed by true reason would seem to lack stability. But true reason, since it is immutably sanctioned and fortified by its own power, needs the support of no buttress of authority. And indeed I take it that true authority may be defined as truth discovered by the power of reason, and committed to writing by the holy Fathers for the benefit of posterity."*

But clearly Erigena never meant this bold assertion of independence to hold as against Scripture. Its truth is never questioned by him, and no attempt to prove it is deemed necessary. And, practically, the whole body of current dogma is assumed to be valid, and both the Greek and the Latin Fathers are treated as men of such sanctity and acumen that it would be the height of presumption to pronounce any of their utterances mistaken or untrue. Nevertheless reason always takes the first place, and the whole force of Erigena's powerful and subtle mind is thrown into the philosophical side of his work. He is, as already stated, a thoroughgoing Neoplatonic pantheist. His permanent significance in the region of thought is

* *De divisione naturae*, i. 66, 69.

due to his exceptional lucidity and subtlety as an exponent of the Platonic doctrine of ideas, and of the Neoplatonic doctrine of the Absolute. The boldness with which he pushes the theology of negation even to the point of maintaining that God is unintelligible not only to human and angelic spirits but even to Himself, is indeed startling. His great work takes the form of a dialogue between the teacher and the disciple. But the bewilderment of the disciple, when he hears such pronouncements as to the unintelligibility of the Deity, does not in the least disturb the teacher; and he proceeds to show that there is nothing in the contention that can possibly be disputed or that ought to be any shock, and that it does not involve "ignorance" or want of self-knowledge on the part of the Deity.

The great mystics, we have seen, are amongst his chief authorities. They were evidently his favourite reading, and his own work is full of mystic fervour and beauty. But we need not be surprised that he came to be regarded by the Church as a dangerous writer, that he appears in fact to have inspired systems of thought in less discreet followers which the Church could in no way tolerate, and that, in the thirteenth century, his work was formally condemned and perhaps practically suppressed. It has been supposed that he owed his safety even in his own day to the protection of Charles the Bald.

His speculations were in truth quite formidable enough, from the point of view of orthodoxy, amply to warrant any degree of ecclesiastical hostility. His

belief in the resurrection of the body was, to say the least of it, attenuated. His views on the fall of man and on the Trinity were markedly Platonic. He was powerfully attracted by Origen's belief in the redeemable nature of the devil and the fallen angels, and sometimes seems to accept it. He did not believe in the reality of evil in any shape or form, and he held that all men, good or bad, would be restored, in the end, to the unsullied human nature as first created by God. There was no room in his system for a material hell, or for anything approaching to the current conception of damnation. Hell could only mean the survival of the memory of irrational and illusory aberrations of the will, fixed upon objects that had no real existence, and eternally restrained from any kind of vent in self-realisation or self-utterance. It is a sign of the genuineness of Erigena's reverence for authority after all, and of the hold which the Church tradition had upon him, that he feels compelled to devote the full force of his intellectual power and spiritual insight to the task of making this state of surviving and thwarted memories a veritable hell of eternal anguish, though realised only in the consciousness of spirits who may still be called blessed, in a very true, though not in the supreme sense. Had his reason really been capable of asserting its priority to authority it would never have allowed him to accept any belief in hell at all; for in truth it is a conception foreign to his philosophy, and it is only by violence that he finds room for it even in its modified form.

But how, it may be asked, can all these things be reconciled with the authentic revelation of Scripture and the authority of the Fathers? The answer is simple. A fantastic method of interpretation enables Erigena, as it had enabled Augustine and many others, to make the Scripture say anything that the interpreter wishes it to say. It can turn round the most explicit statements into their exact opposites. But the Fathers are a little more difficult to deal with. When Erigena explains Scripture otherwise than they do, he is careful to say that he does not condemn or reject them, where no essential point of doctrine is concerned, but leaves them the liberty of interpretation which he claims for himself; and when an essential matter, which seems at variance with reason, is involved, they did not mean what they said, but were uttering what they thought would come nearest to conveying their real meaning to minds of a lower order of intelligence! Thus the teaching of the Fathers on the subject of hell and heaven was merely their way of endeavouring to suggest spiritual facts by material images, in such a way as would strike the mind of the average man. It is utterly incredible, he thinks, that men of such supreme spiritual insight as the Fathers should really have held doctrines so gross.

These notes do no kind of justice to Erigena, whose appearance in the ninth century is hardly less than a portent, but they will suffice to show with how much or how little justice he is regarded as the father of scholasticism. To sum up:—He formulates

the problem of the relation of reason to authority explicitly, and gives the specific answer that, though reason takes the formal precedence, it is impossible that the two should not agree. This leaves us with no clear principle to guide us when they seem to contradict each other; but in practice, where Erigena's own reason is fully convinced, no authority, and least of all the authority of Scripture, is allowed any independent weight at all. It has to conform itself, by whatever contortions, to the conclusions of reason. But where his own mind has itself been so deeply influenced by the Christian tradition as to be restrained inwardly from following its own trend and boldly accepting what would naturally be its own conclusions, then some compromise is admitted. The authorities, indeed, are still forced to "toe the line," but the line itself is now drawn not by free reason, but by reason subconsciously hampered and thwarted by the power of a tradition alien to its native movements. This is specially conspicuous in Erigena's teaching as to hell and the final restoration. The real conflict or compromise, therefore, wherever it is found, is not between reason and the formally acknowledged authorities, but between the natural movements of the mind and the thwartings and entanglements of inherited beliefs that have been outgrown but not rejected. Into this region of psychological analysis we shall have to attempt, presently (p. 184), to penetrate more deeply. (14)

It is only when we come to Anselm († 1109) that

we find a clear and adequate definition of the relation of reason to revelation capable of being compared in detail with that of Thomas. The two agree in holding that revealed truth is to be accepted without question and without appeal, but that nevertheless it is the business of the human reason to exercise itself upon the truths of revelation, and to attempt to bring its own light to bear upon them. They agree that there can be no real contradiction between reason and revelation, since both are given to man by God to guide him to the truth, and so far they agree with Erigena; but they dissent from him in so far as they both take their ultimate stand unhesitatingly upon the infallible authority. Reason is neither to judge nor challenge revealed truth. It must accept it in unqualified submission, while faithfully exercising its own powers and attempting not only to accept but to understand. But if reason fails to understand, that must not be taken to throw the slightest doubt upon the truth of the doctrine in question. It only shows the limitations of human reason or of the reasoning powers and the insight of the particular theologian who is probing the question.

It is on this very point, however, that Anselm and Aquinas, in spite of the wide area of their agreement, part company. Aquinas holds that, though it is inconceivable that any revealed truth should flatly contradict reason, yet the truths of revelation are in their nature inaccessible to reason in its own strength. They are not irrational, but they are supra-rational, and it is highly mischievous to main-

tain the contrary. By Anselm, on the other hand, the revealed truth, as to the Incarnation, or the tri-personality of the Deity, is not regarded as intrinsically out of reach of the human intelligence. It may be true that we could never have worked out such truths for ourselves by our unaided powers; but when they have been given us on the assured authority of revelation, reason herself can then see that they follow from her own axioms and processes, and can in fact be independently proved by her and vindicated as rational. Reason was not strong enough to reach them independently along her own lines, but nevertheless they really lie on those very lines all the time. The task of Anselm, therefore, is to accept from revelation the conclusions which she lays down, and then, without any further reference to authority of any kind, to show that reason *ought* to have been able to arrive at them *a priori*, as her own natural conclusions. But if he, Anselm, or any other, should fail in this attempt, no derogation to the unassailable truth of the revealed doctrine itself is implied in the failure. It would be lack of faith to demand the understanding of a doctrine as a condition of belief in it, but there would be a kind of frivolity in being content to believe without trying to understand what you believe. Aquinas himself, in a passage that we shall have to examine with some care presently (p. 216), explains that, when the intellect is compelled by faith to accept as truth what it has not arrived at by its own processes, it is left with an unsatisfied desire, however devoutly it submits, and will there-

fore persistently exercise itself on the beliefs which it has not fathomed. In a sense this precisely represents the attitude of Anselm. His original title for the *Proslogion* was *Fides quaerens intellectum*—Faith seeking to understand. But Anselm's ideal aim was to reach a demonstration, at last, that *would* satisfy the intellect. Aquinas held this to be intrinsically impossible, though he still reserved, as we shall see (p. 63), a certain function for the restless intellect.

Enough has been said to show how truly Anselm may be regarded as a precursor of Aquinas, and how aptly he may be called the father of scholasticism, and this makes the points of difference between Anselm and Thomas of special interest and significance. We have already seen that Anselm is in theory bolder in his claim for reason than is Thomas; and moreover he is less dependent upon tradition. The central dogmas of the Church he accepts without demur. That "God became man" he takes for granted; but in inquiring into "the reason why," he shows scant reverence for the whole weight of ecclesiastical and patristic tradition, and he rejects the received doctrine on this subject without so much as noticing that Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Gregory the Great, and the whole array of Fathers expressly or implicitly sanction it. Such independence would have been impossible to Aquinas. (15)

Again, Anselm's Platonism had not felt the impact of the Aristotelian invasion of Western thought, nor had his generation of Christian thinkers come into direct contact with the Moslem systems; and this

explains two highly interesting points of difference between him and Thomas. In the first place, the system of Christian doctrine itself was much less rigidly defined in the time of Anselm than in that of Thomas; and as to philosophy, it can hardly be said that there was any systematised body of accepted doctrine at all. Anselm was not of the Neoplatonic school, and his temperate Platonism was a way of thinking rather than a body of beliefs. The definiteness and the compactness of the *corpus dogmaticum* and the *corpus philosophicum*, between which Thomas had to arrange his treaty, hardly existed for Anselm. And again, the absence from his field of vision of any systematic thinkers who owed allegiance to a rival "revelation" made it possible to him altogether to ignore the logical necessity of proving the authority of the Christian revelation.

We are expressly assured by Anselm that the authority of the revelation, on which he constantly relies, does not depend for its validity upon the sanction of reason. But when we ask "upon what, then, does it depend?" he gives us no definite answer. Had he never asked himself the question? Aquinas, at any rate, both asked and answered it, and he *had* to do so. (16)

And yet, though Anselm had no Moslem rivals to refute, he does assume the existence of systematic philosophical doubt that openly assails the Christian dogmas and mocks at the Christian believers. But since the arguments of these opponents are purely philosophical and Anselm is defending Christian

dogma on purely philosophical lines himself, even this does not compel him to go behind his human reasoning and to vindicate his reliance upon revelation. Then who were these philosophic doubters? Had they any real existence at all? I think it is more than doubtful. Anselm does indeed introduce us to actual "Devil's advocates" who put the case for the unbelieving philosophers; but they themselves are Christians, and they studiously dissociate themselves from their clients. We never meet the unbelievers or misbelievers themselves, as we do in Aquinas, when he is confuting the Arabians. Thus, in the *Cur Deus homo*, a dialogue sustained by Anselm and Boso, the interlocutors are often ostensibly engaged in forging weapons against their "adversaries," but it is fairly obvious that they are really meeting an active spirit of inquiry amongst the believers themselves. Boso, assuming the position of the supposed opponents, pushes his points relentlessly and persistently in their name. But all the time he declares that he does not for a moment share their scepticism. And when the monk Gaunilo was bold enough to indite his still extant *Liber pro insipiente*, in which he refuted Anselm's ontological proof of the existence of God as set forth in the *Proslogion*, and showed what the fool who "says in his heart: There is no God" might urge against it, he hastens to add the expression of his unbounded admiration of the *Proslogion* as a whole, and his sense of its truth and beauty. In principle he says it is all very rightly "felt" and conceived, though not always successfully "argued out."

This question whether the philosophical opponents of the Church are introduced dramatically or are real contemporary thinkers is again forced upon us when we turn to Abelard, who justifies his love and admiration of the great Pagan philosophers by arguing first that their teaching is substantially in harmony with the Christian doctrine, and secondly that, since the opponents of Christianity rely exclusively upon philosophical arguments, it is only by an appeal to the philosophers that they can be met. You must either argue with a man on principles that he accepts, or move him by an appeal to authorities that he acknowledges; and therefore the Christian would be helpless in his controversies with philosophical opponents unless he were well versed in the principles of philosophy and the tenets of philosophers. So here again we ask: Who are these philosophical opponents who, in open day, deride and attack the Christian doctrine? It is interesting and instructive to note that Abelard himself was challenged on this very point by those who looked with suspicion on his study and admiration of the Pagan philosophers. The Pagan and heretical opponents of the truth, they urged, no longer exist! Is it not superfluous and mischievous to rake up their refuted and forgotten arguments? Abelard is at pains to confute this assertion, and he declares that those who make it are living in a fool's paradise, for, as a matter of fact, Christian lands are swarming with dangerous teachers. And it is amusing to note with what appearance of fervour and conviction

Abelard brings against these teachers exactly the kind of charges which were urged against him himself by Bernard and others. They are, he tells us, dialecticians, whose boundless arrogance is intolerable. One of them, moreover, believes that the heathen could be saved without faith even in the Trinity or the Incarnation; and he fortifies his case by raking up obscure fanatics (of the type that every age produces) whose pretensions were based on anything but philosophical arguments. But, to my mind at least, the resultant impression left by his defence is that his restless and inquiring spirit was really moved by its own demand for clearer light on the relations between faith and reason and between the Christian and the Ethnic scriptures. The systematic philosophical opponents of the Christian dispensation, who reject the Christian revelation, are probably reconstructed from the environment of the earlier centuries of the Church as reflected in the works of the great Fathers, and as echoed in the later schools by way of exercise. It is noteworthy that Aquinas, at a later date, somewhat naively complains that one of the difficulties of the teacher of his day in refuting the "sacrilegious utterances" of the false teachers is that he does not always know exactly what they were! It is worth noticing, too, in this connection, that in answer to the charge of being too much given to the study of heathen philosophers, Abelard replies, with apparent truth, that he has very little first-hand acquaintance with them, but knows them

chiefly from the references to them in the Christian writers; and he adopts the profound saying that theology owes its development to the challenges of the heretics, without which it would never have reached its firmness and precision.

It need not be doubted that insane fanaticism, as well as the Puritan protest against the pomp and circumstance of the established hierarchy or even the complexity of its doctrine, was endemic in the Church; nor is it possible to say how much real scepticism or uneasiness of belief may have lain behind the dramatic assumption of the mask of the philosophic "opponent." But it seems clear enough that the challenge which Anselm and Abelard actually met came, not from any organised system of theology or philosophy outside the Christian Church, but from reflection and inquiry within it. And indeed both of these doctors insist that they write at the urgent request of their friends and pupils. (17)

On the question of authority and reason Abelard is precise and explicit. He repeatedly declares that authority is higher than reason, and denounces the arrogance of those who will believe nothing that they cannot understand. How could we suppose that human reason should be able to fathom divine mysteries? But, on the other hand, he is equally emphatic on the absurdity of professing to believe or to teach a proposition that has no meaning to you, or which you can only support by an appeal to blind faith. The heathen idolater would have as good a right to make that appeal in favour of his superstition

as the Christian believer has to urge it in support of his faith. Abelard does not much concern himself to reconcile these two principles or define their limits; but incidentally he indicates the line afterwards taken by Aquinas, by suggesting that the "adversaries" might perhaps say that their objection to the Christian dogmas is not that they cannot be proved by reason, but that they are contradicted by reason and cannot be defended. And, as a matter of fact, much of his theological writing is devoted to showing that Christian truth on the one hand has been "revealed," and on the other hand is not unreasonable.

But what is "revelation," and how are we to test it? To this Abelard gives no answer. He is further than any of the thinkers we are examining from seeing any necessity to vindicate the exclusive claim of the Christian Scriptures to authority. For he believes that authentic revelation is by no means confined to them. On the other hand, the doctrine of the trinity was known by revelation to the heathen philosophers, and especially to the Platonists. Indeed, Abelard finds the Trinity everywhere, even in a casual phrase of Virgil, or in the three grammatical "persons" of the verb. Socrates was one man, but he was three persons, according as he spoke, was addressed, or was spoken about. The doctrine of the Incarnation, which was necessary to salvation, was far less widely diffused by revelation. But the Sibyl proclaimed it, and so (whether consciously or unconsciously) did Virgil. Nor are we to suppose that the sages who did not proclaim it

were necessarily ignorant of it; for Job (himself a Gentile) certainly knew it, but he never proclaimed it as clearly as did the Sibyl. All these things considered, we may well have good hope that many of the Gentile philosophers accepted this crowning truth of revelation and are saved.

And again, Abelard maintains that there are certainly some, and probably many, important truths held by the Christian Church which are not to be found in the Scripture. The inspiration of the Church, rather than that of the Scripture, must be relied on for the formulating even of the doctrine of the Trinity itself.

Abelard is quite uncritical in his acceptance (from Lactantius, or wherever he can find them) of supposed Sibylline and Hermetic utterances, and he is an eager student of the Neoplatonist Macrobius (*c.* 400). Moreover, he is at great pains to harmonise the Neoplatonist and the Christian conceptions of the Trinity. The very definite grading of the former, and more especially the assertion that the *anima mundi*, which corresponds to the *Spiritus Sanctus*, is not eternal, drives him to ingeniously forced interpretations; and on the other side he agrees with Erigena in finding the *Filioque* a stumbling-block; for, in spite of his genuine desire to *be* orthodox as well as to seem so, he is at heart too much of a Platonist to get rid of the emanational conception of the Trinity, according to which the Holy Spirit must proceed from the Father *through* the Son, and in no other sense *from* the latter. Bernard was fully

justified in scenting danger and heresy in the teaching of Abelard, but he showed little enough insight or comprehension in the specific form of his charges. He declares that, whenever Abelard speaks of the Trinity, "he smacks of Arius." This reproach is a mere commonplace, and has no point at all. Had he said "smacks of Platonism," he would have hit the mark.

Again, if Abelard is in danger of dividing, or rather diluting, the Substance, when he traces Filiation and Procession, he is in more danger yet of confounding the Persons when he dwells on the unity of the Substance. For the most striking feature of his own teaching on the subject is found in his insistence upon the supreme goodness of God being set forth more adequately to our limited capacities under the three heads of Power, Wisdom, and Love than it could possibly be otherwise. Power would be blind without wisdom, wisdom would be helpless without power, and there would be no security as to the beneficent direction of wise power without love. It is needful, therefore, to dwell upon all the three aspects, power, wisdom and love, of the supremely One, in order that we may rise to the fullest conception possible to us of the perfection of the Godhead. This surely goes far towards reducing the doctrine of the Trinity to a conceptual, as opposed to a "real," distinction.

From these imperfect hints it will be sufficiently plain that, though Anselm is earlier in date than Abelard, he represents, in many respects, a later

phase of thought. Abelard has something of the breadth and discursive spaciousness that characterises much of the scholarship of the twelfth century; whereas Anselm represents the compacter and more systematised and dogmatic thought that ran side by side with it in that century, but only won its triumph over it in the scholasticism of the thirteenth. Thus Anselm may be regarded, from the logical as distinct from the chronological point of view, as the immediate precursor of Aquinas, and it is only in his writings that we find a treatment of the relations between revelation and reason that offers material for a close comparison with that of Aquinas, which we must now consider. (18)

The meanderings and digressions into which I have been betrayed in dealing with the alleged precursors of Aquinas will not be without their justification if they serve to bring into relief the admirable firmness and symmetry of the framework within which the teaching of Thomas himself is presented to us.

A vast amount of his work is done for the benefit of Christian students discussing their own system; and here every possible kind of objection that can be urged against any accepted dogma of natural or revealed religion is urged with perfect frankness, not as the contention of an opponent but as an argument that might reasonably occur to the inquirer. Sometimes the objection is based on the saying of a Christian Father, or of a Pagan philosopher. Sometimes it is embodied in a text of

Scripture. Sometimes it is a piece of direct reasoning urged on its own merits. All these objections have to be dealt with; and the axiomatic basis, in this branch of Thomas's work, is the authority of the Scriptural revelation. Now in marked contrast with Anselm, Thomas maintains that the supreme doctrines of Christianity, of which the Trinity may be taken as the type, are intrinsically and decisively beyond the range of the human faculties. Not only could our intelligence never have discovered them, but it can never prove their truth, or indeed even comprehend them—no, not even when they have been revealed to us and have been devoutly accepted by us as true. Certainly there is a wide field of religious truth that is accessible to the human mind without revelation, and that was actually arrived at by Ethnic philosophers, and this may be argued out on its own merits, though always subject to the control or confirmation of Scripture. Thus the Christian teacher, working with and for Christian students, must be prepared to show that nothing in any branch of his teaching is in contradiction with Scripture, and that all his dogmatic teaching is vouched by Scripture. But he must also show that even when inaccessible to reason, and incomprehensible, Christian dogmas do not contradict reason, for it is not to be supposed that God would actually place a garrison in our minds to defend them against the access of the truth necessary to salvation, and this would be the case if he had endowed us with an instrument for the testing of truth which flatly

rejected the saving truth itself. And we may go a little further than this; for, though our minds are incapable of grasping the mysteries of faith, yet, when we have devoutly accepted them, we can dwell with comfort and delight upon certain hints and analogies which indicate some relationship at least between our thought and the mysteries that lie beyond its reach. Only, we must be most careful not to let this edifying and exalting task of tracing out such hints and analogies degenerate into a presumptuous attempt to establish the truths themselves upon a basis of reasoning.

So far the Christian teacher in the Christian school. But in the time of Aquinas there were in truth very real and very formidable "opponents" to be dealt with. The Arabian philosophers were the representatives of an organised body of thought which was in many respects dangerous, and in some directly hostile, to Christian truth. As long as you were only dealing with the effect upon the Christian student of reading their works, it was enough to point out the fallacy of their reasoning and to confirm your argument by Scriptural authority. But Christian zeal could not rest there, and, in addition to certain minor treatises, Aquinas composed his *Contra Gentiles* expressly for the use of missionaries amongst the Mohammedan peoples. They did not accept the Christian or even the Jewish Scriptures, and it therefore became necessary to give them reasons why they should do so. How are the rival claims of the Bible and the Koran, then, to be decided? And

generally, how is the authority of the Christian revelation to be established, if it is not already accepted? Manifestly it can only be by an appeal to reason. The very revelation, then, which is to supersede reason must establish its claim to do so in the court of reason itself. This recognised necessity of establishing the basal position of the validity of the Scriptural revelation was recognised neither by Erigena, Anselm, nor Abelard; but Aquinas is forced to recognise it in connection with the existence of an organised religious philosophy, coming into contact with Christianity and hostile to it.

We can now set out and appreciate the following theses, as maintained by Aquinas:—

1. The necessity of a revelation is involved in the constitution of human nature and in its implicit promises. 2. The revelation thus demanded must (*a*) coincide over a large area with the dictates of reason, must (*b*) give assurance of truths not accessible to it, but (*c*) must never contradict it. 3. The Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments claim to contain a revelation that meets these conditions, and they can, and do, make good the claim at the bar of reason.

Our minds will be directed to these points, or to considerations that are necessary for their adequate treatment, during the next two lectures. (19)

NOTES TO LECTURE I

(1) *To page* 3.—A single illustration of the grudging recognition of their obligations to the Ethnic thinkers by the Fathers, as contrasted with the unreserved frankness of the Schoolmen, may be given as a sample. Gregory of Nyssa (fourth century) professes to extract from the order in which the creation of the elements, the plants, the animals and man is narrated in Genesis a complete psychological theory of the different grades of vitality. The theory is in fact purely Aristotelian, and it is set forth in close adherence to Aristotle's exposition in the *De anima*. But Gregory introduces it with the remark that he believes Moses to be revealing a great secret here, and to be handing down an esoteric psychological philosophy, "of which indeed Ethnic learning caught a glimpse, but without any clear discernment."

'Αλλ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δόγμά τι τῶν κεκρυμμένων παραδηλοῦν διὰ τούτων ὁ Μωϋσῆς, καὶ τὴν περὶ ψυχῆς φιλοσοφίαν δι' ἀποῤῥήτων παραδιδόναι, ἣν ἐφαντάσθη μὲν καὶ ἡ ἔξωθεν παίδευσις, οὐ μὴν τηλαυγῶς κατενόησε.—*De hominis opificio*, lib. i. cap. 8 (tom. i. p. 59 B).*

* *Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Episcopi Nysseni Opera*, Greek and Latin, 3 vols., Paris, 1638.

When Thomas deals with the same subject his references, as well as those in the objections he has to meet, are direct to Aristotle; and no mention at all is made of Scripture, except incidentally of a passage in Ecclesiasticus (xl. 22).—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 78 (Leon., v. 250 * *sqq.*), and elsewhere.

(2) *To page* 4.—Some account of the transmigrations and transformations of Aristotelianism and the special work of Avicenna in the harmonising (and so warping) the Platonic and the Aristotelian doctrines concerning the *universalia* will be found in my *Dante and Aquinas* (London, 1913), chapter iii. *Cf. also* pp. 32 *sqq.*, 76 *sqq.*, in this volume.

(3) *To page* 6.—An instance of Albert's repudiation of responsibility for Aristotle's views occurs at the close of the *De animalibus.*

"Jam expletus est liber *Animalium*, et in ipso expletum est totum opus naturarum, in quo sic moderamen tenui, quod dicta Peripateticorum prout melius potui, exposui: nec aliquis in eo potest deprehendere quid ego ipse sentiam in philosophia naturali: sed quicunque dubitat, comparet hæc quæ

* Citations from the *Summa Theologiae* follow the text of the Leonine edition, begun as *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis O.P. Opera omnia* in 1882, at Rome, under the auspices of Leo XIII. Unfortunately no further volumes have appeared since the twelfth in 1906. The twelve volumes contain introductory matter, some of the Aristotelian commentaries, and the *Summa Theologiae* alone. Page references to this edition are distinguished as "Leon." All other page references to the works of Aquinas are to the Parma edition in twenty-five volumes, 1852–1873.

in nostris libris dicta sunt, dictis Peripateticorum, et tunc reprehendat, vel consentiat, me dicens scientiæ ipsorum fuisse interpretem et expositorem: si autem non legens et comparans reprehenderit, tunc constat ex odio eum reprehendere, vel ex ignorantia: et ego talium hominum parum curo reprehensiones" (vol. xii. 582). Cf. *Metaphysicorum*, lib. xi. tract. ii. cap. 1 (vol. vi. 609b); and the remarkable outburst at the close of the *Politica* (vol. viii. 803).*

(4) *To page* 21.—No attempt will be made here to give a catena of passages from Aristotle in illustration or justification of the summary of his teaching presented in the text, but special attention may be called to Book viii. of the *Physics*, Book ii. of the *De caelo*, and Book xi. (xii.) of the *Metaphysics* for the important and often neglected subject of the animated heavens. We shall meet with this theory again from time to time in other connections. It is related to the "argument from motion" for the existence of God (*vide* p. 281). Further *cf. infra* pp. 72 *sqq.* and the footnote on p. 394.

The most important passages as to the human νοῦς and its relation to the noëtic principle of the cosmos occur in the third book of the *De anima* and in the *De generatione animalium*, lib. ii. cap. 3, but it will be more suitable to speak of them later on. *Vide* pp. 449 *sqq.*

* *B. Alberti Magni Ratisbonensis Episcopi O.P. Opera omnia*, 38 vols., Paris, 1890–1899.

(5) *To page* 28.—Compare, for example, "Si cui sileat tumultus carnis, sileant phantasiae terrae et aquarum et aeris, sileant et poli" (Augustine, *Confessiones*, ix. 10) with ἥσυχον δὲ αὐτῇ ἔστω μὴ μόνον τὸ περικείμενον σῶμα καὶ ὁ τοῦ σώματος κλύδων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶν τὸ περιέχον· ἥσυχος μὲν γῆ, ἥσυχος δὲ θάλασσα καὶ ἀὴρ, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀμύμων.—Plotinus, *Enn.*, v. lib. i. cap. 2. Ed. Didot (p. 299, lines 15–19).

But note that the echo is only verbal. The *silentia* of Augustine is the fading of all sense-impressions in the presence of an intense spiritual experience. The ἡσυχία of Plotinus is the inertia of soulless matter. For Plotinus is not here speaking, as Augustine is, of communion with the Supreme, but of the effort of the individual ψυχή of a man to realise that the cosmic ψυχή (of which it is a self-alienated fragment,) is the creator, and therefore the superior, of heaven and earth. Let a man think of all nature, and the heaven itself, in lifeless stagnation, and then let him think of life (ψυχή) flowing in and making the dead heaven "a living being, blessed and eternal," and he will understand how his own ψυχή is more to be wondered at than all the material creation. Yet even the cosmic ψυχή, (the third member of the graded Plotinian trinity,*) is, in its turn, dependent on the νοῦς, which is greater than it, and is itself again subordinate to the τελειότοτον.

We must be perpetually on our guard against assuming that identity, or even conscious adopting, of phrases necessarily implies identity of doctrine

* *Cf.* p. 335.

or experience, or involves a lower grade of sincerity or directness of vision on the part of the later writer.

For this and further parallels consult the Rev. W. Montgomery's paper on "S. Augustine and Plotinus: Points of Contact, with Special Reference to Mysticism," in the fourth volume of *Transactions* (1912–14) printed for "members only" of the London Society for the Study of Religion.

On Augustine's Platonism, *vide* note (11), p. 87.

(6) *To page* 31.—I give the passage in Bernard, in which (as I think) these echoes may be heard, *in extenso*, and three quotations from Maximus that occur in Erigena's *De divisione naturae*:

"Delectabit sane non tam nostra, vel sopita necessitas, vel sortita felicitas, quam quod eius in nobis, et de nobis voluntas adimpleta videbitur: quod et quotidie postulamus in oratione, cum dicimus: *Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo, et in terra.* O amor sanctus et castus! o dulcis et suavis affectio! o pura et defaecata intentio voluntatis! eo certe defaecatior et purior, quo in ea de proprio nil iam admixtum relinquitur: eo suavior et dulcior, quo totum divinum est quod sentitur. Sic affici deificari est. Quomodo stilla aquae modica, multo infusa vino, deficere a se tota videtur, dum et saporem vini induit et colorem; et quomodo ferrum ignitum et candens igni simillimum fit, pristina propriaque exutum forma; et quomodo solis luce perfusus aër in eandem transformatur

luminis claritatem, adeo ut non tam illuminatus, quam ipsum lumen esse videatur: sic omnem tunc in sanctis humanam affectionem quodam ineffabili modo necesse erit a semet ipsa liquescere, atque in dei penitus transfundi voluntatem. Alioquin quomodo omnia in omnibus erit deus, si in homine de homine quicquam supererit?"—*De diligendo Deo*, cap. 10 [sec. 28].

Maximus, as quoted by Erigena:

"Sicut enim aer a sole illuminatus nihil aliud videtur esse nisi lux, non quia sui naturam perdat, sed quia lux in eo praevaleat, ut id ipsum lucis esse aestimetur; sic humana natura Deo adjuncta, Deus per omnia dicitur esse, non quod desinat esse [humana] natura, sed quod Divinitatis participationem accipiat, ut solus in ea Deus esse videatur." —*De divisione naturae*, lib. i. cap. 10 (450 A).*

"Nam cum ferrum conflatum in igne in liquorem solvitur, nihil de natura ejus remanere sensibus videtur, sed totum in igneam qualitatem vertitur. Sola vero ratione suam naturam quamvis liquefactam servare cognoscitur."—*Ib.* (451 A, B).

"Non stat, quousque fiat totum in toto amato, et a toto comprehendatur, libenter totum secundum voluntatem, salutarem accipiens circumscriptionem, ut totum toto afficiatur circumscribente, ut nihil omnino restet velle ex seipso seipsum totum cognoscere valendo circumscriptum, sed ex circumscribente,

* The page references in brackets are to *Joannis Scoti Opera*. Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, cxxii. The bracketed *humana* is in the text.

sicut aer per totum illuminatur lumine, et igne ferrum totum toto liquefactum." — *Ib.*, 70 (515 B, C).*

(7) *To pages* 23–32. — Citations from authors mentioned in this section illustrating the negative theology will be found on pages 288 *sqq.*

(8) *To page* 34.—It should be noted that Aristotle himself was not, and would naturally not be, aware of any affinity whatever between his deities and Plato's Ideas, for in the *Timæus* Plato has a long passage about the demiurgic gods and the animated heavenly bodies, in which he represents them all as created and subordinate beings, perfectly distinct from the uncreated and eternal noëtic order of Ideas, of which they were a kind of copy. Aristotle would see perfectly well that his doctrine dealt with the same subject, but he dissevered it from any theory either of creation or of imitation of a prototype. Nowhere less than here would he seem to himself to be approximating to the doctrine of Ideas.

(9) *To page* 36.—The following notes on the heavenly spheres and their relation to Intelligences will give precision to the indications contained in the text.

* All these passages are given by Erigena expressly as quotations from Maximus, but in *Sancti Patris Nostri Maximi Confessoris Opera* (Migne, *Pat. Graec.*, xc., xci.) I have only succeeded in tracing the last. It is in the *Ambiguorum liber* (xci. 1073 D–1076 A).

i. *Aristotle and Aquinas*

Aristotle's own conclusions cannot be more clearly and concisely formulated than in the following summary of them by Aquinas:

"Bonum enim simpliciter et absolute non cadit sub apprehensione sensus, sed solius intellectus. Unde relinquitur quod primum mobile appetit primum movens appetitu intellectuali. Ex quo potest concludi, quod primum mobile sit appetens et intelligens. Et cum nihil moveatur nisi corpus, potest concludi, quod primum mobile sit corpus animatum anima intellectuali. Non autem solum primum mobile, quod est primum caelum, movetur motu aeterno, sed etiam omnes inferiores orbes caelestium corporum: unde et unumquodque caelestium corporum animatum est propria anima, et unumquodque habet suum appetibile separatum, quod est proprius finis sui motus."—Opusc. xiv., *De angelorum natura*, cap. 2 (vol. xvi. 185a).

Aristotle's system required comparatively little modification in order to become acceptable to Aquinas. Scientifically indeed Aquinas accepted the Ptolemaic astronomy, with its nine concentric spheres and superimposed epicycles, whereas Aristotle followed the earlier more complicated (though in some respects more symmetrical) system of Eudoxus with its twenty-seven or more concentric spheres. But this difference did not touch the Aristotelian principle that every "proper" spherical motion, as well as the motion common to them all,

implies the existence of a spiritual and immaterial being who causes it. And this conclusion was accepted by Aquinas. Again: Aristotle, as we have seen, considered that each sphere was itself an animated being, and was also actuated by a yearning both towards the supreme spiritual being and towards the special spiritual being that inspired its own "proper" motion; whereas Aquinas is content simply to say that each sphere is moved by an angel.

To Aquinas, therefore, this angel (probably belonging to the order of Virtues) represents alike the Aristotelian "soul" of the animated sphere, and the divine being that inspires its special longing. But the nature of the dependence of all these subordinate immaterial beings upon the supreme being is not defined by Aristotle, whereas Aquinas in calling them angels thereby pronounces them to be "creatures"—created by the one sole deity, therefore, "out of nothing." The question still remains, however, whether they can be called the "souls" of the spheres.

On this matter Thomas frequently expresses himself in hesitating language. There is nothing inconsistent with Christian truth in regarding the heavens as animated, and, if they are, then their "souls" are to be regarded as ranking with the angels. But in spite of this guarded language there is nothing vague in his actual belief. The relation of the human body to the soul is twofold. It supplies, through the senses, the material on which the intelligent faculty of the soul works, and it furnishes the instrument through which the soul expresses itself and

acts upon what is outside itself. The sphere stands in this second or instrumental relation to the angel who guides it, but not in the other. The only question is whether this real but imperfect analogy justifies us in calling the sphere an animated being with an angelic "soul" or life.

On the motor angels as probably of the order of Virtues, we have:

"Proprium officium Virtutum esse videtur corpora caelestia movere, quae sunt causa eorum quae in natura inferiori aguntur: et hoc etiam ipsum nomen sonat, quia *Virtutes caelorum* dicuntur."—4 *Dist.*, xlviii. q. 1: a. 4, solutio 3 (vol. vii. 1172a).

And:

"Decimus septimus articulus est, an Angeli moventes orbes sint de numero virtutum.

"Videtur mihi quod satis probabiliter hoc dici possit: nec video quid inconveniens inde sequatur, cum et Origenes exponens illud Matth. 24, *Virtutes caelorum commovebuntur*, dicat, quod 'Conveniens est caelorum rationabiles virtutes pati stuporem remotas a primis functionibus suis.' Hoc tamen omnino asserendum non videtur."—*Responsio ad Magistrum Joannem de Vercellis*, art. 17 (vol. xvi. 165b).

On the animation of the heavens:

"Ipsae enim animae caelestium corporum, si tamen sint animata, inter angelos sunt connumerandae, ut Augustinus definit in Enchyridion."—*De angelorum natura* (Opusc. xiv.), cap. 1 *ad fin.* (vol. xvi. 184b).

In answer to the Question: *Utrum caelum sit animatum.*

"Respondeo dicendum, quod de hoc diversimode sentiunt doctores Ecclesiae. . . . Ego autem dico . . . quod non refert ad fidem, utrum sic vel aliter sit."—*Quodlibet* xii. art. 8 (vol. ix. 622b), and many other passages.

But:

"Dicere autem ulterius, quod corpora caelestia hoc modo sint animata sicut inferiora corpora quae per animam vegetantur et sensificantur, repugnat incorruptibilitati caelestium corporum. . . . Non est tamen negandum corpora caelestia esse animata, si per animationem nihil aliud intelligatur quam unio motoris ad mobile."—*De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 6 (vol. viii. 446a).

Compare:

"Intellectualis autem operatio, cum non exerceatur per corpus, non indiget corpore nisi inquantum ei per sensus ministrantur phantasmata. Operationes autem sensitivae animae corporibus caelestibus non conveniunt, ut dictum est. Sic igitur propter operationem intellectualem, anima caelesti corpori non uniretur.

"Relinquitur ergo quod propter solam motionem."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 70: a. 3. c. (Leon., v. 180b).

ii. *Avicenna and Averrhoes.*

(*a*) *Avicenna*

Avicenna, like Aquinas, adopts the Ptolemaic astronomy, but in other respects he keeps closer to Aristotle; for he distinguishes between the soul of

each sphere and the Intelligence that inspires it with longing.

Far more important that any such detail, however, is the Neoplatonic spirit in which he treats the relations of the subordinate intelligences to the Supreme. Whereas Aristotle inferred the existence of the hierarchy of intelligences from the observed movements of the heavens, Avicenna arrives at the conception of the supreme Existent by a metaphysical analysis of what existence itself implies; and then attempts to show that, by some metaphysical, logical or natural necessity, this supreme Existent must inevitably flow down, immediately or mediately, into successive triads of material heaven, celestial soul, and sejunct Intelligence, through all the nine spheres down to its ultimate action upon the elemental world of matter.

Now, this is the method by which Plotinus evolved his Trinity of the Existent, Intelligence, and Life (as to which see p. 335), and the correspondence between that Trinity and the first three members of Avicenna's hierarchy is close. Thus we find in Avicenna the Neoplatonic theory of emanation applied to the Ptolemaic astronomy and to the Aristotelian conception of the animated heavens whose movements are determined by immaterial beings.* The primal being alone is intrinsically

* Thus Dante could regard Platonic "Ideas," Aristotelian Motor Intelligences, Christian Angels, and Pagan Gods as varied conceptions or misconceptions of the same beings.—*Convivio*, trattato ii. cap. 5, ll. 1–51, and elsewhere.

"necessary." But it causes or involves the necessity of all else.

"Postquam autem nihil preter ipsum est necesse esse: tunc ipsum est principium debendi esse omne quod est . . . debito primario vel mediante alio."—*Meta.*, viii. 4 (folio 98 *verso* b).*

Hence it is the supreme Intelligence:

"Ipse enim intelligit res simul ita: ut per eas non multiplicetur in sua substantia: nec ut imaginetur certitudo sue essentie esse hoc quod ipse imaginet eas: sed quod fluunt forme eorum ab eo intellecto: unde ipse aptior est ad hoc ut sit intelligentia quam ipse forme fluentes a sua intelligibilitate: et quod ipse intelligit seipsum: et quod ipse est principium omnis quod est."—*Ib.*, 7 (f. 100 *v.* b).

From this absolute Unity only One can flow: "Nosti etiam quod ex uno secundum quod est unum non est nisi unum."—*Meta.*, ix. 4 (f. 104 *v.* b, *circ. med.*).

That One is the first of the subordinate Intelligences. But it is no longer a simple unity; for in itself it is a mere potentiality, since it derives its necessity from the prime Existent. In its consciousness, then, of the Prime, its consciousness of itself, and its consciousness of the potentiality of its own nature, actualised only by the Prime, lies a *ternitas*, in virtue of which there flow from it (i.) a subordinate

* The extracts from Avicenna are taken from the Venice edition of 1508, Scotus. *Avicenne perhupatetici philosophi . . . opera in lucem redacta: ac nuper quantum ars niti potuit per canonicos emendata.*

I have expanded the contractions, but have preserved the spelling and system of punctuation. The text has been corrected with the aid of the Bodleian MS., Digby 217.

Intelligence, (ii.) the form or soul of the first heaven, and (iii.) the "corporeitas," which together with the soul constitutes that heaven in its completeness:

"Unde oportet ut possibilitas essendi hec tria sit ab illa intelligentia prima in creatione* propter ternitatem que est nominata in ea: et nobile sequitur ex nobiliore multis modis: igitur ex prima intelligentia inquantum intelligit primum sequitur esse † alterius intelligentie inferioris ea: et inquantum intelligit seipsam: sequitur ex ea forma celi ultimi:‡ et ejus perfectio: et hec est anima: et propter naturam essendi possibilem que est ejus . . . est esse corporeitatis celi ultimi que est contenta in totalitate celi ultimi."—*Ib.* (f. 104 *v.* b, 105a).

In the first number of this triad, viz. the Intelligence, rests the power of giving rise to a second triad, and so on to a third and fourth, and finally to the triad of the Lunar heaven (i.) Intelligence, (ii.) soul, and (iii.) "corporeitas."

But in these successive triads the respective Intelligences are successively different and inferior in their nature, so that the process of emanation has a natural termination, and when we come to the Intelligence that determines the motions of the

* *prima in creatione* is an inaccurate expression for the first emanation. There is no room for the conception of "creation" at all in Avicenna's philosophy.

† *esse* here and in countless passages of the Schoolmen is a substantive. "The existence of an Intelligence lower than itself follows from the prime (derivative) Intelligence in so far as it contemplates the prime Existence."

‡ *ultimum* here means "furthest from *us*." The same word is used in a subsequent passage to mean "remotest from the Prime."

Lunar heaven we find that the emanations to which it gives rise are (i.) immaterial human souls, (ii.) specific forms, and (iii.) the elements, capable of receiving the impress of the forms.

"Et sequitur semper intelligentia post intelligentiam: quousque fiat spera lune: et deinde fiant elementa et aptantur recipere impressionem unam in speciem multiplicatam numero ab intelligentia ultima."—*Meta.*, ix. 4 *ad fin.* (f. 105b).

"Non est autem dubium hoc esse intelligentias simplices separatas [*i.e.* souls] que fiunt cum factura corporum humanorum que non corrumpuntur: sed permanent. Jam autem hoc manifestum est in scientiis naturalibus quod nec proveniunt a principio primo: eo quod multe sunt: quamvis sunt una in specie. Sed quia fiunt: sunt causate primi mediante aliquo."—*Ib.* (a, b).

Now this Intelligence, which determines the movements of the Lunar heaven, is no other than the *Intellectus* (or *Intelligentia*) *agens* (on which see p. 381). It is the light in which our human intelligence can perceive the spiritual and general realities that lie, dissipated and obscured, behind the individual and material phenomena of the illusory world of the senses.

Inasmuch as our individual souls are derived from the prime Existent through a chain of immaterial Intelligences, they are themselves immaterial. The noëtic world is their natural element, and their true blessedness lies in spiritual or intellectual delights, and in them alone. But as long as they are im-

prisoned in bodies they are subject to manifold distractions and illusions. Each soul indeed retains the faculty of the *intellectus materialis* (corresponding to the *intellectus possibilis* of the Schoolmen), which even on earth can be to some extent informed or actualised by the *Intelligentia agens*, and can rise thus into contact with its natural element of the noëtic world. But it is only after death and delivery from the body and its senses that our souls can complete their union with the *Intelligentia agens* and so, mediately, with the prime Existent:

"Dicemus quod anima humana prius est intelligens in potentia: deinde fit intelligens in effectu. Omne autem quod exit de potentia ad effectum: non exit nisi per causam: que habet illud in effectu: et extrahit ad illum: ergo hec [the *Intelligentia agens*] est causa per quam anime nostre in rebus intelligibilibus exeunt de potentia ad effectum. Sed causa dandi formam intelligibilem non est nisi intelligentia in effectu: penes quam sunt principia formarum intelligibilium abstractarum. Cujus comparatio ad animas nostras est sicut comparatio solis ad visus nostros: . . . virtus enim rationalis cum considerat singula: que sunt in imaginatione: et illuminatur luce intelligentie agentis in nos: . . . fiunt * nuda a materia et ab ejus penditiis et imprimuntur in anima rationali . . . quia ex consideratione eorum aptatur anima: ut emanet in eam ab intelligentia agente abstractio."—*De anima*, v. 5 (f. 25b).

"Cum autem anima liberabitur a corpore: et ab

* *sc.* singula.

accidentibus corporis: tunc poterit conjungi intelligentie agenti: et tunc inveniet in ea pulcritudinem intelligibilem: et delectationem perennem."—*Ib.*, 6 (f. 26 *v.* a).

"Dico igitur quod sua perfectio anime rationalis est ut fiat seculum intelligibile et describatur in ea forma totius: et ordo intelligibilis in toto: et bonitas fluens in esse: et ut incipiens a principio totius procedat ad substantias excellentiores spiritales absolute: et deinde ad spiritales pendentes aliquo modo ex corporibus . . . et deinde ut hec omnia sint descripta in anima secundum dispositiones et vires eorum: quousque perficiatur in ea dispositio esse universitatis: et sic transeat in seculum intellectum instar esse totius mundi: cernens id quod est pulcritudo absolute: et bonitas absolute: et decor verus fiat unum cum ea insculpta * exemplo eius: et dispositione eius et incedens secundum viam eius conversa in similitudinem substantie eius."—*Meta.*, ix. 7 (f. 107a).

(*b*) *Averrhoes*

In his doctrine of the animated spheres Averrhoes is far less metaphysical and more Aristotelian than Avicenna. He will have nothing to say to any Intelligence higher than the immaterial mover of the first heaven.

"Quod autem Moderni dicunt substantiam primam

* I understand this to refer to the *anima*, but the construction appears to pass from the ablative to the nominative. The soul is "impressed by the model and disposition of the *decor verus*, treads on its path, and is transformed into the likeness of its being."

esse priorem motore totius, falsum est; quælibet enim substantia istarum est principium substantiae sensibilis secundum motorem, et secundum finem."*—*Meta.*, xii. 44, *com.* (vol. viii. 327 H).†

He discusses the question of the number of the Intelligences in an Aristotelian spirit; but agrees with Avicenna in the very un-Aristotelian conception of the identity of the *Intellectus agens* with the object of the Lunar sphere's desire.

"Intellectus autem agens ordinatur ex ultimo horum in ordine: et ponamus ipsum esse motorem orbis Lunae."—*Epitome in libros Meta.*, Tractatus 4 (vol. viii. 393 H). He goes a step further than Avicenna, however, in making the *Intellectus materialis*, as well as the *agens*, an impersonal principle, or Intelligence, not a faculty of the individual human soul. The individual man, however, has a faculty, the seat or organ of which is the mid-chamber of the brain, which differentiates him from the brute beasts and enables him to effect a *continuatio*, or contact, with the *Intellectus agens* and the *Intellectus materialis*. This faculty is the *intellectus passibilis*, or *virtus cogitativa*, and its positive acquisitions constitute the *intellectus adeptus*, *factus* or *speculativus* of the individual man. The *intellectus passibilis*, and with it the personality, perishes with the dissolution of the brain at death, and so, though the human race

* *I.e.* either as its moving soul, or as the object of its desire.

† The page references are to the Venice edition of 1574–5. It is usual to distinguish a division of the Aristotelian text and the commentary thereon in the form 44 *text.* and 44 *com.*

is eternal, there is no immortality for the individual. But while he lives he may indefinitely increase the acquired store of his *intellectus adeptus*, and with it the area of his assimilation to the *Intellectus agens*, in which the "generals" (= the Platonic ideas) are actualities. Theoretically he might make this assimilation complete, and it would appear that Aristotle, at any rate, did so:

"Intellectus materialis est unus in numero in omnibus individuis hominum, non generabilis neque corruptibilis."—*De anima*, iii. 5, *com.*, in the section *secundæ quæstionis examinatio* (vol. vi. 146 F).*

"Et per istum intellectum, quem vocat Aristoteles passibilem, diversantur homines. . . . Et per istum intellectum differt homo ab aliis animalibus, et, si non, tunc necesse esset ut continuatio intellectus agentis et recipientis [= materialis] cum animalibus esset eodem modo."—*De anima*, iii. 20, *com. ad fin.* (vol. vi. 165 E).

"Et jam diximus quod virtus cogitativa non est intellectus materialis . . . sed est virtus particularis . . . quam Aristoteles vocavit intellectum passibilem,† et dixit eam esse generabilem et corruptibilem, et hoc est manifestum de ea, cum habet instrumentum terminatum, scilicet medium ventriculum cerebri."—*Ib.*, 33, *com. ad fin.* (173 C). *Cf.* pp. 452, 454 *sq.*

* This is the celebrated doctrine of the "Unity of the intellect" so constantly and scornfully attacked by Albert and Thomas.

[*N.B.*—In my copy, and probably in others, the portion of vol. vi. containing the *De anima* is bound up in vol. ix.]

† *Passibilem* (sic lege). The *possibilem* in the edition cited is a misprint. *Cf.* p. 453, *note*.

"Opinandum est quod in anima sunt tres partes intellectus. Quarum una est intellectus recipiens [= materialis]. Secunda autem est efficiens [= agens]. Tertia autem factum. Et duæ istarum trium sunt æternæ, scilicet agens et recipiens: tertia autem est generabilis et corruptibilis uno modo [in the individual], æterna autem alio modo [in the race]. . . . Species humana est æterna."—*Ib.*, 5, *com.* (149 E, F).

"Necesse est ut intellectus agens copuletur nobiscum per continuationem intellectorum speculativorum.

"Et manifestum est, quando omnia intellecta speculativa fuerint existentia in nobis in potentia, quod ipse erit copulatus nobiscum in potentia, et cum omnia intellecta speculativa fuerint existentia in nobis in actu, erit ipse tunc copulatus in nobis in actu, et cum quædam fuerint in potentia, et quædam in actu, tunc ipse erit copulatus secundum partem, et secundum partem non: et tunc dicimur moveri ad continuationem. Et manifestum est, cum iste motus complebitur, quod statim iste intellectus copulabitur nobiscum omnibus modis. . . . Et, cum ita sit, necesse est ut homo intellegat per intellectum sibi proprium omnia entia. . . .

"Homo igitur secundum hunc modum . . . assimilatur Deo in hoc, quod est omnia entia quoquo modo, et sciens ea quoquo modo."—*Ib.*, 36, *com. ad fin.* (185 F, 186 A, B, C).

"Si sermo Aristotelis non inveniretur in eo [*i.e.* as to the question of the soul as a *tabula rasa*], tunc valde esset difficile cadere super ipsum, aut forte

impossibile, nisi inveniretur aliquis talis ut Aristoteles. Credo enim quod iste homo fuerit regula in natura, et exemplar, quod natura invenit ad demonstrandum ultimam perfectionem humanam in materiis."—*Ib.*, 14, *com.* (159 D). Consult further Lecture v. and notes, pp. 381 *sqq.*, 452 *sqq.*

(10) *To page* 38.—Aquinas and the Platonic Ideas.

"Plato enim posuit omnium rerum species separatas; et quod ab eis individua denominantur, quasi species separatas participando; ut puta quod Socrates dicitur homo secundum ideam hominis separatam. Et . . . ponebat ideam hominis et equi separatam, quam vocabat *per se hominem* et *per se equum*. . . . Et quamvis haec opinio irrationabilis videatur quantum ad hoc, quod ponebat species rerum naturalium separatas per se subsistentes, ut Aristoteles multipliciter probat," etc.—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 6: a. 4. c. (Leon., iv. 70). But compare p. 328, last citation.

"Plato enim posuit formas quae sunt in materia corporali, derivari et formari a formis sine materia subsistentibus, per modum participationis cuiusdam. Ponebat enim hominem quendam immaterialiter subsistentem, et similiter equum, et sic de aliis, ex quibus constituuntur haec singularia sensibilia, secundum quod in materia corporali remanet quaedam impressio ab illis formis separatis, per modum assimilationis cuiusdam, quam *participationem* vocabat. Et secundum ordinem formarum ponebant Platonici ordinem substantiarum separatarum; puta quod una substantia separata est quae est equus, quae est causa

omnium equorum; supra quam est quaedam vita separata, quam dicebant per se vitam et causam omnis vitae; et ulterius quandam quam nominabant ipsum esse, et causam omnis esse. . . . Sed, sicut probat Aristoteles in vii. *Metaphys.* id quod proprie fit, est compositum: formae autem corruptibilium rerum habent ut aliquando sint, aliquando non sint, absque hoc quod ipsae generentur aut corrumpantur, sed compositis generatis aut corruptis: quia etiam formae non habent esse, sed composita habent esse per eas; sic enim alicui competit fieri, sicut et esse." —*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 65: a. 4. c. (Leon., v. 152).

"Videtur esse alienum a fide quod formae rerum extra res per se subsistant absque materia, sicut Platonici posuerunt, dicentes *per se vitam*, aut *per se sapientiam* esse quasdam substantias creatrices."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 84: a. 5. c. (Leon., v. 322a).

(11) *To page* 39.—The question is raised in the *Summa Theologiae*:

"*Utrum anima intellectiva cognoscat res materiales in rationibus aeternis.*"

The negative answer is supported by the contention:

"Rationes aeternae nihil aliud sunt quam ideae: dicit enim Augustinus, in libro *Octoginta trium Quaest.*, quod *ideae sunt rationes stabiles rerum in mente divina existentes.* Si ergo dicatur quod anima intellectiva cognoscit omnia in rationibus aeternis, redibit opinio Platonis, qui posuit omnem scientiam ab ideis derivari."

Aquinas replies that Augustine, knowing that Plato's doctrine of ideas was counter to the faith, endeavoured to modify it in the right direction; but did not mean to give the *rationes stabiles* any such degree of independent existence, even in the divine mind, as is implied by the objector:

"Augustinus, qui doctrinis Platonicorum imbutus fuerat, si qua invenit fidei accommoda in eorum dictis, assumpsit; quae vero invenit fidei nostrae adversa, in melius commutavit."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 84: a. 5. ob. 3. and c. (Leon., v. 321b *sq.*).

Augustine gives *light* "the first place amongst bodies," whereas it is not really a "body" at all. On which Aquinas comments:

"Nihilominus Augustinus non intendit hoc asserere, quasi fidei conveniens, sed sicut utens his quae philosophiam addiscens audierat."—2 *Dist.*, xiii. q. 1: a. 3. ad 1^{m} (vol. vi. 501a).

Augustine maintained *quod anima quaedam sentit non per corpus, immo sine corpore, ut est timor et huiusmodi*, which is bad Aristotelian psychology; for it is only the purely intellectual, not the passionate, functioning of the soul that is independent of a bodily organ. On this Aquinas remarks:

"Opinio Platonis fuit quod sentire est operatio animae propria, sicut et intelligere. In multis autem quae ad philosophiam pertinent, Augustinus utitur opinionibus Platonis, non asserendo, sed recitando."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 77: a. 5. ob. 3. and ad 3^{m} (Leon., v. 244, 245b).

Compare q. 84: a. 6. ad 2^{m} (Leon., v. 324b), where

Augustine's similar attitude towards the *imaginatio* is dealt with in the same way.

(12) *To page* 40.—According to Augustine we may speculatively hold any opinion as to the meaning of Scripture on questions that come within the range of human investigation, unless such opinion has been demonstrated not to be true (*donec veritate certissima refellatur*), but if it is conclusively proved to be false we must no longer believe it to be what Scripture meant:

"Non hoc habebat divina Scriptura, sed hoc senserat humana ignorantia."

We must be very cautious, therefore, in committing ourselves as to the meaning of Scripture in such matters. Rash and ignorant Christians have done much harm in this way:

"Turpe est autem nimis et perniciosum ac maxime cavendum, ut Christianum de his rebus quasi secundum Christianas litteras loquentem, ita delirare quilibet infedelis audiat, ut (quemadmodum dicitur) toto cælo errare conspiciens, risum tenere vix possit."

It is well, therefore, to keep plenty of alternatives open:

"Ut quidquid ipsi [the cavillers] de natura rerum veracibus documentis demonstrare potuerint, ostendamus nostris litteris non esse contrarium."—*De Genesi ad litteram*, lib. i. cap. 19–21 [sec. 39–41] (first part of vol. iii. 129–131). *Cf.* p. 210.

(13) *To page* 45.—The theological tracts of Boetius are continued in Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, lxiv. 1247 *sqq.*

Their authenticity, long and not unnaturally disputed, was established by the discovery in a Reichenau MS. of a direct testimony cited from a lost work of Cassiodorus, the contemporary of Boetius himself, "scripsit librum de sancta trinitate et capita quaedam dogmatica et librum contra Nestorium." Vide *Anecdoton Holderi*, et cet., von Hermann Usener, p. 4, Leipzig, 1877.

The design to translate, expound and harmonise the works of Plato and Aristotle is announced in the introduction to the second book of the *De interpretatione* (translation and commentary), *Editio secunda* (Migne, lxiv. 433 C, D).

N.B.—It is in the *Consolatio*, not in any of the theological tracts, that Boetius gives us the celebrated definition of Eternity which became classical in the schools: "Æternitas est, interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio" (lib. v. prosa 6).

(14) *To pages* 45–50.—Erigena.

The passage cited on p. 46, in view of its importance, is here given in the original:

"Nulla itaque auctoritas te terreat ab his, quae rectae contemplationis rationabilis suasio edocet. Vera enim auctoritas rectae rationi non obstitit, neque recta ratio verae auctoritati. Ambo siquidem ex uno fonte, divina scilicet sapientia, manare dubium non est. . . .

"Auctoritas siquidem ex vera ratione processit, ratio vero nequaquam ex auctoritate. Omnis enim auctoritas quae vera ratione non approbatur, infirma videtur

esse. Vera autem ratio, quoniam suis virtutibus rata atque immutabilis munitur, nullius auctoritatis astipulatione roborari indiget. Nil enim aliud mihi videtur esse vera auctoritas, nisi rationis virtute reperta veritas, et a sanctis Patribus ad posteritatis utilitatem literis commendata."—*De div. nat.*, lib. i. capp. 66, 69 (Migne, cxxii. 511 B, 513 B).

For Erigena on the theology of negation, *vide* p. 291 ; for his views on the problem of evil, p. 306 ; on materiality and substantiality, p. 402, note; on the Trinity, p. 348 ; and on God as not "intelligible" to himself, p. 460.

The citations that follow demonstrate his far-going Platonism or Neoplatonism, the inroads it made on his orthodoxy, and the hold which, in spite of all, the tradition still retained on him.

His belief in the illusory nature of all material phenomena is pronounced. They are but echoes or reflections of the causal and seminal realities. They had no place in the creation, and will have none in the resurrection.

"Visibilium et sensibilium corporum moles et species resurrecturas non dicimus, sed, ut saepe inter nos convenerat, in suas causas et rationes, quae in homine factae sunt, in resurrectione hominis cum homine et in homine reversuras, in quibus plus animalia omnia dicenda sunt animalia esse, quam in ipsis effectibus corporeis ac sensibilibus. Ubi enim subsistunt, ibi veraciter animalia sunt Similiter de omnibus sensibilibus, sive caelestibus sive terrenis, intelligendum. Omnia siquidem, quae

locis temporibusque variantur, corporeisque sensibus succumbunt, non ipsae res substantiales vereque existentes, sed ipsarum rerum vere existentium quaedam transitoriae imagines et resultationes intelligenda sunt. Cujus rationis exemplum est vox ejusque imago, quae a Graecis ἠχώ vocatur, seu corpora ipsorumque umbrae, quae sive in puro aëre formatae, sive de aquis, sive de qualicunque re, unde solent resultare, resultant: quae cuncta non res, sed falsae rerum imagines probantur esse. Itaque sicut imagines vocum umbraeque corporum per se non subsistunt, quia substantia non sunt: sic corpora ista sensibilia veluti rerum subsistentium quaedam similitudines sunt, et per se subsistere nesciunt. Nam et humana corpora, quae nunc localiter distenduntur, incrementis decrementisque variantur et moventur, species quoque eorum, sive generales illae, quas omnia corpora humana participant, sive speciales, quibus singulorum corporum quantitas circumscribitur, in resurrectione futura non erunt, sed in spiritualem naturam, quae locis temporibusque, propriis quoque speciebus, quae ex qualitate et quantitate sumuntur, nescit circumscribi, transituras esse naturalis ratio edocet. Hoc autem dicimus non praescribendo sententias eorum,qui aliter de resurrectione corporum omnino disputant."—*Ib.*, lib. v. cap. 25 (913 D.–914 B).

Erigena's doctrine of the fall of man illustrates the violent exegesis by which he forces Scripture into harmony with his view. Man was first created "in the image of God" collectively and sexless, and in that state he fell. The differentiation of the sexes

followed as a consequence, and is irreconcilably opposed to the unfallen state "*in imagine Dei.*" In the verse in Genesis (i. 27): *Ad imaginem Dei creavit illum: masculum et feminam creavit eos*, the first clause is referred to the original creation, and the second to the differentiation subsequent to the fall.

"Praefati itaque magni theologi* [*sc.* Greg. Nyss., *De hominis opificio*, cap. 17 (vol. i. 90 B *sqq.*)] verba quae a te [*sc.* discipulo] introducta sunt, nil aliud videntur suadere, quam ut hominem intelligamus solo animo et virtutibus ei naturaliter insitis ad imaginem Dei factum—insunt autem ei sapientia, scientia, ratiocinandi virtus, ceteraeque virtutes, quibus ornatur anima, similitudinem in se Creatoris sui exprimens—et quod omnes homines semel et simul facti sunt in illo uno homine, de quo scriptum est: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*, et: *In quo omnes peccaverunt*; adhuc enim ille unus omnis fuit, et in quo omnes beatitudine paradisi expulsi sunt. Et si homo non peccaret, in geminum sexum simplicitatis suae divisionem non pateretur. Quae divisio omnino divinae naturae imaginis et similitudinis expers est, et nullo modo esset, si homo non peccaret, sicut nullo modo erit post restaurationem

* In citing the works of Gregory of Nazianzus (Theologus) and Gregory of Nyssa, Erigena usually assigns them correctly to their respective authors; but occasionally there is confusion, as here. That this happens no oftener is due to the remarkable scrupulosity of Erigena's literary methods, for he himself supposed them to be one and the same man. Vide *De div. nat.*, lib. iii. cap. 38 (755 D): "Gregorius item Nyssaeus, qui etiam Nazianzenus vocatur."

The page reference to Gregory of Nyssa is to the Paris edition of 1638. Erigena's translation of the long passage is on pp. 797 *sq.*

naturae in pristinum statum."—*Ib.*, lib. iv. cap. 12 (799 A).

But these successions were only causal and rational, not temporal:

"Deo nihil est ante, nihil post, cui nihil praeteritum nihil futurum, nihil medium inter praeteritum et futurum, quoniam *ipsi omnia simul sunt.* Cur ergo non simul faceret, quae facienda simul videbat et volebat? Nam cum dicimus ante et post peccatum, cogitationum nostrarum mutabilitatem monstramus, dum adhuc temporibus subdimur: Deo autem simul erant et peccati praescientia ejusque consequentia."—*Ib.*, iv. 14 (808 A).

So that really man may be said never to have been without sin:

"Mala quippe voluntas, quod est peccatum occultum, praecessit vetiti fructus gustum, quod est peccatum apertum. . . . Ac per hoc datur intelligi, hominem peccato nunquam caruisse: sicut nunquam intelligitur absque mutabili voluntate substitisse. Nam et ipsa irrationabilis mutabilitas liberae voluntatis, quia causa mali est, nonnullum malum esse necesse est. Causam siquidem mali malam non esse, quis audeat dicere, quandoquidem libera voluntas ad eligendum bonum data seipsam servilem fecit ad sequendum malum?"—*Ib.* (808 B, C).

Coleridge's views on original sin and on the fall (*Aids to Reflection*, Aphorism x., *On Original Sin*, in the series of Aphorisms on Spiritual Religion; and elsewhere in his works) are closely akin to Erigena's.

As to the restoration of all things, the free movement of Erigena's own mind finds splendid expression in passages such as this:—"Generaliter in omnibus hominibus sive perfecti sint, sive imperfecti, sive puri, sive contaminati, sive veritatem cognoscentes in Christo renovati, sive in tenebris ignorantiae in veteri homine detenti, unus atque idem naturalis appetitus est essendi, et bene essendi, et perpetualiter essendi, et, ut sanctus Augustinus breviter comprehendit, beate vivendi miseriamque fugiendi. Motus namque iste feliciter vivendi et subsistendi ab eo est, qui semper et bene est et omnibus inest. Et si omnis motus naturalis necessario non desinit, neque quiescit, donec perveniat ad finem quem petit, quid potest humanae naturae necessarium motum prohibere, compescere, sistere, ne ad id, quod naturaliter appetit, valeat pervenire? Nulla enim creatura est, quae velit vel appetat nihil esse; fugit autem ne ei contingat non esse, praesertim dum omne, quod ab eo, qui vere est, et super esse est, factum est, ad nihilum redire difficile est. Si vero aliqua occasione natura Deo similis a principio sui per dissimilitudinem remota fuerit, semper ad suum principium redire contendit, ut similitudinem quam corruperat, recipiat. Si enim ignis iste visibilis, in aliqua materia ardens, flammarumque suarum comas erigens, semper in altum tendit, nulloque suae flagrantiae motu ima petit: qua ratione ignis ille intelligibilis substantiae ad imaginem Dei creatae credibile sit in imis mortis atque miseriae posse semper detineri, ut in sublimia vitae beatitudinisque naturali appetitu, et conditoris

gratia ad vitam non valeat erigi?"—*Ib.*, lib. v. cap. 3 (867 C–868 B).

His compromise with tradition is based on the belief that all evil is negation and is non-existent, and that the evil will in man, being the choice of the non-existent, and itself without cause, may be regarded as non-existent (*cf.* pp. 306 *sq.*). To punish the evil will in man, therefore, is to punish the non-existent in the existent.

"*Discipulus.*—Puniri autem vitium, quod non est, in aliquo tamen, quod est, et impassibile est, quoniam pati poenas non sinitur, credibile mihi videtur, verique simillimum. Quamvis mentis meae contuitum adhuc fugere videatur, utrum tale quiddam sit."—*Ib.*, lib. v. cap. 31 (940 D).

Sometimes Erigena follows out this line of thought consistently:

"Paradigma: solaris radius munda penetrat et immunda, dum sit in omnibus mundus, neque purior in nitidis, quam in sordibus incontaminatus. . . . Quae cum ita sint, quis recte philosophantium pureque naturas rerum inspicientium non continuo pronunciaret, irrationabiles motus malarum voluntatum posse puniri in his, qui naturam bonam et rationabilem et impassibilem participant? Et quemadmodum mala voluntas naturale bonum non contaminat, ita etiam tormentum ejus, malae voluntatis dico, naturale subjectum, cui accidit, et in quo continetur, non torquet."—*Ib.*, cap. 31 (942 D–943 C).

But, elsewhere, he treats the indelible memories of

perverse desires as still active but thwarted, and thus makes a veritable hell:

"Sin . . . in suis perversis motibus perseverare voluerit, impetus ejus libidinosus retinebitur, ne, quod illicite appetit, apprehendat. Et hoc est totum, quod dicitur liberae ac perversae voluntatis supplicium, hoc est, ab illicitis suis motibus prohiberi, ne ad finem suae cupiditatis possit pervenire."—*Ib.*, cap. 36 (967 A).

"Aut quanta tristitia, quantus dolor, qualis flamma perpetuae egestatis eos torquebit, quando nihil terrenarum cupiditatum mortaliumque deliciarum, quas spe vana imbiberant, reperturi, nihilque eis remanebit praeter vacuam incomprehensibilemque rerum, quas sibi futuras esse crediderant, umbram fugitivam? Quam semper comprehendere volentes et non valentes, quoniam nihil est, poenas luent aeternas." —*Ib.*, cap. 32 (949 D).

As for the *vana deliramenta* that hold to a hell of physical fire and a heaven in which the bodily organs persist, the disciple can only cry: "Sed dum talia in libris sanctorum Patrum lego, stupefactus haesito, maximoque horrore concussus titubo, et, dum intra me ipsum cogito, cur spiritualissimi viri ultra omnes operationes localium temporaliumque cogitationum ascendentes, totumque sensibilem mundum virtute contemplationis superantes, hujusmodi dicta suis scriptis commendaverunt posteritatique tradiderunt, facilius ducor existimare, non aliam ob causam ad haec excogitanda et scribenda attractos fuisse, nisi ut saltem vel sic terrenis carnalibusque cogitationibus

deditos, simplicisque fidei rudimentis nutritos ad spiritualia cogitanda sublevarent."—*Ib.*, cap. 37 (986 B, C).

Erigena's treatment of the question of the restoration of the devils follows very similar lines :

" Vidisti ergo, quod natura daemonum et bona sit, et a summo bono facta, et quod non secundum quod sunt, sed secundum quod non sunt, mali dicuntur. Ac per hoc naturali necessitate sequitur, quod in eis est a summo Deo factum, solummodo in eis permansurum, nullo modoque puniendum, quod autem ex Deo non est, illorum videlicet malitia, periturum, ne in aliqua creatura, sive humana, sive angelica, malitia possit fieri perpetua et bonitati coaeterna." —*Ib.*, lib. v. cap. 28 (934 D–935 A).

But this does not exclude the reservation : " De salute autem ejus [*sc.* substantia daemonum], aut conversione, seu in causam suam reditu propterea nihil definire praesumimus, quoniam neque divinae historiae, neque sanctorum Patrum, qui eam exposuere, certam de hoc auctoritatem habemus."—*Ib.*, cap. 31 (941 B).

Erigena quotes Origen freely in connection with the final restitution, but he appears not to have been acquainted with that remarkable work of his favourite Gregory of Nyssa, the *De anima et resurrectione*. This treatise is quite explicit. Eternal punishment could not be corrective. It could only be vindictive. And we cannot think that the Deity is vindictive. The merciless debtor in the Gospel was handed over to the tormentors only till he had " paid all that was

due"; and however long the purifying torment of the sinner may endure, it cannot be eternal.—(Vol. iii. 226 B, 227 D, 228 B, *et cet.*)

(15) *To page* 53.—The current doctrine up to Anselm's time turned upon the interpretation of Colossians ii. 14: "Delens quod adversus nos erat chirographum decreti, quod erat contrarium nobis, et ipsum tulit de medio, affigens illud cruci."

By the disobedience of man the devil acquired a "bond" by which he had a claim on man the validity of which could not be disputed. God, in his omnipotence, might of course have refused to recognise the claim, but this would have been "violent," and it was better to proceed legally. In that case, however, the devil must himself be induced either to surrender his bond voluntarily or to violate its conditions and so put himself out of court. In either case it could only be under some delusion that he would do anything of the kind. In fact he must be, and he was, outwitted; for Christ, as the Incarnate Word, was both man (so that the devil might suppose himself to have, or to be able to acquire, a legal claim to him) and God (so that he was intrinsically outside the devil's power and his claim alike), and it was by dexterous playing upon this equivoke that the devil was overreached.*

* It would be interesting to enquire into the relation of this curious piece of Christian mythology with the innumerable popular legends of cheating the devil (or Shylock). And I presume also that "give the devil his due" (="the Jew must have his bond") properly means that a legal claim must be considered on its merits

The Fathers differ in detail, but they vie with each other in the frankness with which they set forth the main point.

Gregory of Nyssa compares the humanity of Christ to the fisherman's bait and his deity to the hook.

Τῷ προκαλύμματι τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἐνεκρύφθη τὸ θεῖον, ἵνα κατὰ τοὺς λίχνους τῶν ἰχθυῶν τῷ δελέατι τῆς σαρκὸς συναποσπάσθη τὸ ἄγκιστρον τῆς θεότητος.—*Cat. Mag. Oratio*, xxiv. (vol. iii. 82 A).

Augustine repeatedly speaks of the "trap" in which the devil found himself caught when, rejoicing to discover the "flesh" in Christ, he behaved as if he had discovered "sin" in him. His divine opponent taunts him thus:

"Decepisti innocentes, fecisti nocentes. Occidisti innocentem; peremisti quem non debebas, redde quod tenebas. Quid ergo ad horam exsultasti, quia invenisti in Christo carnem mortalem? Muscipula tua erat: unde lætatus es, inde captus es. Ubi te exsultasti aliquid invenisse, inde nunc doles quod possederas perdidisse."—*Sermo* cxxxiv., *De scripturis* (vol. v. 655 E, F *).

Compare: "Et quid fecit Redemtor noster captivatori nostro? Ad pretium nostrum tetendit muscipulam crucem suam: posuit ibi quasi escam sanguinem suum."—*Ib.*, cxxx. (vol. v. 638 D, E).

apart from the character of the claimant; not, as usually taken, that a villain must have credit for whatever better traits can be detected in him.

* The pagination is that of the Benedictine edition of 1679–1700.

"Placuit Deo, ut propter eruendum hominem de diaboli potestate, non potentia diabolus, sed justitia vinceretur, atque ita et homines imitantes Christum, justitia quaererent diabolum vincere, non potentia. Non quod potentia quasi mali aliquid fugienda sit: sed ordo servandus est, quo prior est justitia. . . . Quae est igitur justitia, qua victus est diabolus? Quae, nisi justitia Jesu Christi? Et quomodo victus est? Quia cum in eo nihil morte dignum inveniret, occidit eum tamen. Et utique justum est ut debitores quos tenebat, liberi dimittantur, in eum credentes quem sine ullo debito occidit. Hoc est quod justificari dicimur in Christi sanguine. . . . Et justitia ergo priùs, et potentia postea diabolum vicit: justitia scilicet, quia nullum peccatum habuit, ab illo injustissime est occisus; potentia vero, quia revixit mortuus, numquam postea moriturus."—*De Trinitate*, lib. xiii. 13, 14 (vol. viii. 938 G–940 C).

Gregory the Great attaches the doctrine to Job xl. 20: *An extrahere poteris Leviathan hamo?* on which he comments:

"Sed Leviathan iste hamo captus est; quia in Redemtore nostro dum per satellites suos escam corporis momordit, divinitatis illum aculeus perforavit. Quasi hamus quippe fauces glutientis tenuit, dum in illo et esca carnis patuit, quam devorator appeteret, et divinitas passionis tempore latuit, quæ necaret." *

* Hence the representation in popular art (persisting long after Anselm's reform of the doctrine) of the Deity fishing, with the genealogy of Christ's human descent from David "after the flesh" as his fishing line, the Crucifix as his hook and bait, and a greedy sea monster in act to swallow them.

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—*Magna moralia*, lib. xxxiii. cap. 9 (vol. i. 1087 A*).

Anselm puts a masterly refutation of the whole doctrine upon the lips of the enquiring Boso in the dialogue *Cur Deus homo*:

"Sed et illud quod dicere solemus, Deum scilicet, debuisse prius per justitiam contra diabolum agere, ut liberaret hominem, quam per fortitudinem; ut, cum diabolus eum, in quo nulla mortis erat causa, et qui Deus erat, occideret, iuste potestatem, quam super peccatores habebat, amitteret; alioquin injustam violentiam fecisset illi, quoniam juste possidebat hominem, quem non ipse violenter attraxerat, sed idem homo se sponte ad illum contulerat: non video quam vim habebat. Nam, si diabolus aut homo suus esset aut alterius quam Dei, aut in alia quam in Dei potestate maneret, forsitan hoc recte diceretur: cum autem diabolus aut homo non sit nisi Dei; et extra potestatem Dei neuter consistat, quam causam debuit Deus agere cum suo, de suo, in suo, nisi ut servum suum puniret, qui suo conservo communem Dominum deserere, et ad se persuasisset transire, ac traditor fugitivum, fur furem cum furto Domini sui suscepisset? Uterque namque fur erat; cum alter, altero persuadente, seipsum Domino suo furabatur. Quid enim justius fieri posset, si hoc Deus faceret? Aut si judex omnium Deus hominem sic possessum, de potestate tam injuste possidentis, vel ad puniendum illum aliter quam per diabolum, vel ad parcendum illi eriperet: quae haec iniustitia esset? Quamvis

* Pagination of the Benedictine edition of 1705.

enim homo iuste a diabolo torqueretur; ipse tamen illum injuste torquebat. Homo namque meruerat ut puniretur, nec ab ullo convenientius quam ab illo cui consenserat ut peccaret. Diaboli vero meritum nullum erat, ut puniret: imo hoc tanto faciebat iniustius, quanto non ad hoc amore iustitiae trahebatur; sed instinctu malitiae impellebatur."—*Cur Deus homo*, lib. i. cap. 7 (Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, clviii. 367 A–C).*

Anselm's own doctrine is that the immeasurable presumption and guilt of man left him with immeasurable "overdues" of humble self-submission to God which he had no means of rendering. God alone, from whom nothing was due, could by self-humiliation render overdues. The only escape, then, was for God actually to become man, while remaining God, so that the being from whom the compensating self-submission was due and the being who alone could render it might be one and the same.

(16) *To page* 54.—Anselm formulates his position as to authority and reason with perfect clearness. The *Cur Deus homo* opens thus:—"*Boso*: Sicut rectus ordo exigit, ut profunda Christianae fidei prius credamus, quam ea praesumamus ratione discutere; ita negligentia mihi videtur, si postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intelligere. Quapropter quoniam gratia dei praeveniente fidem nostrae redemptionis sic puto me tenere, ut etiam si nulla possum quod credo ratione comprehendere,

* Fritzsche's text in the *Cur Deus homo*. Page references to Migne throughout.

nihil tamen sit quod ab ejus firmitate me valeat evellere: a te peto mihi aperiri, quod, ut scis, plures mecum petunt, qua necessitate scilicet et ratione Deus, cum sit omnipotens, humilitatem et infirmitatem humanae naturae pro eius restauratione assumpserit? *Anselmus*: Quod quaeris a me, supra me est, et idcirco altiora me tractare timeo, ne forte, cum putaverit aut etiam viderit aliquis me non sibi satisfacere, plus existimet rei veritatem mihi deficere, quam intellectum meum ad eam capiendam non sufficere." Further on we read: "*Ans.* quoniam accipis in hac questione personam eorum, qui credere nihil volunt nisi praemonstrata ratione, volo tecum pacisci, ut nullum vel minimum inconveniens in Deo a nobis accipiatur, et nulla vel minima ratio, si major non repugnat, reiciatur. Sicut enim in Deo quamlibet parvum inconveniens sequitur impossibilitas, ita quamlibet parvam rationem, si maiori non vincitur, comitatur necessitas."—*Ib.*, capp. 2, 10 (362 B, C, 375 C).

Speaking of the *Monologium* and the *Proslogion*, in the proem to the latter work he says: "Unicuique suum dedi titulum ut prius exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei, et sequens fides quaerens intellectum, diceretur."—(225 A.)

Anselm is sensitive to the suspicion of thinking it *necessary* to prove the dogmas of the faith.

"Quippe si ego contemptibilis homuncio, tot sanctis et sapientibus ubique existentibus, ad confirmandum fidei Christianae firmamentum, quasi mea indigeat defensione, aliquid scribere tentarem; praesumptor utique iudicari, et deridendus possem videri. Si

enim me viderent homines alii onustum paxillis, et funibus, et aliis rebus, quibus nutantia ligari et stabiliri solent, elaborare circa montem Olympum, ad confirmandum eum, ne alicuius impulsu nutaret aut subverteretur; mirum, si se a risu et a derisu contineant. Quanto magis cum lapis, qui abscissus de monte sine manibus, percussit et comminuit statuam, quam vidit in somno Nabuchodonosor iam factus mons magnus impleverit universam terram, si eum meis rationibus fulcire et quasi nutantem stabilire nitar; tot sancti et sapientes, qui super ejus aeternam firmitatem se stabilitos esse gaudent, indignari mihi possunt; et hoc imputare, non studiosae gravitati, sed jactantiae levitati? Si quid ergo de firmitate fidei nostrae in hac epistola disputavero, non est ad confirmandam illam, sed ad fratrum hoc exigentium precibus satisfaciendum."—*De fide Trinitatis*, cap. 1 *ad fin.* (262 C 263 A).

And he is keenly alive to the danger involved in reversing the order of Faith and Reason:

"Unde fit ut, dum ad illa, quae prius fidei scalam exigunt, sicut scriptum est: *Nisi crederitis, non intelligetis* (Is. vii. 5), praepostere prius per intellectum conantur ascendere, in multimodos errores per intellectus defectum cogantur descendere. . . . Nemo ergo se temere immergat in condensa divinarum quaestionum, nisi prius in soliditate fidei, conquisita morum et sapientiae gravitate, ne per multiplicia sophismatum diverticula incauta levitate discurrens, aliqua tenaci illaqueatur falsitate." A passage in rebuke of contemporary dialecticians, especially the

"flatum vocis" nominalists, follows.—*Ib.*, cap. 2 (263 D–265 A).

(17) *To pages* 54–58.—On the "adversaries" in Anselm and Abelard.

(*a*) *Anselm.*

"*Boso*: Patere igitur ut verbis utar infidelium: aequum enim est, ut cum nostrae fidei rationem studemus inquirere, ponam eorum objectiones, qui nullatenus ad fidem eandem sine ratione volunt accedere. Quamvis enim illi ideo rationem quaerant, quia non credunt, nos vero, quia credimus, unum idemque tamen est quod quaerimus; et si quid responderis, cui auctoritas obsistere sacra videatur, liceat mihi illam obtendere, quatenus quomodo non obsistat, aperias."—*Cur Deus homo*, lib. i. cap. 2 [3] (364 A).

Gaunilo declares: "Caetera libelli illius tam veraciter et tam praeclare sunt magnificeque disserta, tanta denique referta utilitate, et pii ac sancti affectus intimo quodam odore fragrantia, ut nullo modo propter illa, quae in initiis recte quidem sensa, sed minus firmiter argumentata sunt, ista sint condemnenda, sed illa potius argumentanda robustius, ac omnia cum ingenti veneratione et laude suscipienda."—*Liber pro insipiente adversus S. Anselmi in Proslogio ratiocinationem, fin.* (Migne, clviii. 248b).

Anselm answers Gaunilo, in the *Liber apologeticus contra Gaunilonem respondentem pro insipiente*, with some impatience, but without the least suggestion of bad faith or malign intent on his adversary's part.

(*b*) *Abelard.*

"Maxime autem et nos opere hoc testimoniis seu rationibus philosophorum niti convenit, in quo adversus eos praecipue agimus, qui fidem nostram philosophicis nituntur oppugnare documentis, praesertim cum nemo nisi per ea quae recipit, arguendus sit vel convincendus; et ille nimia confusione conteratur, qui per eadem vincitur, per quae vincere nitebatur."—*Introductio ad theologiam*, lib. i. cap. 15 (1005 B*).

"Et quoniam philosophicis maxime rationibus nos aggrediuntur, et nos † eas praecipue prosecuti sumus, quas credo ad plenum nemo intelligere valet, nisi qui philosophicis et maxime dialecticis studiis invigilaverit. Necesse autem erat ut adversariis nostris ex his quoque quae recipiunt resisteremus, cum nemo nisi ex his quae concesserit arguendus sit aut refellendus, ut illud Veritatis judicium impleatur, quo dicitur: *Ex ore tuo te judico, serve nequam.*" — *Theologia Christiana*, lib. iv. (1314 D).

"Quod si adhuc aliquis in meam perseveret reprehensionem, et cum nondum illa periculosa tempora instent, nostra penitus abjiciat vel non curet scripta *et cet.*"

"Nullas huius etiam temporis haereses aut schismata reprehendendas aut corrigendas esse censemus, quas vel ipsi non ab his qui eas profitentur audivimus vel ab his qui eas audierint didicimus."—*Ib.* (1284 D–1285 A).

* Pagination of Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, clxxviii.

† *I.e.* "we too." The apodosis opens here.

He goes on to cite cases, amongst which is that of an unnamed French professor who poses as the superlative expounder of the Scriptural truth, and not only teaches heretical and absurd doctrines as to the Trinity, but:

"Sicut arrogantissimus omnium omnes plane haereticos vocat quicunque ita non tenent, quem etiam hi qui ab eo legerunt ita in fide ab Ecclesia jam divisum esse asserunt, ut multos qui ante Incarnationem Dei fuerunt, salvari asserat et per passionem eius redimi, qui nunquam aut incarnationem aut passionem eius crediderunt."—*Ib.* (1285 D).

And again:

"Ad haereticos venio qui quanto domesticiores, tanto pejores, civilibus bellis inquietare Ecclesiam non cessant. Atque ut ad nostra veniamus tempora quibus jam, aiunt, adeo repressas esse ut jam nullo fidei fundamento sit opus: nullos in tantam olim insaniam prorupisse haereticos quisquam audierit, quanta nonnulli contemporaneorum nostrorum debacchati sunt. Tanquelmus quidam laicus nuper in Flandria, Petrus presbyter nuper in Provincia, ut ex multis aliquos in medium producamus. Quorum quidem alter, Tanquelmus scilicet, in tantam se erexerit dementiam, ut se Dei Filium vocitari atque decantari, et a seducto populo, ut dicitur, templum aedificari sibi faceret. Alter vero ita fere omnem divinorum, sacrorum et ecclesiasticae doctrinae institutionem enervarat, ut multos rebaptizari cogeret, et venerabile Dominicae signum crucis removendum penitus censeret, atque altaris sacramentum nullatenus

celebrandum esse amplius strueret." — *Introductio*, lib. ii. cap. 4 (1056 A).

"Quae enim superius ex philosophis collegi testimonia, non ex eorum scriptis quorum pauca novi, imo ex libris sanctorum Patrum collegi."— *Ib.*, lib. ii. cap. 1 (1039 A, B).

On the educational value of the study of heresies:

"Haereticorum ergo occasione propagati sunt doctores in fide, et per acumen haeresium hodie creverunt magistri. Unde et sancti doctores cum ad exercitationem, ut dictum est, fidelium adeo necessarias esse haereticorum disputationes vel inquisitiones attenderent, ratione potius quam potestate eos coerceri sanxerunt." — *Ib.*, lib. ii. cap. 3 (1048 C, D).

As to the pressure from believers:

"Saepe et studiosissime a multis rogatus sum," etc.—Anselm, *Cur Deus homo*, lib. i. cap. 1 (361 B).

"Scholarium nostrorum petitioni, prout possumus, satisfacientes," etc.—Abelard, Prologue to the *Introductio ad theol.* (979 A).

Other passages from both authors might be added; and indeed the plea is a commonplace of the mediæval theologians.

The passage from Thomas referred to on p. 57 runs: "Contra singulorem autem errores difficile est procedere propter duo.

"Primo, quia non ita sunt nobis nota singulorum errantium dicta sacrilega, ut ex his quae dicunt, possimus rationes assumere ad eorum errores destruendos."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. i. cap. 2 (vol. v. 2a).

(18) *To pages* 58–62.—Abelard on authority and reason.

"Perpende quisquis es quanta praesumptio sit de eo, quod cuncta transcendit humana, discutere ratione, nec aliter acquiescere velle, donec ea quae dicuntur, aut ex sensu aut ratione humana sint manifesta. Quod est penitus fidem et spem tollere, cum utramque de non apparentibus esse constet."—*Theol. Christ.*, lib. iii. (1223 D–1224 A).

"Omnis quippe controversia, ut in Rhetoricis suis Tullius meminit, aut in scripto, aut ratione versatur, et beato attestante Augustino, in omnibus auctoritatem humanae antiponi rationi convenit; maxime autem in his quae ad Deum pertinent, tutius auctoritate quam humano nitimur judicio."—*Introductio*, lib. ii. cap. 1 (1039 C).

This generalising of the principle of "authority above reason" so as to include Ethnic scriptures and authorities is quite characteristic, and is paralleled by a similar extension of the area of revelation.

"Nunc autem ad nostrae fidei assertionem adversus universos Christianae fidei derisores, tam Judaeos scilicet quam gentiles, ex scriptis eorum testimonia inducere libet, quibus hanc Trinitatis distinctionem omnibus annuntiatam esse intelligant, quam quidem divina inspiratio et per prophetas Judaeis, et per philosophos gentibus dignata est revelare, ut utrumque populum ad cultum unius Dei ipsa summi boni perfectio agnita invitaret, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia, et facilius haec fides Trinitatis tempore gratiae susciperetur ab utroque

populo, cum eam a doctoribus quoque antiquis viderent esse traditam."—*Ib.*, lib. i. cap. 12 (998 B, C).

On the other hand:

"Quid enim ad doctrinam loqui proficit, si quod docere volumus exponi non potest ut intelligatur?"—*Ib.*, lib. i. cap. 6 (988 D–989 A).

"Quomodo ergo audiendi sunt, qui fidem rationibus vel astruendam vel defendendam esse denegant? . . . Si enim cum persuadetur aliud ut credatur, nil est ratione discutiendum, utrum ita scilicet credi oporteat vel non: quid restat nisi ut aeque tam falsa quam vera praedicantibus acquiescamus? . . . Alioquin . . . cuiusque populi fides, quantamcunque astruat falsitatem refelli non poterit, et si in tantam devoluta sit caecitatem ut idolum quodlibet Deum esse ac caeli ac terrae creatorem fateatur. Statim quippe qui hoc receperit, cum hinc pulsare eum coeperimus sicut olim martyres faciebant, cum idololatriae cultum gentilibus improperarent, respondere poterit secundum nosipsos etiam de fide ratiocinandum non esse, nec a nobis alios impeti debere, unde nos ab aliis censemus impetendos non esse."—*Ib.*, lib. ii. cap. 3 (1049 D–1050 C).

The inferentially reconciling passage runs:

"Ad extremum illud nobis opponendum arbitror, ut dicere illi tales velint, se non ideo fidem nostram reprobare, quia probari vel disseri non valet, sed magis quia defendi non potest, cum eam penitus manifestae rationes stare non permittant."—*Theol. Christ.*, lib. iii. (1226 D).

But the truth of the doctrines is not dependent on any such defence as reason can give:

"Ad propositum festinemus, illo prius a nobis commemorato atque constituto, ne si in tanta obscuritate ratio calligaverit, quae magis religione, quam ingenio conspicitur, aut tot et tantis subtilissimis inquisitionibus parvitas nostra non suffecerit, aut etiam victa succubuerit, ne ob id, inquam, culpare aut reprehendere fidem nostram praesumant, quae minus in se non valet, si quis in disserendo eam deficiat."—*Ib.* (1228 C).

On the Ethnic philosophers, their doctrine and their fate:

"Ille maximus philosophorum Plato, eiusque sequaces, qui testimonio sanctorum Patrum prae caeteris gentium philosophis fidei Christianae accedentes, totius Trinitatis summam post prophetas patenter addiderunt."—*Introductio*, lib. i. cap. 17 (1012 C).

Virgil [*Ecl.* viii. 75], "divinam Trinitatem non mediocriter innuens," says:

> "Trina [*sic*] tibi haec primum triplici diversa colore
> Licia circumdo, terque haec altaria circum
> Effigiem duco, numero Deus impare gaudet."

—*Ib.*, cap. 21 (1032 B).

"Similiter et Socrates cum sit tres personae secundum grammaticos, in eo scilicet quod est loquens et audiens, et de quo alter ad alterum loquitur: non tamen in eo quod est Socrates vel quod est substantia *et cet.*"—*Theol. Christ.*, lib. iv. (1261 B). Cf. *Introductio*, lib. ii. cap. 12 (1067 B).

"Unde et superius cum Platonicorum sententias de Verbo Dei Augustinus praesentaret, solum quae ad divinitatem Verbi pertinent se in eis reperisse confirmavit, et nil de incarnationis mysterio, in quo totam salutis humanae summam consistere certum est, sine quo caetera frustra creduntur."—*Introductio*, lib. iii. cap. 18 (1085 B).

After citing lines from the Sibyl and from Virgil's 4th Eclogue, Abelard adds: "Quae apertissimam de incarnatione Filii Dei continent prophetiam, ipso fortassis poeta ignorante quid in Sibylla vel in eo Spiritus sanctus loqueretur."—*Theol. Christ.*, lib. i. (1163 C).

"Gentiles fortasse natione, non fide, omnes fuerunt philosophi; sicut de Job et amicis ejus dicitur. . . . Quis etiam asserat nullis eorum fidem Incarnationis revelatam esse, sicut et Sibyllae, licet in eorum scriptis non videatur expressa? quae neque a Job et nonnullis prophetarum aperte praedicatur."—*Ib.*, lib. ii. (1172 A, B).

We need not suppose that Job received the Jewish sacraments either. It would seem that salvation was possible without them.

"Si sacramenta non susceperunt, qui ante adventum Salvatoris exsisterunt, cum neque de Job gentili id credere cogamur, *et cet.*"—*Ib.*, lib. ii. (1172 C).

"Nulla itaque ratione cogendi videmur, ut de salute talium diffidamus gentilium, qui ante adventum Redemptoris nullo legis scripto instructi, naturaliter, juxta Apostolum, ea quae legis sunt facientes, ipsi sibi lex erant, qui ostendebant opus legis scriptum in

cordibus suis, testimonium reddente illis conscientia ipsorum."—*Ib.* (1173 A).

Indeed since Christ is the "sophia" it may be said that *Christian* and *Philosopher* are as close to each other in name as they are in fact.—*Ib.* (1179 B).

"Hinc quidem facilius evangelica praedicatio a philosophis, quam a Judaeis suscepta est, cum sibi eam maxime invenerunt ad finem [? *leg.* affinem], nec fortasse in aliquo dissonam, nisi forte in his quae ad incarnationis vel sacramentorum vel resurrectionis mysteria pertinent."—*Ib.* (1179 C, D).

The doubt raised by this reservation, as though perhaps, after all, explicit faith in the incarnation were not necessary to salvation, may be solved by the passage in which he cites the well-known story of Trajan's release from hell at Gregory's prayer and other considerations telling in the same direction, *Ib.* (1204 B *sqq.*), and then adds:

"Quod si hi post Evangelii traditionem, sine fide Jesu Christi, vel gratia baptismi, tanta apud Deum ex anteactae vitae meritis obtinuerint, quid de philosophis ante adventum Christi, tam fide quam vita clarissimis, diffidere cogamur, ne indulgentiam sint assecuti, aut eorum vita et unius Dei cultus, quem ipsi tunc temporis praecipue habuerunt, et scribendo praedicaverunt, magna eis a Deo dona tam in hac quam in futura vita non acquisierit, et quae necessaria saluti essent ostenderit."—*Ib.* (1205 D–1206 A).

The idea that Scripture is the sole source of revealed truth is expressly challenged by Abelard:

"Nec rectae confessioni officit, si nonnulla confessionis verba in canonicis minime reperiantur Scripturis. Ob hoc enim maxime symbola conciliorum Scripturis illis sunt superaddita, ut illa doceant vel disserant quae ibi aperte non habentur. Quis enim Trinitatem, sed tres personas * in ea sibi coaeternas et coaequales, quarum unaquaeque sit Deus in illis Scripturis dici meminerit, aut Pilatum Pontium appellari, aut ad inferos animam descendisse Christi, et alia quaedam quae in verbis non continentur canonicis? Multa profecto fidei necessaria post Evangelium ab apostolis, vel apostolicis viris addita sunt, quae ex verbis evangelicis minime comprobantur, sicut est illud de virginitate Matris Domini etiam post partum jugiter conservata, et de aliis fortasse multis."—*Introductio*, lib. ii. cap. 15 (1076 D).

Abelard's special views on the Trinity are illustrated on p. 349.

(19) *To page* 65. — The several points of this scheme will be amply illustrated as we go along; but it will be well to emphasise at once the distinctive principle that revelation cannot contradict, however much it transcends, human reason:

"Illud idem, quod inducitur in animam discipuli a docente, doctoris scientia continet, nisi doceat ficte; quod de Deo nefas est dicere. Principiorum autem naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis divinitus est indita, quum ipse Deus sit auctor nostrae naturae. Haec

* *I.e.* "That there is a Trinity [singular], but three Persons [plural], *et cet.*"

ergo principia etiam divina Sapientia continet. Quidquid igitur principiis hujusmodi contrarium est, est divinae sapientiae contrarium; non igitur a Deo esse potest. . . .

"Si igitur contrariae cognitiones nobis a Deo immitterentur, ex hoc a veritatis cognitione intellectus noster impediretur; quod a Deo esse non potest. . . .

"Non igitur contra cognitionem naturalem aliqua opinio vel fides homini a Deo immittitur. . . . Sed quia superat rationem, a nonnullis reputatur quasi contrarium; quod esse non potest."*—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. i. cap. 7 (vol. v. 5a).

It follows of course that arguments brought against the faith cannot be conclusive (*demonstrativa*), but at best can only be such as raise an adverse presumption (*probabilia*), but can be shown to fall short of proof (*solubilia*). This is often insisted upon. For example:

"Cum enim fides infallibili veritati innitatur, impossibile autem sit de vero demonstrari contrarium, manifestum est probationes quae contra fidem inducuntur, non esse demonstrationes, sed solubilia argumenta."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 1 : a. 8. c. (Leon., iv. 22a).

And again:

"Unde Apostolus non monet humanam rationem inducere ad probandum fidem, sed divinam, ut ostendatur quod Deus dixit; humanam autem ad

* Compare book iii. chap. 100, *Quod ea quae Deus facit praeter naturae ordinem non sunt contra naturam.*

defendendum, ut per eam ostendatur quod ea quae fides praesupponit, non sunt impossibilia; non ita autem quod sufficienter per rationem humanam ea quae fidei sunt, probari possint."—3 *Dist.*, xxiv. q. 1: a. 2. sol. 2. ad 3^{m} (vol. vii. 263a).

LECTURE II

THE GOAL POSTULATED BY HUMAN NATURE

Aquinas held that the nature and constitution of man contain an implicit promise, which in its turn demands a revelation as a step or instrument in its fulfilment, and that we can determine certain conditions with which that revelation must comply. The development of this thesis is to be the subject of to-day's lecture.

The demonstration, however, is part of a much wider inquiry, the outlines of which we must endeavour to trace, while keeping our special and immediate theme in view. To begin with, then, Aquinas is an Aristotelian in his reliance on the validity of the data of the senses. He does not in any degree share the distrust of them common to all the Platonic schools. But his confidence extends further. Aristotle's "teleology," or belief in the "goalfulness" of nature, carries with it the principle that things can only be understood by considering what it is that they are making for. The potentialities of the acorn can only be read in the light of the actualised functionings of the oak. But this principle, which in Aristotle amounts to little more than the

recognition of something in nature more or less analogous to the "purposes" of man, becomes in Aquinas a defined and compact conviction, that since all things proceed from the will of God, and the will is always directed to an end, all things are directed by God to the attainment of some "finis" which is connatural to them, and in the attainment of which they rest and find their good.

Hence if we can discover what is the specific "good" connatural to any creature, we have thereby discovered the goal which it is naturally destined to attain. If exceptions or effective obstacles to such attainment occur, we must account for them as best we may; but the broad principle may be laid down confidently that it is normal for a creature that has no will of its own to be directed by the will of God towards the attainment of its connatural good; whereas in creatures that have a will of their own, the desires connatural to that will indicate (however vaguely) the end towards which God is directing them, and which they are normally destined to reach unless there is some efficient obstacle.* It follows that no fundamental impulse or aspiration of man is normally destined to be thwarted.

Thus we start, as from an assured principle, from the conviction that though nothing is due from God to his creatures except that which he himself has either promised explicitly, or implicitly made their

* The existence of such obstacles under the all-good and almighty will of God raises the "problem of evil" (*cf.* p. 307), which does not lie on our direct line of investigation at this point.

due by their very constitution, yet whatever *is* so promised or implied becomes due to them from the moment of their creation. Thus, an animal has no grievance because it was not made a man; nor has a man any grievance because he cannot fly like a bird and is not as strong as a lion; but human nature being once constituted as it is, all that is essential to its full development and self-realisation becomes its due from God; or, more properly, is something on which it may rely as "due" to the consistency and harmony of the divine volitions, and therefore as a *debitum* from God to himself if not to his creature. (1)

Now, the conception, however vague, of a conclusive and comprehensive satisfaction or attainment, a definite realisation of happiness, bliss, or whatever we may name the supreme object of desire, is obviously implanted in the human mind. Philosophers have indeed variously defined this ultimate object of desire, but they have all of them held that its full fruition or enjoyment is at least conceivable, and that our lives should be uniformly directed towards its attainment.

Consideration will show that those philosophers who have sought this conclusive blessedness in anything that man shares with the brutes have not really been contemplating *human* blessedness at all, for that must be related to the distinctive element in man which makes him human. And this cannot be found elsewhere than in his intellectual nature. The emotional nature, so far as it is specifically human, is lifted

above the appetites of the brutes, and the resultant attractions and repulsions, just by its association with the intelligence, which gives it the conscious recognition of goodness, beauty, and truth as things to be desired, and thus distinguishes it from a mere unreasoning drift.

According to the psychology of Aquinas, a sheep, for example, feels that the wolf she sees is noxious and repulsive, and she is repelled by it. She also feels that her own lamb is something congenial to her, and she is attracted to it. But she has no such feeling towards another lamb, and having no power of abstraction, she cannot know that the relation which exists between another lamb and its mother sheep is the same as that existing between her lamb and herself. She has therefore no conception of "a lamb," nor does she know what "a wolf" in general is, or why it is repulsive. In a word, any distinct recognition of "qualities" or "reasons" is dependent upon the power of abstraction which is the leading attribute of intelligence, as distinct from sense cognition; and therefore no spiritual qualities, and still less any spiritual being, can be impressed upon the conscience at all except through the intelligence. The intelligence, therefore, is the organ, and the sole organ, of all æsthetic and moral perceptions, as well as of those that we should in our narrowed modern use of the term describe as "intellectual." The intelligence, in short, is the faculty that recognises not only truth but beauty and goodness, as making whatever they characterise desirable. It does not matter whether

we say with Plato that beautiful, good, and true things are such because they participate in the self-existing and absolute Beauty and so forth, or whether we say with Aristotle that "beauty" is a conception abstracted from a group of concrete objects or impressions which, amid wide diversities, have something recognisable in common. Indeed, we shall see (p. 328) that there is room for a harmony between both these conceptions in the system of Aquinas. The present point is that we must enlarge our conception of "intelligence" so as to make it include the organ of spiritual perceptions of every kind; and we may note in passing that the mere recognition that there *is* some kind of common element in all the things we call "beautiful," or all the actions we call "brave," is already a manifestation of our intelligence or power of abstraction, even if we have not perfected it by analysing and defining what the common element in question is.

It is, then, in the life of the "intelligence" that the specifically human life is found, and so we must look for the specific human blessedness also in some act, possession, or experience of the intelligence and not of the senses. But at this point the progress of our inquiry is barred by the first suggestion of a difficulty that will confront us again and again as we proceed. The question is perpetually raised by Aquinas whether knowledge or love is the higher faculty. And to deal with it rightly we must examine his idea of the relations between the will and the intelligence, for his doctrine of love and his doctrine

of will are inseparable. What he meant by the intelligence we already know in a provisional kind of way that will serve our present turn, but we have yet to examine the idea of volition as understood by the schoolmen. And the matter is far from obvious to the modern student, though axiomatic to the mediæval theologian.

If we can achieve clarity on this point, we shall have gone far towards grasping many of the most baffling psychological, theological, and ethical conceptions that the student of scholasticism has to encounter; and it is well worth while delaying our steps to deal with this question on the threshold.

Love and hate, or attraction and repulsion, are the root passions from which all others are derived, and of these love is the more fundamental because it is positive. We hate things only because they thwart, negate, or violate our impulses or satisfactions, which are all of them forms or manifestations of some kind of love. But love itself presupposes something. For it rests upon some congruity between the being that loves and the object of its affection. This congruity is constitutional and must be there previously to all experience. But love itself cannot pass from a potentiality to an actuality till the lovable object has been in some way presented to the consciousness of the lover. When so "actualised," love utters itself in two ways. Love of the absent or unpossessed is desire; love of the possessed or present is joy. Now, the bare mental recognition of the *existence* of such a congruity is the act of the intelligence, but "love,"

that is to say, the appropriation to myself of the congruous object or experience, and the "choice" of it as the thing that *I* desire or enjoy, is the act of the will. To the modern mind, I suppose the word "will" suggests some kind of effort or resolve, a force exerted to control or direct our own powers and actions in the first place, and thereby, in the second place, to bend or affect those of others or the stream of happenings. But no such conception will interpret the word to us as we meet it in the Schoolmen. With them the will is an "appetite" as simply and as truly as hunger is, but it is an intellectual, not a sensuous, appetite; that is to say, it is the appetite for something that presents itself to the mind, or intelligence, as desirable, and therefore it is special to the "intellectual natures"—human and angelic. An animal "wants" a thing and knows what he wants, but we should not naturally speak of his "wishes." If we did, we should be intending expressly to assert something akin to our own psychology in him; for to form a wish or to exercise a volition means that, having consciously recognised something as congenial to our peace or happiness, or consonant with our impulses, we desire it in its absence, and believe that we should rejoice in its presence. To sum up, then, we must understand by *voluntas* or will, in the writings of the Schoolmen, the faculty which makes us choose and appropriate to our affections something that our intelligence has presented to us as good. It is an "appetite," for it is the faculty whereby we desire a thing and long for

it when we have it not; and, if we have made our choice under no illusion, but soundly, then we shall rejoice in the attainment and presence of it when we have it; for the blissful and, so to speak, active repose of the intellectual appetite in possession, no less than its longing for the unpossessed good, is an act of will.

The "act" or functioning of the will, therefore, consists primarily in the election or choice of that which the judgment has presented as good; and it expresses itself in a movement of all the powers, at its bidding, towards the chosen thing when unpossessed, and in the fruition of it when possessed. Once more to repeat:—The will is an appetite, but an intellectual one; that is to say, an appetite that is provoked not by a direct appeal to the senses, but by a mental and spiritual presentation or judgment that pronounces something to be "good."

Nevertheless the judgment may itself be swayed by the senses, and may only too easily present the objects of the sense to the will not only as good, which in their measure they are, but as relatively better than they really are. When the will makes its choice on these false representations it is still "intellectual" and the act is still "voluntary," though in a perverse kind of way, for a choice or election is still made. But if a passion is so blind as to exclude all conscious choice, then the resultant action follows upon no election at all and is not voluntary.

It will now be clear that in the language of the Schoolmen the "acts" or functionings of the will are acts of love. But the will is not coextensive with

love; for no one will deny that a sheep loves her lamb, and yet there is no election, no intellectual element, no choice or selection, and therefore no voluntary principle in her love. A vast range of human love comes under this category, and another vast range under the category of sensuously distorted or perverted choice; but the love of God is a purely intellectual appetite, not in the sense that it is cold and passionless, but in the sense that it is directed to supersensuous beauty, goodness, and truth. It is also unalloyed, for God is the supreme and unqualified "good." Clearly, then, it must be in the realised presence of God, as in some sense possessed by us, that our conclusive blessedness is to be found. And no less than a promise of such fruition is implied in our native longing for bliss.

Now, the only way in which God can be possessed is by being "known," for it is only through the "intelligence," in the wider sense, that we can have any access to him at all. It is true that we often use the language of sense in speaking of divine things, for we can hardly be said to have any other language to use. Thus we speak of "seeing" God, for seeing is the noblest of the senses, and we use its terms to express the highest and directest kind of spiritual perception. If we say "I *see* that that is true," we imply a direct knowledge of it and therefore a personal possession of it. If we say "I *hear* that that is true," we intentionally exclude any such implication. Thus when it is said that the vision of God is the ultimate blessedness, "vision"

means knowledge and possession. Therein both intellect and will find their goal and attainment.

Does beatitude, then, consist primarily in the knowledge of God or in the love of him? The love of the unpossessed may often seem to outstrip the knowledge of it. A man may ardently love science, or another man, or God, when his knowledge is most imperfect; and so his love may seem to exceed and to forerun his knowledge. But if we consider the matter, we shall see that this is not truly so. When we seem to love people or things, though not knowing them, it is really something that we do know, and that we attribute to them, that we love; and it is possible that real knowledge of the things themselves may bring disillusionment. But just in proportion as we know God, we possess and enjoy the supreme object of love. And when we remember that though love of the unpossessed is desire, love of the possessed is joy, our question whether blessedness consists essentially in the knowledge of God or in the love of him must reshape itself, and we must ask, "Does felicity or blessedness consist in actual possession of good, or in the joy of possession?" To this question there is really no answer. The presupposition of all desire is a congruity between the thing seeking and the thing sought, and the presupposition of all joy is the *possession* or presence of that which was the direct object and goal of desire. Possession would be imperfect without joy, but joy cannot be either pursued or attained unsubstantially and detached. It must be

an outflow from the attainment of that which is pursued *for its own sake* and which satisfies in its own power. Hence the contention of Aquinas, subject to many explanations and qualifications, that blessedness is an "act" or functioning primarily and substantially of the intelligence and only secondarily of the will. It consists in "vision" or possession; but this possession will inevitably be beautified by joy, just because its "connaturality" with our nature, which drew us to it in longing, delights us in fruition.*

The complete satisfaction, then, of our yearning to understand and know the Supreme Good, and experience the joy that inevitably associates itself with the attainment of that high desire, is promised by our very nature and constitution. †

But is the fulfilment of this implied promise possible? It is in his answer to this question that Thomas's theory of the necessity of a supernatural revelation is embedded. Now even the attempt to ask the question intelligently threatens to plunge us into the sea of mystic speculation. Is the Absolute, the Self-existent, the central and all-embracing Truth and Reality, the πρῶτος Θεός, really accessible to our minds? I have no intention of either trying to answer the question on its own merits or entering upon an elaborate analysis or

* The relations of the will and the intelligence, which will require further attention in other connections (*cf.* pp. 269 *sqq.*), are illustrated in the first *Excursus* at the end of this volume.

† The consideration of the nature and conditions of the *Visio Dei* will be carried a stage further in Lecture v. (pp. 384 *sqq.*), and is completed in the second *Excursus* at the end of this volume.

history of the systems of mysticism. Indeed, I should be dealing unfairly with those of my hearers who have no special knowledge of the subject were I not frankly to avow that my own studies, such as they are, have expatiated but little amongst the writers, either ancient or modern, who are most distinctively or typically regarded as "mystics." But on the highways of theology, philosophy, or literature, the pilgrim naturally encounters certain great mystics—a Plotinus, an Augustine, an Erigena, a Bernard, a Dante, or, in modern days, a Wordsworth—from whom he may catch the glow of the mystic experience without in any way professing to be either an adept or a historical expert.

But even while we keep on these broad highways, it becomes necessary, for our present purpose, to attempt to draw certain distinctions and to define certain conceptions in order to understand Thomas's characteristic teaching with respect to the "vision of God" and the relation of our human faculties to it. And in this, as in so many other questions, we must start from Plato and Aristotle. In Plato's mind, and still more in that of his later followers, there was always present the conception of some kind of direct spiritual sense by which a man might have access to a world of realities above the illusory world of the material senses. It was some sort of relation to this world of realities, or participation in its life, that gave to the lower world of shadowy phenomena whatever intelligible meaning or significance it had. And this belief in the possibility of

getting into direct and immediate relations of perception and experience with the spiritual world I take to be the essential characteristic of all mystic systems of thought, while the attempt to convey some infectious impression of such supreme experiences is at the heart of all great mystic utterance.

In Aristotle, on the other hand, I find a quite marked absence of any pretension to a mystic sense of spiritual discernment, or even a desire, or unsatisfied yearning, turned that way. Even in the wonderful passages in the *Physics*, the *Metaphysics*, and the *De caelo*, in which he tries to picture the eternal life and joy of the immaterial beings that inspire the movements of the heavens, there is no hint of any direct *sense* of their life or presence. Aristotle is convinced that he has arrived at a belief in their existence by a hard and unimpassioned process of thought — and unimpassioned indeed it is except in so far as the pure and limpid desire to find the truth, whatever it may be, is a passion,—and having arrived at their existence and a general conception of the nature of their eternal life of contemplation of the truth, he allows himself to be caught by the rush of thought and emotion which the contemplation of such a life, and the endeavour to realise what it is to the beings who live it, inevitably sets flowing. Many have followed him on similar lines, and have been raised into a kind of ecstasy as they contemplated the sum of things, or the highest expression of being, as it revealed itself not to any mystic or direct perception, but to their constructive

thought and imagination. Yet the marvellous thing is that, whether the object so conceived by thought be a spirit world, as with Aristotle, or a soulless sweep of swerving atoms through space, as with Lucretius, the emotion expressed appears to be of the same essential quality. And yet more this emotion, whether tapped by the spiritual conceptions of an Aristotle or the materialistic conceptions of a Lucretius, is hard to distinguish, in its expression, from that of the avowed mystic, who has felt himself in the realised presence of the Supreme, directly revealed not to the intelligence but to the spiritual sense. A single well-known and often quoted example will suffice. It is the passage in which Lucretius tells us that when he thinks of the atoms moving through space, "a kind of divine rapture lays hold" of him, under the stress of which he "shudders."*

Thus we can trace an almost continuous series of religious utterances from Lucretius to Plotinus, in which we recognise in great souls something fundamentally akin, underlying the widest differences of philosophy and of the psychological interpretation of experience. But this must not blind us to the significance of those differences themselves. Only confusion, I think, would arise from an attempt to include Aristotle or Lucretius among the mystics, for I suppose the widest definition that could fairly be given of the mystic experience would be something like this:—"The awareness of direct emotional

* *De rerum natura*, iii. 28 *seq.*

reaction between the individual consciousness and the All-pervading, felt as a presence." This note of directness of perception is absent alike from Aristotle and Lucretius. In them it is a mental conception, not a direct spiritual perception, that wakes the emotional response.

But when we have thus excluded the systems in which emotion is recognised as rising out of conceptions rather than direct perceptions, we must push our analysis a step further within the area recognised as covered by mysticism in a broad sense. And here I must ask you to follow me through a rather extended digression. The distinction between knowing God through his essence and knowing him through his effects lies at the heart of Thomas's treatment of this subject, and it is of consequence, therefore, that we should have a clear understanding of it. We are fortunate in being able to call two great modern poets to our aid, and it will be from Goethe and Wordsworth that I shall draw my illustrations, in attempting to make the distinction clear.

First, however, we must try, by the help of analogies, to get as clear a conception as possible of what the Schoolmen really mean by "knowing God" (or indeed knowing anything or anyone) through his essential being and not through his effects. The typical mystic in many cases aspires to actual self-identification with the Supreme, and if not to that, then to an assimilation of himself to the Supreme, which will put him at the divine point of view, so that he will see all things as God sees

them. That is to say, he will realise all the sum of things as contained and implied in his own being, or as flowing out from the centre at which he stands. This is self-utterance if considered as creative and dynamic; it is self-realisation if considered as changeless and eternal.

But our minds, on the plane of the senses and the intelligence, seem to be incapable of knowing the inmost nature of anything whatever, or of getting at the phenomenal world from inside or from above at all. We know things directly by their effects upon our consciousness, not in themselves or in their sources. The stream flows *upon* us, not *from* us, and in seeking a more intimate knowledge we try to work up against it towards its spring. Is it possible for the human soul to be transplanted into oneness with, or at least into participation in, the fontal source of things? Can we know things from within the central Unity, as involved in its own essential life?

The mystic of a not uncommon type might answer, "Yes. It is possible, but possible only to the few and in favoured moments; yet all our life and thought and love may be dominated by the sense of this possibility of experiential realisation, and by the permanent conviction that it represents the utmost truth of our lives and of their relation to the eternal reality."

Now even those who neither claim to have experienced such ecstatic union with the divine, nor share the conviction that it is attainable, may at least form a conception of the kind of insight that the mystic aspires to, by the analogy of mathematical

perceptions. It seems much to be regretted that the teaching neither of mathematics nor of philosophy is usually inspired by an adequate appreciation of this typical significance of mathematical knowledge; but from Plato to Coleridge, I suppose, there have never been wanting certain thinkers who have insisted upon it. In mathematical study we seem to be moving in a world in which cause and effect are superseded by some more intimate bond of relation in which the axioms, which we cannot conceive as not holding good, are seen to involve all the remotest deductions that can be made from them; so that to the enlightened mind the most advanced mathematical theories are realised as being in themselves, and in the nature of things, just as inevitable, as axiomatic in fact, as the proposition that the whole is greater than its part. This abstract study moves in a purely conceptual world, and its concepts, by their very nature, can never be realised in material things. But, nevertheless, they give us command of material things, and enable us to predict their conduct. We can thus control things with a knowledge and a power that gets at them from the inside, and makes the external phenomenon the utterance and expression of an internal thought. Again, the soul of science is found in the principle of simplification, that is to say, in embracing an ever wider and wider range of diversity and multiplicity of phenomena under a single statement or formula. And in the application of mathematical study to other branches of science this principle stands out in luminous distinctness.

The classical example is that of Kepler, followed by Newton. When Kepler had brought all the complex motions of the planets under his three laws, he had included a bewildering multiplicity of phenomena under three simple statements of a systematic and comprehensive nature. Given the relative distances of the respective planets from the sun, these three statements implicitly contained the whole sum of the observed facts as to planetary motion. After that, all the observations that had been laboriously accumulated through the ages, from the outside, could now be evolved from the inside, with the one exception of the observed distances themselves. But there were still three statements, which were not axiomatic, however comprehensive they might be. Next came Newton, who reduced the three statements to one, and that one a statement that embraced other regions of vast range that Kepler's laws had not approached. For it established a bond between the movements of the heavenly bodies and the phenomena of physical reactions on earth. And, moreover, this one statement, far-flashing as it was, was so simple that it has for the most part been naively accepted as axiomatic. And this is just because it so easily allies itself to a purely mathemetical proposition that does indeed follow from mathematical axioms.*

But whether we are dealing with the multiplex phenomena on which inductions are based, or the

* *Videlicet* the formula for the superficies of a sphere, varying with the square of the radius.

generalised and collective statements to which they lead, there is still a basis of observed fact, which we see is thus, but can conceive as being otherwise. If we get further in astronomy than in chemistry, it is because, given a few simple data, we can see how the astronomical phenomena must follow; whereas in chemistry we have not yet learned to see why two elements having the properties of oxygen and hydrogen should, when suitably combined, produce a substance having the properties of water. Molecular physics and the more recent speculations that are endeavouring to go behind and below them are, I suppose, trying to bring chemistry in this respect nearer to the level of the more closely mathematical sciences; but, except in pure mathematics, it still remains true that we can construct no branch of science entirely from inside, starting only from what our consciousness regards as involved in the very nature of truth and reality, and incapable of being thought or imagined to be otherwise.

Now, what the mathematician thus approximately attains with respect to a certain defined region of intellectual truth in the narrower sense, the mystic of the type we are now examining believes it possible to attain, perhaps believes that he has himself attained in moments of insight, with respect to the whole spiritual and moral order, and the sum of being. He believes it possible to enter into such communion or self-identification with the Supreme that all sense of contradiction or discord should vanish, and his own being should be at the radiating centre, set right

in the consciousness to which no disconnection, no chance, no "possible otherwise," and above all, no evil or imperfection, exists.

The Neoplatonist mystics are of this type, and a great modern poet who had studied them may help the modern reader (though on a limited area and at a stage short of the highest) to understand something of the meaning of this inwardness of vision, as from the source of being. For the first monologue in *Faust* represents the passionate demand of the baffled and disillusionised student for just that direct knowledge of the inmost reason of things which should enable him to stand at the centre and exult in the whole order of nature, as that to which he had the key within himself and which he could feel as the spontaneous and self-justifying utterance of the life at the very fountain of which he himself was standing, participating in its directness and its plenitude. Nothing short of this was knowledge worthy of the name, and with nothing short of this would he be satisfied.

This monologue (I am speaking of the first monologue alone) was written under Neoplatonic inspiration, but is very far from covering either the whole of the Neoplatonic ground or the most important part of it. In the first place, it is immediately dependent upon the degenerate Neoplatonism of Iamblicus, who sought for short cuts to the mystic goal by the aid of magic; and, in the second place, the passion of Faust's discontent in this great monologue has a scientific rather than a moral or

spiritual source. Plotinus did indeed seek to understand the material world and its origin from within, but he was much more deeply and immediately concerned with the moral and spiritual world; and his mental, moral, and emotional discipline had no element or suggestion of magic in it. Nevertheless, a sympathetic study of the monologue may help us to realise the distinction between knowing and experiencing from the inside, by penetration to, and participation in, the causal and fontal life of all, on the one hand, and on the other hand a knowledge not from inside but simply by effects upon us, of something that is beyond and outside us. And it is the former kind of enlightenment, in its fullest extent and in its inmost realisation, that is the demand and conditional promise of our souls to the mystic of this type.

And now let us turn from Goethe to another modern poet to whom the mystic sense will hardly be denied. Wordsworth (as we shall see presently, p. 445) did indeed regard mathematics as the purest type of knowledge accessible to our minds, but he did not seek to assimilate his intercourse with nature to it; nor did he aspire to any self-identification with the power behind nature that should enable him to do so.

And yet he is a mystic:

> "I have felt
> A presence that disturbs me with the joy
> Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,

> And the round ocean and the living air,
> And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
> A motion and a spirit, that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things."

I think the context shows that the comparison implied in the words "far more deeply interfused" refers to the "still, sad music of humanity" that has been mentioned just before, as chastening and subduing the irresponsible raptures of an early and less reflective day. The sense of humanity has interfused the sense of nature, but the whole organically related cosmos of nature and man has been "far more deeply" interfused by the mystically felt "presence" immanent in "all things." But, be that as it may, the very terms of the passage, the "felt," the "presence," the "sense," all testify to the immediateness of the experience recorded. Yet it is not the experience of self-identification with the source of life, but rather that of the receptive *response* to the manifestation and expression of life that flows upon the poet's soul from its eternal source. The seer is acted upon by the presence that he feels, and knows that it flows through him and through all things, but he does not move out with it and from it, he receives it and answers to it. This, in the language of Aquinas, must still be deemed knowing God through his effects not in his nature and causal essence, and therefore as something short of the vision of God which our nature promises. And it is primarily in order to bring this point into relief that I have

called attention at this stage, by way of contrast, to Wordsworth's mystic converse with the supreme Presence, as acting upon him and waking a response from him. The demand and "due" of human nature, as defined by Thomas, reaches far beyond the experience of Wordsworth. It is as intimate as the demand of Faust, and at the same time as high as the experience claimed for Plotinus.

We are now in a position to follow Aquinas in the line of thought which leads him to postulate a revelation as an *a priori* necessity. In a series of chapters of extreme beauty, full of restrained eloquence and passion, in his treatise *Contra Gentiles*, he argues at length that nothing short of the vision of God can satisfy the aspirations of man or redeem the promise of God implicit in human nature. But, as we shall see more fully in a later part of our inquiry (p. 384), when we come to deal expressly with psychology, human nature, as regarded from the point of view of so sound an Aristotelian as Thomas, has in itself no power at all of apprehending immaterial things in any direct fashion. All the material that our minds have to work upon comes to them through the senses, and although by the process of abstraction we can arrive at general truths in which our thoughts can move without immediate dependence upon the organs of sense, yet, even in their highest flights, there still cleaves to them a necessary dependence upon certain sense images. Thus we can never form a vivid conception of purely spiritual or immaterial beings, that stand in no relation to space and occupy

no place or position. Our intellect may convince us that such beings exist, but our "imaginative" or "image-making" way of visualising, or otherwise sensuously representing things, leaves us without support in these regions; and therefore just because such beings are purely "intelligible" and in no degree "sensible" (that is to say, are only intellectually apprehended and offer no hold to the senses), they lie outside the range of our faculties. Just because they are purely "intelligible" they can never be "understood" by us! We are to them as bats and owls to the sun. We cannot see them because they have no element of darkness in them. It would seem, then, that the promise cannot be fulfilled on earth and through the natural faculties we now possess. But fulfilled somewhere and somehow it must be.

Thus, so far as these limitations are inherent in the conditions of our earthly life, they point to a future state in which we shall be so changed as to transcend them; and to this subject we shall return in due course (p. 385). But, as far as, *within* the necessary limitations, our faculties can be so exercised, guided, supported and supplemented, as to secure the maximum of possible progress towards the ultimate goal, or some preparation for it and foretaste of its fruition, so far we may claim the fulfilment of the promise, even here on earth.

What, then, can our unaided human faculties give us in the way of spiritual truth? Much, according to Aquinas; for he, like other Catholic theologians,

is generous in his recognition of the scope of religious truth which is accessible to reason. It was no part of his system to depreciate either the range or the validity of human reason on its own ground. The human mind could, in some directions, far transcend the data of the senses, though never able in this life to free itself from the sense-images that haunt and limit it. Thus philosophy, according to Aquinas, can lead us to the recognition of a first cause, to the belief in the infinite power and goodness of that first cause, to a perception of the ordered and purposeful disposition of human affairs by providence, to a conviction of the spiritual nature of the human soul and its immortality, and to the recognition of other spiritual beings like us inasmuch as they are spirits, but unlike us in being no way bound to material bodies, or dependent upon them for intercourse with each other or knowledge of God. All this and more Aquinas believed was within the range of human reason, and had, as a matter of fact, been triumphantly demonstrated by the Ethnic philosophers. But to whom had it been demonstrated? And how? To the few, the very few, who have the natural gift and taste for philosophical inquiry, and the perseverance to continue for many years the arduous task of severe thinking as the main business of life, and who are also fortunate enough to be favoured by circumstances—by them, but by them only, can such knowledge be attained.

What proportion of humanity do these few constitute? Surely the many who are excluded from

this gate of knowledge have a claim to some other mode of access to the same measure of essential truth. And again, what security is there in this earthly knowledge even when attained? The great truths enumerated above as within the range of the human faculties have all been disputed, and the weight of authority against them, even though it does not prevail against the truth, must yet seem to the plain man to undermine its certainty. And may not even the philosopher himself, who has found the truth, be shaken with uncertainty, as he reflects on the intricacy of the argument through which he must thrid his way to it, the fallibility of all human systems of thought, and the greatness of the minds which have nevertheless gone astray?

Thus, even on the ground which is intrinsically open to investigation and apprehension by our faculties on earth, there is crying need of some conclusive authority that shall place the truth within the grasp of the simple rustic just as much as of the finest philosopher, and shall not only place the results within his reach but shall give him that conclusive guarantee of their truth which alone can give him rest.

Nor is it only to extend to the many what would otherwise be the privilege of the few—to substitute, if we may say so, a democracy of believers for an aristocracy of philosophers—that revelation is needed. For what does the truth accessible to philosophy give us after all? Granted that the power of the direct vision or perception of purely spiritual beings, or even of our own souls, is beyond the faculties of

man in his earthly state, and that revelation itself cannot bestow it upon him, there are nevertheless truths which the human mind is capable of receiving, and in some cases understanding, albeit it is incapable of establishing them. The significance, nay the necessity, of these for such progress towards our goal as is possible to us here on earth, we know by experience; and that the knowledge of them is, in itself, a condition of our ultimate salvation we know on the authority of that very revelation which gives us the truth. It is possible, then, for an authenticated revelation to lead us essentially forward towards our goal, even in this life. We have therefore a right to expect, and even to rely upon, such a revelation as our "due" while yet on earth.

And note that if revelation gave us nothing that philosophy could not reach, we should be tempted to think that we had grasped the whole range of truth, and had, by searching, found out God. But revelation assures us, for instance, that the material universe is not eternal, and is not an emanation from the being of God. These truths, which were inaccessible the one to Aristotle and the other to the Platonists, and which are not to be demonstrated conclusively by human reason, cut at the root of a whole series of false and misleading heresies and philosophies, which otherwise, though they could never have firmly established themselves as true, might perennially have held up their heads and defied refutation.

Again, if these truths of revelation can be grasped

by our intelligence and can be supported, though not conclusively established, by weighty and even preponderating arguments, there are others which human reason can neither reach nor grasp. Such is the doctrine of the triune Deity. It is incomprehensible; and thereby impresses upon man the limits of his own faculties in this mortal state, and so wakes a wholesome diffidence and awe; but it also removes the sense of solitariness, and aloofness from all fellowship, that the severer philosophical thought of the Supreme must almost inevitably beget. It directs the thought into channels that lead the mind up towards the conception of the Incarnation, that central doctrine of Christian soteriology, without which there is no Church and no salvation. And it is by pondering upon it that the contemplative soul can, even here, experience some reflected glow from the higher state of insight which it is destined to reach when faith is superseded by sight. For everything we can know of God must help to give definiteness to our present contemplations and to our hope of future vision, and while deepening our sense of the vastness of our still unsupplied need, must also quicken and focus our sense of the treasure that is already ours.

And lastly, the mystery of the Eucharist, while wholly unattainable by the intelligence and ungraspable by it even when believed, can by its very appeal to those senses, which more than any other doctrine it seems to defy, give the vividness of a direct perception to the spiritual conception of the universal

presence of God. For even when we are in space, and God is present to us in space, and under the apparent dimensions of space, we know that his incarnate presence in its totality is in countless places simultaneously; and thus we may more closely realise how absolutely he himself transcends the laws of space. (2)

I have now tried to work out the special points of the system of Aquinas that fall within our subject to-day. We have seen how he starts from the spiritual postulate that any fundamental and ineradicable yearning of man conveys its own guarantee of fulfilment. He goes on to show that the mystic *visio Dei* alone can fulfil man's natural and legitimate demand for conclusive blessedness; whereas his faculties and endowment are intrinsically incapable of bringing him to any such realisation. Hence the necessity of some enlargement of faculty hereafter and some supplement of the equipment for preparation here. This supplement, which we have a right to expect if not to demand, must be given us in a revelation of truths above the reach of reason but not in contradiction with it.

Thus Aquinas arrives at an *a priori* definition of the conditions which authentic revelation must comply with. Those conditions were set out at the close of the last lecture, but they may conveniently be restated here. The revelation must (*a*) put the simple believer in possession of that degree of truth which human reasoning could at best only give

to the chosen few, favoured by constitution and by circumstance; it must (*b*) raise even the profoundest thinker into a region of truth beyond his natural range, and yet (*c*) it must not contradict the reason which it transcends.

On point (*c*) we shall find Thomas hard put to it (pp. 276, 278). The doctrines of the trinity and of the real presence, to name no others, are not easily presented, in their uncompromising dogmatic form, as anything but contradictory to reason. But let that pass for the present. How far the conditions laid down *a priori* are fulfilled by the Christian revelation remains for further inquiry; but the process by which Aquinas arrives at the conditions themselves is already, I hope, sufficiently clear; and it has been our immediate business to-day to reach just this point.

The demonstration we have followed, it is true, is part of a far wider scheme, and the revelation it has led us to expect will avowedly leave man still far from his goal. For, even when enlightened by revelation, man's intelligence remains subject to its inherent limitations of incapacity to perceive or apprehend spiritual beings in their essential nature. He will still know, and with his present faculties can only know, God and the angels through their effects and not in themselves. Nay, even his own soul, in its essence, is inscrutable to him. He will, therefore, still need further and more transcendent gifts if he is to reach his goal. But the further pursuit of this theme must be deferred till we have made a more

express examination of the psychology of Thomas and the other Peripatetics (pp. 385 *sqq.*).

Meanwhile attention must be turned, at our next meeting, to the point for which we are now completely prepared, namely, the examination of the claim of the Christian Scriptures actually to be that very revelation that the demands of our nature and the limitations of our faculties have led us to expect.

NOTES TO LECTURE II

(1) *To pages* 118–120.—All creatures are directed by God towards their goal:

"Ea enim quae casu accidunt, proveniunt ut in minori parte; videmus autem hujusmodi convenientias et utilitates accidere in operibus naturae aut semper, aut in majori parte; unde non potest esse ut casu accidant; et ita oportet quod procedant ex intentione finis. Sed id quod intellectu caret vel cognitione, non potest directe in finem tendere, nisi per aliquam cognitionem ei praestituatur finis, et dirigatur in ipsum; unde oportet, cum res naturales cognitione careant, quod praeexistat aliquis intellectus, qui res naturales in finem ordinet, ad modum quo sagittator dat sagittae certum motum, ut tendat ad determinatum finem; unde, sicut percussio quae fit per sagittam non tantum dicitur opus sagittae, sed projicientis; ita etiam omne opus naturae dicitur a philosophis opus intelligentiae.

"Et sic oportet quod per providentiam illius intellectus qui praedictum ordinem naturae indidit, mundus gubernetur."—*De veritate*, q. 5: a. 2. c. (vol. ix. 76 *sq.*).

"Inde enim manifestum est omne agens agere propter finem, quia quodlibet agens tendit ad aliquod determinatum. Id autem ad quod agens determinate

tendit oportet esse conveniens ei; non enim tendet in ipsum nisi propter aliquam convenientiam ad ipsum. Quod autem conveniens est alicui est illi bonum. Ergo omne agens agit propter bonum.

"Praeterea, Finis est in quo quiescit appetitus agentis vel moventis et ejus quod movetur. Hoc autem est de ratione boni ut terminet appetitum; nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Omnis ergo actio est motus propter bonum."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. cap. 3 (vol. v. 161b).

The general question whether, and in what sense, anything can be "due" from God to the creature is often raised by Aquinas, generally in connection with the discussion of whether God can rightly be called "just." The formal act of "justice" is "reddere debitum unicuique." The "debitum" may be a debt, but it does not follow that it is. It is easy (and apparently tempting) to translate *debere* by "owe" and *debitum* by "debt"; but this narrows and materialises the discussion, both on the point now in hand and on the doctrine of the atonement.

As to "justice" and "dues," it is clear that nothing can be "due" from God to the uncreated; but in the act of creation, and "conditionally" on that act, do not certain things become conditionally "due" to the creature when once there?

"Media autem via est eligenda; ut ponatur, ea quae sunt a Deo prima volita, procedere ab ipso secundum simplicem voluntatem; ea vero quae ad hoc requiruntur, procedere secundum debitum, ex suppositione tamen: quod tamen debitum non

ostendit Deum esse debitorem rebus, sed suae voluntati, ad cujus expletionem debetur id quod dicitur procedere secundum debitum ab ipso." — *De veritate*, q. 6 : a. 2 (vol. ix. 96a).

"Ex hoc quod Deus vult aliquid, vult illa quae requiruntur ad ipsum. Quod autem ad perfectionem alicujus requiritur, est debitum unicuique."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. cap. 93 (vol. v. 63b).

And :

"Invenitur ratio debiti non ex parte agentis, cum Deus nulli sit debitor, sed ex parte recipientis : debitum enim est unicuique rei naturali ut habeat ea quae exigit sua natura, tam in essentialibus quam in accidentalibus."—*De veritate*, q. 23 : a. 6. ad 3^{m} (vol. ix. 344b).

Thus :

"Nullus sapiens homo affligitur de hoc quod non potest volare sicut avis vel quia non est Rex vel Imperator, cum sibi non sit debitum : affligeretur autem, si privaretur eo ad quod habendum aliquo modo aptitudinem habuit."—2 *Dist.*, xxxiii. q. 2 : a. 2. c. (vol. vi. 691b).

Exactly the same principle applies to merit. Can a man "earn" rewards so that they become due to him from God ?

"Deus non efficitur debitor nobis, nisi forte ex promisso, quia ipse bona operantibus praemium repromisit : et ideo non est inconveniens, si ab ipso quis mereri possit, ex quo aliquo modo debitor est." —2 *Dist.*, xxvii. q. 1 : a. 3. ad 4^{m} (vol. vi. 633b).

The relation between what is *debitum sibi* on the

part of the Deity and what is *debitum rei creatae* is sounded in the following passage:

"Est autem duplex ordo considerandus in rebus. Unus, quo aliquid creatum ordinatur ad aliud creatum: sicut partes ordinantur ad totum, et accidentia ad substantias, et una quaeque res ad suum finem. Alius ordo, quo omnia creata ordinantur in Deum. Sic igitur et debitum attendi potest dupliciter in operatione divina: aut secundum quod aliquid debetur Deo; aut secundum quod aliquid rei creatae. Et utroque modo Deus debitum reddit. Debitum enim est Deo, ut impleatur in rebus id quod eius sapentia et voluntas habet, et quod suam bonitatem manifestat: et secundum hoc iustitia Dei respicit decentiam ipsius, secundum quam reddit sibi quod sibi debetur. Debitum etiam est alicui rei creatae, quod habeat id quod ad ipsam ordinatur: sicut homini, quod habeat manus, et quod ei alia animalia serviant. Et sic etiam Deus operatur iustitiam, quando dat unicuique quod ei debetur secundum rationem suae naturae et conditionis. Sed hoc debitum dependet ex primo: quia hoc unicuique debetur, quod est ordinatum ad ipsum secundum ordinem divinae Sapientiae. Et licet Deus hoc modo debitum alicui det, non tamen ipse est debitor: quia ipse ad alia non ordinatur, sed potius alia in ipsum. Et ideo iustitia quandoque dicitur in Deo condecentia suae bonitatis; quandoque vero retributio pro meritis."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 21: a. 2. ad 3^{m} (Leon., iv. 258b).

Man's goal is the "good" in principle:

"Nostra enim cognitio ab universalibus ad specialia

procedit, ut patet i. *Physic.*; et ideo in principiis nihil cognoscimus de fini hominis nisi hoc generale quod est quoddam optimum; et sicut cognoscimus, ita desideramus."—4 *Dist.*, xlix. q. 1: a. 1. sol. 1. ad 4[m] (vol. vii. 1183).

"Agens autem per intellectum non determinat sibi finem nisi sub ratione boni; intelligibile enim non movet nisi sub ratione boni."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. cap. 3 (vol. v. 161b).

"Aestimativa [a faculty shared by the brutes] autem non apprehendit aliquod individuum, secundum quod est sub natura communi, sed solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium alicuius actionis vel passionis; sicut ovis cognoscit hunc agnum, non inquantum est hic agnus, sed inquantum est ab ea lactabilis; et hanc herbam inquantum est eius cibus. Unde alia individua ad quae se non extendit eius actio vel passio, nullo modo apprehendit sua aestimativa naturali. Naturalis enim aestimativa datur animalibus, ut per eam ordinentur in actiones proprias, vel passiones, prosequendas, vel fugiendas."—*Commentum super Libros de anima*, lib. ii. lectio 13 fin. (vol. xx. 71b).

"Quaedam sunt quae non agunt ex aliquo arbitrio, sed quasi ex aliis acta et mota, sicut sagitta a sagittante movetur ad finem. Quaedam vero agunt quodam arbitrio, sed non libero, sicut animalia irrationalia: ovis enim fugit lupum ex quodam judicio, quo existimat eum sibi noxium; sed hoc judicium non est sibi liberum, sed a natura inditum. Sed solum id quod habet intellectum, potest agere judicio libero,

inquantum cognoscit universalem rationem boni, ex qua potest judicare hoc vel illud esse bonum. Unde ubicumque est intellectus, est liberum arbitrium."—*Summa Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 59 : a. 3. c. (Leon., v. 95a).

Man of necessity desires blessedness, but is free in his estimate of its nature and in his choice of the means of attaining it :

"In omnibus particularibus bonis [ratio] potest considerare rationem boni alicuius, et defectum alicuius boni, quod habet rationem mali : et secundum hoc, potest unumquodque huiusmodi bonorum apprehendere ut eligibile, vel fugibile. Solum autem perfectum bonum, quod est beatitudo, non potest ratio apprehendere sub ratione mali, aut alicuius defectus. Et ideo ex necessitate beatitudinem homo vult, nec potest velle non esse beatus, aut miser. Electio autem, cum non sit de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, ut iam dictum est ; non est perfecti boni, quod est beatitudo, sed aliorum particularium bonorum. Et ideo homo non ex necessitate, sed libere eligit."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 13 : a. 6. c. (Leon., vi. 103a).

(2) *To pages* 140–146.—The chapters referred to on p. 140 open the *Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. Note especially cc. 25–35, culminating in the demonstration, *Quod ultima hominis felicitas consistit in contemplatione Dei.*

The ample and ardent proof of the necessity of a divine revelation (*ib.*, lib. i. cc. 3–5) paraphrased in the text is condensed and chilled in the opening of the *Summa Theologiae* :

"Necessarium fuit ad humanam salutem, esse doctrinam quandam secundum revelationem divinam, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, quae ratione humana investigantur. Primo quidem, quia homo ordinatur ad Deum sicut ad quendam finem qui comprehensionem rationis excedit, secundum illud Isaiae lxiv.: *oculus non vidit Deus absque te, quae praeparasti diligentibus te.* Finem autem oportet esse praecognitum hominibus, qui suas intentiones et actiones debent ordinare in finem. Unde necessarium fuit homini ad salutem, quod ei nota fierent quaedam per revelationem divinam, quae rationem humanam excedunt.

"Ad ea etiam quae de Deo ratione humana investigari possunt, necessarium fuit hominem instrui revelatione divina. Quia veritas de Deo, per rationem investigata, a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione multorum errorum, homini proveniret: a cujus tamen veritatis cognitione dependet tota hominis salus, quae in Deo est. Ut igitur salus hominibus et convenientius et certius proveniat, necessarium fuit quod de divinis per divinam revelationem instruatur.

"Necessarium igitur fuit, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, quae per rationem investigantur, sacram doctrinam per revelationem haberi."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 1: a. 1. c. (Leon., iv. 6).

To which may be added:

"Ergo quicunque errat circa Deum non cognoscit Deum, sicut qui credit Deum esse corpus nullo modo cognoscit Deum, sed apprehendit aliquid aliud loco

Dei. Secundum autem quod aliquid cognoscitur, secundum hoc amatur et desideratur. Qui ergo errat circa Deum, nec amare potest Deum nec desiderare eum ut finem."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. cap. 118 (vol. v. 256a).

And an extract from the paraphrased passage itself:

"Est etiam necessarium hujusmodi veritatem ad credendum hominibus proponi, ad Dei cognitionem veriorem habendam. Tunc enim solum vere Deum cognoscimus, quando ipsum credimus supra omne id, quod de Deo cogitari ab homine possibile est, eo quod naturalem hominis cognitionem divina substantia excedit. . . . Per hoc ergo quod homini de Deo aliqua proponuntur, quae rationem excedunt, firmatur in homine opinio, quod Deus sit aliquid supra id quod cogitari potest.

"Alia etiam utilitas inde provenit, scilicet praesumptionis repressio, quae est mater erroris. Sunt enim quidam tantum de suo ingenio praesumentes, ut totam naturam divinam se reputent suo intellectu posse metiri, aestimantes scilicet totum esse verum quod eis videtur, et falsum quod eis non videtur. Ut ergo ab hac praesumptione humanus animus liberatus ad modestam inquisitionem veritatis perveniat, necessarium fuit homini proponi quaedam divinitus, quae omnino intellectum ejus excederent."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. i. cap. 5 (vol. 4a).

For illustrations of the points here raised in connection with the doctrines of the Trinity and the Eucharist *vide* pp. 259 *sqq.*, 333 *sqq.*, 527 *sqq.*

LECTURE III

SCRIPTURE THE AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE

Our investigations in the last lecture expatiated over a wide area, but they were focussed at last upon the elaborate *a priori* demonstration, given by Aquinas in the *Contra Gentiles*, of the necessity for a supernatural revelation. It is easy to follow that demonstration sympathetically, and the sincerity of Thomas's belief in its validity need cause us no surprise. But it is obvious enough throughout that his intelligence is not really guided by its own inherent laws, but is rendering service to the unrecognised pressures of foregone conclusions.

The whole case stands thus: The Aristotelian philosophy, science, and psychology had fairly captured the minds of the Christian Peripatetics. Aquinas felt the truth of the new conceptions and loved the intellectual life they opened up to him. He could not do without them, and whatever his complete scheme of things might be, there must, at least, be room in it for them.

But he also loved the transformed Platonic philosophy that had been assimilated under one aspect of Christian theology and devotion. He loved it, not

on its purely intellectual and psychological side only, but also in its mystic spirit. The relativity, which is the very heart of Aristotelianism, vindicated itself as true to experience and observation, but it did not satisfy the whole demand of human nature. Plato's formal doctrine (as Thomas understood it) of self-existent "ideas" his intelligence rejected, and he could very well do without it; but Plato's sense of the Absolute was as dear to him, and constituted a much more intimate element in his devotional consciousness than the relative world of Aristotle did. He could not do without it.

With Plotinus, therefore, he accepts the goal as nothing short of the complete and conclusive acquisition of a mystic sense which will unite us with God; but he also accepts the psychology of Aristotle which will allow us no such mystic sense at all. Thus, while appearing to be both an Aristotelian and a Neoplatonist, he is in fact neither. Plotinus believed in the mystic goal, but he believed that we have the mystic sense, which only needs discipline and development to bring us to that goal. Aristotle's system recognises no such sense, but neither does it require it. For to Aristotle all that man needs for the fulfilment of his utmost desire is within the reach of his capacity under favouring conditions. The enjoyment of moderate material well-being and freedom from tragic mental distresses are *conditions* of the desirable life; and the essentials of that life itself are human companionship, friendship, and love, on the social and mutually dependent side, and on

the personal and independent side the search for truth and the contemplation of such truth as has been found, including our sublime but imperfect conceptions of spiritual beings, and of states of existence to which we cannot ourselves attain but the contemplation of which fills us with a high and ennobling delight.

To take our account of man's goal from the Neoplatonist, therefore, and our account of his constitution from Aristotle, leaves us with a huge gap in our theory. But this gap is exactly what Aquinas wants. For there was something else that he could not do without, in addition to the Platonic and Aristotelian elements we have examined. He had been nurtured in the bosom of the Christian church, he had been spiritually fed by the Christian scriptures, his deepest devotions had been taught to cling around mysteries of which Aristotle knew nothing and of which the Neoplatonists, if they seemed to know anything, knew it wrong. In a word, he wanted the Christian revelation and its promise; and they exactly fitted into the gap that he had made for them by his Platonic mysticism united with his Aristotelian ejection of the mystic sense.

Thus the necessity and reality of a revelation, which the Church had always implicitly assumed, but which it had now become necessary formally to defend, finds its organic place in the scheme of Aquinas. And moreover, by definitely severing the Platonic ecstasy from its roots in Platonic mystic psychology and emanational philosophy, he kills at a blow the philo-

sophical heresies of the Arabians, arms his reader against the dangers lurking under the expressions of the earlier Fathers, which had an emanational flavour and suggested a gradation in the Persons of the Trinity (*cf.* p. 344), and at the same time clears the way for a whole-hearted welcome to Aristotelian science. Thus we can see that his belief in a miraculous revelation unifies the whole complex of his new enthusiasms and his old organic loyalties and loves, and is in fact dictated by them, while it appears to himself to emerge in strict obedience to the claims of the naked intelligence.

It is a profoundly instructive study in the reactions between the unconscious and the conscious workings of the mind to note how Thomas,—not consciously looking for a defensible line on which to protect a foregone conclusion, but forging, in complete good faith, what he conceives to be the adamantine links which bind all truth into a coherent whole,—should have performed a feat of constructive apologetics which no adroitness of a conscious advocate could rival. As an argument, his plea can make no effective appeal to the modern mind, distrustful of fine-drawn *a priori* reasoning, and imbued with other principles and other presuppositions than his. But it is animated by a vital spirit of sincerity which retains our respect even when it can least command our assent.

The keystone of the arch, however, has still to be placed. Granted that in the nature of things we are entitled to expect a revelation, and that we know

the conditions with which it must comply, on what evidence are we called upon to accept the Christian scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as being, or as containing, that revelation?

The principal passage in which Aquinas recognises the necessity of expressly answering this question is to be found in the *Contra Gentiles*. This treatise was composed at the special request of Raymond Pinnaforte (celebrated as the collector of the Decretals), who was then the Master General of the Dominicans, for the support of the missionaries who were attempting the conversion of Saracens and others. In his great theological text-books and monographs Thomas was able to assume the authority of the Scriptures as axiomatic, because "no science has to prove its own principles." The "principles" of other sciences, if not self-evident, are received by them from "first philosophy" or metaphysics. The principles of theology are received originally from Christ himself, that is to say, from God, by the inspired writers, including especially the Apostles, who saw and heard the Word made flesh. Secondarily, they are handed down from these inspired writers to us. This is the accepted basis upon which the Christian teacher, addressing Christian students, is to rear his systematic instruction.

But now that S. Thomas is equipping his readers to deal with Saracens and Moors who do not accept any portion of the Christian scriptures—to say nothing of the Jews who reject the most important part of them—it is obviously necessary to show the rational

basis on which our faith in the Scriptures rests, for there is no other ground of appeal.

Here, then, is the argument. The necessity of revelation having been demonstrated, we are to show that the Christian scriptures, which claim to be such a revelation, comply with the required conditions, and can establish their claim to be considerately accepted as true. The Christian believer is not a light-hearted follower of "cunningly devised fables," but can give a reason for the faith that is in him.

The momentous chapter (book i. chap. 6) in which this keystone of the arch is set in position deserves to be summarised in its entirety:

The divine Wisdom's self that deigned to reveal its own secrets to men, deigned also to confirm the revelation by the exhibition of powers excelling the capacity of nature, to wit, miraculous healing of diseases, raising of the dead, changing the course of the heavenly bodies, and—yet more marvellous—the sudden inspiration of simple and unlettered folk with the height of eloquence and wisdom.

At sight of these wonders, innumerable crowds, not merely of simple folk but of the most learned of mankind, flocked to the faith; under no compulsion of arms and with no promise of delights, but rather in face of the fierce persecutions of tyrants, and the demands of the faith itself to restrain all the pleasures of the flesh, to despise all earthly objects of desire, and to believe things transcending all human intelligence. These conversions, this contempt of things seen and eager reliance upon things invisible, are

themselves the supreme miracle. And that they were no random sport of nature is proved by their having been long foretold in the prophetic oracles.

And although God still deigns to work miracles by the saints, yet, even were it not so, the past wonders would suffice; for had the world been led by simple and unknown men to beliefs so hard to accept, to deeds so hard to accomplish, to hopes of so high a flight, without any miraculous signs, this had been a miracle transcending all others.

Far other was the case of the founders of false creeds. As witness Mahomet, with the seduction of his promises of carnal delights, with the poverty of his corrupted scriptures, with the absence of confirming miracles or prophetic anticipations, with the original acceptance of his faith by savage and ignorant inhabitants of a desert, and its subsequent propagation by force of arms. (1)

The constructive part of this argument—all, that is to say, except the contrast with Islam—is adopted without modification by Dante; and it held its place, exactly as it stands, in the theological schools down to quite recent times, and I suppose holds it still. Subsequent apologists have certainly not surpassed the eloquence and passion with which it was urged by Aquinas and by Dante, and neither have they strengthened a single link in the chain of the logical argument.

No one, I think, can read this chapter of the *Contra Gentiles* or the paraphrase of it in the

twenty-fourth canto of the *Paradiso* without being moved. But as an argument, it is only impressive in its own context and environment. To the modern mind, so far as it can entertain the question of the occurrence of miracles at all, the relation between them and the authority of the teaching with which they are associated in the Bible is completely reversed. The historical credibility of the scriptural miracles is now hardly defended except on the credit of the teaching with which they are associated. The miracles, so far from being a support to the truth of the Gospel, are only a weight that it has to carry.

But our present concern is not with the weakness of the argument, but with the narrowness of the foundation which it lays in comparison with the amplitude of the erection which it is called upon to support. For the modern reader, accustomed to think of the mediæval Church in terms of the polemics of the Reformation, will not be slow to note that what we have here is a defence of the scripturalistic as against the ecclesiastical theory of the ultimate authority in matters of faith. In proving, to his own satisfaction, the conclusive and unique authority of the Scripture, Aquinas has furnished after generations of Protestants with all they want. But has he provided himself with all he wants? Emphatically not. He is, indeed, as we shall see, prepared to prove the authority of the Church by an appeal to the authority of the Scripture, but long before he has done so he assumes it without proof; for in spite of the very

explicit assignment of the sole ultimate authority to the Scriptures, and the recognition of the duty of the theologian to bring all his teaching to the test of Scripture and be content to rest upon no lower grade of assurance, we feel ourselves from the very first guided in our interpretation of Scripture by an invisible hand, and referred to clauses of the creeds, to phrases in the liturgy, or to decrees of councils, as though they were final authorities.

In one place or another of the works of Aquinas, the links which connect his practice with his theory are discoverable. Scriptural proof of the authority of the Church to interpret Scripture is alleged, and scriptural proof is offered of the existence of an extra-scriptural apostolic tradition that has the same divine origin as Scripture itself. But the significant point is, that when systematically laying the foundations of his edifice Thomas ignores the necessity of giving these proofs at all. No sooner has he vindicated or postulated the authority of Scripture than he assumes the right to appeal to the authority of the Church, or tacitly to accept her guidance in interpretating the Scriptures. And it is only incidentally that he notices the steps by which, in his own mind, he is logically justified in advancing from what he has proved or claimed to what he thenceforth assumes.

This is the more noteworthy because, in general, he is an exceptionally systematic thinker and writer. As a rule he is scrupulous to advance step by step, and if he has to anticipate a proposition, not yet established, he is careful to note the fact and to

promise the proof required further on—a promise which he may be relied on to keep with faultless fidelity.

How is it, then, that in this crucial matter he departs so radically from his general practice, and neglects the obvious requirements of his argument?

Before answering the question, let me illustrate the facts by an examination of a number of passages in the *Summa Theologiae*.

Near the beginning of that treatise Thomas lays it down that theology rests on the canonical Scripture, whenever she is arguing conclusively and on assured ground; whereas the authority of other teachers of the Church is employed only in making deductions, and it leads only to "probable" conclusions. For "our faith rests upon the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets who wrote the canonical books, and not upon the revelation made, if such there were, to any other teachers." In a later section of the same work, we find that "the arguments adduced by holy men in support of the things of faith do not amount to demonstration, but are of the nature of pleadings to show that what is laid down by faith is not impossible. Or they are derived from the principles of faith, to wit, the utterances of holy Scripture, as saith Dionysius in his second chapter *On the divine names*. Now a proof derived from these principles has the same demonstrative force to the faithful as one derived from axiomatic principles has to folk at large."*

* *Sum. Theol.*, i^a. q. 1: a. 8. ad 2^m; ii^a–ii^ae. q. 1: a. 5. ad 2^m.

Here we have 'principles of faith = utterances of holy Scripture' as an identical equation. But in other and earlier passages the equation 'principles of theology = articles of faith' has already passed unchallenged; and an "article of faith" turns out (in discussions as to the number of "articles" in the Apostles' creed) to be a separate coherent texture of truth, referring to a single dogma. The term is applied to a proposition, or group of propositions, laid down in one of the several creeds of the Church; primarily in the Apostles' creed, but no less authoritatively in the expansions and explanations of it embodied in the Nicene and Athanasian creeds. Here, then, at a stroke, we have a transition from the Scriptures alone to the body of the creeds as expressly containing the *principia fidei*, which the theologian accepts on the divine authority without being called upon to prove them. And yet no proof of the legitimacy of this transition has as yet been so much as attempted.

Now we know from a monograph on the Apostles' creed * that Aquinas believed it to have been drawn up by the Apostles themselves, so that it might come under the wider formula of "the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets who wrote the canonical books," if not under the narrower one of the "canonical Scriptures" themselves. Moreover, Thomas's exposition bristles with scriptural supports and illustrations of every clause. So that the links to justify

* Opusculum, vii., in *Symbolum Apostolorum*, scilicet "Credo in Deum" Expositio (vol. xvi. 135 *sqq.*).

the transition from the Scriptures to the Apostles' creed were completely forged and clasped in his own mind; yet he does not think it necessary, in his closely knitted systematic exposition, so much as to indicate their existence. Moreover, it is a long step from the Apostles' to the Athanasian creed; but here, too, Aquinas can give a reason for his faith. In another passage in the *Summa* we are told why creeds are needed at all. It was necessary that the diffused and spacious revelation contained in the Scriptures should be concentrated, and should be presented to the simple believer in a form easy to survey and grasp. Few can have the power and opportunity of mastering the whole body of Scripture; and, in order that the common man may even so much as intelligently assent to the faith, he must have it concisely formulated and presented to him. And this is why the "articles of faith" must be set forth in the creeds.

Now amongst the creeds, the primacy falls to the apostolic symbol, but the other creeds, while not adding to it, explain, in the face of subsequent heresies or questionings, what its meaning is. And it is the office of the Pope to reissue, in such expanded forms as the councils (summoned by him) shall have determined, the successive versions of the creeds.

Here, then, long after the conclusive authority of the creeds has been assumed, we find the claim formally put in. But it includes, in principle, far more than the creeds themselves, for it is an implicit claim to the authority of the Church to interpret the

articles of faith, and even of the Pope to interpret, or at least to formulate, the interpretation of the Church. Has the Church the same power with respect to the Scriptures? Certainly she has. This is somewhat naively and incidentally laid down in quite unmistakable words far on in the *Summa Theologiae* in answer to an objection. "Belief in all the articles of faith is clenched by one single clasp, namely, the primal truth set before us in the Scriptures, as rightly understood in accordance with the teaching of the Church." *

Naturally, the proof of this authority to interpret Scripture must be found in the Scripture itself, and so it is, but we have to search for it. The chief passages, when we find them, are John xvi. 18: "Howbeit, when he, the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide you into all truth." Luke xxii. 32: "But I have prayed for thee [Peter] that thy faith fail not: and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren."

This latter passage, together with Matt. xxviii. 20, "Lo! I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world," is cited in proof of the identity of the Apostolic Church with the later Church, and the claim of the latter to the gifts conferred upon the Apostles.

It is in virtue of this assumption that Aquinas never feels the necessity of establishing the canon, and showing us that the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, as contained in the Vulgate,

[1] *Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 5 : a. 3. ad 2^{m}.

possess, in their entirety and exclusively, the direct authentication claimed for the Revelation. Nor is he troubled with questions as to the text; for he is in truth relying on an authority that lies behind all such considerations.

Moreover, in dealing with Scripture S. Thomas is never dismayed by passages which seem to conflict with his conclusions. They are to be understood allegorically; or a word is employed in an unusual sense, or with a limited application that renders it harmless (3). In a word, the scriptural proofs are merely formal, for everything depends upon interpretation. Scripture authority is indeed the only proof that a doctrine is true. But we need the Church to tell us what the truths are that scripture authority has proved! (2)

We must try, presently, to find some explanation of this contrast between the systematic assumption of portentous deductions from the doctrine of scriptural authority and the incidental, almost casual, way in which the validity of these same deductions is demonstrated. Here we only note it.

But there is more. Not only the teaching of the Church, but her practice is taken as authoritative; and this in cases as to which no authority either of Scripture or of council is, or apparently can be, alleged.

Thus the question whether it is right violently to enforce baptism upon the children of the recalcitrant is decided in the negative, because at many periods during the earlier centuries Christian kings were in a

position to enforce baptism, and would doubtless have enforced it had the teachers of the Church recommended them so to do. The fact that they did not is proof enough that it ought not to be done.

The most striking proof, however, that the whole tradition of the Church is the real starting-point of Aquinas, is to be found in a passage on the adoration of images, which we must now examine.

The Apostles, as we have seen, are the primary channels of the divine inspiration, and it is therefore possible that the incarnate Word gave precepts to them which they handed down by oral tradition and never committed to writing. And Scripture itself proves that this was so: for Paul says:* "Therefore, brethren, stand fast, and hold the traditions which ye have been taught, whether by word or our epistle." It is clear, then, from Scripture itself that the inspired Apostles, "at the intimate prompting of the Holy Spirit handed down for observance by the Church certain things, which they did not leave in writing, which have been enjoined in the observance of the Church by successive generations of the faithful. . . . And amongst such traditions is the adoration of images of Christ. Whence also it is currently said that the blessed Luke painted the likeness of Christ, which is preserved at Rome."†

Note that here, for once, Thomas's logic is defective. Granted that he has scriptural proof of the existence of an extra-scriptural but authoritative tradition,

* 2 Thess. ii. 15.

† *Sum. Theol.* iii^{a}. q. 25: a. 3. ad 4^{m}.

it does not logically follow that every established practice of the Church, not sanctioned by Scripture, rests upon this tradition. But it is habitually assumed by Aquinas that it is so. Thus the sacrament of confirmation must have been secretly instituted by Christ by injunction to the Apostles; for the apostolic authority does not extend to the institution of fresh sacraments—and there the sacrament of confirmation is! And again, the solemn and essential formula of the consecration in the mass, *Hic est enim calyx sanguinis mei, novi et æterni testamenti: mysterium fidei: qui pro vobis et pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum*," almost exactly repeats the recorded words of the Lord, but the addition of *æterni*, and the insertion in this place of *mysterium fidei* * are derived from the tradition of the Lord which came to the Church through the Apostles, according to the text, "I have received that which also I delivered unto you." †

When we note that the two modifications in question are *not* contained in the formula which S. Paul goes on to repeat as "received and delivered by him," we can no longer doubt that, as a matter of fact, the faith of Aquinas finds its basis primarily in the authority of the Church; and that his fundamental demonstration to the unbeliever should rightly have been a demonstration of the divine authority of the Church, rather than of Scripture. And again, when addressing himself to the believer, he should have formally claimed as an initial axiom what he virtu-

* From 1 Tim. iii. 9. † 1 Cor. xi. 23.

ally assumes, namely, the authority of the Church to declare what the Scripture means and to show by her practice what the extra-scriptural tradition contained. (3)

I trust I shall not be suspected in these remarks of any carping desire to pick holes in Thomas's logic, or to replough the vexed and barren sands of obsolete polemics. My purpose is something very different. It is to throw light on the general psychology of conviction, and to draw lessons of universal application. *De nobis*, be sure (whoever we are), *fabula narratur*.

We must ask, then, how it is that so powerful and systematic a thinker as Thomas, a man moreover incapable of attempting to conceal a weakness in his own argument or to take by stealth a position to which he dare not openly advance, should be guilty of such defects of exposition and such inherent inconsistencies as we seem to have discovered.

The answer is not so difficult to find as we might have expected. Aquinas did not forge the links between his formal demonstrations (or axioms) and his practical assumptions, because he did not feel the need of them. The conviction that the ecclesiastical tradition was continuous, that the Church was its repository, and that it was founded upon the rock of direct divine authority, vouched by signs and miracles, was so ingrained in him that his acutely analytical mind was thrown off its ward. For, as he himself says in another connection, "custom, and especially custom to which we have been born, acquires the

force of nature; whence it happens that tenets with which the mind has been imbued from childhood, are as firmly held as if they were self-evident by nature."*

And again the attitude of the mediæval mind towards Scripture, the combination of sensitive and profound spiritual sympathy with entire innocence of critical or exegetical principles, the exhaustive knowledge of the text and the frequent neglect of the context, all transfused by a habit of allegorising at once systematic and irresponsible, blurred the very conception of scripture proof, and made Scripture itself into a resonant celestial echo of anything that a man's heart uttered, whether originally derived from Scripture or no.

Thus to Thomas's mind there was an organic sense of the unity and continuity of scriptural and ecclesiastical authority which made it possible for him, as he faced an unbelieving opponent, to think that, when he had proved the authority of Scripture, he had done all that was needed and that he might then assume the authority of the Church; and still more that, when he was facing a fellow-believer, in assuming the authority of Scripture, he had already assumed the authority of the Church. The formal obligation to establish the links would be readily enough admitted, and it was met whenever it was recognised, but it did not obtrude itself; and, at what appear to us the supreme critical moments, it was not even felt.

* *Contra Gentiles*, lib. i. cap. 2; *cf.* p. 229.

The voice to which the reason of Aquinas bowed its head in humble submission came to him echoed by the Scriptures, but it issued from the Church. Yet his own belief is firm and genuine that he is submitting primarily to the Scripture and only consequentially to the Church. The great demonstration in the *Contra Gentiles* and the bold axiomatic claim in the *Summa Theologiae* refer to the Scripture alone, and in their places they stand isolated and self-sufficing as though needing no supplement or consequential developments. (4)

Yet, when we have picked up, where we can find them, the links of the argument, and when we reckon its strength against the load it has to carry, we must be filled with a strange but wholesome self-questioning as to the part that reason has really played in any conclusion of our own to which it seems to have brought us—if that conclusion squares with our prejudices, our passions, our interests, our creed, or our theory. The lesson is as much needed by science and by philosophy as it is by theology; and surely there could hardly be a more impressive warning to every earnest searcher for the truth than is here afforded by Aquinas. Even the most honest and intellectually keen apologist may bore a needle-eye through some intellectual obstruction to his faith, by what he honestly believes to be a perfectly sound and legitimate method, and may then straightaway assume not only that a camel can pass through it, but that all his own particular drove of camels has already performed the feat, and is safe on the other side.

The power of seeing the obvious but unexpected, for which our accepted scheme, whatever it may be, finds no place, is one of the rarest and most precious gifts of the true hunter after truth; and the willingness to admit through the gate of truth, at half price, everything for which there is a place waiting in his own theory is one of the most fatal weaknesses that beset him.

Here our investigation of this branch of our subject might seem to have its natural close. But this is very far from being the case. The proof of the authority of Scripture in the *Contra Gentiles* is given without misgiving or qualification, and there is no hint throughout that treatise that Aquinas felt it to be anything short of conclusive or to need any development. But the conviction has forced itself upon us that, in spite of the evident sincerity of his intention, he has not here admitted us into the true psychology of his belief; and the passages in the *Summa Theologiae* and other works that have hitherto been cited hardly give us adequate light upon it.

Such light, however, is to be found in another connection. The *Contra Gentiles* deals only cursorily with the nature of Christian faith, but in the Commentary on the *Sentences*, in the *De veritate*, and in the second part of the *Summa Theologiae*, the subject is treated at length, and we are startled to find in all these contexts the assertion, in apparent contradiction with the impression produced in the *Contra Gentiles* and elsewhere, that the demonstration of the validity

of the articles of faith is not intellectually compelling, and that faith would lose its nature and its worth if they were.

It is an essential part of the scheme of Aquinas that faith is meritorious. The bliss of heaven is indeed the free gift of God, and no man can deserve it, or earn it, in the full sense. But man, in the exercise of his free will, must co-operate with the divine grace, and in this co-operation there is merit. Now nothing is meritorious except what is voluntary, and our assent to an unassailable intellectual proof is not voluntary but compelled. We "know" everything that has been shown to follow inevitably from the axioms, and we cannot help assenting to it. We do not "choose to think" it, we do not "believe" it; we "know" it. But faith is distinct from knowledge, and the same person cannot both "know" and "believe" the same thing in the same sense at the same time. Belief may be as confident as knowledge, but it is not the same thing; and no more is faith the same as "sight" or "vision" in the larger sense of the words. Here, as so often, the use of familiar words with an unfamiliar shade of meaning is apt to mislead us. We, too, distinguish between "knowing" and "believing," but most of us would have no hesitation in saying that we "know" the earth to be round and not flat; or if we declined to say we "knew" it, but said we "believed" it, that would imply some reservation or want of certainty. With Aquinas this is not the case. In his language we may be absolutely "certain" of a thing we do not

"know" but "believe." Indeed, this is of the essence of true and full faith. The difference is in the process by which the certainty is reached, not in the degree of certainty actually attained. The precise nature of this difference we shall examine in a few moments, but provisionally we may say that when the intelligence "knows," it cannot help knowing; but when it believes, it does so at the bidding of the will, and the belief shares in the voluntariness of a "choice." It is only because the act of faith is indirectly an act of the will, as well as directly an act of the intelligence, that it is meritorious at all.

To understand this, we must go back to the relations between the intelligence and the will which we have already touched upon in another connection.* The proper object of the intelligence is the True. The proper object of the will is the Good. We have already seen that the leading idea of will is not effort or resolution, or a putting forth of power, but a choosing, or taking to ourselves, of that which is "understood" by us to be good. The reactions then between the intelligence and the will are close and continuous. The will may recognise truth as a special form of the Good, and if it does so it will choose and appropriate it to itself, to long for when absent; but to rest in, when secured, with that satisfied but still keen love that lives in fruition. And again the intelligence, which thirsts for all truth, seeks to know the truth about the nature of the Good in the abstract, and of every special good

* Pages 123 *sqq.*; *cf.* pp. 270 *sqq.*; and *Excursus* ii.

in particular. But when the intelligence has discovered that this or that is "good," its own nature is satisfied. It reposes in the bare recognition of the truth that this thing *is* good, and it is thereby appeased by the joy of fruition. Not so the will. Having learned from the intelligence that the thing is good, it sways to it, claims it for itself, and can rest only in the possession of it, not in the mere recognition of its goodness. Now this choosing, or appropriation of the thing chosen, on the general ground of its intellectually recognisable goodness, not on the immediate impulse of direct and concrete attraction, is what makes the *voluntus*, or will, not only an appetite, but an intellectual appetite. By it man is distinguished from the brutes, and in virtue of it he realises open alternatives and chooses between them on principle and with discrimination (well or ill applied), not on a mere thrust of impulse.

With respect to faith, what the intelligence of itself perceives is that the demand to believe the mysteries that transcend its own scope is not arbitrary. Weighty reasons can be urged for such belief, but they are not compelling. Further, the intellect can see that it is good to believe them, and that they are not inherently impossible to believe. The will, therefore (and remember that the will, in its seeking and in its resting alike, acts as "love"), receiving from the intelligence good reasons for choosing faith, chooses it, and in its turn bids the intelligence to accept as true what it has already seen to be *possible* and *good* to believe.

Now at first sight, as I have said, this doctrine strikes us as contradicting the line of argument adopted in the *Contra Gentiles*, in which Aquinas, with what looks like a triumphant sense of conclusiveness, urges his *reductio ad incredibilius*, and seems to think that he has compelled assent. But the contradiction at once begins to soften when we note that the alleged incompleteness in the intellectual credentials of faith consists essentially in their indirectness. The object of intellectual assent is truth, and if the intellect were compelled by proof to accept the doctrines of faith, it would have to be by a direct demonstration of their truth, which by hypothesis is impossible. The will bids the intelligence to accept not the *demonstrated truth* of the doctrines themselves —the intelligence would need no bidding to accept the truth if it were demonstrated—but the *authority* of the Christian revelation. And obedience to this command cannot possibly give the intelligence its own proper rest in fruition. The intelligence then, at the bidding of the will, or in our parlance, the mind at the bidding of the heart, accepts as true, without qualification, what it cannot see to be true, but has, on its own motion, seen to be possible and good to believe. It has indeed received adequate though indirect reason to "believe" the doctrines to be true, and it does so "believe" in them and is "certain" of them, but it does not and cannot "know" them, because they are not proved to it. Thus faith is primarily an act of the intelligence, but it is dictated by the will, though the will in its

turn dictated it on the strength of data supplied by the intelligence.

Now, if we consider the matter, we shall see that this is a proceeding to which the intelligence is perfectly well accustomed on other fields. To return to an example that Thomas himself supplies. Which of us, belonging to the great unscientific public, "knows," in the Thomist sense, that the earth is spherical and not flat? We may be quite certain of it, but it is because, for reasons we consider good, we have accepted the authority of certain persons who tell us that it is so. Our intelligence has received no complete and direct satisfaction in the matter, and ought still to be in a state of restless curiosity and inquiry; but meanwhile we "choose" rather to accept as true what our teachers tell us than to refuse to believe anything that our own intelligence has not yet fathomed. To do this is the merit of the pupil. To refuse to do it is arrogance.

Thus the imperfection of the arguments for faith, as addressed to the intelligence, is necessarily implied in the indirectness of their appeal. However conclusive, or even compelling, the arguments for accepting the authority of Scripture or of the Church might be, the intelligence cannot be directly satisfied in its own nature of the truth of the doctrines themselves. It must "accept" them, and cannot "know" their truth as it knows the truths deduced from mathematical and logical axioms.

Once more to summarise:—We "know" the axiomatic and self-evident truths, and whatever else can

be shown to be involved in them and to follow necessarily from them. These we do not "choose" to know, for we cannot now help knowing them, though, of course, our looking into the question before we knew may have been a matter of choice. But "belief," in the strict theological meaning of the term, is not knowledge. The two are incompatible; for belief means "taking on faith," and we do not take on faith what we "know." If ever we come to know what we once took on faith, we take it on faith no longer. But we may be and ought to be just as certain, nay, more certain, of what we "believe," in this sense, than we are of what we "know"; for the intellect, though it cannot receive adequate demonstration of the truth of the mysterious doctrines of Christianity and therefore cannot "know" that they are true, can nevertheless receive something better than adequate grounds for "thinking" that they are true, namely, adequate grounds for "believing" their truth, that is to say, wholeheartedly accepting and assenting to them, on an authority whose credentials it has itself examined and passed. The "merit" of faith, then, belongs to the will; but seeing that the ultimate bliss consists primarily in the vision of God, which is vouchsafed to the intelligence, it is this latter that receives the "reward." (5)

The relations and interactions between the will and the intelligence are admittedly amongst the most intricate branches of the Thomist psychology, but in this particular case I think we shall hardly fail to

see underlying the whole exposition a true and searching analysis of the psychology of conversion, of religious conviction, and of doubt. We will begin with the points that Aquinas himself brings out most clearly and explicitly. The proof of the mysteries of the Christian faith being indirect, and the intelligence having accepted it at the bidding of the will, the intelligence itself has not received its proper satisfaction, nor will receive it until the consummation of all things. The intelligence, then, is not at rest, and its restlessness may take several different forms. It may, with Anselm, Abelard, or Aquinas himself, occupy itself in the attempt to find points of contact or analogy between its own processes and conclusions, and the higher truths that it cannot directly reach, reverently and sensitively withdrawing whenever such tentacular investigation encounters obstacles that must be respected. And further, it may draw conclusions from the premises it receives on faith, which will have such validity as any other deductions from assured premises have. But, on the other hand, the restlessness of the intellect may take the form of a rebellion against the service laid upon it by the will and a demand for full leave to go its own way and draw its own conclusions. This would be proud rebellion. Midway between these two may be the state of the intelligence that accepts the legitimacy of the authority that bids it assent to the articles of faith, but finds itself unable to obey! This would naturally, and indeed inevitably, be so if these articles should appear not only to transcend but flatly to contradict

ing down of an elaborate dogmatic creed, may be either delayed or accelerated by moral or æsthetic sympathies. (6)

But it is specially in the consideration of conversions from one creed to another that involve the acceptance, not of a less but of a more elaborate dogmatic scheme, that the profundity of the analysis of faith given us by Aquinas reveals itself. There may indeed be cases of such conversions that are primarily intellectual in their origin and progress. Not only is the old creed rejected or transcended because the intellect pronounces it inadequate, but the new creed is accepted because the intellect assents to it on its own motion. But in the great majority of cases of individual conversion, is it not true that the intelligence and the will take very much the part that Aquinas assigns to them? A general type of character, or a spiritual tone and atmosphere, or a way of facing life and appraising spiritual values, attracts the convert and makes him feel as if he would be at home in the atmosphere of the Church towards which he is drawn. And on this he either naively accepts the creed as likely to be true because its fruits are so desirable, or he gradually allows his sympathies to infect his belief, and finds himself accepting statements as true because he sees the profession of them constantly associated with expressions of a feeling or manifestations of a spirit that attracts him; and he is assured that these graces really draw their strength from the acceptance of certain beliefs as true. These beliefs then are

"good to hold," it is evident that they are "possible to hold," and there is good "authority" for holding them. Hold them, then, he will and does—or thinks he does.

What is all this in effect but the will ordering the intelligence to believe?

Again, it is impossible to read the early Christian Apologists, or Augustine's *Confessions*, or Bede's *Ecclesiastical History*, without feeling that whatever it was that drew the heirs of Greek and Roman civilisation, or the great Barbarian communities, to the Christian faith, it was not a process of reasoning that convinced the intelligence of the superior claims of the new creed. The creed was accepted either on the authority of those whom the converts felt to be their superiors, or because of the attractive power of the type of life, aspiration, or devotion, with which it was associated.

And the same analysis which explains why men accept intellectual conclusions on other than intellectual grounds, thereby planting in their minds the possible seeds of future doubt, explains the intellectual conservatism (hardening on the one hand into sincere obscurantism, and putrefying on the other into insincere apologetics) which is the endemic disease of all "institutions" resting on a dogmatic basis. Whenever the profession of beliefs opens or keeps open the way to advantages or opportunities, spiritual or practical, the will pleads with the intelligence to accept these beliefs as true. With the change and progress of knowledge and

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thought, the stability of dogmatic systems is perpetually threatened; and since the spiritual and devotional life naturally feels the shock of a disturbance of the intellectual basis on which it has been accustomed to rest, it is natural that the Church, as an institution, and many individual believers, should be inclined to caution and conservatism in scientific and philosophic thought. It is impossible that the Church should welcome anything which threatens beliefs which are honestly felt to be "good" to hold. Hence her constant tendency first to denounce and attempt to suppress intellectual developments which she regards as hostile, and then, when this becomes hopeless, to find room for them by judicious concessions, yielding positions which she does not regard as vital. But, all the while, there is the danger of the breach widening between the representatives of the spiritual and those of the intellectual life of a community, or between the faith and the intelligence of the individual.

Now, as long as the intelligence is, so to speak, spontaneously and unconsciously infected by the will or the emotions, these reactions simply mean that most men's minds are not built on analytical lines, that their movements are concrete and synthetic, and that "heart and mind," whether "according well" or not, at any rate work together somehow, without any conscious striking of a bargain. But when the conscious strain does rise, and the unconscious or "subliminal" accommodation is dragged up above the

"threshold" and men begin to defend a doctrine, not because they believe it to be true but because they cannot afford to confess it to be false or insecure, then the graduated degradation sets in, and the apologist stamps a coin of base alloy with the imprint of the royal mint of truth, because he fears that not to do so would have woeful results, perhaps spiritual, perhaps material; and perhaps social, perhaps institutional, perhaps personal—and bankruptcy is more terrible to him than forgery or "coining."

Enough has been said to illustrate the thesis that, in the doctrine of faith, as an act of the intellect motived by the will, Aquinas has given us a revealing analysis of the unconscious side of the process of conversion, of the origin of doubt, of the spontaneous and legitimate conservatism of the Church, of the shrinking of the believer from those who reject what he feels to be essential to the health of the soul, and of his natural instinct to condemn them, even when he admits their honesty.

But this instinct of condemnation, however natural, is deplorable in the extreme. The suspicion or conviction that a belief which has been found "good to hold" is not really tenable, must in many cases bring inevitable suffering, but if the sufferer could rely on respect and sympathy, instead of anticipating condemnation and alienation, from those who have hitherto been his spiritual kin, how much of his burden might be lifted, and how much the temptation to insincere profession might be relaxed!

But how are we to explain it that Aquinas re-

presents as "meritorious" the process which we can only respect, or really understand, when it is unconscious. Surely what is unconscious is neither blameworthy nor meritorious. We all of us unconsciously believe things because we want to believe them; but as soon as we recognise that our belief rests upon our wish, we cease really to believe at all, and if our will insists that we must believe, such insistence is an attempt to do violence to the intellect, and can hardly do more than extract a confession in lieu of imposing a conviction. How, then, can a conviction dictated by the will be "meritorious"?

We cannot for a moment question the sincerity of Aquinas. But we have not yet found any clear light as to the psychology of his personal faith. Has he not told us that the merit of faith lies in the will to believe, and that the intellect is neither compelled to believe nor satisfied and appeased in its own proper nature by the beliefs it accepts? Does he not contemplate the possibility of honest disbelief, and yet insist on belief as meritorious? Does it not look as if he were dragging above the "threshold" of consciousness the processes that can only be innocent and wholesome when they are subconscious; and yet as though he were still commending them?

To these questions a careful comparison of the numerous references to the nature of faith in the works of Aquinas will give us an answer; but, before looking at a selection of them, let us try to get some further insight into the state of mind of an actual "doubter" in the thirteenth century.

The difficulty of believing, so far as I have noted, always centres round the mystery of the Eucharist. Many miraculous confirmations of the doctrine of transubstantiation are recorded in mediæval books, such as that of the patina that filled with blood when the wafer was broken, or that of an infant appearing in the place of the wafer. The miracle of Bolsena in 1263 was of this kind, and the cathedral of Orvieto, built in commemoration of it, records it in the frescoes of one of its chapels.

Joinville tells us a moving story of one of those very doubters for whose solace such miracles were supposed to be vouchsafed; and it will help us to find the clue we are seeking. Joinville is telling of a conversation he had with Saint Louis:—"He said that William, bishop of Paris, had told him how a certain great master of divinity had come to him and said he wanted to speak with him. And he said, 'Master, what is your pleasure?' And when the master thought to speak to the bishop he began to weep bitterly. And the bishop said to him: 'Master, speak out, for no man can sin so much but that God can pardon more.'—'But I tell you, Sire,' said the master, 'that I cannot choose but weep; for I doubt me I am an unbeliever, inasmuch as I cannot drive my heart to believe in the sacrament of the altar, as holy Church teaches it; yet well I know that it is a temptation of the enemy.'

"'Master,' said the bishop, 'now tell me. When the enemy sends you this temptation, take you pleasure in it?'—And the master said: 'Nay, Sire,

but it is grievous to me even to the uttermost.'— 'And now I ask you,' said the bishop, 'whether you would take gold or silver to utter with your mouth aught against the sacrament of the altar, or the other holy sacraments of the Church?'—'I, Sire!' said the master. 'Know that there is nought in the world that I would take. Nay, rather would I choose to have every limb torn from my body than to utter such a word.'

"'Now will I speak to you of another matter,' said the bishop. 'You know that the king of France is at war with the king of England; and you know that the castle hardest by their frontier is la Rochelle in Poitou. Now I will ask you a question: If the king had given you la Rochelle on the perilous frontier to defend, and had given me the castle of Montlhéry to hold, which is in the heart of France, in a land at peace, to which would the king owe the more grace, at the end of the war—to you who had held la Rochelle, or to me who had held the castle of Montlhéry?'—'Why, in God's name, Sire,' said the master, 'to me who had held la Rochelle.'

"'Master,' said the bishop to him, 'I tell you that my heart is like the castle of Montlhéry; for no temptation have I, nor any doubt, as to the sacrament of the altar. Wherefore I tell you that, for once that God shall hold me in his grace for that I kept my faith in security and peace, four times shall he do it for you for that you held your heart for him in the war of tribulation, and hast such good will toward him that for no earthly thing, nor for no

despite man might work on your body, would you desert him. Wherefore I bid you be well at ease, for your state is better pleasing to our Lord than is mine.' "*

Now here we see clearly enough that the "master" was quite sure that it was "a temptation of the devil" that he had to deal with. That is to say, he was convinced all the time that the thing he could not "believe" (*i.e.* wholeheartedly accept as "certain") was really true all the same.

It is worth while to elaborate and define this point. And if we return to Aquinas and search for sidelights, we shall not search in vain. We find in one passage not only the familiar phrase that faith is the act of the intellect at the bidding of the will, but the expansion that the will is "moved of God by grace"; in another (in answer to an objection), we find that the believer is induced to accept the authority of the divine teaching by the miracles "and also, which is more, by the inward prompting of God who invites him to believe"; and finally, in another connection we learn that when the gift of wisdom is "infused" into the believer's mind, he is drawn by a certain "experience and natural affinity to divine things, which comes about through love which unites us to God," and that this gives him a kind of connaturally sound judgment as to divine things, as one of chaste mind has a naturally sound judgment in matters of chastity.† (7)

* *Histoire de saint Louis*, ix. [46–49].

† *Sum. Theol.*, ii^a–ii^{ae}. q. 45 : a. 2. c.

And so, after all, at the end of the chapter, the great Catholic theologian joins the Reformers, with their ultimate appeal to the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*, and the Quakers, with their "inner light." In all these cases it is open to the disinterested student to inquire into the actual genesis—metaphysical, rational, traditional, or emotional—of the believer's creed, but he must tax no man with insincerity for his firm belief that it is derived direct from the fountain of Truth.

The psychology of faith and doubt as conceived by Aquinas is now no longer clouded to us. To the confirmed "habit of faith," so long as it endures, doubt and "knowledge" are equally impossible, and the certainty of "belief" is never shaken. Is it wonderful that, if one who thought he had achieved the "habit of faith" finds his intellect recalcitrant, refusing to "believe" inasmuch as it cannot "know," and losing its feeling of "connatural affinity" to the things of faith, he should recognise in his present experience an assault of the devil, and should fear that he is losing or has lost the grace of God? It is only this belief that can justify him in attempting to force his intelligence into submission. Were he to cease to believe that his doubt is a temptation of Satan, the father of lies, and should he still try, for his own ease or advantage, to give a soporific to his intelligence and hypnotise it into assent, that were indeed a sinful attempt to "believe in Christ against conscience."

When we turn back from this long examination

of Thomas's teaching on the subject of faith to the *Contra Gentiles*, in which this subject is only touched upon, we note a striking contrast, which will now no longer appear to be an inconsistency. In dealing with faith, we find, underlying the whole treatment, and occasionally cropping up at the surface, the consciousness that the doctrines of revelation are attractive; whereas, in the *Contra Gentiles*, the whole stress of the argument falls upon the apparently insuperable difficulties of accepting the Christian revelation, the recalcitrance of man's natural instincts against it, and the miracles that were necessary to confirm it. The belief that faith is inspired by grace explains the contrast and removes the contradiction. To the natural man, the doctrines of faith and the practice of Christian virtues and abstinences are alike repellant; but to one in a state of grace, they are attractive. The unbeliever, then, must be attacked, in the first instance, indirectly, and must have his respect and attention forced by the stupendous miracles that foreshadowed and accompanied the revelation, and by its victory over apparently invincible obstructions. But, though the *Contra Gentiles* leaves the formal argument at that point, it is throughout a noble attempt to infect the reader with the very faith which makes Christianity attract in its own power instead of repelling.

The whole body of natural religion is so expounded as to clear it from all hostile or misleading errors, and, at the same time, to make it point directly to a revelation beyond itself. The Scriptures in the

first three books are used only in illustration, not as proofs, but their piercing power and insight and the splendour of their appeal to the heart and head are so brought out in almost every page as to predispose the reader to commit himself to their guidance; the doctrine of grace (though not that of faith) is so introduced as to seem inevitably to follow upon the dictates of reason; the humanly inaccessible goal of the *visio Dei* is itself represented as demanded by reason, and in its turn is made to imply revelation and mystery; and the deep enthusiasm and conviction of the writer give unity and continuity to the whole progress.

The *Contra Gentiles* is undoubtedly the greatest achievement of S. Thomas Aquinas. It is obvious enough to the modern reader that the conclusion inspires the argument, and does not rest upon it; but the work is a superb monument to the faith that inspired it. It is impossible not to be impressed by its grandeur. It sweeps the eye of the spirit upward from its base to its summit, and the lines on which it rises lift our souls towards the fulfilment of their promise, even if they find it not where Aquinas found it. (8)

NOTES TO LECTURE III

(1) *To pages* 162 *sq.*—The passage here paraphrased must be taken to refer solely to the preaching of the Apostles. For the Jews ought to have believed in Christ himself even without miracles. For:

"Interior instinctus, quo Christus poterat se manifestare sine miraculis exterioribus, pertinet ad virtutem primae veritatis, quae interius hominem illuminat et docet."

Joan. xv. 24: *Si opera non fecissem in eis quae nullus alius fecit, peccatum non haberent*, does not contradict this, for:

"Inter illa opera quae Christus in hominibus fecit, annumerari etiam debet vocatio interior, qua quosdam attraxit. . . . Annumerari etiam debet ejus doctrina, cum etiam ipse dicat: *Si non venissem, et locutus eis non fuissem, peccatum non haberent.*" —*Quodlibet*, ii. a. 6. ad 3^{m} and 1^{m} (vol. ix. 477b).

(2) *To pages* 164–170.—Theology is above all other sciences, and receives its *principia* by revelation:

"Non enim accipit sua principia ab aliis scientiis, sed immediate a Deo per revelationem."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 1: a. 5. ad 2^{m} (Leon., iv. 16b).

These revealed "principia" are the utterances of Scripture, and upon them theology builds as other sciences build upon axiomatic truths, or truths they have received from a higher science:

"Rationes quae inducuntur a Sanctis ad probandum ea quae sunt fidei non sunt demonstrativae, sed persuasiones quaedam manifestantes non esse impossibile quod in fide proponitur. Vel procedunt ex principiis fidei, scilicet ex auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae: sicut Dionysius dicit, ii.* cap. *De Div. Nom.* Ex his autem principiis ita probatur aliquid apud fideles sicut etiam ex principiis naturaliter notis probatur aliquid apud omnes."—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 1 : a. 5. ad 2^{m} (Leon., viii. 17a).

The utterances of Scripture, then, are the *principia* of theology. The passage from Dionysius runs:

"Igitur universaliter non est audendum dicere aliquid nec etiam cogitare de supersubstantiali et occulta Deitate praeter ea quae divinitus nobis ex sanctis eloquiis sunt expressa."—Opusculum Theol., vii., *Commentum in Lib. de div. nominibus*, cap. 1, lectio 1, Text (vol. xv. 260).

As Dionysius repeats these words with renewed emphasis a little further on, he shall be allowed, for once, to speak in his own language:

Καθόλου τοιγαροῦν οὐ τολμητέον εἰπεῖν, οὔτε μὴν ἐννοῆσαι τι περὶ τῆς ὑπερουσίου καὶ κρυφίας θεότητος, παρὰ τὰ θειωδῶς ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν λογίων ἐκπεφασμένα.—Migne's edition, Paris, 1815 (vol. i. 588 A).

Many other citations might be added. The *ex-*

* *I.e.* § 2 of cap. i. in the editions.

clusive authority of the Scripture is emphasised in such passages as the following:

"Auctoritatibus autem canonicae Scripturae utitur [sacra doctrina] proprie, ex necessitate argumentando. Auctoritatibus autem aliorum doctorum ecclesiae, quasi arguendo ex propriis, sed probabiliter. Innititur enim fides nostra revelationi Apostolis et Prophetis factae, qui canonicos libros scripserunt: non autem revelationi, si qua fuit aliis doctoribus facta." —*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 1: a. 8. ad 2^{m} (Leon., iv. 22b).

And note the *singularis* in the concluding paragraph of the following citation. Thomas has been insisting on the distinction between the truths of religion that are accessible to the human intelligence and those which can only be known by revelation. As to this *duplex modus* of knowledge he goes on:

"Dico autem duplicem veritatem divinorum, non ex parte ipsius Dei, qui est una et simplex Veritas, sed ex parte cognitionis nostrae, quae ad divina cognoscenda diversimode se habet.

"Ad primae igitur veritatis manifestationem per rationes demonstrativas, quibus adversarius convinci possit, procedendum est. Sed quia tales rationes ad secundam veritatem haberi non possunt, non debet esse ad hoc intentio, ut adversarius rationibus convincatur, sed ut ejus rationes, quas contra veritatem habet, solvantur, quum veritati fidei ratio naturalis contraria esse non possit, ut ostensum est.

"Singularis vero modus convincendi adversarium contra huiusmodi veritatem, est ex auctoritate Scripturae divinitus confirmata miraculis. Quae enim

supra rationem humanam sunt, non credimus nisi Deo revelante. Sunt tamen, ad huiusmodi veritatem manifestandam, rationes aliquae verisimiles inducendae, ad fidelium quidem exercitium et solatium, non autem ad adversarios convincendos; quia ipsa rationum insufficientia eos magis in suo errore confirmaret, dum aestimarent nos propter tam debiles rationes, veritati fidei consentire."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. i. cap. 9, princ. (vol. v. 6a).

In complete harmony with this is the definition of the task of Christian theologian in the proem of the fourth book of the *Contra Gentiles*, in which we are told, with respect to revealed truths transcending human intelligence, that the theologian must prove them from Scripture, must confess that he cannot completely understand them, and must show that though above reason they do not run counter to it:

"Restat autem sermo habendus de his quae nobis revelata sunt divinitus ut credenda, excedentia intellectum humanum.

"Circa quae qualiter procedendum sit praemissa verba nos docent. Cum enim veritatem vix audierimus in sermonibus sacrae Scripturae, quasi stilla parva ad nos descendente, nec possit aliquis in hujus vitae statu tonitruum magnitudinis intueri [*cf.* Job xxvi. 14], erit hic modus servandus ut ea quae in sermonibus Sacrae Scripturae sunt tradita quasi principia sumantur; et sic ea quae in sermonibus praedictis occulte nobis traduntur studeamus utcumque mente capere, a laceratione infidelium defendendo; ut tamen praesumptio perfecte cognoscendi non adsit. Probanda

enim sunt hujusmodi auctoritate sacrae Scripturae, non autem ratione naturali; sed tamen ostendendum est quod rationi naturali non sunt opposita, ut ab impugnatione infidelium defendantur." — *Contra Gentiles*, lib. iv. cap. 1, fin. (vol. v. 292b *seq.*).

And yet, side by side with these, are closely parallel passages, in which the *principia* of theology are said to be the *articuli fidei*:

"Sicut aliae scientiae non argumentantur ad sua principia probanda, sed ex principiis argumentantur ad ostendendum alia in ipsis scientiis, ita haec doctrina non argumentatur ad sua principia probanda, quae sunt articuli fidei; sed ex eis procedit ad aliquid aliud ostendendum; sicut Apostolus, i. ad *Cor.* xv, ex resurrectione Christi argumentatur ad resurrectionem communem probandam.

Sed tamen considerandum est in scientiis philosophicis, quod inferiores scientiae nec probant sua principia, nec contra negantem principia disputant, sed hoc relinquunt superiori scientiae: suprema vero inter eas, scilicet metaphysica, disputat contra negantem sua principia, si adversarius aliquid concedit: si autem nihil concedit, non potest cum eo disputare, potest tamen solvere rationes ipsius. Unde sacra scriptura, cum non habeat superiorem, disputat cum negante sua principia: argumentando quidem, si adversarius aliquid concedat eorum quae per divinam revelationem habentur; sicut per auctoritates sacrae doctrinae disputamus contra haereticos, et per unum articulum contra negantes alium. Si vero adversarius nihil credat eorum quae divinitus revelantur, non

remanet amplius via ad probandum articulos fidei per rationes, sed ad solvendum rationes, si quas inducit, contra fidem."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 1 : a. 8. c. (Leon., iv. 21b *sq.*).

Compare:

"Sacra doctrina procedit ex articulis fidei," *Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 1 : a. 2. ob. 1 (Leon., iv. 8a), and "Sacra doctrina, cuius principia, scilicet articuli fidei, *et cet*," *Ib.*, a. 5. ob. 1 (*ib.*, 16a).

We shall see directly that these *articuli fidei* derive their authority from Scripture; and therefore are not strictly *principia*, though they are immediately and authoritatively deduced from them. But the curious point is that before this claim has been substantiated, or even made, they are treated as ultimate authorities.

For these "articuli fidei" are nothing less than the clauses of the several creeds. Compare *Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 1 : a. 8. (*Utrum articuli fidei convenienter enumerentur*), which is an analysis of the Apostles' Creed, and *ib.*, a. 9. (*Utrum convenientur articuli fidei in symbolo ponantur*), ad 2^{m}. "In omnibus symbolis eadem fidei veritas docetur. Sed ibi oportet populum diligentius instrui de fidei veritate ubi errores insurgunt, ne fides simplicium per haereticos corrumpatur. Et haec fuit causa quare necesse fuit edere plura symbola. Quae in nullo alio differunt nisi quod in uno plenius explicantur quae in alio continentur implicite, secundum quod exigebat haereticorum instantia," and *ib.*, a. 10. c. "Ad illius ergo auctoritatem pertinet editio symboli ad cuius auctoritatem pertinet sententialiter determinare ea

quae sunt fidei, ut ab omnibus inconcussa fide teneantur. Hoc autem pertinet ad auctorem Summi Pontificis, *ad quem majores et difficiliores Ecclesiae quaestiones referuntur*, ut dicitur in *Decretis*, dist. xvii. Unde et Dominus, Luc. xxii., Petro dixit, quem Summum Pontificem constituit: *Ego pro te rogavi, Petre, ut non deficiat fides tua: et tu aliquando conversus confirma fratres tuos.* Et huius ratio est quia una fides debet esse totius Ecclesiae: secundum illud i. *ad Cor.* i.: *Idipsum dicatis omnes, et non sint in vobis schismata.* Quod servari non posset nisi quaestio fidei de fide * exorta determinaretur per eum qui toti Ecclesiae praeest, ut sic eius sententia a tota Ecclesia firmiter teneatur. Et ideo ad solam auctoritatem Summi Pontificis pertinet nova editio symboli: sicut et omnia alia quae pertinent ad totam Ecclesiam, ut congregare synodum generalem et alia huiusmodi."—(Leon., viii. 21, 23b, 24.)

References to the creeds as a final authority are, accordingly, frequent.

In further illustration of the points brought out on p. 164 *sq.* of the Lecture the following passages may be cited:

"Veritas fidei in sacra Scriptura diffuse continetur et variis modis, et in quibusdam obscure; ita quod ad eliciendum fidei veritatem ex sacra Scriptura requiritur longum studium et exercitium, ad quod non possunt pervenire omnes illi quibus necessarium est cognoscere fidei veritatem, quorum plerique, aliis

* The words *de fide* are apparently inserted in the Leonine edition by error. Or, alternatively, *fidei* should be omitted.

negotiis occupati, studio vacare non possunt. Et ideo fuit necessarium ut ex sententiis sacrae Scripturae aliquid manifestum summarie colligeretur quod proponeretur omnibus ad credendum. Quod quidem non est additum sacrae Scripturae, sed potius ex sacra Scriptura assumptum."—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 1 : a. 9. ad 1^{m} (Leon., viii. 23).

Here the derivative nature of the authority of the creeds, as against the primary authority of the Scripture, is expressly recognised. And the same thing is again asserted a little afterwards—but with a significant qualification :

"Omnibus articulis fidei inhaerit fides propter unum medium, scilicet propter veritatem primam propositam nobis in Scripturis secundum doctrinam Ecclesiae intellectis sane."—*Ib.*, q. 5 : a. 3. ad 2^{m} (Leon., viii. 58b).

So here we find the authority of the Church to interpret the Scriptures, which has been systematically assumed throughout, incidentally but explicitly asserted.

The identity of the Apostolic Church, to which authority was given, and the later Church, by which it is exercised, is asserted elsewhere :

"Mat. ult. [*i.e.* xxviii.] 20 : *Ecce ego vobiscum sum usque ad consummationem saeculi.* Hoc autem non intelligitur tantum ab Apostolis, quia omnes mortui sunt, et adhuc saeculum non est consummatum. . . .

Dicendum quod eadem est numero Ecclesia quae tunc erat et quae nunc est : quia eadem fides et eadem fidei sacramenta, eadem auctoritas, eadem professio :

unde dicit Apostolus, 1 Corinth. i. 13: *Divisus est Christus? Absit.*"—*Quodlibet*, xii.: a. 19. contra, and c. (vol. ix. 625b).

This is the only passage given in the Index of the complete works of Aquinas * under the head "Eadem numero est ecclesia nunc, et tempore Apostolorum."

But it is not the only passage in which authority is expressly claimed for the later Church to exercise powers conferred on the Apostles.

Compare:

"Cum Ecclesia habeat nunc eamdem potestatem statuendi et destruendi quam tunc habuit, *et cet.*"—4. *Dist.*, xvii. q. 3: a. 3. ad 2^{m} (vol. vii. 936b).

The most explicit and comprehensive assertion of the authority of the Church which I have noted occurs in reference to the curiously subordinate question of the right order of the several articles in the Apostles creed:

"Sed contra est quod Ecclesia universalis non potest errare, quia Spiritu Sancto gubernatur, qui est Spiritus veritatis: hoc enim promisit Dominus discipulis." The citation of John xvi. 13 follows.†—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 1: a. 9. (Leon., viii. 23a).

* Drawn up by the industrious and accomplished Petrus a Bergamo and included in the *Editio Princeps* of the *Opera omnia* of Aquinas. Rome, 1570. It survives in later editions in more or less deformed and mutilated condition, and even so is of immense value.

† Compare further *Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 106: a. 4. 2^{m} (Leon., vii. 277), ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 176: a. 1. ad 1^{m} (Leon., x. 411); *Quodlibet*, ix. a. 16. c. (vol. ix. 599b), in which the infallibility of the Church is confined to essentials of the faith. The Church cannot always predict the future, may be misled by false witnesses in civil or criminal cases, and has no authority on theorems of arithmetic or geometry.

Mediæval scholars often treated variants in the text as alike valid. Aquinas, too, occasionally does this.

An objector challenges the right of *sapientia* to a place amongst the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and alleges the text in *Job* xxviii. 27, *Ecce timor Domini ipsa est sapientia*, adding that the LXX followed by Augustine read, *Ecce, pietas ipsa est sapientia.* The objector concludes:

"Sed tam timor quam pietas ponuntur dona Spiritus Sancti. Ergo sapientia non debet numerari inter dona Spiritus Sancti quasi donum ab aliis distinctum."

Thomas accepts and expounds both readings as true (though the truths they teach are not identical), but still maintains that *timor*, *pietas*, and *sapientia* are three distinct gifts of the Spirit (cf. *Isaiah* xi. 2, 3).—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 45: a. 1. ob. 3. c. and ad 3^{m} (Leon., viii. 339 *sq.*).

S. Thomas even extends the same practice to the text of Dionysius. An objector urges, against the doctrine that Angels "know themselves,"

"Videtur quod Angelus seipsum non cognoscat. Dicit enim Dionysius, vi. cap. *Angel. Hier.*, quod Angeli *ignorant proprias virtutes.*"

To which Thomas replies:

"Littera illa est antiquae translationis [Erigena's], quae corrigitur per novam [that of Joannes Sarracenus, twelfth century*], in qua dicitur: *praeterea et ipsos*, scilicet angelos, *cognovisse proprias virtutes.*"

* This was the translation used by Aquinas for his commentary on the *Divine names.* It may be noted that Albertus Magnus in

But nevertheless he goes on to explain that the old reading too may be defended as true, because:

"Angeli non perfecte cognoscunt suam virtutem, secundum quod procedit ab ordine divinae sapientiae, quae est angelis incomprehensibilis."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 56: a. 1. ob. 1 and ad 1^{m} (Leon., v. 62).

This concern to show that, in the translation of an authoritative text, a certain reading even if not *correct* is nevertheless likely to be *true* is highly characteristic.

I have indeed noted one passage in which Aquinas seems to make the portentous concession that a reading in Scripture itself may be false, both diplomatically and materially. In Marc. xv. 25 we read, *Erat autem hora tertia: et crucifixerunt eum*, whereas in Ioan. xix. 14 we find *hora quasi sexta* mentioned shortly *before* the actual crucifixion, and in Luc. xxiii. 44, when darkness fell upon the earth, it was *fere hora sexta*. The symbolic appropriateness of noon impressed the mediæval imagination, and Aquinas accepts the explanation that it was the *hora tertia* at which the Jews decisively demanded their victim. At this hour, therefore, "crucifixus est linguis Judaeorum," but at the *sexta* "crucifixus est manibus militum."

Aquinas, however, appears to admit an error in

his commentary on the *Celestial hierarchies*, cap. vi. § 1 (vol. xiv. 139b *sqq.*) follows Erigena here, and explains the passage as Aquinas suggests. *Cf.* Bernardus de Rubeis, O.P.: *De gestis et scriptis ac doctrina Sancti Thomae Aquinatis dissertationes, et cet.*, Venetiis, 1750. Reprinted both in the Leonine and the Parma editions of S. Thomas. *Diss.* viii. cap. iii. § 3 (Leon., i. cxxxv; Parma, xvi. 484).

the text as a possible alternative solution of the difficulty:

"Quidam tamen dicunt quod haec diversitas ex peccato scriptoris contingit apud Graecos: nam figurae quibus tria et sex representantur, satis sunt propinquae apud eos."—*Sum. Theol.*, iii^{a}. q. 46: a. 9. ad 2^{m}, and q. 83: a. 2. ad 3^{m} (Leon., xi. 449a and xii. 273a).

There is no indication that Aquinas perceived the far-reaching consequences of the admission of such an alternative, in combination with his assertion of the ultimate authority of Scripture. This is only one more indication that his real reliance was on the authority of the Church.

A few examples of the way in which Thomas deals with texts that seem to contradict his conclusions must suffice. They are instructive in many ways:

The Law, says Paul, was given *per angelos*, whereas we read in Exodus that God *loquebatur ei* [Moses] *facie ad faciem*. Aquinas says that the people believed it to be so, though it was really otherwise, and the Scripture adopts their point of view:

"Quod ergo dicitur quod *loquebatur ei facie ad faciem*, secundum opinionem populi loquitur Scriptura, qui putabat Moysen *ore ad os* loqui cum Deo, cum per subjectam creaturam, idest, per Angelum et nubem, ei loqueretur et appareret."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 98: a. 3. ad 2^{m} (Leon., vii. 195b).

Perhaps it should be added (though Thomas does not add it), in extenuation of this excessive condescension of Scripture, that Moses, it was

supposed, did really see God *facie ad faciem*, though not on this occasion. Compare *Excursus* ii. at the end of this volume.

Again Aquinas teaches that the rebel angels fell immediately after their creation. But Ezekiel says (xxviii. 14 *sq.*) when addressing Satan:

"Ambulasti perfectus in viis tuis a die conditionis tuae, donec inventa est iniquitas in te."

On which Thomas comments:

"Per motus corporales, qui per tempus mensurantur, quandoque in sacra Scriptura intelliguntur metaphorice motus spirituales instantanei. Et sic per *ambulationem* intelligitur motus liberi arbitrii tendentis in bonum." — *Ib.*, i^{a}. q. 63: a. 6. ad 1^{m} (Leon., v. 133a).

The account of the Cherub with the flaming sword at the gate of the Garden of Eden presents difficulties if taken literally; for if, as is asserted in *Gen.* ii. 8, the garden was "inaccessible," it would have been superfluous to take steps to prevent the return of the exiles. But Thomas answers ingeniously that the flaming sword means the equatorial regions, which were precisely what *made* it inaccessible:

"Salvis spiritualis sensus mysteriis, locus ille praecipue videtur esse inaccessibilis propter vehementiam aestus in locis intermediis ex propinquitate solis. Et hoc significatur per *flammeum gladium*: qui *versatilis* dicitur propter proprietatem motus circularis huiusmodi aestum causantis."—*Ib.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 164: a. 2. ob. 5 and ad 5^{m} (Leon., x. 336a, 337b).

When we read the warning (1 *Cor.* vii. 29) that

"the time is short," in manifest contradiction with the event, we are told:

"Verba illa quae videntur in Scriptura ad brevitatem temporis pertinere, vel etiam ad finis propinquitatem, non tam sunt ad quantitatem temporis referenda quam ad status mundi dispositionem. Non enim legi evangelicae alius status succedit, quae ad perfectum adduxit; sicut ipsa successit legi veteri, et lex vetus legi naturae."—*De potentia*, q. 5: a. 6. ad 9[m] (vol. viii. 114b).

The multiple interpretation of Scripture is defended by Thomas, as by Augustine (*vide* p. 89), on the ground, amongst others:

"Ut . . . et per hoc etiam contra infideles facilius defendatur, dum si aliquid, quod quisque ex sacra Scriptura velit intelligere, falsum apparuerit, ad alium ejus sensum possit haberi recursus."—*De potentia*, q. 4: a. 1. c. (vol. viii. 79a).

(3) *To pages* 170–173.—On the usage of the Church as authoritative:

"Maximam habet auctoritatem Ecclesiae consuetudo, quae semper est in omnibus aemulanda. Quia et ipsa doctrina Catholicorum Doctorum ab Ecclesia auctoritatem habet: unde magis standum est auctoritati Ecclesiae quam auctoritati vel Augustini vel Hieronymi vel cuiuscumque Doctoris. Hoc autem Ecclesiae usus nunquam habuit quod Iudaeorum filii invitis parentibus baptizarentur: quamvis fuerint retroactis temporibus multi Catholici principes potentissimi, ut Constantinus, Theodosius, quibus familiares

fuerunt sanctissimi episcopi, ut Sylvester Constantino et Ambrosius Theodosio, qui nullo modo hoc praetermisissent ab eis impetrare, si hoc esset consonum rationi. Et ideo periculosum videtur hanc assertionem de novo inducere, ut praeter consuetudinem in Ecclesia hactenus observatam, Iudaeorum filii invitis parentibus baptizarentur.

"Et huius ratio est duplex. Una quidem propter periculum fidei. Si enim pueri nondum usum rationis habentes baptismum susciperent, postmodum, cum ad perfectam aetatem pervenirent, de facili possent a parentibus induci ut relinquerent quod ignorantes susceperunt. Quod vergeret in fidei detrimentum.

"Alia vero ratio est quia repugnat iustitiae naturali. Filius enim naturaliter est aliquid patris. Et primo quidem a parentibus non distinguitur secundum corpus, quamdiu in matris utero continetur. Postmodum vero, postquam ab utero egreditur, antequam usum liberi arbitrii habeat, continetur sub parentum cura sicut sub quodam spirituali utero, *et cet.*"—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 10: a. 12. (*Utrum pueri Iudaeorum et aliorum infidelium sint invitis parentibus baptizari*) c. (Leon., viii. 94).

On the extra-scriptural apostolic tradition:

"Apostoli, familiari instinctu Spiritus Sancti, quaedam ecclesiis tradiderunt servanda quae non reliquerunt in scriptis, sed in observatione Ecclesiae per successionem fidelium sunt ordinata. Unde ipse [Apostolus *] dixit, 2 *Thess.* ii. [14]: *State, et tenete*

* The word *Apostolus*, omitted in the Leonine edition, probably by error, appears in the Parma edition.

traditiones quas didicistis, sive per sermonem, scilicet ab ore prolatum, *sive per epistolam*, scilicet scripto transmissam. Et inter huiusmodi traditiones est imaginum Christi adoratio. Unde et beatus Lucas dicitur depinxisse imaginem Christi, quae Romae habetur."—*Sum. Theol.*, iii[a]. q. 25 : a. 3. ad 4[m] (Leon., xi. 279b).

Compare :

" Apostoli multa tradiderunt quae scripta non sunt in canone, inter quae unum est de usu imaginum. . . . Fuit autem triplex ratio institutionis imaginum in Ecclesia. Primo ad instructionem rudium, qui eis quasi quibusdam libris edocentur. Secundo ut incarnationis mysterium et sanctorum exempla magis in memoria essent, dum quotidie oculis repraesentantur. Tertio ad excitandum devotionis affectum qui ex visis efficacius incitatur quam ex auditis."—3 *Dist.*, ix. q. 1 : a. 2. sol. 2 ad 3 (vol. vii. 109a).

On the sacrament of Confirmation :

" Circa institutionem huius sacramenti est triplex opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod hoc sacramentum non fuit institutum nec a Christo nec ab Apostolis, sed postea processu temporis in quodam concilio. Alii vero dixerunt quod fuit institutum ab Apostolis.—Sed hoc non potest esse : quia instituere novum sacramentum pertinet ad potestatem excellentiae, quae competit soli Christo.

" Et ideo dicendum quod Christus instituit hoc sacramentum, non exhibendo, sed promittendo : secundum illud Ioan. xvi. [7]. *Nisi ego abiero, Paraclitus non veniet ad vos : si autem abiero, mittam eum*

ad vos. Et hoc ideo quia in hoc sacramento datur plenitudo Spiritus Sancti, quae non erat danda ante Christi resurrectionem et ascensionem: secundum illud Ioan. vii. [39]: *Nondum erat Spiritus datus, quia Iesus nondum erat glorificatus.*"—*Sum. Theol.*, iii^{a}. q. 72: a. 1. ad 1^{m} (Leon., xii. 125b *sq.*).

On the Eucharist:

It is urged, as an objection to the current formula of consecration, that:

"Verba quibus hoc sacramentum conficitur, efficaciam habent ex institutione Christi. Sed nullus Evangelista recitat Christum haec omnia verba dixisse. Ergo non est conveniens forma consecrationis vini."

To which it is replied:

"Evangelistae non intendebant tradere formas sacramentorum, quas in primitiva Ecclesia oportebat esse occultas, ut dicit Dionysius, in fine *Ecclesiasticae Hierarchiae.* Sed intenderunt historiam de Christo texere.

"Et tamen omnia haec verba fere ex diversis Scripturae locis accipi possunt. Nam quod dicitur, *Hic est calix*, habetur Luc. xxii. [20] et 1 *Cor.* xi. [25]. Matthaei autem xxvi. [28] dicitur, *Hic est sanguis meus novi Testamenti, qui pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum.*—Quod autem additur, *aeterni*, et iterum, *mysterium fidei*, ex traditione Domini habetur, quae ad Ecclesiam per Apostolos pervenit: secundum illud 1 *Cor.* xi. [23]: *Ego accepi a Domino quod et tradidi vobis.*"—*Sum. Theol.*, iii^{a}, q. 78: a. 3. ob. 9 and ad 9^{m} (Leon., xii. 209b. 210 b, *sqq.*).

(4) *To page* 175. — The general truth of this explanation is confirmed by a comparison of the method of S. Thomas with that of the Council of Trent. In the third and fourth sessions of that Council (A.D. 1546) we find, first, the basis of union laid down in the Nicene creed supported by ecclesiastical authority; second, the assertion of the Apostolic claim, derived direct from Christ, to the guardianship of the unsullied purity of the Evangelic tradition in the Church; third, the proclamation, side by side, of the Scriptures and the unwritten Tradition as the repositories of the pure doctrine in question; and, fourth, the fixing of the Canon and of the Vulgate text, and the prohibition of unauthorised interpretations.

This method, which was no less logically binding in the time of Aquinas, had only become polemically necessary in the time of the Reformation.

From the Catholic point of view, of course, all this is quite in harmony with the principle that the truth in the Church's keeping never varies, but the stress and amplitude of the exposition varies with the requirements of the time.

(5) *To pages* 177–182.—On the parts respectively taken by the will and the intelligence in the act of faith.

The most elaborate treatment of this subject which I have found in Aquinas is in the comparatively early work, the *Quaestio de veritate.* It is too long to quote in its entirety, but the substance and the most important phrases must be given.

There are propositions that compel assent as soon as the terms are understood. These are the axioms, and in virtue of his acceptance of them man is spoken of as *intelligens principia*, or simply as *intelligens*. There are other propositions which follow from these necessarily, but not obviously, or without reflection. To arrive at these *cogitatio* is needed, and it leads to *assensus*. The man who has reached this assured conviction is the *sciens*. There are cases, however, in which we can find no evidence, or in which the evidence is evenly balanced, and then the *dubitans* wavers between the two possible and contradictory conclusions. Between the *sciens* and the *dubitans* stands the *opinans*, who sees that the evidence recommends one of the conclusions but does not impose it:

"Unde accipit quidem unam partem, tamen semper dubitat de opposita: et haec est dispositio opinantis, qui accipit unam partem contradictionis * cum formidine alterius."

But, in these cases, sometimes the intellect, which cannot be "determined" by its own proper processes, is nevertheless determined: "per voluntatem, quae eligit assentire uni parti determinate et praecise

* *Contradictio* is here used in the technical sense of a pair of propositions, one of which must be true, and both of which cannot be true, *e.g.* "No A's are B's" and "some A's are B's," or "All A's are B's" and "some A's are not B's." Of such "contradictions" one member must be true and the other false. *Cf.* Dante, *Paradiso*, vi. 20, 21:

> "Veggio ora chiaro, si come tu vedi
> ogni contraddizion e falsa e vera."

propter aliquid quod est sufficiens ad movendum voluntatem, non autem ad movendum intellectum, utpote quod videtur bonum vel conveniens huic parti assentire; et ista est dispositio credentis, ut cum aliquis credit dictis alicujus hominis, quia videtur decens vel utile: et sic etiam movemur ad credendum dictis, inquantum nobis repromittitur, si crediderimus, praemium aeternae vitae: et hoc praemio movetur voluntas ad assentiendum his quae dicuntur, quamvis intellectus non moveatur per aliquid intellectum."

The *sciens*, then, arrives at *assensus* by *cogitatio*, and his *cogitatio* is laid to rest and ended when *assensus* has been reached. But the *credens*, though possessing the faculty of *cogitatio*, like the *sciens*, and, like him, having reached the stage of *assensus*, was not led to his *assensus* by his *cogitatio;* and therefore this latter faculty is not stilled, but goes on searching for its proper object, viz. the *intelligibile*. In the *credens*, then, the *cogitatio* persists after *assensus* has been reached. Hence, on the one hand the unsatisfied curiosity or devout fascination of the believer urging him to investigate the mysteries of his religion as far as may be, and on the other hand the possibility of doubt:

"Sed quia intellectus non hoc modo * terminatur ad unum ut ad proprium terminum perducatur, qui est visio alicuius intelligibilis; inde est quod eius motus nondum est quietatus, sed adhuc habet cogitationem et inquisitionem de his quae credit; quam-

* To wit, the *modus* that convinces the *sciens*.

vis firmissime eis assentiat: quantum enim est ex se ipso, non est ei satisfactum, nec est terminatus ad unum; sed terminatur tantum ex extrinseco. Et inde est quod intellectus credentis dicitur esse captivatus, quia tenetur terminis alienis, et non propriis. 2 Corinth. 10, 5, *In captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum.* Inde etiam est quod in credente potest insurgere motus de contrario hujus quod firmissime tenet, quamvis non in intelligente vel sciente."—*De veritate*, q. 14: a. 1. c. (vol. ix. 227b *sq.*). *Cf. infra*, note 6.

"Credere autem, ut supra dictum est, non habet assensum nisi ex imperio voluntatis; unde, secundum id quod est, a voluntate dependet. Et inde est quod ipsum credere potest esse meritorium; et fides, quae est habitus eliciens ipsum, est secundum theologum virtus."—*Ib.*, a. 3. c. (*ib.*, 233a). Cf. *Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 1: a. 4. c. (Leon., viii. 13b).

Compare further:

"Argumenta quae cogunt ad fidem, sicut miracula, non probant fidem per se, sed probant veritatem annunciantis fidem: et ideo de his quae fidei sunt, scientiam non faciunt."—3 *Dist.*, xxiv. q. 1: a. 2. sol. 2. ad 4^{m} (vol. vii. 263).

"Nostra autem naturalis cognitio se habet ad divinam sicut ad superiorem; et ideo cum ratio nostra divinae consentit, actus laudabilis est, sicut cum irascibilis subditur rationi; et ideo credere veritati primae, in his quae non videntur, laudabilis est, et opus meritorium, et opus virtutis."—*Ib.*, a. 3. sol. 2. c. (vol. vii. 265a).

On the certainty of faith.

The certitude of faith is intrinsically and absolutely higher than that of knowledge. It is only subjectively and relatively to our weakness that it may be lower.

In answer to the question: *Utrum fides sit certior scientia et aliis virtutibus intellectualibus:*

"Dicendum est quod certitudo potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, ex causa certitudinis: et sic dicitur esse certius illud quod habet certiorem causam. Et hoc modo fides est certior tribus praedictis: * quia fides innititur veritati divinae, tria autem praedicta innituntur rationi humanae. Alio modo potest considerari certitudo ex parte subjecti: et sic dicitur esse certius quod plenius consequitur intellectus hominis. Et per hunc modum, quia ea quae sunt fidei sunt supra intellectum hominis, non autem ea quae subsunt tribus praedictis, ideo ex hac parte fides est minus certa."—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 4: a. 8. c. (Leon., viii. 52b).

Normally, however, the believer's adhesion to matters of faith is more secure and certain than his adhesion to aught else, though the direct evidence is weaker:

"In his ergo quae per fidem credimus, ratio voluntatem inclinans, ut dictum est, est ipsa veritas prima, sive Deus, cui creditur, quae habet majorem firmitatem quam lumen intellectus humani, in quo conspiciuntur principia, vel ratio humana, secundum quam conclusiones in principia resolvuntur; et ideo fides habet majorem certitudinem quantum ad fir-

* Sc. *Sapientia, scientia, intellectus.*

mitatem adhaesionis, quam sit certitudo scientiae vel intellectus: quamvis in scientia et intellectu sit major evidentia eorum quibus assentitur."—3 *Dist.*, xxiii. q. 2: a. 2. sol. 3. (vol. vii. 249b).

And again, *De veritate*, q. 12: a. 2. ad 3^{m} (vol. ix. 194a):

"Firmius adhaeremus Prophetarum dictis per fidem quam demonstrationibus scientiarum."

Thus the term "scire" may sometimes be used, though not properly, of faith, as by the fellow-townsmen of the woman of Samaria:

"Debet fides esse certa, quia qui dubitat in fide infidelis est. Jac. i. 6: *Postulet autem in fide nihil haesitans.* Et ideo istorum fides certa erat: unde dicunt, *Et scimus.* Aliquando enim ipsum credere dicitur scire, sicut hic patet: quia scientia et fides conveniunt in certitudine: nam sicut scientia est certa, ita et fides: immo multo magis: quia certitudo scientiae innititur rationi humanae, quae falli potest; certitudo vero fidei innititur rationi divinae, cui contrariari non potest. Differunt tamen in modo: quia fides habet certitudinem ex lumine infuso divinitus; scientia vero ex lumine naturali."—*In Joan. Evang. expositio.* Lecture v. on chap. iv. (vol. x. 374b).

For the general distinction between the *lumen infusum* and the *lumen naturale* compare Lecture vii. pp. 493 *sqq.*, 516 *sqq.*

For the analogy between accepting authority in matters of faith and in matters of knowledge:

"Et similiter videmus in operibus humanis, et praecipue in disciplinis. In principio enim homo

imperfectus est in cognitione: ad hoc autem quod perfectionem scientiae consequatur, indiget aliquo instruente, qui eum ad perfectionem scientiae ducat; . . . sed tradit ei quaedam, quorum rationes tunc, cum primo instruitur, discipulus nescit; sciet autem postea, perfectus in scientia. Et ideo dicitur, oportet addiscentem credere: et aliter ad perfectam scientiam pervenire non posset, nisi scilicet supponeret ea quae sibi in principio traduntur, quorum rationes tunc capere non potest."—*De veritate*, q. 14: a. 10. c. (vol. ix. 243b). *Cf. infra*, note 8.

If I am not mistaken, Aquinas somewhere refers to the sphericity of the earth, specifically, as an illustration of this relation between teacher and pupil. But I have not been able to recover the place. That it is well within the range of his field of illustration, however, is shown by the following passage:

"Terram esse rotundam per aliud medium demonstrat naturalis, et per aliud astrologus: astrologus enim hoc demonstrat per media mathematica, sicut per figuras eclipsium, vel per aliud hujusmodi; naturalis vero hoc demonstrat per medium naturale, sicut per motum gravium ad medium, vel per aliud hujusmodi."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 54: a. 2. ad 2^{m} (Leon., vi. 343a).

Thus it comes that "authority," though the weakest reason for believing in matters of science, where it is only a makeshift, is, in matters of faith, as we have seen, the foundation of a certainty above that of any scientific knowledge:

"Argumentari ex auctoritate est maxime proprium

huius doctrinae: eo quod principia huius doctrinae per revelationem habentur, et sic oportet quod credatur auctoritati eorum quibus revelatio facta est. Nec hoc derogat dignitati huius doctrinae: nam, licet locus ab auctoritate quae fundatur super ratione humana, sit infirmissimus, locus tamen ab auctoritate quae fundatur super revelatione divina, est efficacissimus."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 1 : a. 8. ad 2^{m} (Leon., iv. 22a).

Naturally, both in the other sciences and in theology the teacher ought to know more than he will ever be able to teach the majority of his pupils. And in theology, especially, faith on many points which must be explicit in the teachers, or *majores*, may well be implicit only in simple folk, or *minores*. That is to say, the *minores* must be ready to believe what their teachers tell them on such matters, should occasion arise for them to do so.

Thus in answer to the question, *Utrum omnes coequaliter teneantur ad habendum fidem explicitam*, we read:

"Contra est quod dicitur *Iob* i. [14], quod boves arabant et asinae pascebantur iuxta eos; quia videlicet minores, qui significantur per asinos,* debent in credendis adhaerere maioribus, qui per boves significantur."—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 2 : a. 6. contra (Leon., viii. 33).

This delicious bit of exegesis is based on Gregory's *Magna Moralia*, lib. 2, cap. 30 (vol. i. 57 C, D). The raiding Sabaeans are the "immundi spiritus . . .

* Apparently an error for *asinas*, as read in the Parma edition.

qui cunctos, quos sibi subjiciunt, in infidelitatem captivas ducunt."

We have seen (p. 128) that the *visio Dei* consists primarily in an act of the intelligence (cf. *Excursus* ii.). But its meritoriousness is derived from the act of the will that prompts it. Whence the curious conclusion:

"Praemium autem dicitur per modum receptionis, sed meritum per modum actionis; et inde est quod totum praemium principaliter attribuitur intellectui; et dicitur visio tota merces, quia inchoatur merces in intellectu et consummatur in affectu. Meritum autem attribuitur caritati, quia primum movens ad operandum opera meritoria est voluntas, quam caritas perficit."—*De veritate*, q. 14: a. 5. ad 5^{m} (vol. ix. 236b).

(6) *To pages* 184–186.—The possibility of doubt surging up in the believer's mind is distinctly recognised by Aquinas:

"Illa quae sunt fidei, certissime cognoscuntur, secundum quod certitudo importat firmitatem adhaesionis: nulli enim credens firmius adhaeret quam his quae per fidem tenet. Non autem cognoscuntur certissime, secundum quod certitudo quietationem intellectus in re cognita importat: quod enim credens assentiat his quae credit, non provenit ex hoc quod intellectus eius sit terminatus ad credibilia virtute aliquorum principiorum; sed ex voluntate, quae inclinat intellectum ad hoc quod illis creditis assentiat.

Et inde est quod in his quae sunt fidei, potest motus dubitationis insurgere in credente."—*De veritate*, q. 10: a. 12. ad 6[m] contra (vol. ix. 179b *sq.*).

And if the reason represents a good thing as bad, and the will, on that representation, chooses it, it chooses it *sub specie mali*, and the act is bad, even if it be believing in Christ:

"Conscientia nihil aliud est quam applicatio scientiae ad aliquem actum. Scientia autem in ratione est. Voluntas ergo discordans a ratione errante, est contra conscientiam. Sed omnis talis voluntas est mala; dicitur enim *Rom.* xiv. [23]: *Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est*, idest omne quod est contra conscientiam. Ergo voluntas discordans a ratione errante est mala."

Some contend:

"Ratio vel conscientia errans praecipiendo ea quae sunt per se mala, vel prohibendo ea quae sunt per se bona et necessaria ad salutem, non obligat."

But this is false:

Non solum enim id quod est indifferens, potest accipere rationem boni vel mali per accidens; sed etiam id quod est bonum, potest accipere rationem mali, vel illud quod est malum, rationem boni, propter apprehensionem rationis. Puta, abstinere a fornicatione, bonum quoddam est: tamen in hoc bonum non fertur voluntas, nisi secundum quod a ratione proponitur. Si ergo proponatur ut malum a ratione errante, feretur in hoc sub ratione mali. Unde voluntas erit mala, quia vult malum: non quidem id quod est malum per se, sed id quod est

malum per accidens, propter apprehensionem rationis. Et similiter credere in Christum est per se bonum et necessarium ad salutem: sed voluntas non fertur in hoc, nisi secundum quod a ratione proponitur. Unde si a ratione proponatur ut malum, voluntas feretur in hoc ut malum: non quia sit malum secundum se, sed quia est malum per accidens ex apprehensione rationis."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 19: a. 5. contra, and c. (Leon., vi. 145).

(7) *To page* 193.—The text of the passages quoted or referred to on the subject of the "connaturality" between revealed truth and the soul that is in a state of grace and that has the "habit" of faith, here follows:

"Ipsum autem credere est actus intellectus assentientis veritati divinae ex imperio voluntatis a Deo motae per gratiam, et sic subjacet libero arbitrio in ordine ad Deum. . . .

"Ille qui credit habet sufficiens inductivum ad credendum: inducitur enim auctoritate divinae doctrinae miraculis confirmatae, et, quod plus est, interiori instinctu Dei invitantis. Unde non leviter credit. Tamen non habet sufficiens inductivum ad sciendum. Et ideo non tollitur ratio meriti."—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 2: a. 9. c. and ad 3^{m} (Leon., viii. 37b, 38b).

"Rectitudo autem judicii potest contingere dupliciter: uno modo, secundum perfectum usum rationis; alio modo, propter connaturalitatem quandam ad ea de quibus iam est judicandum. Sicut de his quae ad castitatem pertinent per rationis inquisitionem recte

iudicat ille qui didicit scientiam moralem: sed per quandam connaturalitatem ad ipsa recte iudicat de eis ille qui habet habitum castitatis. Sic igitur circa res divinas ex rationis inquisitione rectum judicium habere pertinet ad sapientiam quae est virtus intellectualis: sed rectum judicium habere de eis secundum quandam connaturalitatem ad ipsa pertinet ad sapientiam secundum quod donum est Spiritus Sancti: sicut Dionysius dicit, in ii. cap. *De Div. Nom.* quod Hierotheus est perfectus in divinis *non solum discens, sed et patiens divina.* Hujusmodi autem compassio sive connaturalitas ad res divinas fit per caritatem, quae quidem unit nos Deo: secundum illud i. *ad Cor.* vi.: *Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est.* Sic igitur sapientia quae est donum * causam quidem habet in voluntate, scilicet caritatem: sed essentiam habet in intellectu, cuius actus est recte judicare, ut supra habitum est."—*Ib.*, q. 45: a. 2. c. (*Ib.*, 341).

"Sicut enim per alios habitus virtutum homo videt illud quod est sibi conveniens secundum habitum illum, ita etiam per habitum fidei inclinatur mens hominis ad assentiendum his quae conveniunt rectae fidei et non aliis."—*Ib.*, q. 1: a. 4. ad 3^{m} (*Ib.*, 14b).

"Habitus scientiae inclinat ad scibilia per modum rationis; et ideo potest habens habitum scientiae aliqua ignorare quae ad illum habitum pertinent. Sed habitus fidei cum non rationi innitatur, inclinat per modum naturae, sicut et habitus moralium virtutum, et sicut habitus principiorum; et ideo quam-

* On the meaning of *donum*, *cf.* pp. 499 *sqq.*, 516 *sqq.*

diu manet, nihil contra fidem credit."—3 *Dist.*, xxiii. q. 3: a. 3. sol. 2. ad 2[m] (vol. vii. 257a).

"Caritas" as an essential of true faith is constantly insisted on. The loveless "belief of the devils" (James ii. 19) is neither voluntary nor meritorious, and therefore is not faith in the true sense at all. It can only be called "credere" in so far as it is a belief in what is not seen, or made evident by a direct appeal to the intellect:

"Daemones non voluntate assentiunt his quae credere dicuntur, sed coacti evidentia signorum, ex quibus convincitur verum esse quod fideles credunt; quamvis illa signa non faciant apparere id quod creditur, ut per hoc possint dici visionem eorum quae creduntur, habere. Unde et credere aequivoce dicitur de hominibus fidelibus et daemonibus: nec est in eis fides ex aliquo lumine gratiae infuso, sicut est in fidelibus."—*De veritate*, q. 14: a. 9. ad 4[m] (vol. ix. 242a).

Compare:

"Fides [est] in daemonibus, inquantum ex ipsa naturali cognitione simul, et ex miraculis, quae vident supra naturam esse multo subtilius quam nos, coguntur ad credendum ea quae naturalem ipsorum cognitionem excedunt."—3 *Dist.*, xxiii. q. 3: a. 3. sol. 1. (vol. vii. 256b).

(8) *To page* 196.—Aquinas himself, in speaking of the preparation by grace, on earth, for the *visio Dei* in heaven, has unconsciously given beautiful expression to the process by which he himself, in the

Contra Gentiles, seeks gradually to warm the unbeliever with the flame of his own faith until he too catches fire:

"Quandocumque ab aliquo agente movetur aliquid ad id quod est proprium illi agenti, oportet quod a principio ipsum mobile subdatur impressionibus agentis imperfecte, quasi alienis et non propriis sibi, quousque fiant ei propriae in termino motus; sicut lignum ab igne primo calefit, et ille calor non est proprius ligno, sed praeter naturam ipsius; in fine autem, quando jam lignum ignitum est, fit ei calor proprius et connaturalis; et similiter, quum aliquis a magistro docetur, oportet quod a principio conceptiones magistri recipiat, non quasi eas per se intelligens, sed per modum credulitatis, quasi supra suam capacitatem existentes; in fine autem, quando jam edoctus fuerit, eas poterit intelligere."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. cap. clii. (vol. v. 283b).

LECTURE IV

NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY

In the first lecture, we made a rapid survey of the materials of the Thomist synthesis, and brought out the special features of the conception of the relations between reason and revelation which characterise his system. In the second, we examined the *a priori* demonstration of the necessity of a revelation and the conditions with which that revelation must comply; and this led us to an examination of S. Thomas's theory as to the mystic sense, which we traced so far as was necessary for the immediate subject, reserving a further treatment of it, on its own merits, for a later period. In the third, we examined the argument in support of the Christian revelation specifically, and brought it under the light of Thomas's doctrine of the nature of faith and the natural affinity between a soul in a state of grace and the central dogmas of the Church.

To-day we must attempt to form some general conception of the leading features of the synthesis itself.

It falls at once into the two divisions of natural and revealed truth, and in the former, which will first occupy our attention, we shall be prepared to

find Aristotelianism sometimes attacking and rejecting Platonism, and sometimes alternating or intimately blending with it.

An example of the antagonistic relation meets us on the very threshold, for, in relation to the fundamental question of the existence of God, what is called the "ontological" proof, best known from Anselm's treatise the *Proslogion*, is decisively rejected by Aquinas. That argument, briefly stated, is to this effect:—"By the very word 'God' we mean 'That than which nothing greater can be conceived in thought.' But, if God did not exist, we should be able to conceive of something greater, for the existent is greater than the non-existent. Therefore the very conception of God involves his existence." Even in Anselm's own day this demonstration was challenged (*cf.* pp. 55, 106), and though Aquinas had a great respect for definitions, as we shall see (p. 458), he knew perfectly well that they are a product of the intelligence, and that, just because they rest on generalisations, they are no guarantee of the objective existence of the thing defined. It were as easy to define a centaur as a lion. Anselm is far too Platonic for Aquinas in his reliance upon the objective existence of the universals, and the validity of clarified "conceptions" as proving the reality of existences corresponding to them. (1)

But neither will Thomas admit that the existence of God is a self-evident truth.* And so, where Anselm and the Platonists fail him, he turns to Aristotle.

* The passage is cited on pp. 173 *sq.* *Cf.* p. 281.

Now, the two conceptions on which Aristotle's theology is based are first the impossibility of regarding the world of matter-in-motion as a self-contained and self-sustaining system; and second, the perception that nature is purposeful, so that we can only understand things in their origin and progress by considering them in relation to their goal. And it is upon these two conceptions that Aquinas bases his demonstration of the existence of God, laying the chief stress on the first of the two, in the form of what is called the "argument from motion." The other consideration, under the form of the "argument from design," is constantly in his mind, and frequently appears both expressly and incidentally. We shall examine it in due course (p. 440). But it never occupies the first place. Dante is a true disciple not only of Aristotle but of Aquinas in his constant insistence upon the conception of God as the "unmoved source of motion";* for it is here that we find the cornerstone of the natural theology of S. Thomas.

The argument from motion, as presented by Aristotle, forms the main theme of his *Physics*, and it is highly intricate and technical. To the modern student, interested not primarily in the history of thought but in positive science, the chief value of the *Physics* lies in its profound analysis of the relation of statics to dynamics, of the point to the line, of the metaphysical "now" to time, of station to motion, and generally of divisions of magnitude to magnitude itself. On these matters

* *E.g.* Par. xxiv. 130 *sqq.*

mathematicians and philosophers can ill afford to neglect it even to-day. But in the structure of the treatise itself, all this is subordinate to the contention that the material world of matter-in-motion, when examined in a purely scientific and philosophical spirit, proclaims itself as maintained by, and moment by moment dependent upon, an immaterial principle, that cannot be thought of as in any sense spatial or local. And just because this principle is immaterial and non-spatial, it must be regarded as unmoving. Yet it is the source of all motion. Aristotle defines the scope of natural science as including all things that move or change, whether primarily, as in the case of inanimate nature, or incidentally, as in the case of the "soul" (p. 415) or vital principle of man or beast or revolving heaven; and the central purpose of his *Physics* is to prove that "nature," in the sense of "all that changes," does not constitute a closed and self-sustaining system, but points beyond itself to an immaterial and unchanging "principle" of its life and motion. "On this principle all heaven and nature hang." *

And here it is important to insist upon a distinction between two things that may easily be confused. Many materialistic philosophers have maintained, or appeared to maintain, that the world of matter-in-motion "explains," or includes in itself, the world of consciousness; that is to say, that mind is no other than a function of matter, or a special form of material motion. This would amount to saying

* *Cf.* p. 21.

that matter-in-motion constitutes the whole known universe. We shall have occasion to challenge this contention presently, but it is not what we are concerned with at the moment; for the contention of Aristotle (and of Aquinas) that we are now examining is not that matter-in-motion gives us no account of mind, but that it gives no account of *itself* as a self-sustaining and self-contained system, but always implicitly postulates something other than itself as sustaining it.

I say "sustaining," for Aristotle is not arguing for any theory of creation. He regarded the material universe as eternal, without beginning or end. But, taking it as it stands, it involves and implies, to him, the unbroken and unchanging action of some immaterial, unmoving, and unchanging "Principle." Aquinas was not quite willing to admit that this purely analytical and "positive" account of the relation of nature to God was really all that could be found in Aristotle. He regarded the Aristotelian doctrine as a theory of "continuous creation" (which it certainly was not), thus narrowing, though he could not deny, the difference between it and his own theory. (2)

Now the remarkable thing is that, although Aristotle's attempted proof of the existence of this unmoving source of motion is far too dependent on the superseded science of his day to carry conviction to the modern mind, and is in any case too intricate and subtle a web to support the weight that he lays upon it, yet in one shape or another its main

contention has perpetually reasserted itself; and the science or philosophy in vogue at any period, whatever it is, can always be appealed to in support of the conviction, ineradicable apparently from the human mind as normally constituted, that the material universe of matter-in-motion, as known to physical science, does not constitute a closed system maintaining and sustaining itself, but points irresistibly to something generically unlike itself out of which perhaps it sprang, by which it is at any rate sustained, and on which it therefore "depends."

In my student years I was given, in quite another form of expression, something extremely close to Aristotle's proof. And so far as I know, the latest word of science still tells us that the conservation of energy is not a whit more certain than the diffusion of energy, and that all the life we know is incidental to a trend towards thermal equilibrium, which draws upon a fund of existing thermal inequalities and concentrations of which it can give no account. Nature is always moving in one "sense," and is therefore drawing upon a condition of things which all her known ways tend to contradict and undo. She subsists on a capital which it is her very life to dissipate, and is neither replenishing it nor able to give any account of how it comes to be there. The wheel of nature is turned as by a "head" of descending water, but it cannot itself fill the reservoir on the fulness of which its motion depends.

Thus to modern science, as to Aristotle, the honest examination of the accepted theories of matter-in-

motion points to something outside all known material laws and forces, and apparently not only outside them but unlike them. And this is really all that Aquinas asks of his "proof from motion." Aristotle had gone further. Holding (as Thomas held after him) that all motion originates from that of the heavens, he made a bold leap from his conviction that the heavens are animated and his observation that they have no sense organs, to the conclusion that their life is super-sensuous not infra-sensuous. He conceived of the heavens themselves, therefore, as animated by intellectual desires, and of the immaterial beings towards whom they yearned as themselves in full fruition of the truth, in the contemplation of which was divine bliss (p. 20).

Now the conception of the angelic lives which Aquinas entertained was closely assimilated to that which Aristotle ascribed to his deities (*cf.* p. 74), but he did not found it directly upon the argument from motion. The weight he made that argument bear was no more than the conviction that all the moving phenomena of nature implied an unmoving cause of which they were the effects. And this unmoved mover, he adds, "we call God."*

When he goes on to inquire what more we can know or say of this ultimate cause of motion, S. Thomas falls back upon the Platonism which had long been endemic to Christian thought and which, as we have seen, still occupied its citadel.

It was an axiom of his philosophy—an inheritance

* *Contra Gentiles*, lib. i. cap. 16; cf. *Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 2: a. 3. c.

perhaps from the Platonic doctrine of ideas—that the effect is in some way like the cause, but that the cause is greater than the effect. And if our questioning of nature is perpetually leading us to find unity behind apparent diversity, and permanence behind apparent transiency, we can hardly doubt that as we approach unity we approach reality, and that, however multiplex the phenomenal effects may appear, or may actually be, the essential cause is supremely One.

Now if the first cause is absolutely one, and if it contains in itself, in some way, all its effects and yet transcends them all, then it follows that nothing we can predicate of it can be true in the same sense in which it is true of any created being. For what makes a created being what it is always involves some kind of limitation and defining, and therefore exclusion, whereas the supreme cause is all-embracing. How, then, can we ever get further than saying that the first cause is not material but yet is the cause of all the material universe, is not subject to the limitations of time and space and yet is the cause of time and space and all their limitations, does not move but is the cause of all motion?

"The divine Substance exceeds in its immeasurable greatness any form that our understanding can attain to; and therefore we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is, but we have a kind of cognisance of it by knowing what it is not. For we approach nearer to a knowledge of it in proportion as our intelligence enables us to exclude more and more from our con-

ception of it. For our knowledge of any given thing becomes more and more perfect in proportion as we gain a fuller insight into its distinctions from other things; for each thing has in itself its proper being, distinct from all others. And so, in respect of things whereof we know the definitions, we first place them in their genus, which indicates in a general way what they are, and then add the differences whereby they are distinguished from other things [of the same genus but of another species]; and thus we advance to the full knowledge of the 'substance' [*i.e.* the essential being] of the thing itself.

"But since, in considering the Divine substance, we cannot lay down anything that it 'is,' so as to place it in a genus, and cannot get at anything to distinguish it from other things by positive differences, we must needs get at such distinctions by negative differences. Now, just as in the case of affirmative differences one narrows down the other, and we approach nearer to the complete defining of the thing, as we increase the number of the things from which it differs, so in the case of the Divine substance, one negative differentiation lies within another, and excludes a greater number of predications. Thus if we say that God is not an accident, we thereby distinguish him from all accidents. Then if we say that he is not corporeal, we further distinguish him from certain substances, and so, in due course, he will be distinguished by these negations from everything that is, except himself. And then we shall be able to proceed to the proper consideration of

his substance, having learned that he is distinct from everything; but such knowledge will not be perfect, because it will not be known what in himself he is." *

Within the range of our human faculties it would seem we could hardly go beyond this, were it not for the principle that the cause must leave its imprint on the effect. This appears to open a door to some kind of positive knowledge, but meanwhile we naturally ask how far we are to push these negations. May we not even say that God is good? And if we say that he is the cause of all goodness, must we not also say that he is the cause of all badness?

To begin with the first question. All the theologians with whom we are dealing, while they declare that God is good, or rather that he is Goodness itself, yet insist that when we say so we are not using the word "good" in the same sense in which we use it when we say that a man is good. In this latter case, the term will always be found to imply some effort or other limitation that we cannot conceive as finding place in the Supreme Being. Indeed, Dionysius detects a danger in such words as "light" and "life," applied to the Deity, unless corrected by such terms as lion, man of war, or worm. For it is by this latter class of names that Scripture forces us to look through and above the image, and so invites us to apply the same method even to the most uplifting similitudes. The only concrete concep-

* *Contra Gentiles*, lib. i. cap. 14.

tions that the noblest words can raise in our minds are those relating to our own limited and conditioned being, and in that sense they are not true of God. But are they true in any sense? Yes. For the effect is like the cause, and it is not arbitrary or untrue to apply to the effect a term which is primarily applicable to the cause, or to the cause one which experientially we only know in the effect. Thus the term "healthy" applies primarily to a healthy man, but we call a climate "healthy" because it is one which makes men healthy, and we call secretions healthy when they are such as indicate that they come from a healthy man. Now God is the source and cause of goodness or of love in us. Our goodness is secondary and derived, though it is the only goodness of which we have direct experience in itself, as distinct from experience of its effects. In this case, then, we know the derivative at first hand and the primary only "analogically," whereas in the case of health, we know the primary seat of it in our own organism directly, and the derivative or analogical application of the term is to things that either cause it or indicate its presence. Thus the goodness that we know and can realise, when we use the word "good," is a mere derivative which bears no more close relation to the primary goodness than the healthiness of a climate or of a secretion bears to the healthiness of a man. The language we thus use of God, therefore, is neither univocal, as when we speak of the "head" of a man or of a horse, meaning the same corresponding member of

the organism in each case, nor simply "equivocal," as when we call the picture of a house a "house," nor metaphorical, as when we call a brave man a "lion," but "analogical" in the sense explained.

We are therefore to think of God, and, when we are careful, to speak of him, not as "good" but as "super-good," thereby reminding ourselves that our goodness, or our conception of goodness, is only a faint and derived reflection of the supreme and causal goodness, and has the quality that makes us call it good not in its own right but in virtue of its derivation. In all this, it will be perceived, we are moving altogether within the circle of Platonic conceptions; and it is from the Neoplatonic tradition that Aquinas derives it. (3)

But is not God the cause of evil as well as of good? And if he is the prime cause of all creation and of all existence other than his own, why would it not be as true to call him the super-evil as the super-good? The Neoplatonist could hardly so much as ask the question. When Thales taught that all material things are forms of water, philosophy and science were born in Hellas. For a distinction was recognised between the changing multiplicity of manifestations and the abiding unity of the underlying indestructible something that assumes so many garbs. And the abiding and indestructible seemed to be the real and true as compared with the changing and evanescent. The senses then reveal semblances to us, and it is only by the reason that we reach the truth. From the true to the good is an easy step,

and the sublime theology of Xenophanes and metaphysic of Parmenides established the identity of the two in the minds of their disciples. To reach the Divine we must reject bustling movement and specialised organs from our conceptions of Deity, and to reach the True we must eradicate all ideas of change from our conception of Reality. Hence as our thoughts recede from sense impressions and we learn to move among Platonic Ideas, each one of which gathers into its spiritual and abiding unity and reality a host of materially diverse appearances, we are thereby automatically approaching the Good.

In some such historical evolution of thought the roots of Neoplatonism pierced deep. The One was essentially identical with the Good, the Real, and the True; multiplicity and diversity are unreal, untrue, and imperfect. Multiplicity means recession from the Absolute, unity means approach to it. And therefore it would be impossible even to ask whether the supremely Unifying could be the supremely evil.

And beside the historical there is the experimental or mystic approach to the same subject, with the logical analysis that it calls to its aid. As our minds rise to the sense of unity, reality, and permanence, we find that we are, as a matter of fact, moving in the direction of what we mean by good, and trying to project the movement beyond it in the same sense. In the confusions and contradictions of our actual experience, what we understand by good is always the positive and constructive, the harmonising and unifying principle.

Evil is always parasitical, and presupposes the good, which it feeds on. Aquinas has a fine chapter in which he demonstrates that there cannot be a *Summum Malum*, or supreme principle of evil, although the conception of a *Summum Bonum* is natural and indeed, as he thinks, inevitable to the reason of man. Evil always needs good to start from and to work upon, since it is by nature negative, dispersive, and destructive. Thus, in seeking the One and the Unconditioned, we are following the lines of good, and, when we are following the lines of evil, we are receding from the One. "Analogically," therefore, we are fully justified in calling the Supreme super-good.

Surely there is deep and unexhausted significance in this doctrine. Its fundamental thought, or experience, finds varied expression in every religious or philosophical idiom, and underlies them all. But the question remains: Is not God, as the universal cause, the cause of what we, at least, mean by evil as well as of what we mean by good? Certain philosophers have found an easy escape from this dilemma. Evil is negation. It is not the presence of anything but the absence of something. Evil does not exist. What does not exist, says Erigena, has no cause. Therefore God is not the cause of evil.

But we cannot leave the matter here, for we have been brought up against the "problem of evil," and we must see what Aquinas and his authorities have to say in answer to the question why these

distressing absences or limitations (if that are all that evil is), which admittedly baulk the full realisation of good, are allowed to occur at all in the scheme of things.

We must approach the subject by an examination of the doctrine of the *impossibilia per se*, or things inherently impossible. There is no sense in saying that God could make two and two equal five, or that, when an event has passed, he could now make it not have been when it was. It is indeed better to say that these things "cannot be done" than to say that God "cannot do them," for the one way of putting it only states that by definition the terms or "elements" of the proposition exclude the assertion made in it, whereas the other seems to condition the Unconditioned and place limitations upon God. Nevertheless, when this is clearly understood, it is safe to exclude such things from the scope not only of nature but of the action of God himself, for since the inherently impossible is incapable of being done, even omnipotence cannot do it.

But when this principle is once admitted, there is a fatal facility in transferring everything that transcends our own power or our own imagination to this category of the *impossibilia per se*. And Aquinas, as well as Plotinus and the Areopagite before him, tread this path all too readily in their attempts to deal with the problem of evil. In all these writers, and in many others, there are passages of splendid eloquence to show that what we call evil is not really evil at all; and indeed, inasmuch as it is essential

to the realisation of some transcendent good, must itself be regarded as a part of that good; but underlying it all is the abuse of the conception of the *impossibilia per se*, to which I have referred. It is always assumed, in the first place, that there was some inherent demand for self-utterance or self-revelation on the part of God. Aquinas is careful to say that it was not any need in the divine existence that this self-revelation in creation was designed to fulfil, for God is absolutely self-sufficing. It was no necessity of his being but a dictate of his goodness and wisdom that found expression in creation. But since all the attributes of God *are* his essence (p. 265), this only amounts to saying that it is in terms of wisdom and goodness, not in terms of necessity of nature, that *we are to think* of creation, and that again means that we shall find it easier to trace an analogy between our conceptions of goodness and wisdom and the action of God in creation, than between our conception of his essence and its demand for external expression. We have then to look to our own moral and intellectual nature for our clue to the divine impulse towards creation, and if it is to be made intelligible to us at all, it is to be made intelligible to these faculties.

The first step is easy to follow. It is of the nature of goodness to communicate itself, and therefore God, out of his infinite goodness, chose to create Intelligences, angelic and human, that might have the joy of being, and might rejoice in his communication of himself to them. But what of evil? Did God create that too? If so, why? And if not, how

comes it to be? The Neoplatonic answer, repeated by Aquinas and on into our own day, is, as we have already seen, that there is no such thing as real evil, and that what we call evil is an inevitable ingredient or condition of good. We must now consider more closely how this is made out.

Starting from the premise that it was well that God should reveal himself, these thinkers go on to say that the infinite cannot be completely revealed to a finite intelligence, and that to create a second infinite is one of the *impossibilia per se*, because that "other" would be the "same," namely, the Unconditioned, and absolutely All-embracing. The intelligences, then, to whom God reveals himself must be finite, and therefore they will not be able to receive within the compass of their faculties the all-embracing unity of the Creator. So the defect must be made good, as far as possible, by the variety and multiplicity of the revealed aspects of God, each one imperfect in itself but each contributing something towards a fuller conception than any one of them could have given alone. Hence variety in creation is essential to the adequate fulfilment of its intention. Next, by a leap, variety is identified with grading, and grading with differing degrees of perfection. Our concession, therefore, of the *impossibilia per se* has now been stretched to cover the proposition that various degrees of perfection and therefore of imperfection are directly involved in God's self-revelation, so that to ask why it is so is to ask why the *impossibilia per se* are not matters of daily experience.

Now, except as a matter of logic, we need not quarrel with this, for although the "necessity" of a graded as well as varied universe is not obvious, its beauty and charm are undeniable, and few writers have dwelt on them with more moving eloquence than the Neoplatonists. Plotinus himself gives the lead, and again and again falls into raptures over the loveliness of the material universe, not ever forgetting the variety and beauty of the animal world. Yet all the time he is maintaining that material things are illusory, and is only pleading that this imperfect order of things is the best that we could possibly expect, or even imagine, given the necessity of the divine emanations.

But the trouble comes when this variety and grading of material things, which at one moment is presented as beautiful to our devout admiration, is at the next moment equated with "evil," as though a plant were a bad or evil animal, or a man an evil angel. Wherever I have found an attempted Neoplatonic solution of the problem of evil, from Plotinus himself down to Aquinas, this identification of imperfection with evil, in the sense explained, lies at the base of it and is in fact "its roof and floor."

The Neoplatonic argument is only one of the variations on the theme that underlies all optimist or monist solutions of the problem of evil. They all consist in an attempt to prove that there is really no such thing as evil, and that, if we look at the things we call evil in their right connection, we shall see that they are really good. It was thus that Augustine

and his friends, having watched a cock-fight, found that the miserable and dejected look of the defeated bird somehow added to the splendid exhibition of energy, and heightened their enjoyment of it. And it was neatly, if not convincingly, put by Boetius, when he argued that since there is nothing which God cannot do (because he is omnipotent), and since God cannot do evil, it follows that evil is nothing, *i.e.* that it does not exist. It is a relief to escape from this atmosphere of sophistry and of moral confusions and contradictions into the wholesome objectivism of Aristotle, where the "problem of evil" that absorbs our attention is the problem of how to control and eliminate it, rather than how to explain it away. (4)

In the optimistic contention that evil is an illusion, however, there is nothing special to Aquinas or to Christian philosophy. But whereas the Pagans and the Moderns have only actual and experienced evil to deal with, the Christian theologians of the Ages of Faith had the added burden of a hideous imagined evil that outweighed beyond all reckoning the whole sum of known evil upon the earth—past, present, or to come. It is no part of my duty—and if it were I should not be able to perform it—to guess why this ghastly and gratuitous dream of an eternal and non-remedial hell should be endemic to the religion of love. But the fact is there. Indeed, Aquinas does not let us easily forget that an integral part of the evil which he has to represent as really good, is comprised in the fact, as he held it, that the vast majority of mankind are condemned to an eternity of physical

torment every moment of which transcends the fiercest anguish that ever has been or can be endured on earth, not even excepting the agony on the cross. And this physical agony, we are told, is accompanied by total exclusion from all fellowship with God, and by torments of conscience that are fiercer than the flames. Moreover, Aquinas, though he repeatedly declares that man is a free agent, and sins because he chooses to sin, nevertheless admits that he would not choose evil unless God allowed him to do so, and had made him such that, if allowed, he would choose it. For he could only help choosing it if God directly conferred on him grace to make the better choice. And yet further, Aquinas does not represent this awful fact as one of the mysteries of revealed truth that human reason cannot grasp. He undertakes to explain it by considerations that appeal to human reason, and to justify it at the bar of the moral sense.

Here, then, we see Aquinas at his worst. It is a solemn warning against allowing our deepest instincts and our fundamental perceptions of truth to resign their functions and surrender them to any "authority" however august. Let us return upon our footsteps and see how we have reached the situation that now faces us. The argument may be epitomised thus:—

Everything must ultimately rest upon the trustworthiness of our own faculties. If we do not trust our senses and our intelligence, when properly disciplined and questioned, we can have no assurance of anything. But our reason itself tells us that the Scripture is miraculously ordained to supplement and

control it, and therefore it is only reasonable to place scriptural authority above reason. Then under the cloak of the authority of Scripture, the whole body of current ecclesiastical tradition is introduced, including the doctrine of an eternal hell, the only escape from which is through the sacraments of the Church. All men deserve to go to hell, but by the grace of God some are mercifully prompted to take the provided means of escape; and it is better to be than not to be, on the chance of thus evading damnation. Reason tells us to accept the authority that tells us this is true; and further tells us to try how far we can find arguments which will approve it to our sense of right and justice, and make us see that it is really good that it should be as it is. If we fail in this attempt, we can, of course, fall back upon the authority that is above reason, and can accept it as a mystery, but in this case Aquinas is by no means conscious of failure.

Even apart from revelation, his philosophical creed would have enabled him to say that since "goodness," when applied to God, does not mean what it does when applied to men, we are not bound to justify the ways of God to our human sense of justice and of benevolence. He might have told us that it should be enough for us to know that our sense of justice is itself derivative from God's justice, and that if God's justice does not seem to coincide with ours it must be because it is more, not because it is less, just.

If he had followed this line, as Dante (so far as it

concerns the virtuous heathen, at least) does, the believer would have been left with his moral sense unsatisfied and restless, perhaps even protesting, but submissive. This would place the moral sense in a position precisely analogous to that of the intelligence in respect to other inscrutable mysteries of the faith as to which it is unsatisfied but acquiescent. And this is Dante's actual position.

But Aquinas will have none of it. He undertakes not to silence but to satisfy the moral sense.

Armed only with the principle of the *impossibilia per se*, he undertakes to show that hell is good. His argument is as follows:—Granted that the manifestation of God's goodness is supremely good, and that such goodness can only be manifested by multiplicity, all the several phases under which the all-embracing unity of God's being is seen by created intelligences must be severally and recognisably made manifest. Amongst these is justice, and justice can only manifest itself by the punishment of sin. Even human justice, with its limited resources, in inflicting the death penalty or the sentence of lifelong exile, goes as far as it can towards making the casting out of the sinner from the fellowship he has outraged and rejected as enduring and conclusive as possible. Considering the immeasurable nature of the sin of averting the soul's love from God, and seeing that (by Christian hypothesis) that aversion, if not renounced and absolved on earth, will be irrevocable and will be perpetually renewed for ever, how could God's justice be manifested in his dealings with the

sinner except by a never-ending hell, or manifested at all if there were no sin? God does not take pleasure in the suffering of the damned, and does not will it in itself; but as incidental to a greater good, which could not be without it, it is good; and God, the angels, and the saints, rejoicing in all good, rejoice in this too.

I have said that here we see Aquinas at his worst. And in so saying, I do not refer to his acceptance of the doctrine of hell, but to his contamination and outrage of the moral sense by representing the doctrine as acceptable to it. Throughout he takes his supposed facts from unchallenged tradition, and defines God's relation to them under the conception of God as the universal and all-embracing cause; but then he attempts to reconcile the result to our conception of a humanly intelligible goodness, so like human goodness that we may and must maintain that all its acts are not "analogically" but "univocally" *humanly and intelligibly* good.

Let any man accept, if he must, the doctrine of an eternal hell. Let him believe, if he can, that, if placed at the divine point of view, he would see that it is super-good. But let him not undertake to show, to our human justice or love, why and how it is good, as tried at *their* bar. Against this our moral nature revolts. To grasp at a divine serenity towards evil without having reached the divine insight is not to rise above but to sink below humanity.

And yet perhaps our last word on this matter should be a word of gratitude to Aquinas for his

bold and characteristic utterance. Optimists and monists of every colour have declared that what seems evil in its isolation is good when related to all else as a part of a whole. But Aquinas has the courage to face the conclusion that, to the man who has *not* risen to the width of view of the poet, the philosopher, or the saint, evil exists precisely in that unrelated state in which it *is* evil. Thomas accordingly tells us frankly that though hell is good, yet it is not good to those who are in it; for to them it is no part of a larger scheme. It is all their world. Not for one moment shall they see beyond it. Even at the great assize, when they shall be summoned into the presence of their judge, they will hear the sentence but will not see the judge, because to see him, even as he pronounced their doom, would be a joy. (5)

Hell is not good for those who are in it. The splendour of the exhibition to which he was contributing was lost upon Augustine's defeated bird. Let this thought accompany us in our judgment upon every system which assures us that evil only exists in semblance; and let us turn to a more modest statement which we find where perhaps we should least expect it: for it is none other than the great monist Plotinus himself who assures us that evil is not here in order to conduce to the perfection of the universe. On the contrary, it is due to the imperfection inherent in a graded universe. But nowhere is the transcendent might of good more triumphantly displayed than in its power to extract some good out of every evil. If we understand this (as I am convinced

we may) to mean that we can make every evil yield some *specific* good of its own, we shall have a creed that will enable us to face every evil thing with a high heart and to welcome with ungrudging thankfulness every good, great or small, that it can be forced to yield, though all the time we are trying utterly to destroy evil. We shall not need to stultify our intelligence or harden our heart by calling evil good, or pleading that life would not be worth living if we really succeeded in slaying the foes of life against which we are, or ought to be, fighting.

The natural counterpoise or supplement to the philosophic agnosticism of the theology of negation is the mystic consciousness of communion, or the experiential knowledge of an inward command and an inward support in choosing and pursuing good and rejecting and warring against evil. It is possible to accept all that is, as in some mysterious sense the will of God, and at the same time to feel that the "categorical imperative," which bids us fight against much that is, meaning to destroy it, is the special "word" or "command" of God to us. We shall then understand what is meant by saying that the moral categories, in the sense in which we understand, and must understand, them, though not applicable to God, are derivative from him, rest upon his eternal and inscrutable being, and are supported, as they are inspired, by it. But if God is the universal cause (and not a great fellow-subject of ours, limited and controlled by external conditions even as we are), the attempt to "justify his ways" at the bar of our

derivative sense of justice and love can only result in eviscerating our philosophical conception of the source, or polluting the stream that flows from it into our hearts. S. Thomas's defence of hell as an element in God's goodness, in a sense intelligible to us, is an appalling example and illustration of this.

Returning to the consideration of Thomas's general scheme of natural theology, we are impressed with the very wide extension which he gives to the area of truth that is accessible to the human intelligence. The two poles, so to speak, between which our minds must move are the conviction of the unqualified unity or "simplicity" of the divine being himself, and the reality of his self-revelation, necessarily multiplex, to our natural faculties. To say, for instance, that God is good and then that God is wise, is not to repeat an identical proposition, although the actual fact that each of these statements imperfectly represents is itself the same fact. In ordinary matters the student has learned to distinguish in his thought between the nature of his apprehension and the nature of the thing he apprehends. He knows that his "apprehension" of a stone, for instance, is an immaterial fact in the subjective world of consciousness, and that the "stone" itself is a material fact in the objective order of nature. And he knows that his apprehension or conception of the stone is a much simplified version of the "stone" itself. But this does not prevent his apprehension of the stone from being true as far as it goes. Now, just as

material things are too "complex" for us, so spiritual beings, and God in the supreme degree, are too "simple" for us, and so we have to approach God's single and all-embracing excellence, in which all distinctions are lost, by diverse ways. As we follow up now the excellence of one creature, or one attribute of a creature, and now another, asserting this proposition and denying that, we are conscious all the time that the distinctions are not in the divine object of our thought but in the limited grasp of our thought itself; and further, that these limitations neither prevent our thought from being true as far as it goes, nor reduce the variety of propositions it formulates to a mere vain repetition of identical assertions. And yet, all the time, the thing we are trying to say is always one and the same thing, and we know it to be so.*

Thus we may build up the several "proofs" of God's goodness, wisdom, and power, we may distinguish between what is inherent to his essential being, and may so be called the necessity of his nature, and what he chooses freely at the dictate not of the necessity of his nature but of his wisdom or love, and we may think of all these different predicates as united in God; so long as we never forget that the unity is in the divine *subject* of thought, the *intellectum*, and the diversity in the human *organ* of thought, the *intellectus*. Yet even in the organ of thought itself, the diversity should be felt as giving us a means of approaching the unity, and as a partial

* *Cf.* p. 265.

escape from limitations in ourselves, or compensation for them. That is to say, this variety of partial revelation is to be accepted as a grace, without the condescension of which we could have no access at all to God; not as a limitation grudgingly imposed upon us by him. (6)

Moving along these lines—guided, that is, by the principles of the *impossibilia per se*, and the necessity of a divine self-revelation under the form of diversity—Aquinas leads us to a belief in the two orders of created intelligences, the purely spiritual order of the angels, all created at once and of intuitive, direct, and synthetic vision, on the one hand; and on the other hand, the order of human intelligences successively arising and developing individually from mere potentiality to actuality, dependent for the material of thought upon the senses, but gradually building up the faculties that transcend the range of their material organs, and rise to an independent life of the spirit. The immortality of the human soul is involved in this conception, and the theologico-psychic errors of the Arabians are elaborately examined and refuted.

A future state of rewards and punishments is deduced from the same data, together with a distinction between venial and mortal sins and a defence of religious orders under vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. All this and more, that we should scarcely have expected, is evolved *a priori* from the data of human intelligence, and from the "divine law" as postulated and formulated by human reason apart from revelation.

Nay, we are carried still further along the road that led us on the basis of reason to demand a revelation that should supplement and supersede it. For this demand of reason is so defined and extended as to cover an expectation of the gift of grace, and of a corresponding faith that shall at once exalt our natural powers and assure us of truths beyond their scope.

Thus, in the first three books of the *Contra Gentiles* Aquinas leads us with consummate skill and unwavering sincerity to the acceptance, on their own merits, of the greater number of the positive beliefs of his Church; and at the same time, the whole vital movement of his argument tends with ever-increasing insistence towards something beyond itself, and attunes the reader's mind to accept the supra-rational sequel. (7)

Throughout the three books Thomas has made masterly use of the Scriptures. Not, as he now expressly tells us, by way of proof, but only by way of illustration and enforcement of truths reached by reason. But his exhaustive knowledge of the Bible, his strong and sensitive feeling for analogy and relation, and the fineness of his moral and spiritual sense, enable him so to bring out the strength and depth of the scriptural passages with which he crowns and adorns almost every conclusion he reaches, as to predispose the reader to accept, as the organ of the revelation for which he is panting, those very writings which have already interpreted and confirmed his own highest thought, impregnated it with a long-

ing for something yet higher, and at the same time endowed it with a right to demand it.

Almost all the other extensive works of S. Thomas are designed for the theological student, and both in form and content bear the stamp of the school upon them. And the same is true to no inconsiderable extent of the *Contra Gentiles* itself. It contains some of the severest and most technical chains of reasoning to be found in Thomas's writings. Much of it must exercise rather than impress the intelligence of the modern student, and must leave his heart unmoved. And the scholastic form of composition, hampered and broken in its constructive advance by minute discussion and debate, is often disguised rather than really escaped. But when all this has been said, it remains true that the *Contra Gentiles*, in the majesty of its progress, in the continuity of its structure, in its sustained fervour, and in its masterly construction, is the outstanding representative, to the disinterested student of philosophy and literature, of what scholasticism at its highest could achieve.

It is on the field of natural religion, which we have now very cursorily surveyed, that the *Contra Gentiles* is on its own special ground. The fourth book, which deals with truths that can only be known by revelation, is of relatively subordinate interest, except that its concise treatment of some of the sacraments, and of the final state of the spiritual and material world, deals with that portion of the subject which Aquinas never included in his unfinished *Summa Theologiae*,

and at the same time represents a later stage of his thought than is expressed in his other great theological synthesis, the *Commentary on the Sentences* of Peter the Lombard.

One special service, however, which we might naturally have expected from it, it is a little disappointing not to receive. It will be remembered that Aquinas explains that revelation, as a matter of fact, covers much of the ground that is not peculiarly its own inasmuch as it is actually accessible to reason. In his other works, therefore, he often appeals to the authority of Scripture or of the Church in proof of a proposition, without expressly telling us whether or not such proposition is by its nature exclusively dependent upon the sanction of revelation. Sometimes, not always where we should expect it, we are given this information. For instance, we learn that it is rather a matter of faith than of reason that the heavens will cease to revolve after the final judgment. But I have noted no passage in which the truths known only by revelation are, so to speak, scheduled. And the structure of the *Contra Gentiles* seems to promise this, from the fact that, according to its plan, everything that can possibly be brought under the province of reason is dealt with in the first three books and the rest reserved for the fourth. But our hope is disappointed, for the division does not practically make a clean cut. In dealing with the general subject of creation, in the second book, for instance, Thomas is constrained to go at great length into the question of the creation of the material

universe "out of nothing," at a point whence time began, as against the theory of a continuous and eternal creation which he (unwarrantably) assigns to Aristotle. And this is one of the stock examples (the doctrine of the Trinity being the other) of truths inaccessible to the reason, or questions not capable of being decided by it. And, moreover, the relative conciseness of the treatment of truths known only by revelation, in the fourth book of the *Contra Gentiles*, prevents anything like detail. The doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Sacraments, and the Eternal Life are all that are dealt with in it. (8)

In turning to two of these subjects in conclusion, we must try, in accordance with our general method, to see how far Aquinas fulfils the condition he has himself imposed upon the Christian philosopher of showing that, although this region of truth transcends the human intelligence, it never contradicts or outrages it. The two doctrines we will take as illustrations are those of the trinity and the real presence.

On the field of natural theology, of which we have just made a rapid inspection, it is often clear enough that Aquinas is in truth arguing up to a foregone conclusion and squaring his reasoning to it rather than really reaching his conclusion by the argument. But this is not what he professes or intends, or believes himself to be doing. He does not, it is true, stake the truth of his conclusions upon the correctness and cogency of his reasoning, for they are assured, for the most part at any rate, by revelation. But also for the most part they had been actually reached

by uninspired philosophers, and Aquinas sincerely believed that they could all be established and victoriously defended on grounds of reason alone. But now that we come to the second order of truths, those namely that are intrinsically inaccessible to reason, the case is naturally quite different, and we have to ask what room there is for the reasoning faculty at all in the matter. Why should Aquinas, for instance, devote much of his hardest and most conscientious thinking and make his severest demands upon the powers of thought and the perseverance of his readers, in arguing about conclusions that are avowedly incomprehensible at the end of the chapter, and which have, moreover, been determined to the minutest detail by an authority that reason dare not question?

The answer is twofold. In the first place, surely Aquinas must have felt what Abelard constantly insisted on and what Anselm held with equal firmness, namely, that it would argue frivolity and vacancy of mind to be content to repeat formulæ without an attempt to attach some kind of intellectual concept to them. We must understand *something* when we say that there are three Persons in the Godhead, but only one Substance. And, moreover, we have the divine assurance that these things do mean something, and that what they mean is supremely true and significant. It seems obvious, therefore, that while the simple man may be content to accept an unintelligible statement in humble reverence, knowing that he does not understand it

but knowing also that it means something and is true and sacred, the Christian thinker must avail himself of every possible means of approaching the comprehension which he cannot reach, and must search out with extremest diligence those lines of suggestion and analogy which will enable him partially to interpret the mysterious dogmas, and so to form a truer, even if not a clearer, conception of the ineffable Deity than the wisest of Pagans could enjoy. For inasmuch as a man who has formed a wholly false conception of God and feels emotionally moved towards this creature of his imagination is not really loving God, it follows that, in proportion as our conception of God approaches the truth, so our love is indeed love of God and not of an idol.

But there is more than this. The naive acceptance of a wholly unintelligible dogma might suffice for the simple man, the dogma itself might have been developed on comparatively simple lines by the Christian thinkers, and the authority of the Church might have been confined to the promulgation of a relatively simple creed, as indeed in early times it was, had it not been for the disastrous presumption and perversity of the heretical teachers. These men were determined to understand more than the Church had defined, and they understood it wrong. Hence the necessity of closer definition by the Church herself. For there was danger lest the supposed believer, in attempting to advance beyond the inadequate faith of the wisest heathen—which was true

as far as it went—should actually embrace a positively false faith, and, instead of having his love truly though inadequately directed, should have it definitely misdirected and turned to a false object.

If it is difficult for modern minds to realise the relentless pressure of such considerations upon the heart and mind of Aquinas, it is because it is difficult for the modern mind to realise the atmosphere breathed by a man who took his dogmatics seriously and who actually and effectively believed the statement *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. But it is just this seriousness that gives dignity to the work of Aquinas, even where the hasty reader would deign to bestow no more than a passing glance upon its subtleties and "hair-splitting" distinctions.

It will help us to realise the position if we remind ourselves of the way in which the intellectual *impasse*, offered by the strict orthodox doctrine of the trinity, arose. The conception of a trinity sprang up, as we have already noted, amid the mutual reactions of the Neoplatonic and the Ante-Nicene Christian schools. Amongst the Platonists, it was a natural product of the attempt to bridge the chasm between the ineffable and all-embracing unity of the Absolute and Unfathomable, and the multiplicity of the phenomenal world revealed to the senses. The Platonic "Ideas" themselves suggested such mediators, and, if "beauty" was an actual self-existing reality, why not "intelligence" or "vitality"? Thus the Plotinian trinity of (1) the absolute, (2) mind (or intelligence, νοῦς) and (3) soul (or life, ψυχή), grew

up quite naturally on Platonic soil. This trinity was, by its very nature, and in virtue of its philosophic office and origin, graded. It remained purely philosophical, though it easily allegorised and assimilated some of the materials of the popular mythology, without any detriment to its own genius.

In its Christian development, particularly under Clement of Alexandria, the doctrine was based on the same agnosticism that underlay Neoplatonism, and it satisfied the same demand for mediation between the inaccessible unity of the Absolute and our world of multiplicity and experience, but it had from the first to absorb a historical element into its philosophic processes, for its development was inextricably intertwined with the doctrine of the person of Christ. For the rest, the Christian trinity, like its Plotinian twin, was graded.

But, having elaborated a trinitarian doctrine, under Neoplatonic impulses, the Christian theologians became aware that it threatened to carry them too far from the monotheistic conception of God as the Creator, and of all else or other than God as the created, which was rooted in the Hebrew antecedents of the Christian Church, and belonged to its innate genius. Emanational Platonism could not permanently suppress the Christian and Hebrew insistence on "creation out of nothing." The graded intermediaries between God and his creatures must needs be drawn up into the one term or down into the other of this fundamental duality. The angels, and all that in other systems was taken as a mis-

reading of them, were of course created; but, with the graded persons of the Trinity, it must go the other way. The developments already made in the doctrine of the person of Christ decided this. It was impossible to recede from the Arian position, or anything like it, to humanitarianism. The movement must be in the contrary sense, and it culminated in Athanasianism and the decrees of Nice.

When the full Nicene doctrine had thus established itself, and acceptance of the Christian Trinity no longer involved a doctrine of emanations, the characteristic Platonic conception of Ideas was profoundly modified; for even the Areopagite, who at first sight strikes us as an almost undiluted Neoplatonist, is emphatic in his assertion that the ideal "beauty," and the rest, exist only in God, and not with a separate created existence of their own. Secured in this retreat, however, they continue to dominate the natural theology of the Christian schools, and are safe even from the assaults of Aquinas and the other Peripatetics at a later day. This is the meaning and origin of the doctrine that the categories do not apply to God, which both Erigena and Aquinas accept; and to which we must give a moment's attention at this point.

The only "categories" with which we need directly concern ourselves are those of *substance* and *quality*. A substance is any being that has an independent existence of its own, such as a man, a tree, an angel, a disembodied soul. A quality is (for once) just what

we moderns understand by the word. Beauty, greenness, weight, are qualities. They answer the question, not "What is it?" but "What like is it?" But if, as the Platonist held, "beauty," for example, was not only a characteristic of certain things of sense and experience, but also a separate and independent existence, some kind of participation in which it is that beautifies things beautiful, then this absolute or ideal beauty would be a substance or thing-in-itself. Now, to the Aristotelian, there is no objectively existing "beauty itself," which is nothing else but beauty. Beauty, therefore, is a *qualitas*, not a *res* or *substantia*.

To the Christian philosopher (Neoplatonist, Peripatetic, or both) neither of these positions quite adequately represents the truth; for to him, though a beautiful thing is something else besides beauty, and an individual man is something else besides humanity, yet God is nothing else besides deity, and therefore his beauty, truth, goodness, and power are not *attributes* of his deity nor parts of it, but are different and imperfect ways in which our limited minds attempt to conceive, under the form of multiplicity, the ineffable unity of the divine essence. And thus, while "beauty" is an attribute and not a thing in all else, it is a *res*, or thing in God; but it is the *same* thing as his goodness or his power, or what else you will. No one of these phrases wholly expresses the Deity, but in so far as any one of them expresses him at all, it expresses the same identical essence that all the others express;

and thus beauty and the rest have, after all, a real, substantive, and objective existence, but only in the being and essence of God.* (9)

So far philosophy. But Christian dogmatics were too deeply committed to the "distinction of the persons," alike by their genesis from a graded trinity and their relation to the person of Christ, to be able to retreat from it. Hence the Christian dogmatist's dilemma. God is supremely one. His wisdom is himself, and so is his love. They are the same *res*. But yet each is distinct from the other, and distinct as an actual Person. Gregory of Nazianzus and other Fathers repeatedly declare that Christians assert the unity of the substance against the Gentiles, and the distinction of the Persons against the Jews. But, in truth, we may go further and, substituting the positive for the negative form of expression, may say that the Church owes the distinction of the Persons to Platonic emanationism, and the unity of the substance to Jewish monotheism.

The two doctrines are incompatible, but the Christian theologians exercised a ceaseless vigilance in trying to guard against an expression of either of them that should too plainly betray itself as a formal contradiction of the other.

We can now define the precise place that Thomas must assign to systematic reasoning in connection with this doctrine. To begin with, reason must surrender itself to authority not only in general but at every step and on every point. And yet it must

* *Cf.* note (6) on pp. 324 *sqq.*

work loyally on its own principles and according to its own laws. That is to say, we must exercise our intelligence by following up every clue and analogy that promises to bring us nearer to the understanding of the mystery, or at any rate to make us feel that it is not wholly and blankly unintelligible and self-contradictory, or in isolated severance from all our thought and experience. In doing this, we are to strain and pervert nothing, but we are to remember all the time that we are not testing or trying to discover the truth itself. We are testing the hints and analogies that have occurred to our reason as likely to lead us into closer touch with the truth; and we are testing them by seeing whether, as a fact, they do so lead us. We know, in advance and by authority, exactly what the truth is, and if the lines we have followed really take us to a closer and firmer sense of its significance and fill it with a richer and clearer meaning to us, then this is an indication that we are on the right track; but if, on the contrary, they suggest a conception which we know on authority to be false, then we must dismiss them. By their fruits shall we know them. Whether we are to follow up this or that analogy or deduction, then, and how far we are to follow it, where we are to welcome it as leading us into the sanctuary, and where we are to reject it as vain or dangerous, depends not upon its promise but upon its performance, not upon its inherent strength or cogency but upon its serviceableness. A weak thrust in the right direction is better than a strong one

that is counter to it; and we know what this right direction is.

All this is the inevitable and perfectly logical expression of Thomas's dogmatic seriousness. As between truth and intelligibility, revelation and reason, dogma and dialectic, there is to be no give and take. You are not to trifle with the meaning of the word "Person," for example, in order to make the doctrine of the Trinity easier to relate to our own natural conceptions. And when one step of your argument has helped you to get into effective touch with a dogmatic truth and the next step, that seems inevitably to follow, contradicts another dogmatic truth, you are neither to refrain from going so far, nor to insist on going further. The intelligence is to put out its tentacles and feel its way everywhere, but we must only follow it where it "finds a yielding element."

Examples will presently make this clearer, but meanwhile some light may perhaps already have been thrown on a point which, I suppose, must have impressed every earnest student of any one of the great classical expositions of the doctrine of the Trinity which are to be found in the works of Aquinas. I mean the contrast between the perfect confidence and firmness of tread (felt from the very first) with which Thomas passes through the labyrinth of his argument, never for a moment hesitating or losing his clue, and the bewildered sense of inability to follow him that so long distresses and entangles the student. The fact is that the student

is looking for consistency in the wrong place, and therefore, while he feels that it is somewhere present, he does not anywhere find it.

But it is time to turn from these general considerations to some attempt to initiate ourselves into a few concrete examples of the function and limitations of philosophic reasoning on this pre-eminently dogmatic ground.

On the constructive side of his argument Aquinas is not original. He follows the line of psychological analogy which Augustine had made classical in the Western Church. The assurance that man was made not only in the likeness (*similitudo*) but also in the image (*imago*) of God suggested that, in the constitution of our own minds (imperfectly as we understand even them), we may find helpful analogies to the mystery of the Trinity. We shall see how Aquinas worked out this clue presently; but in order to follow him we must first remind ourselves that, for Thomas, love is an act of volition, and the will itself is an "intellectual appetite."

My intelligence simply recognises the Good as good in the abstract. My will appropriates it as good for me, and is borne to it with a certain impetus and passion; but only because it has been manifested to it by my intelligence as good. If the passion is merely blind, concrete and unreasoning, it is not voluntary. The will, therefore, is an "intellectual appetite," and its motions are identified with those of every kind of love except such as are purely instinctive or unintelligently passionate.

Now all this becomes clearer when we realise that the intelligence and will are faculties of the single soul. The soul thinks by and with its intelligence and loves by or with its will. And therefore when we say that the soul seeks truth by exercise of the intellect or good by the exercise of the will, it is the same soul in either case, but the faculties exercised are distinct, though not existing separately in independence of each other.*

We can now proceed to an examination of the light which the analogy of the human mind is found by the doctors to shed on the mystery of the Trinity. Our very conception of an intelligence, as known to us primarily in the intellective nature of man, involves the processes of understanding and of love. Both of these "go forth" or "proceed," and when we are considering our own psychology we find that they generally "go forth" to something outside ourselves. But in the sole and self-sufficing Deity, the "procession" must be internal and must abide with its origin. Our "thought" or "unspoken word," proceeding from the thinking faculty within our being to find its object, is never in perfect unity with it. God's thought or "internal Word" is directed to himself and is in the perfect and absolute harmony of identity with it. The "Word" then proceeds from the "intellective power" in the being of God, and its content is God himself. *We* distinguish between the powers of our minds and our minds themselves, but this is only because we cannot grasp

* Cf. *Sum. Theol.*, i^a. q. 77.

the essential being and nature of our minds. In God we must suppose the "intellective power," that begets the "Word," to be no other than his very self or essence. But if I think of myself, my thought is distinguishable from the intellective power which begets it, and the distinction asserts itself to me as something "real," that actually is, however completely identical the thought and the thinker (who is also the object of the thought) may be. Our minds cannot choose but carry up this sense of a real distinction into our conception of the divine intelligence, for it is involved in our conception of intelligence as such, and it in no way qualifies our sense of unity. Thus both a distinction and a relation, between the source of thought and the thought, a kind of paternity and sonship, necessarily enters into our conception of deity. And revealed truth assures us that in this our modes of thought, when reverently used, do not deceive us.

The "Word" proceeds from its divine source, and a real intrinsic relation distinguishes them from each other. Yet they are like, not with the imperfect likeness of an earthly father and son, but with the perfect and essential unity of identity of substance. And here whosoever desires to enter with sympathy into the supreme effort of this great man's mind, must school himself to a potential respect even for a "distinction without a difference." For one of the things that we are to be most careful about is to recognise the *distinction* between the Persons as real, and yet to avoid saying that one is *different* from

the other. For "distinctions" rise from relations of origin constituting the Persons and distinguishing them. But no "differences" can arise out of internal relations existing in one undivided essence.

There is an example drawn from Aristotle of which telling use was made in the Schools. The road from Thebes to Athens is the road from Athens to Thebes. The road is one identical road, not two "different" roads. And yet you can "distinguish" between the two, and can establish relations between them. There is a "distinction" then, and a real one, between the road from Athens to Thebes and the road from Thebes to Athens, but yet the road is one and the same road, not two "different" roads. So there may be "a distinction without a difference," and the analogy of the road may help us to understand that it is not without reason that we are told to distinguish between the Persons of the Father and the Son but yet may not say that the Father is "other" than the Son. So far, the analogy is helpful and leads us into closer touch with the truth. But we must not push it further, for the distinction, in the case of the road, springs out of its relation to persons and things other than itself, whereas the relations of origin that distinguish the Persons of the Trinity are internal to the Deity.

Returning to the "image" of the Trinity in ourselves, we are led to the next step. It is not conceivable that the supreme Good should "know" himself and not "will" himself. The "procession" of love must accompany the "generation" of thought.

For, to know good is to be moved and impelled to it. The words "paternity" and "filiation" or "sonship" express the personal relation of origin between the Father and Son, but there are no parallel words expressive of the relation between the Father or the Son and the Spirit. Hence a difficulty in giving the same distinctness of expression to the relations of "procession" that is possible in those of "generation." But the conception itself is equally clear. In our minds the acts of understanding and of willing (love) both alike flow out of the "intellective power," but the act of willing flows out of the act of understanding also. And we are authoritatively assured that this dependence of origin does not deceive us, even when we carry up its analogies into the divine relations, and say that the Spirit proceeds not only from the Father (the intellective power), but also from the Son (the thought, or understanding, of good).

We need pursue the subject no further; for though we have not touched on the most intimate and intricate aspects of the matter at all, yet enough has been said to show how easily Aquinas might have escaped all difficulties had he taken his dogmatic system less seriously. What could have been easier, for instance, or more philosophical, than to say that whereas *we* have to distinguish between God's power, wisdom, and love, and so have to conceive of him in a threefold way, yet these are only the distinctions of our limited thought and cannot be carried up into our belief as to the actual nature of the divine being?

And indeed the philosophical principle that involves this has already been maintained and established as an item in the scheme of natural theology.* But no such facile treatment of the subject will meet the dogmatic demands of the orthodox faith, which declares that the distinction between the Persons is "real" and not merely conceptual; and even that each Person is an *individua substantia*, a *res naturæ*, that is, an individual being, existing in itself and not in another. And so the Scylla and Charybdis between which Aquinas has to sail are the conceptions that we can only distinguish the Persons as constituted by relations of origin, and are yet compelled to maintain that in God every relation is a *res*, or thing, and is the *same* thing in every case. So when we have "distinguished" between the intellective power, the thought or internal Word, and the love of God, we are to save these distinctions and relations from being regarded as merely conceptual by saying that the three Persons are *res*, realities existing in the Deity; but we must not insist, in this connection, upon the truth (which we shall require, however, in other connections) that the three *res* are identically the same *res*; for so we should lose the "distinction." But again we must shrink even here from asserting that these "distinct" *res* are also "different," lest we should directly impugn the divine unity. Nor, in insisting upon the supreme "simplicity" of the divine essence, admitting of no categorical distinction between substance and attri-

* Page 254.

butes, are we so to express ourselves as to imply that the distinctions, the relations, and the Persons are not real and "distinct" within that unity. No wonder that the early Fathers, who wrote before the Council of Nice, used many expressions, in their innocence, that the perversions of later heretics have made dangerous. No wonder that even the great Augustine himself may use a phrase which the student must reverently and discreetly explain (knowing that Augustine meant no harm by it), but must by no means employ himself. Thomas's feeling, when he encountered such phrases, must have been something like that of a teacher who is reading a classic of his own language, some few centuries old, with a foreign pupil, and encounters a word that has contracted a sordid or obscene meaning in later times. He will carefully explain what it means in the passage, and, at the same time, will warn his pupil against ever using it himself, as "it would now be liable to be misunderstood."

To sum up. What it comes to is this:—When we have learned to distinguish the Persons, in rigid conformity to the truth as delivered to us, and have exhausted the analogies that can give us support in our flight, we cannot escape the implicit contradiction between our language and a belief in the unqualified divine unity, but we can avoid expressing ourselves in terms that make the implicit contradiction needlessly explicit. And counterwise, we must express in unqualified terms the truth of the divine unity, but must avoid terms that might

seem primarily and specifically to be directed against any of the assertions made concerning the trinity of the Persons. Further than this we cannot go. The contradiction is always there at one remove. Aquinas is too honest to conceal, too orthodox to remove, and too lucid to obscure, it.

But has he made good his contention that the doctrine of the Trinity, while not accessible to reason, or capable of being apprehended by it, is yet not contradictory to it?

In his free application of the principle of *impossibilia per se* Thomas has heavily weighted the scale against himself. For he has maintained, amongst other things, that to ask that the goodness of God should be revealed without an eternal hell forming part of its manifestation is to ask what reason declares to be impossible even to omnipotence.

But let us forget that, and weigh this present contention in an even balance. We are still forced to admit that, if reason, with the best will in the world, cannot hold either of two propositions without drawing from it inevitable conclusions that destroy the other, and is yet required to hold them both at once, and not to draw either of the mutually destructive conclusions, its submission has been pushed to the point of flat contradiction of its own nature.

The contention that the doctrine of transubstantiation does not contradict reason, seems even bolder than the corresponding assertion as to the Trinity. Aquinas enumerates the difficulties with his usual

clearness and intrepidity. The body of Christ clearly was not on the altar before the act of consecration. A thing cannot come to be where it was not, except either by its coming there itself or by something else turning into it there. It would seem that the body of Christ does not come to the altar, for a body can only come into a place where it was not, by leaving the place where it was, and the body of Christ does not leave heaven. But, on the other hand, when one thing becomes another thing, that other thing begins to be; and therefore nothing can become a pre-existing thing other than itself. Again, it is a fundamental axiom in the philosophic creed of Aquinas that accidents cannot exist apart from their subjects, and the subject must be a "substance." Now, the substance of the Eucharist is the body of Christ, and the accidents are not its accidents, but those of bread and wine. And these accidents retain all their natural reactions. If you drank enough of the cup it would intoxicate you. The wafer would mould or crumble if neglected, whereas the body of Christ is incorruptible. But the substance of the bread and wine are not there at all. How, then, can their accidents persist?

These and other difficulties Aquinas meets as best he may. Nature in all her operations presupposes matter, and can only change the form it assumes; and since matter is the individuating principle, nature cannot make the "ear-marked" matter that individuates this finger into the ear-marked matter that individuates another already existing finger. But

God can command matter just as much as form, and therefore he can not only change the form and leave the matter unchanged, but he can change both form and matter into form and matter other than themselves, or can change the matter that individuates this existing substance into the very matter that individuates that other already existing substance, and can leave the form it had before unaltered. In that case the "dimensions" of the former substance, which are themselves accidents, may be made to do duty for the substance that the accidents presuppose. Now, in any other connection, Aquinas would treat this conferring of substantial functions upon the accidental dimensions as a philosophical heresy. He is emphatic on the point, and it is integral to his Aristotelian creed.

The student of philosophy may find a genuine interest, and may even derive profit from a careful consideration of the exact implications of this substitution, at a critical point, of a Platonic heresy for Aristotelian orthodoxy; but it will be very hard for anyone to deny that much easier feats than the one here said to be possible have been included among the *impossibilia per se* in other connections. Judged by the standards there erected, Aquinas again fails in his attempt to show that the most mysterious of the doctrines of the Church never actually contradict reason.

This essential requirement of the scheme set forth at the conclusion of our first lecture Aquinas can hardly be held to have met even formally. (10)

NOTES TO LECTURE IV

(1) *To page* 229.—The passage in Anselm is too celebrated not to be given in the original:

"Ergo, Domine, qui das fidei intellectum, da mihi, ut, quantum scis expedire, intelligam quia es, sicut credimus; et hoc es, quod credimus. Et quidem credimus te esse aliquid, quo majus nihil cogitari possit. An ergo non est aliqua talis natura, quia *dixit insipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus?* (*Psal.* xiii. 1). Sed certe idem ipse insipiens, cum audit hoc ipsum quod dico, 'aliquid quo majus nihil cogitari potest'; intelligit quod audit, et quod intelligit in intellectu ejus est; etiamsi non intelligat illud esse.* Aliud est enim rem esse in intellectu; aliud intelligere rem esse. Nam cum pictor praecogitat quae facturus est, habet quidem in intellectu; sed nondum esse intelligit quod nondum fecit. Cum vero jam pinxit, et habet in intellectu, et intelligit esse quod jam fecit. Convincitur ergo etiam insipiens esse vel † in intellectu aliquid, quo nihil majus cogitari potest; quia hoc cum audit, intelligit; et quidquid intelligitur,

* *esse*, verb substantive "to exist." The *est* in the line before and the *esse* in the line following are little more than copulative. The double, and sometimes transitional, use of the verb *esse* often demands careful attention from the reader of scholastic literature.

† *vel* = "even if only."

in intellectu est. Et certe id, quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re: quod majus est. Si ergo id, quo majus cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu, idipsum, quo majus cogitari non potest, est quo majus cogitari potest: Sed certe hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu, et in re."—*Proslogion*, cap. ii. (227 *sq.*).

And again:

"Ergo, Domine, non solum es quo majus cogitari nequit; sed es quiddam majus quam cogitari possit. Quoniam namque valet cogitari esse aliquid hujusmodi; si tu non es hoc ipsum, potest cogitari aliquid majus te: quod fieri nequit."—*Ib.*, cap. xv. (235a).

S. Thomas rejects this argument:

"Forte ille qui audit hoc nomen *Deus*, non intelligit significari aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, cum quidam crediderint Deum esse corpus. Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat hoc nomine *Deus* significari hoc quod dicitur, scilicet illud quo maius cogitari non potest; non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod intelligat id quod significatur per nomen, esse in rerum natura; sed in apprehensione intellectus tantum. Nec potest argui quod sit in re, nisi daretur quod sit in re aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest: quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 2: a. 1. ad 2^{m} (Leon., iv. 28b). *Cf.* 1 *Dist.*, iii. q. 1: a. 2. ob. 4. and ad 4^{m}, where Anselm is mentioned by name (vol. vi. 32b *sq.*).

But neither will Aquinas allow that the knowledge of God's existence is intuitive:

"Praedicta autem opinio provenit: *

"Partim quidem ex consuetudine, qua a principio homines assueti sunt nomen Dei audire et invocare. Consuetudo autem, et praecipue quae est a principio, vim naturae obtinet; ex quo contingit ut ea, quibus a pueritia animus imbuitur, ita firmiter teneantur ac si essent naturaliter et per se nota."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. i. cap. 11 princ. (vol. v. 7a).

(2) *To page* 232.—The argument from motion.

The argument from motion, as summarised by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*, is translated in *The Spirit of Man* (No. 39) by the Poet Laureate, with great, but not excessive, insistence on its importance.† The reader who is not familiar with the technical side of Aristotle's reasoning must not expect to find either Aristotle's argument, or the following summary of it by S. Thomas, easy reading; but to elucidate the passages adequately would take us too far afield:

"Circa essentiae quidem divinae unitatem primo quidem credendum est Deum esse; quod ratione conspicuum est. Videmus enim omnia quae moventur, ab aliis moveri: inferiora quidem per superiora, sicut elementa per corpora caelestia; et in elementis quod

* *Sc.* that the existence of God is *per se notum*.

† I venture, however, respectfully to challenge the translation (or emendation?) of τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα (in line 5 of the second page) as "for the sake of something." I take it to mean "that because of which [movement takes place]," *i.e.* the inspirer of movement. Note, too, that the reference should be to Λ 7, not 10.

fortius est, movet id quod debilius est; et in corporibus etiam caelestibus inferiora per superiora aguntur. Hoc autem in infinitum procedere impossibile est. Cum enim omne quod movetur ab aliquo, sit quasi instrumentum quoddam primi moventis; si primum movens non sit, quaecunque movent, instrumenta erunt. Oportet autem, si in infinitum procedatur in moventibus et motis, primum movens non esse. Igitur omnia infinita moventia et mota erunt instrumenta. Ridiculum est autem etiam apud indoctos, ponere instrumenta moveri non ab aliquo principali agente: simile enim est hoc ac si aliquis circa constitutionem arcae vel lecti ponat serram vel securim absque carpentario operante. Oportet igitur primum movens esse, quod sit omnibus supremum; et hoc dicimus Deum.

"Ex hoc apparet quod necesse est Deum moventem omnia, immobilem esse. Cum enim sit primum movens; si moveretur, necesse esset se ipsum vel a se ipso, vel ab alio moveri. Ab alio quidem moveri non potest: oporteret enim esse aliquid movens prius eo; quod est contra rationem primi moventis. A se ipso autem si movetur, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Vel quod secundum idem sit movens et motum; aut ita quod secundum aliquid sui sit movens, et secundum aliquid motum. Horum quidem primum esse non potest. Cum enim omne quod movetur, inquantum hujusmodi, sit in potentia; quod autem movet, sit in actu; si secundum idem esset movens et motum, oporteret quod secundum idem esset in potentia et in actu; quod est impossibile. Secundum

etiam esse non potest. Si enim esset aliquod movens, et alterum motum, non esset ipsum secundum se primum movens, sed ratione suae partis quae movet. Quod autem est per se, prius est eo quod non est per se. Non potest igitur primum movens esse, si ratione suae partis hoc ei conveniat. Oportet igitur primum movens omnino immobilem esse.

"Ex eis etiam quae moventur et movent, hoc ipsum considerari potest. Omnis enim motus videtur ab aliquo immobili procedere, quod scilicet non movetur secundum illam speciem motus; sicut videmus quod alterationes et generationes et corruptiones quae sunt in istis inferioribus, reducuntur sicut in primum movens in corpus caeleste, quod secundum hanc speciem motus non movetur, cum sit ingenerabile et incorruptibile et inalterabile. Illud ergo quod est primum principium omnis motus, oportet esse immobile omnino."—*Compendium Theologiae*, capp. 3, *Quod Deus sit*, and 4, *Quod Deus sit immobilis.* (vol. xvi. 2).

Aristotle and creation.

It can hardly be denied that S. Thomas is sometimes inconsistent with himself, and sometimes distorts his evidence, on this subject. The problem whether the order of nature was eternal Aquinas regarded as philosophically open. It could only be determined by faith (*cf.* p. 259). But that nature, including "first matter," must be produced, and held out of nothingness, by the divine will he regarded as a truth within the reach of reason. Believing the

contrary was one of the chief errors of Averrhoes, and Aquinas was anxious to clear Aristotle of any complicity in it.

In his *Commentary on the Sentences* S. Thomas goes so far as to maintain that Aristotle himself held the eternity of nature to be an open question:

"Dico ergo, quod ad neutram partem quaestionis sunt demonstrationes, sed probabiles vel sophisticae rationes ad utrumque. Et hoc significant verba Philosophi dicentis quod sunt quaedam problemata de quibus rationem non habemus, ut utrum mundus sit aeternus."—2 *Dist.*, i. q. 1: a. 5. c. (vol. vi. 392b).

The reference is to the *Topica*, lib. i. cap. 9, § 2. But Aristotle merely implies that opinions may differ on the subject.

In a later work, however, Thomas frankly admits that Aristotle did not believe in creation:

"Tertius est error Aristotelis, qui posuit mundum a Deo factum non esse, sed ab aeterno fuisse."—*In articulos fidei et sacramenta ecclesiae expositio*, Opusc. iv. (vol. xvi. 116a).

Between these extremes lies the view expressed in his commentary on the passage in lib. viii. cap. 1 of the *Physica* to prove the eternity of the order of nature. This, I think, must be taken as Thomas's most deliberate and authoritative utterance on the subject.

Here he admits that Aristotle taught the eternity of nature, but declares, and tries to show, that the Philosopher believed, none the less, in its "produc-

tion," out of non-existence, by the divine will. And this amounts to a "creation *ab aeterno*." His arguments, however (as distinct from his assertion), are directed towards proving that Aristotle's principles must have led him to this belief, rather than that Aristotle himself actually expressed it—which he too evidently did not:

"Ex hac autem Aristotelis probatione, Averrois occasionem sumpsit loquendi contra id quod secundum fidem de creatione tenemus. . . . Nec hoc etiam est secundum intentionem Aristotelis: probat enim in secundo Metaphysicae, quod id quod est maxime verum et maxime ens, est causa essendi omnibus existentibus; unde hoc ipsum esse in potentia, quod habet materia prima, sequitur derivatum esse a primo essendi principio,* quod est maxime ens: non igitur necesse est praesupponi aliquid ejus actioni quod non sit ab eo productum. . . . Sicut ergo, si intelligamus rerum productionem esse a Deo ab aeterno (sicut Aristoteles posuit, et plures Platonicorum), non est necessarium, immo impossibile, quod huic universali productioni aliquod subjectum non productum praeintelligatur. . . . Quod patet ex hoc quod Philosophus dixit in primo Physicorum. Dixit enim ibi, quod si fiat hoc animal inquantum est hoc animal non oportet quod fiat ex non animali sed ex non hoc animali: puta si fiat homo ex non homine, aut equus ex non equo: si autem fiat animal

* *unde . . . prima*, "so that the kind of potential existence that must be allowed to prime matter must be derived, like any other existence, from the first principle of existence."

inquantum est animal, oportet quod fiat ex non animali. Sic ergo, si fiat aliquod particulare ens, non fit ex omnino non ente: sed si fit totum ens, quod est fieri ens inquantum est ens, oportet quod fiat ex penitus non ente; si tamen et hoc debeat dici fieri; aequivoce enim dicitur."—*Commentum in libros Physicorum*, lib. viii. lectio 2 (vol. xviii. 475).

The meaning of the last portion of this passage is, that if you said that a dog was "made into" a dog, or "became" a dog by some act or process, it might have "become" or been "made into" a dog out of a cat. But if you said it "became" or was "made into" an animal, it must have been produced out of something that was not an animal. So Aristotle reasons; and it follows that if any particular existence comes into being it may have come out of something previously existing, but if "existence" in its totality comes into being it must have been "made" or must have "become" existent out of the previously non-existent. Note that "becoming" is here used *aequivoce*, and perhaps scarcely legitimately. (On line 1 of this page *ex non* is an emendation of *non ex.*)

Again, as to the divine will (a crucial point; *cf.* pp. 312 *sqq.*):

"Attendendum est autem, quod cum Aristoteles hic dicat, quod necessitas primi motus non est necessitas absoluta, sed necessitas quae est ex fine, (finis autem principium est, quod postea nominat Deum), inquantum attenditur per motum assimilatio ad ipsum: (assimilatio autem ad id quod est volens, et

intelligens, cujusmodi ostendit esse Deum, attenditur secundum voluntatem et intelligentiam, sicut artificiata assimilantur artifici, inquantum in eis voluntas artificis adimpletur): sequitur quod tota necessitas primi motus subjaceat voluntati Dei."—*Com. in libros Metaphysicorum*, lib. xii. [xi.] lectio 8 (vol. xx. 638b).

The meaning of this passage is clear enough, but the construction is needlessly complex. I have tried to simplify it by the insertion of brackets.

(3) *To pages* 236–239.—As to the "theology of negation," it will perhaps be more helpful to cite a parallel from another work of Aquinas than to give the original of the passage quoted on pp. 235 *sq.*

Aquinas is commenting on the words of Dionysius:

"Propter quod et ipsi [*sc.* theologi = scriptural writers] per negationes ascensum praehonoraverunt sicut exsuscitantes animam ab his quae sunt ipsi connaturalia, et per omnes divinos intellectus pergentem, a quibus segregatum est quod est super omne nomen et omnem rationem et omnem cogitationem. In ultimis autem totorum ipsi conjungentes, inquantum nobis illi conjungi est possibile."

The comment (which explains all the difficulties presented by the Dionysian "jargon") runs:

"Et quia Theologi consideraverunt quod omne nomen a nobis impositum deficit a Deo ideo ipsi inter omnes modos quibus in Deum possumus ascendere per intellectum, praeordinaverunt eum qui est per

negationes, per quas quodam ordine in Deum ascendimus. Primo enim anima nostra quasi exsuscitatur et consurgit a rebus materialibus, quae sunt animae nostrae connaturalia: puta, cum intelligimus Deum non esse aliquid sensibile aut materiale, aut corporeum: et sic anima nostra negando pergit, *per omnes divinos intellectus* idest per omnes ordines Angelorum, a quibus est segregatus Deus, qui est supra omnem nomen et rationem et cognitionem. Ad ultimum autem anima nostra Deo conjungitur ascendendo per negationes *in ultimis totorum* idest in supremis finibus universaliorum et excellentiorum creaturarum. Et quidem conjunctio animae ad Deum fit, inquantum nobis possibile est nunc Deo conjungi. Non enim conjungitur in praesenti intellectus noster Deo ut ejus essentiam videat, sed ut cognoscat de Deo quid non est. Unde haec conjunctio nostri ad Deum, quae nobis est in hac vita possibilis, perficitur quando pervenimus ad hoc quod cognoscamus eum esse supra excellentissimas creaturas." — Opusc. vii. Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, cap. xiii. lectio 3 (vol. xv., *text.* 402a, *com.* 404).

The whole conception of this "theology of negation" must remain foreign to anyone who cannot place himself at the Platonic point of view, from which the abstract "beauty," for example, is conceived as the cause and the essence of all the qualified and imperfect beauty that exists in things; so that in ascending from them to it you keep in intenser degree, and purified of all alloy, everything that you

have loved and admired in the beautiful things, the limitations and restrictions of which you are now escaping. Any reader who finds this hard to grasp can hardly do better than study the close of Diotima's discourse in Plato's *Symposium*, the sixth chapter of the tenth book of Augustine's *Confessions*, and Shelley's *Hymn to Intellectual Beauty*.*

The following passage from the commentary on *The divine names* may illustrate this point further:

"Duplex modus invenitur in Scripturis ad significandum excellentiam divinorum. Quoniam enim ea quae ad privationem et defectum pertinent, rebus creatis attribuuntur secundum comparationem ad excellentiam divinam, sicut si dicamus, quod omnis justitia hominis est immunditia in comparatione ad Dei justitiam; et similiter possumus dicere, quod omnis humana deliberatio et cognitio reputatur quidam error in comparatione ad stabilitatem et permanentiam divinae et perfectae cognitionis. . . . Alio modo consuetum est in divina Scriptura ut ea quae privative dicuntur, Deo attribuantur propter ejus excessum; sicut Deus, qui est clarissimum lumen, dicitur invisibilis: et qui est ex omnibus laudabilis et nominabilis dicitur ineffabilis: et qui est omnibus praesens, dicitur incomprehensibilis, quasi sit omnibus absens; et qui ab omnibus rebus inveniri potest dicitur non investigabilis: et hoc propter difficultatem inveniendi, quia nusquam ejus sphaerae circumferentia est, sed punctum ejusdem sphaerae intelligibilis ubique est: et

* All of which are given, in adequate measure, in the Poet Laureate's *Spirit of Man*, Nos. 37, 32, 36.

haec cuncta dicuntur propter ejus excessum."—*Ib.*, cap. vii. lectio 1, *com.* (vol. xv. 358a).

It is thus that we are to understand the relentless negations of the Christian Neoplatonists, from Clement to Erigena. Clement runs the ethico-spiritual and the intellectual "initiation" side by side, but the latter is purely analytical, or negative. Confession and sanctity on the one side, and on the other the analysis that first strips all material objects of their differentiating sense-attributes till nothing is left but extension, and then further strips off successively the three dimensions till only the point, or "monad with position," is left. At this stage it only remains to strip the monad of its position also, and to fling ourselves upon "the magnitude of Christ" (? Ephesians, iv. 13), and thence to advance into the abyss,—arriving at the conception, not of what the Almighty is, but of what he is not.

Λάβοιμεν δ' ἂν τὸν μὲν καθαρτικὸν τρόπον ὁμολογίᾳ, τὸν δὲ ἐποπτικὸν ἀναλύσει ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην νόησιν προχωροῦντες, δι' ἀναλύσεως ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιόμενοι, ἀφελόντες μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὰς φυσικὰς ποιότητας, περιέλοντες δὲ τὴν εἰς τὸ βάθος διάστασιν· εἶτα, τὴν ἐς τὸ πλάτος, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὴν εἰς τὸ μῆκος· τὸ γὰρ ὑπολειφθὲν σημεῖόν ἐστι μονὰς ὡς εἰπεῖν θέσιν ἔχουσα· ἧς ἐὰν περιέλωμεν τὴν θέσιν, νοεῖται μονάς· εἰ τοίνυν, ἀφελόντες πάντα ὅσα πρόσεστι τοῖς σώμασιν καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀσωμάτοις, ἐπιρρίψαιμεν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ Χριστοῦ κἀκεῖθεν εἰς τὸ ἀχανὲς ἁγιότητι προΐοιμεν, τῇ νοήσει τοῦ παντοκράτορος ἁμῇ γέ πῃ προσάγοιμεν (ἄν), οὐχ ὅ ἐστιν, ὃ δὲ μή ἐστιν γνωρίσαντες.

—*Stromata*, lib. v. cap. 11. Ed. Stählin, Leipzig, 1906 (vol. ii. p. 374, ll. 4–15).

This comes out clearly enough in such a passage as the following, in which we are told that, when we inadequately (*οὐ κυρίως*) call God by the highest names we can conceive of, it is only that our mind, in its helplessness (*ἀπορία*), may have something to lean on and give it direction, turning it away from random wanderings among lower things:

Κἂν ὀνομάζωμεν αὐτό ποτε, οὐ κυρίως καλοῦντες ἤτοι ἕν ἢ τἀγαθὸν ἢ νοῦν ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν ἢ πατέρα ἢ θεὸν ἢ δημιουργὸν ἢ κύριον, οὐχ ὡς ὄνομα αὐτοῦ προφερόμενοι λέγομεν, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀπορίας ὀνόμασι καλοῖς προσχρώμεθα, ἵν' ἔχῃ ἡ διάνοια, μὴ περὶ ἄλλα πλανομένη, ἐπερείδεσθαι τούτοις.—*Ib.*, cap. 12 (380, ll. 25 *sqq.*).

It is highly instructive, too, in this connection to compare the negative method by which Plotinus comes, as nearly as he can get, to the conception of "matter" and "evil." His language is hardly distinguishable from that by which Clement or Aquinas approaches the conception of God. But his negatives are negatives indeed, not emancipations in disguise. *Vide* p. 338.

So too Erigena, after dividing "Nature" into *ea quae sunt* and *ea quae non sunt*, goes on to place in the *latter* class God, first matter and the causal and seminal ideas:

"Saepe mihi cogitanti, diligentiusque quantum vires suppetunt inquirenti, rerum omnium, quae vel animo percipi possunt, vel intentionem ejus superant,

primam summamque divisionem esse in ea quae sunt, et in ea quae non sunt, horum omnium generale vocabulum occurrit, quod Graece φύσις, Latine vero natura vocitatur . . .

"Ipsa itaque primordialis omnium discretiva differentia certos suae interpretationis modos inquirit.

"Quorum primus videtur esse ipse, per quem ratio suadet, omnia, quae corporeo sensui, vel intelligentiae perceptioni succumbunt, posse rationabiliter dici esse; ea vero quae per excellentiam suae naturae non solum ὕλιον, id est omnem sensum, sed etiam intellectum rationemque fugiunt, jure videri non esse. Quae non nisi in solo Deo, materiaque, et in omnium rerum, quae ab eo conditae sunt, rationibus atque essentiis recte intelliguntur."*

But these assertions are not so startling as they sound, for the *sunt* is to be taken not as the verb substantive, but as the copula. The phrase is elliptical, and means *ea quae non sunt hoc vel illud*, "those things of which you cannot predicate anything definite and positive." If *esse* is to be taken as the verb substantive, the classification must be reversed:

"Non facile concesserim, divinam superessentialitatem nihil esse, vel tali nomine privationis posse vocari. Quamvis enim a theologis dicatur non esse, non eam tamen nihil esse suadent, sed plusquam esse. Quomodo enim causa omnium, quae sunt, nulla

* The concluding words of this passage are to be translated: "And this class is rightly understood as consisting solely of God, matter, and the *rationalia* and essences of all things created by God."

essentia intelligeretur esse, cum omnia, quae sunt, eam vere esse doceant, nullo vero argumento eorum, quae sunt, intelligitur, quid sit?" *—*De div. nat.*, lib. i. capp. 1, 2, 3; lib. iii. cap. 5 (441, 443, 634).

The negations, then, by which we approach a conception of God do but remove limitations, while emancipating beauties and perfections. All the perfections of everything are embraced in the being of God, but in intenser degree and without boundary or limitation:

"In Deo sunt perfectiones omnium rerum. Unde et dicitur universaliter perfectus: quia non deest ei aliqua nobilitas quae inveniatur in aliquo genere. . . .

"Per hoc quod quidquid perfectionis est in effectu oportet inveniri in causa effectiva. . . . Manifestum est enim quod si aliquod calidum non habeat totam perfectionem calidi, hoc ideo est, quia calor non participatur secundum perfectam rationem: sed si calor esset per se subsistens, non posset ei aliquid deesse de virtute caloris. Unde, cum Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens, nihil de perfectione essendi potest ei deesse. Omnium autem perfectiones pertinent ad perfectionem essendi: secundum hoc enim aliqua perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 4: a. 2. c. (Leon., iv. 51b *sq.*).

This is the dominant conception in all the "theology of negation," and it must be kept steadily

* *Quomodo . . . sit* "how should we believe that the cause of all that exists does not exist itself? Whereas all existing things declare that it *is*, though no inference drawn from them can explain *what* it is."

in view as we pursue the subject. Its conclusions can, however, be further defined by means of the Aristotelian and Scholastic doctrine of causes, so that we can, after all, make positive assertions concerning the Deity which shall be true *substantialiter* and more than metaphorically, though the same predication can never be made *univoce* both of God and of a creature. The following passages, which illustrate this subject, may be fittingly introduced by a few general propositions:

A cause acts *univoce* when like produces like:

"Invenimus . . . causam univoce agentem, quando effectus convenit in nomine et ratione cum causa, sicut homo generat hominem et calor facit calorem." —1 *Dist.*, viii. q. i: a. 2. sol. (vol. vi. 68a).

A cause is said to act *aequivoce* when it produces something that falls short of full likeness to itself,* and in this case the cause is always greater than the effect:

"Similitudo autem effectus in causa quidem univoca invenitur uniformiter: in causa autem aequivoca invenitur excellentius."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^a. q. 6: a. 2. c. (Leon., iv. 67b).

* The term "equivocal" covers a wide area. According to the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, the word "fog" may mean "aftermath." The word, therefore, is employed "equivocally" in the fullest sense of the term, in so far as it is used both in this meaning and in the more usual one. When a picture of a house is called a "house," there is a minor degree of equivocality. It is even, to a certain degree, equivocal if we call both the fire and the water it boils "hot." When we speak of "being in a fog" to describe a state of mental confusion, it is another thing altogether. It is a "metaphorical" expression.

A favourite example of this is the sun breeding maggots:

"Vermis enim non generatur ex coitu, sed ex terra, solo calore solis caelestis." — *In psalmos Davidis expositio.* On *Psalm* xxi. 5 [Vulg. xxi. 7, A. V. xxii. 6] (vol. xiv. 219b).

But in every case the effect has *some* similarity to the cause, for an agent can only act in virtue of what it possesses itself; and only so can it actualise the potentialities of the *causatum*:

"Effectus enim a suis causis deficientes non conveniunt cum eis in nomine et ratione. Necesse est tamen inter ea aliquam similitudinem inveniri; de natura enim agentis est, ut agens sibi simile agat, cum unumquodque agat secundum quod actu est." * —*Contra Gentiles*, lib. i. cap. 29 (vol. v. 24b).

We can now go on to consider the proof that nothing can be predicted *univoce* of God and any creature, and also to the qualifications of this principle:

"Impossibile est aliquid univoce praedicari de Deo et creatura; quod ex hoc patet. Nam omnis effectus agentis univoci adaequat virtutem agentis. Nulla autem creatura, cum sit finita, potest adaequare virtutem primi agentis, cum sit infinita. Unde impossibile est quod similitudo Dei univoce in creatura recipiatur. Item patet quod etsi una sit ratio formae existentis in agente et in effectu,

* *agat . . . est* "can only act upon something else in the ways in which its own potentiality has already been actualised." *I.e.* the cause must be *actu* what the thing it is to actualise is *potentia*.

diversus tamen modus existendi impedit univocam praedicationem; licet enim eadem sit ratio domus quae sit in materia et domus quae est in mente artificis, quia unum est ratio alterius;* non tamen domus univoce de utraque praedicatur, propter hoc quod species domus in materia habet esse materiale, in mente vero artificis immateriale. Dato ergo per impossibile quod ejusdem rationis sit bonitas in Deo et creatura, non tamen bonum univoce de Deo praedicaretur; cum quod in Deo est immaterialiter et simpliciter, in creatura sit materialiter et multipliciter.† Et praeterea ens non dicitur univoce de substantia et accidente, propter hoc quod substantia est ens tamquam per se habens esse, accidens vero tamquam cujus esse est inesse.‡ Ex quo patet quod diversa habitudo ad esse impedit univocam praedicationem entis. Deus autem alio modo se habet ad esse quam aliqua alia creatura; nam ipse est suum§ esse, quod nulli alii creaturae competit. Unde nullo modo univoce de Deo et creatura dicitur; et per consequens nec aliquid aliorum praedicabilium. . . . Existente enim diversitate in primo, oportet in aliis diversitatem inveniri; unde de substantia et acci-

* "Because the house in the builder's mind is the conception type or *rationale* of the material house."

† *Vide infra*, p. 301.

‡ A happy man is a "substance," for he exists in himself. Happiness is an "accident," *i.e.* something which can only exist as a quality or experience in a happy creature. The essential nature of an accident is to exist not in itself, but in some "substantial" being. Both are *entia*, but not *univoce*.

§ *Deitas* and *Deus* are identical, *Socrates* and *homo* are not. *Vide infra*, p. 326.

dente nihil univoce praedicatur."*—*De pot.*, q. 7: a. 7. c. (vol. viii. 165b *sq.*).†

But yet there is a sense in which the same word can be positively and constructively, though not univocally, applied both to God and his creatures. This is the "analogical" sense, and it is explained in the following passage, which is one of many:

"Impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis univoce. Quia omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis, recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed deficienter: ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in effectibus, in causa est simpliciter et eodem modo; sicut sol secundum unam virtutem, multiformes et varias formas in istis inferioribus producit. Eodem modo, ut supra dictum est, omnes rerum perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter, in Deo praeexistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significat illam perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis: puta cum hoc nomen

* The "predicables" or "categories" are "substance" (in the sense explained above), "quality," "quantity," "position," *et cet.* All these are *entia*, but *substantiae* alone are *prima entia*. The rest are secondary. Translate *Unde nullo modo . . . praedicatur*: "Wherefore *ens* or *esse* is by no means predicated univocally of God and a creature. And consequently not any of the other predicables either. . . . For where the foundation differs, a difference must be traceable in all the rest."

† In my copy of this volume of the Parma edition the text is continuous, but the pagination after 166 goes back again to 161, so that pages 161–166 inclusive appear twice. The 165 referred to above is the first.

sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab esse ipsius, et ab omnibus hujusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen *sapiens* de homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit * rem significatam: non autem cum dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam, et excedentem nominis significationem. Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen *sapiens* de Deo et de homine dicitur. Et eadem ratio est de aliis. Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur.

"Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari; sed semper incideret fallacia Aequivocationis. Et hoc est tam contra philosophos,† qui multa demonstrative de Deo probant, quam etiam contra Apostolum dicentem, *Rom.* 1 [20]: *Invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur.*

"Dicendum est igitur quod hujusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum analogiam, id est proportionem.‡ Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in nominibus: vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut *sanum* dicitur de

* *comprehendit* "embraces and brings within a definition."

† *contra philosophos* "is contradicted by the authority and achievements of the philosophers."

‡ *proportio* is a word of wide application, signifying any kind of relation or reference.

medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est, illud vero causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut *sanum* dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis. . . . Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones.

"Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut *sanum*, de urina dictum, significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam eiusdem sanitatis."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 13: a. 5. c. (Leon., iv. 146b *sq.*).

But note that in the case of health the effect is more important to us than the cause, as well as more immediately known to us. But in the case of spiritual excellences, though we still name them in God after their effects in us, yet they exist in him supremely and super-excellently:

"In hujusmodi autem analogica praedicatione, ordo attenditur idem secundum nomen et secundum rem

quandoque; quandoque vero non idem. Nam ordo nominis sequitur ordinem cognitionis, quia est signum intelligibilis conceptionis. Quando igitur id, quod prius est secundum rem, invenitur etiam cognitione prius, idem invenitur prius et secundum nominis rationem et secundum rei naturam. Sic . . . ens dicitur prius de substantia quam de accidente et secundum naturam et secundum nominis rationem. Quando vero illud quod est prius secundum naturam, est posterius secundum cognitionem, tunc in analogicis non est idem ordo secundum rem et secundum nominis rationem; sicut virtus sanandi quae est in sanativis, prior est naturaliter sanitate quae est in animali, sicut causa effectu. Sed, quia hanc virtutem per effectum cognoscimus, ideo etiam ex effectu nominamus. Et inde est, quod sanativum est prius ordine rei, sed animal dicitur prius sanum, secundum nominis rationem. Sic igitur, quia ex rebus aliis in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, res nominum * de Deo et rebus aliis dictorum per prius est in Deo secundum suum modum, sed ratio nominis per posterius; unde et nominari dicitur a suis causatis."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. i. cap. 34 (vol. v. 27a).

Nor must it be thought that the relation between "goodness," or the like, in God and in man is merely causal, like that between *medicina* and *sanitas*, for the first cause is the more excellent cause of all excellences, but is not subject to their limitations. Otherwise:

* *res nominum* "the thing named," opposed to the *ratio nominis* "the ground on which the name is given."

"Si nihil aliud intelligitur cum dicitur, *Deus est bonus*, nisi, *Deus est, et est bonitatis causator*; sequeretur quod eadem ratione omnia nomina effectuum divinorum de eo possent praedicari, ut diceretur, Deus est caelum, quia caelum causat."—*Depot.*, q. 7: a. 6. c. (vol. viii. 164a).

Nor is it only metaphorically that we call God good, as it is when we call him a rock:

"Quaedam nomina significant hujusmodi perfectiones a Deo procedentes in res creatas, hoc modo quod ipse modus imperfectus quo a creatura participatur divina perfectio, in ipso nominis significato includitur, sicut *lapis* significat aliquid materialiter ens [which is a limitation]: et huiusmodi nomina non possunt attribui Deo nisi metaphorice. Qu edam vero nomina significant ipsas perfectiones absolute, absque hoc quod aliquis modus participandi claudatur in eorum significatione, ut *ens*, *bonum*, *vivens*, et huiusmodi: et talia proprie dicuntur de Deo."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 13: a. 3. ad i^{m} (Leon., iv. 143b).

What it comes to, then, is that names which signify spiritual excellences, with no other imperfection involved than that of distinction from other spiritual excellences, can be attributed to God *substantialiter*, and, in a sense, *proprie*, but not *univoce* (and therefore not altogether *proprie*), because they exist *simpliciter* in him but *distincte et multipliciter* as we know them.

As to metaphors, Dionysius explains that the high ones direct our minds upwards, but the low ones, forcing us not to rest in them as literal, help

us not to rest even in the high ones as adequate or literal:

"Itaque colendam superessentialis θεαρχίας beatitudinem manifestivorum eloquiorum mysticae traditiones aliquando quidem ut rationem et intellectum et essentiam laudant, divinam rationalitatem et sapientiam ejus declarantes, et vere existentem subsistentiam, et eorum, quae sunt, subsistentiae causam veram, et quasi lumen eam reformant,* et vitam vocant, tantis mirabilibus reformationibus gloriosioribus quidem existentibus, et materiales formationes excellere quoquomodo probatis, deficientibus et sic thearchica ad veritatem similitudine.† Est enim super omnem essentiam et vitam, nullo quidem ipsam lumine characterizante, omnique ratione et intellectu similitudine ipsius incomparabiliter derelictis. . . . Et aliquando quidem ipsam ex luminibus preciosis laudant, ut solem justitiae, ut stellam matutinam, in animum sancte orientem, et ut lumen incircumvelate et intellectualiter resplendens. . . . Sed et bestialem ipsi formam circumponunt, et leonis ei et pantheris speciem coaptant, et pardaliniam vestiunt et ursam saevientem. Addam vero et quod omnium vilius esse et magis significare‡ visum est, quia et vermis specie ipsam seipsam circumformantem divini

* ἀναπλάττουσι means "represent" or "feign."

† *deficientibus . . . similitudine* "and after all falling short of any true divine similitude." *Theorarchia* and *theorarchicus* are simply Dionysian intensives for "God" and "divine."

‡ In the Greek ἀπεμφαίνειν means "to be incongruous." The *magis significare* of the text is either a misprint or a mistake. Corderius translates *absurdissimumque.*

sapientes tradiderunt. Sic omnes theosophi, et occulta inspiratione prophetae, sanctis incontaminatis * destinguunt sancta sanctorum, et dissimilem sanctam figurationem honorant, ut neque divina immundis tractabilia sint, neque mirabilium agalmatum studiosi contemplatores tanquam veris remaneant figuris."—*De caelesti hierarchia*, cap. 2, §§ 4, 5, Erigena's translation (Migne, cxxii. 1041 B, 1043 B, C).

So too Erigena himself, still more explicitly:

"Eoque mirabilius non solum ex creatura ad Creatorem artificiosa Scriptura translationes fecit, verum etiam ex naturae contrariis, ex insania videlicet, ebrietate, crapula, oblivione, ira, furore, odio, concupiscentia, ceterisque similibus, quibus minus simplicium animi falluntur, quam superioribus transfigurationibus, quae ex natura fiunt. Rationabilis siquidem anima, quamvis, admodum simplex, naturalium rerum nomina de Deo praedicari audiens, proprieque de ipso dici aestimans, fallatur; non tamen omnino decipitur, ut eorum, quae contra naturam sunt, nomina de conditore rerum praedicari auscultans, [non] aut omnino falsa esse judicet et respuat, aut figurate dicta concedat et credat." †—*De div. nat.*, lib. i. cap. 67 (*ib*, 512 A, B).

* *Sanctis incontaminatis* is corrupt. The Greek is τῶν ἀτελέστων καὶ ἀνίερων ἀχράντως ἀποδιαστέλλουσι. Corderius renders it *a rebus imperfectis profanisque . . . intemerate secernunt.*

† *I.e.* "A rational soul, even if, in its extreme simplicity, it should be misled by the natural metaphors into believing that such terms are 'properly' applicable to God, will *not* be so deceived by the unnatural ones but that it will either reject them as false or accept them as figurative."—I have altered the punctua-

There yet remains one other point with respect to our names for God. Do they all say the same thing so far as they say anything, since it is the same God that we call "wise" or "powerful"? In other words, are all the names which can in any way be "properly" applied to God synonyms? This point, however, will be best treated in another connection. *Vide* note (6), p. 324.

(4) *To pages* 239–246.—The following citations will, I think, be found to cover every statement made in the section of the Lecture to which they refer, though not exactly in the order in which they there occur:

Page 240.—Xenophanes and Parmenides.

I take the quotations from Diels' *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*,* following his orthography and adding his translations:

Xenophanes.

εἷς θεός, ἔν τε θεοῖσιν καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
οὔτε δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος οὔτε νόημα.

(Ein einziger Gott, unter Göttern und Menschen der gröszte, weder an Gestalt den Sterblichen ähnlich noch an Gedanken.)

αἰεὶ δ' ἐν ταὐτῶι μίμνει κινούμενος οὐδέν
οὐδὲ μετέρχεσθαί μιν ἐπιπρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλη.

(Stets am selbigen Ort verharrt er sich nirgend

tion, and, with some hesitation, supplied the [non]. The text of this particular volume of Migne is generally sound and correctly printed, but the construction here is harsh in any case, and I suspect further corruptions.

* Berlin, 1906, vol. i. 50, 120 *sq.*

bewegend, und es geziemt ihm nicht bald hierhin bald dorthin zu wandern.)

ἀλλ' ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει.

(Doch zonder Mühe schwingt er das All mit des Geistes Denkkraft.)

οὖλος ὁρᾶι, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὖλος δὲ τ' ἀκούει.

(*Die Gottheit ist* ganz Auge, ganz Geist, ganz Ohr.)

Parmenides:

ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκέν ἐστι νόημα.
οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ὧι πεφατισμένον ἐστίν,
εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ (ἢ) ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται
ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ' ἐπέδησεν
οὖλον ἀκίνητόν τ' ἔμεναι· τῶι πάντ' ὄνομ(α) ἔσται
ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,
γίνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναι τε καὶ οὐχι,
καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διά τε χρόα φανὸν ἀμείβειν.

(Denken und des Gedankens Ziel ist eins: denn nicht ohne das Seiende, in dem es sich ausgesprochen findet, kannst Du das Denken antreffen. Es gibt ja nichts und wird nichts anderes geben auszerhalb des Seienden, da es ja das Schicksal an das unzerstückelte und unbewegliche Wesen gebunden hat. Darum musz alles leerer Schall sein, was die Sterblichen in ihrer Sprache festgelegt haben, uberzeugt, es sei wahr: Werden sowohl als Vergehen, Sein sowohl als Nichtsein, Veranderung des Ortes und Wechsel der leuchtenden Farbe.)

Evil a negation only:

For Plotinus, *vide* pp. 337 *sqq.*

Boetius:

"Deum, inquit, esse omnium potentem nemo dubitaverit. Qui, quidem, inquam, mente consistat, nullus prorsus ambigat. Qui vero est, inquit, omnium potens, nihil est quod ille non possit. Nihil, inquam. Num igitur Deus facere malum potest? Minime inquam. Malum igitur, inquit, nihil est, cum id facere ille non possit qui nihil non potest. Ludisne, inquam, me, inextricabilem mihi labyrinthum rationibus texens? quo nunc quidem, qua egrediaris, introëas; nunc vero, quo introieris, egrediare: an mirabilem quendam divinae simplicitatis orbem complicas?"—*De consolatione Philosophiae*, lib. iii. prosa 12.

Dionysius discusses the nature of evil in cap. 4 of the *De divinis nominibus.* It is nothing positive. It is only weakness or absence of good. There is no absolute evil:

"Infirmitas autem non perfecta est: etenim perfecta et corruptionem et subjectum destrueret; et erit talis corruptio et suimet corruptio. Quare tale non malum, sed deficiens bonum: quod enim est expers omnino boni, neque in existentibus est" (§ 23).

"Non est malum, secundum quod est malum, neque existens, neque in existentibus" (§ 34).—Translation of Sarracenus employed by Aquinas (vol. xv. 332a, 341a).

Erigena:

Evil dispositions arise gratuitously without cause,

in beings possessed of free will, and may be said not to exist. God did not make them, and if he punishes them, he is punishing the non-existent, which he did not make, in the existent, which he made:

"Ultor, punit in natura, quam fecit, delictum, quod non fecit, liberans ex delicto, separansque, quod fecit, ineffabilique modo in eo, quod fecit, impunito punit, et ut verius dicam, puniri sinit, quod non fecit. Non enim peccata naturalia sunt, sed voluntaria. Etenim causa totius peccati est, sive in angelo, sive in homine, propria perversaque voluntas: ipsius autem perversae voluntatis causa in naturalibus motibus rationabilis et intellectualis creaturae non invenitur. Etenim bonum causa mali non potest esse; incausalis itaque est, omnique naturali origine carens."

"Pravae vero voluntatis obnoxii motus, qui vere proprieque superflua naturae dicuntur, ex nulla causa naturali seu supernaturali eis accidunt."—*De divisione naturae*, lib. v. 31 (943 D, 944 A, 946 C).

The views of Aquinas himself must be given in more detail.

Evil has no independent existence:

From *Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. cap. 7, *Quod malum non est aliqua natura.*

"Unumquodque secundum suam essentiam habet esse. Inquantum autem habet esse, habet aliquod bonum, nam, si bonum est quod omnia appetunt, oportet ipsum esse bonum dicere, cum omnia esse appetant. Secundum hoc igitur unumquodque bonum est quod essentiam habet. Bonum autem et malum

opponuntur. Nihil igitur est malum secundum quod essentiam habet. Nulla igitur essentia mala est." —(Vol. v. 164a.)

Evil follows from, and is caused by, good, but only "accidentally," or as we should say "incidentally," through defect of power or thwarting of purpose:

Ib. from cap. 10, *Quod causa mali est bonum.*

"Accidit autem agenti, inquantum est agens, quod defectum virtutis patiatur; * non enim agit secundum quod deficit ei virtus, sed secundum quod habet aliquid de virtute; si enim penitus virtute careret, omnino non ageret. Sic igitur malum causatur per accidens ex parte agentis, inquantum agens est deficientis virtutis; propter quod dicitur quod malum non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem. . . . In idem autem redit si defectus . . . proveniat ex defectu instrumenti . . . sicut cum virtus motiva producit claudicationem propter tibiae curvitatem." —(*Ib.*, 166b.)

And evil, caused as it is accidentally, can itself only be an accidental cause of anything:

Ib., cap. 14.

"Secundum omnes species causarum discurrendo invenitur malum esse per accidens causa. In specie quidem causae efficientis, quia propter causae agentis deficientem virtutem sequitur defectus in effectu et actione. In specie vero causae materialis, quia ex materiae indispositione causatur in effectu defectus. In specie vero causae formalis; quia uni formae sem-

* *accidit . . . patiatur* "any defect of power is 'accidental' to the agent, as agent, not essential."

per adjungitur alterius formae privatio. In specie vero causae finalis; quia indebito fini adjungitur malum, in quantum per ipsum finis debitus impeditur.

"Patet igitur quod malum est causa per accidens et non potest esse causa per se."—(*Ib.*, 169b.)

Thus evil only exists in good and through good. *Ib.*, cap. 11, *Quod malum in aliquo bono fundatur.*

"Malum enim non potest esse per se existens, cum non sit essentiam habens. . . . Oportet igitur quod malum sit in aliquo subjecto. Omne autem subjectum, cum sit substantia quaedam, bonum quoddam est. . . . Omne igitur malum in bono aliquo est. . . .

"Ex hoc dicitur aliquid malum quia nocet: non autem nisi quia nocet bono; nocere enim malo bonum est, cum corruptio mali sit bona. Non autem noceret . . . bono, nisi esset in bono; sic enim caecitas homini nocet, inquantum in ipso est. Oportet igitur quod malum sit in bono.

"Item, malum non causatur nisi a bono, et per accidens tantum. Omne autem quod est per accidens reducitur ad id quod est per se. Oportet igitur semper cum malo causato, quod est effectus boni per accidens, esse bonum aliquod, quod est effectus boni per se, ita quod sit fundamentum ejus; nam quod est per accidens fundatur super id quod est per se."

"Sed, cum bonum et malum sint opposita, unum autem oppositorum non possit esse alterius subjectum, sed expellat ipsum, videtur alicui primo aspectu esse inconveniens si bonum subjectum mali esse dicatur."

"Non est autem inconveniens ut non ens sit in ente sicut in subjecto; privatio enim quaelibet est non

ens, et tamen subjectum ejus est substantia, quae est ens aliquod. Non tamen non ens est in ente sibi opposito sicut in subjecto; caecitas enim non est non ens universale, sed non ens hoc, quo scilicet tollitur visus; non est igitur in visu sicut in subjecto, sed in animali. Similiter autem malum non est sicut in subjecto, in bono sibi opposito (sed hoc per malum tollitur), sed in aliquo alio bono; sicut malum moris est in bono naturae; malum autem naturae, quod est privatio formae, est in materia, quae est bonum sicut etiam ens in potentia."—(*Ib.*, 167b *sq.*)

Thus there can be no *summum malum*:

Ib., cap. 15, *Quod non est summum malum, quod sit omnium malorum principium.*

"Summum enim malum oportet esse absque consortio omnis boni, sicut et summum bonum est quod est omnino separatum a malo. Non potest autem esse aliquod malum omnino separatum a bono, cum ostensum sit quod malum fundatur in bono. Ergo nihil est summe malum.

"Adhuc, si aliquid est summe malum, oportet quod per essentiam suam sit malum, sicut et summum bonum est quod per suam essentiam bonum est. Hoc autem est impossibile, cum malum non habeat aliquam essentiam, ut supra probatum est. Impossibile est igitur ponere summum malum quod sit malorum principium.

"Item, illud quod est primum principium non est ab aliquo causatum. Omne autem malum causatur a bono, ut ostensum est. Non est igitur malum primum principium.

"Per hoc autem excluditur error Manichaeorum ponentium aliquod summum malum quod est principium primum omnium malorum."—(*Ib.*, 169b *sq.*)

Whereas there must be a *summum bonum*:

"Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum et nobile: et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed *magis* et *minus* dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est: sicut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maximo calido. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum." —*Sum. Theol.*, i^a. q. 2: a. 3. c. (Leon., iv. 32a).

Proceeding to the question why these defects or absences of good occur, we come first to the *impossibilia per se*:

"[Deus] non potest facere quod affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera, nec aliquod eorum in quibus hoc impossibile includitur. Nec hoc dicitur non posse facere propter defectum suae potentiae; sed propter defectum possibilis, quod a ratione possibilis deficit; propter quod dicitur a quibusdam, quod Deus potest facere, sed non potest fieri."—*De potentia*, q. 1: a. 3. c. (vol. viii. 6b).

"Quaecunque igitur contradictionem non implicant, sub illis possibilibus continentur, respectu quorum dicitur Deus omnipotens. Ea vero quae contradictionem implicant, sub divina omnipotentia non continentur: quia non possunt habere possibilium rationem. Unde convenientius dicitur quod *non possunt fieri*, quam quod *Deus non potest ea facere*. —Neque hoc est contra verbum Angeli dicentis: *non*

erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum. Id enim quod contradictionem implicat, *verbum* esse non potest: quia nullus intellectus potest illud concipere."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^a. q. 25: a. 3. c. (Leon., iv. 293b *sq.*).

"Sub omnipotentia Dei non cadit aliquid quod contradictionem implicat. Praeterita autem non fuisse, contradictionem implicat. Sicut enim contradictionem implicat dicere quod Socrates sedet et non sedet, ita, quod sederit et non sederit. Dicere autem quod sederit, est dicere quod sit praeteritum: dicere autem quod non sederit, est dicere quod non fuerit. Unde praeterita non fuisse, non subjacet divinae potentiae."—*Ib.*, a. 4. c. (*ib.*, 295b).

But to have made nature otherwise, or not at all, involves no contradiction. Therefore if God created nature thus, he chose to do it voluntarily, not by necessity of his being:

"Multa autem non sunt in rebus creatis, quae tamen, si essent, contradictionem non implicarent; sicut patet praecipue circa numerum et quantitatem et distantias stellarum et aliorum corporum, in quibus si aliter se haberet ordo rerum, contradictio non implicaretur. Multa igitur subsunt divinae potentiae quae in rerum natura non inveniuntur. Quicumque autem quaedam eorum quae potest facere facit et quaedam non facit, agit per electionem voluntatis et non per necessitatem naturae. Deus igitur non agit per necessitatem naturae, sed per voluntatem." —*Contra Gentiles*, lib. ii. cap. 23 (vol. v. 80a).

"Quicunque igitur sibi sufficiens est, nullo indigens,

ille vere beatus est. . . . Deus non indiget aliis, cum a nullo exteriori sua perfectio dependeat: nec alia vult propter se sicut propter finem, quasi eis indigeat, sed solum quia hoc conveniens est suae bonitati. Est igitur ipse beatus."—*Ib.*, lib. i. cap. 100 (*ib.* 66b *sq.*).

"Finis ergo naturalis divinae voluntatis est ejus bonitas, quam non velle non potest. Sed fini huic non commensurantur creaturae, ita quod sine his divina bonitas manifestari non possit; quod Deus intendit ex creaturis. Sicut enim manifestatur divina bonitas per has res quae nunc sunt et per hunc rerum ordinem; ita potest manifestari per alias creaturas et alio modo ordinatas."—*De potentia*, q. 1: a. 5. c. (vol. viii. 10b).

God's goodness, or excellence, then, does not demand creation as a means of self-expression or for full "fruition." Creation owes its existence not to God's need, but to his love:

"Communicatio bonitatis non est ultimus finis, sed ipsa divina bonitas, ex cujus amore est quod Deus eam communicare vult; non enim agit propter suam bonitatem quasi appetens quod non habet, sed quasi volens communicare quod habet: quia agit non ex appetitu finis sed ex amore finis."—*Ib.*, q. 3: a. 15. ad 14^{m} (*ib.*, 63a).

"Deus, volendo bonitatem suam, vult etiam alia a se, prout bonitatem ejus participant. Cum autem divina bonitas sit infinita et infinitis modis participabilis (etiam aliis modis quam ab his creaturis quae nunc sunt participetur), si ex hoc quod vult bonitatem suam vellet de necessitate ea quae ipsam participant,

sequeretur quod vellet esse infinitas creaturas infinitis modis participantes suam bonitatem; quod patet esse falsum, quia, si vellet, essent, cum sua voluntas sit principium essendi rebus. . . . Non igitur de necessitate vult etiam ea quae nunc sunt."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. i. cap. 81 (vol. v. 56).

And if creation springs from God's love, the special character of creation is determined by his wisdom:

"Omne igitur agens voluntarium producit effectum secundum rationem sui intellectus. Deus autem agit per voluntatem. . . . Igitur per sapientiam sui intellectus res in esse producit."—*Ib.*, lib. ii. cap. 24, *Quod Deus per suam sapientiam agit* (*ib.*, 81a).

Then could God have made things better than they are? It depends on whether "better" is the comparative of "good," or of "well." Clearly what was done on the impulse of infinite goodness and at the direction of infinite wisdom could not have been "better" done. But equally clearly most things could be made "better" than they are, though still remaining themselves; and in any case "better" things than they are could have been made instead of them, individually and collectively; for their maker is omnipotent, and such betterness involves no contradiction in terms:

"Bonitas alicuius rei est duplex. Una quidem, quae est de essentia rei; sicut esse rationale est de essentia hominis. Et quantum ad hoc bonum, Deus non potest facere aliquam rem meliorem quam ipsa sit, licet possit facere aliquam aliam ea meliorem. Sicut etiam non potest facere quaternarium maiorem:

quia, si esset maior, iam non esset quaternarius, sed alius numerus. Sic enim se habet additio differentiae substantialis in definitionibus, sicut additio unitatis in numeris. . . . Alia bonitas est, quae est extra essentiam rei; sicut bonum hominis est esse virtuosum vel sapientem. Et secundum tale bonum, potest Deus res a se factas facere meliores. Simpliciter autem loquendo, qualibet re a se facta potest Deus facere aliam meliorem.

". . . Cum dicitur Deum posse aliquid facere melius quam facit, si locutio *melius* sit nomen, verum est: qualibet enim re potest facere aliam meliorem. . . . Si vero locutio *melius* sit adverbium, et importet modum ex parte facientis, sic Deus non potest facere melius quam sicut facit: quia non potest facere ex maiori sapientia et bonitate. Si autem importet modum ex parte facti, sic potest facere melius: quia potest dare rebus a se factis meliorem modum essendi quantum ad accidentalia, licet non quantum ad essentialia."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 25: a. 6. c. and ad 1^{m} (Leon., iv. 298b *sq.*).

In sum, therefore, we are left without any *explanation* of evil at all. Our confidence in God's power assures us that he could have made a better world:

"Universum quod est a Deo productum, est optimum respectu eorum quae sunt, non tamen respectu eorum quae Deus facere potest." — *De potentia*, q. 3: a. 16. ad 17^{m} (vol. viii. 67a).

But our confidence in his love and wisdom assures us that it would have been worse done had a better

world been made; and, granted that it was best and wisest to make this kind of universe, all its limitations follow, and their removal becomes an *impossibile* not *per se*, indeed, but *ex hypothesi*:

"Quod enim Deus tale universum constituere voluerit, non est necessarium neque debitum, neque ex fine, neque ex potentia efficientis, neque materiae. . . . Sed supposito quod tale universum producere voluerit, necessarium fuit quod tales et tales creaturas produxerit, ex quibus talis forma universi consurgeret. Et cum ipsa universi perfectio et multitudinem et diversitatem rerum requirat, quia in una earum inveniri non potest propter recessum a complemento bonitatis primae;* necesse fuit ex suppositione formae intentae quod Deus multas creaturas et diversas produceret; quasdam simplices, quasdam compositas; et quasdam corruptibiles, et quasdam incorruptibiles. —*De potentia*, q. 3: a. 16 (vol. viii. 65a).

"Cum bonum totius sit melius quam bonum singularium partium, non est optimi factoris diminuere bonum totius, ut aliquarum partium augeat bonitatem; non enim aedificator fundamento tribuit eam bonitatem quam tribuit tecto, ne domum faciat ruinosam; factor igitur omnium Deus non faceret totum universum suo genere optimum, si faceret omnes partes aequales, quia multi gradus bonitatis in universo deessent, si sic esset imperfectum."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. ii. cap. 44 (vol. v. 99b *sq.*).

* *propter . . . primae* "since every creature singly, being finite, must fall short of even representing the fullness of the prime excellence."

After this, of course, the problem of evil, whenever it presents itself, may be dealt with from the purely relative point of view of a will working under fixed conditions and having to make the best of them:

"Deus est adeo bonus quod nunquam aliquod malum esse permitteret, nisi esset adeo potens quod de quolibet malo posset elicere bonum. Unde nec propter impotentiam nec propter ignorantiam Dei est quod mala in mundo proveniunt; sed est ex ordine sapientiae suae et magnitudine bonitatis, ex qua provenit quod multiplicantur diversi gradus bonitatis in rebus; quorum multi deficerent, si nullum malum esse permitteret; non enim esset bonum patientiae, nisi accidente malo persecutionis; nec esset bonum conservationis vitae in leone, nisi esset malum corruptionis in animalibus ex quibus vivit."—*De potentia*, q. 3: a. 6. ad 4^{m} (vol. viii. 36b). *Cf.* note (5).

Finally, it must be noted that the distinction between the nature of God and his goodness or his wisdom, though by no means without significance,* must be understood to refer only to our ways of thinking, not to the being of God himself. It means that we shall get nearest to understanding, or accepting, the limitations and thwartings we encounter by thinking of them as ordained by divine goodness and wisdom rather than as due to limitations of divine power. But there is not any such distinction actually in God's being:

"In nobis in quibus est aliud potentia et essentia a voluntate et intellectu, et iterum intellectus aliud

* *Vide* p. 347, note.

a sapientia, et voluntas aliud a iustitia, potest esse aliquid in potentia, quod non potest esse in voluntate iusta, vel in intellectu sapiente. Sed in Deo est idem potentia et essentia et voluntas et intellectus et sapientia et iustitia. Unde nihil potest esse in potentia divina, quod non potest esse in voluntate iusta ipsius, et in intellectu sapiente eius."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 25 : a. 5. ad 1^{m} (Leon., iv. 297a).

The passage in Augustine referred to on p. 246 occurs in the *De ordine*, lib. ii. cap. 4 [§ 12]:

"Quid nobis suavius, quod agro villaeque spectaculum congruentius fuit pugna illa conflictuque gallinaceorum gallorum, cujus superiore libro fecimus mentionem? Quid abjectius tamen deformitate subjecti vidimus? At per ipsam tamen ejusdem certaminis perfectior pulchritudo provenerat."—(Vol. i. 335 C, D.)

(5) *To pages* 246–251.—In my *Dante and Aquinas*, appendix to Chapter vii., I have given a catena of passages to prove the rigid determinism that lies beneath Thomas's doctrine of the free will. This is briefly touched upon in the following citations, which are mainly devoted to the illustration of other points.

[Deus] *omnes homines vult salvos esse* (1 Tim. ii. 4), but only in the abstract (*antecedenter*), not in the concrete (*consequenter*):

"Deus non delectatur in perditione hominum quantum ad ipsam perditionem: sed ratione suae iustitiae, vel propter bonum quod inde provenit."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 79 : a. 4. ad 2^{m} (Leon., vii. 81a).

"Sicut hominem vivere est bonum, et hominem occidi est malum, secundum absolutam considerationem: sed si addatur circa aliquem hominem, quod sit homicida, vel vivens in periculum multitudinis, sic bonum est eum occidi, et malum est eum vivere. Unde potest dici quod iudex iustus antecedenter vult omnem hominem vivere; sed consequenter vult homicidam suspendi. Similiter Deus antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari; sed consequenter vult quosdam damnari, secundum exigentiam suae iustitiae."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 19: a. 6. ad 1^{m} (Leon., iv. 241b).

It is only by grace, and through the sacraments, that man can escape condemnation, and God gives or refrains from giving grace *proprio judicio*:

"Cum homo ad gratiam se praeparare non possit nisi Deo eum praeveniente et movente ad bonum, etc."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 112: a. 2. ad 2^{m} (Leon., vii. 324b).

"Deus autem proprio iudicio lumen gratiae non immittit illis in quibus obstaculum invenit. Unde causa subtractionis gratiae est non solum ille qui ponit obstaculum gratiae, sed etiam Deus, qui suo iudicio gratiam non apponit. Et per hunc modum Deus est causa excaecationis, et aggravationis aurium, et obdurationis cordis."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 79: a. 3. c. (*ib.*, 80a).

"Sacramenta necessaria sunt ad humanam salutem inquantum sunt quaedam sensibilia signa invisibilium rerum quibus homo sanctificatur. Nullus autem sanctificari potest post peccatum [Adae], nisi per

Christum. . . . Et ideo oportebat ante Christi adventum esse quaedam signa visibilia quibus homo fidem suam protestaretur de futuro Salvatoris adventu. Et hujusmodi signa sacramenta dicuntur." —*Sum. Theol.*, iii^{a}. q. 61 : a. 3. c. (Leon., xii. 16b).

For all men deserve to be damned eternally :

"Dico ergo, quod omnibus hominibus ex merito proprii peccati debetur poena aeterna ; sed quod aliqui liberentur, hoc est ex sola divina liberalitate : posset enim omnes juste damnare."—4 *Dist.*, xlvi. q. 2 : a. 2. ad 5^{m} (vol. vii. 1147a).

"Poena taxatur secundum dignitatem ejus in quem peccatur ; unde majori poena punitur qui percutit alapa principem quam alium quemcumque. . . . Majestas autem Dei est infinita. Ergo quicumque mortaliter peccat, dignus est infinita poena."—*Ib.*, q. 1 : a. 3. contra, 3. (*ib.*, 1141a).

"Quandoque enim ille qui peccat in aliqua civitate, ex ipso peccato efficitur dignus ut totaliter repellatur a societate civitatis vel per exilium perpetuum, vel etiam per mortem. . . . Quod autem poena quam civitas mundana infligit, perpetua non reputatur ; hoc est per accidens, inquantum homo non perpetuo manet."—*Ib.*, sol. (*ib.*, 1141a *sq.*).

"Est et quarta ratio ad hoc idem : quia culpa manet in aeternum, cum culpa non possit remitti sine gratia, quam homo non potest post mortem acquirere : nec debet poena cessare quamdiu culpa manet."—*Ib.* (*ib.*, 1142a).

And good comes of the actual damnation of those that are in hell, though it does not come to them :

"Ad hoc sunt utiles [impiorum poenae] ut de his electi gaudeant, dum in his Dei justitiam contemplantur, et cum hoc se evasisse cognoscunt."—*Ib.*, ad 4^m (*ib.*).

"Omnia mala quae Deus facit vel permittit fieri, ordinantur in aliquod bonum: non tamen semper in bonum eius in quo est malum, sed quandoque ad bonum alterius, vel etiam totius universi. Sicut culpam tyrannorum ordinavit in bonum martyrum; et poenam damnatorum ordinat in gloriam suae iustitiae."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^a–ii^ae. q. 79: a. 4. ad 1^m (Leon., vii. 80b).

Note that though all the pains of hell are equal in duration they are not equal in intensity. It is in relation to the Stoic doctrine that all sins are equal that we read:

"Et ex hoc etiam derivatus est quorundam haereticorum error, qui, ponentes omnia peccata esse paria, dicunt etiam omnes poenas inferni esse pares."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^a–ii^ae. q. 73: a. 2. c. (Leon., vii. 26a).

The pains of hell are greater than any ever suffered on earth.

The question: *Utrum dolor passionis Christi fuerit major omnibus aliis doloribus*, is answered affirmatively:

"Manifeste apparet quod dolor Christi fuit maximus."

But the objection: *Videtur quod dolor animae patientis in purgatorio vel in inferno, vel etiam dolor Adae si passus fuisset, major fuisset quam dolor passionis Christi*, is refuted as far as the fanciful case

of Adam is concerned, but allowed in the other, because the question only concerns earthly suffering, and this objection refers *ad statum futurae damnationis*, "qui excedit omne malum huius vitae."—*Sum. Theol.*, iii^{a}. q. 46 : a. 6. c. ; also ob. 3. and ad 3^{m} (Leon., xi. 442 *sqq.*).

There are torments of conscience too in hell ; for though the damned still persist in their evil desires, their natural reason tells them that they are evil, and keeps up a perpetual protest :

" Unde vermis qui in damnatis ponitur, non debet intelligi esse materialis, sed spiritualis, qui est conscientiae remorsus : qui dicitur vermis, inquantum oritur ex putredine peccati, et animam affligit, sicut corporalis vermis ex putredine ortus affligit pungendo." —4 *Dist.*, l. q. 2 : a. 3. sol. 2. (vol. vii. 1257a).

" Illi autem qui sunt in inferno retinebunt perversam voluntatem, aversam a Dei iustitia, in hoc quod diligunt ea pro quibus puniuntur, et vellent eis uti si possent . . . dolent tamen de peccatis quae commiserunt, non quia ipsa odiant, sed quia pro eis puniuntur."—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 13 : a. 4. c. (Leon., viii. 111b).

" Etiam in damnato manet naturalis inclinatio qua homo naturaliter vult bonum ; sed haec inclinatio non dicit actum aliquem, sed solum ordinem naturae ad actum. Hic autem ordo et habilitas nunquam in actum exit, ut bonum actualiter velit, propter perpetuum impedimentum obstinationis voluntatem ligantis ; sed tamen naturalis cognitio manet ; et ideo semper manet murmur rationis contra voluntatem ;

voluntas tamen nunquam rationi obedit."—2 *Dist.*, xxxix. q. 3 : a. 1. ad 5^{m} (vol. vi. 740b).

Yet it is better to be born, even with a body that will infect the soul with original sin (*cf.* p. 474), than not to be born at all :

" Melius est autem ei [*sc.* animae] sic esse secundum naturam, quam nullo modo esse : praesertim cum possit per gratiam damnationem evadere."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 83 : a. 1. ad 5^{m} (Leon., vii. 101b).

At the great judgment :

" Cum Deus essentialiter sit ipsa bonitas, non potest Divinitas sine gaudio videri.

" Impii manifeste cognoscent Christum esse Deum, non per hoc quod Divinitatem ejus videant, sed per manifestissima Divinitatis indicia."

And you cannot say that if they did " see " Christ, their own misery would turn the very vision itself to misery, for :

" Omnis autem passio a contraria causa fortiori superveniente tollitur, et non eam tollit ; et ideo tristitia damnatorum tolleretur, si Deum per essentiam viderent."—4 *Dist.*, xlviii. q. 1 : a. 3. sol. c. and ad 1^{m}, 4^{m} (vol. vii. 1170a).

Long as this note already is, I cannot resist the temptation to call the reader's attention to a passage in one of the celebrated but little known *Faust* Puppet-plays, which preserve so many traits of mediæval theology. Mephistopheles is bound by his bargain to answer all questions truly :

" *Faust.* Mephistopheles, wenn du ein Mensch an meiner Stelle von Gott erschaffen wärest, wie ich,

was würdest du wohl thun, das du Gott gefällig würdest?

"*Mephistopheles.* Ach, mein Fauste! wenn eine Leiter von der Erde bis an den Himmel reichte und statt der Sprossen mit lauter Schwertern umgeben wäre, das ich bei jedem Schritt in tausend Stücke zerschnitten würde, so würde ich doch trachten, den obersten Gipfel zu erreichen, um nur ein einziges mal Gott anzuschauen; dann wollte ich gern nieder in aller Ewigkeit ein Geist der Verdammten seyn. Gedenke, wie viel mehr, wenn ich ein Mensch, an deiner Stelle von Gott erschaffen wäre, wie du, was Mühe ich mir geben würde, den Himmel zu erlangen." *Vide* Scheible's *Kloster*, Band v., "Die Sage vom Faust," Stuttgart, 1847, pp. 841 *sq.* *Cf.* the well-known passage in Marlow's *Faustus.*

(6) *To pages* 253–255 *and* 264–266.—We have seen (p. 304) that certain "names" of God are not merely negative, nor yet applied to God solely as the cause of the things they signify, but are used *proprie* and positively, as actually indicating, however imperfectly, his real being. The discussion of the question, whether all such appellations ("good," "wise," "powerful," *et cet.*) are synonymous, when applied to God, was deferred. It may fitly open the treatment of the subject of this note:

"Huiusmodi nomina dicta de Deo, non sunt synonyma. Quod quidem facile esset videre si diceremus quod huiusmodi nomina sunt inducta ad removendum, vel ad designandum habitudinem

causae respectu creaturarum : sic enim essent diversae rationes horum nominum secundum diversa negata, vel secundum diversos effectus connotatos. Sed secundum quod dictum est huiusmodi nomina substantiam divinam significare, licet imperfecte, etiam plane apparet . . . quod habent rationes diversas. Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus de re significata per nomen. Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, format ad intelligendum Deum conceptiones proportionatas perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Quae quidem perfectiones in Deo praeexistunt unite et simpliciter : in creaturis vero recipiuntur divise et multipliciter. Sicut igitur diversis perfectionibus creaturarum respondet unum simplex principium, repraesentatum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum varie et multipliciter ; ita variis et multiplicibus conceptibus intellectus nostri respondet unum omnino simplex, secundum huiusmodi conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Et ideo nomina Deo attributa, licet significant unam rem, tamen, quia significant eam sub rationibus multis et diversis, non sunt synonyma." —*Sum. Theol.*, i^a. q. 13 : a. 4. c. (Leon., iv. 144b *sq.*).

Again, there is the question whether concrete names (substantive or adjective) or abstract ones should be used of God. Shall we call him *Deus* or *Deitas*? Shall we say that he is *bonus* or *bonitas*? And can we say that *deitas* or *bonitas* exists *in* God, without breaking up his *simplicitas* into subject and attribute?

The answer is, that we apply concrete terms

because they suggest to us independent and self-sustained existence, and abstract ones because they are comprehensive and all-embracing in their generality. But to speak of the latter being *in* the former is not, strictly speaking, permissible, for we must not follow the analogy of human experience into a region where it does not hold:

"Cum Deus non sit compositus ex materia et forma, . . . oportet quod Deus sit sua deitas, sua vita, et quidquid aliud sic de Deo praedicatur.

"Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus, nisi per modum compositorum, a quibus cognitionem accipimus. Et ideo, de Deo loquentes, utimur nominibus concretis, ut significemus eius subsistentiam, quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi composita: et utimur nominibus abstractis, ut significemus eius simplicitatem. Quod ergo dicitur deitas, vel vita, vel aliquid huiusmodi, esse in Deo, referendum est ad diversitatem quae est in acceptione intellectus nostri; et non ad aliquam diversitatem rei."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 3 : a. 3. c. and ad 1^{m} (Leon., iv. 40b).

Compare:

"Intellectus non apprehendit res secundum modum rerum, sed secundum modum suum. Unde res materiales, quae sunt infra intellectum nostrum, simpliciori modo sunt in intellectu nostro quam sint in seipsis. Substantiae autem angelicae sunt supra intellectum nostrum. Unde intellectus noster non potest attingere ad apprehendendum eas secundum quod sunt in se ipsis; sed per modum suum, secun-

dum quod apprehendit res compositas. Et sic etiam apprehendit Deum."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^a. q. 50: a. 2. c. (Leon., v. 6a).

And:

"Sunt autem quaedam cognoscibilia quae sunt infra intellectum nostrum, quae quidem habent simplicius esse in intellectu nostro quam in seipsis; sicut sunt omnes res corporales: unde hujusmodi res dicuntur cognosci a nobis per abstractionem. Divina autem simpliciora et perfectiora sunt in seipsis quam in intellectu nostro, vel in quibuscumque aliis rebus nobis notis: unde divinorum cognitio dicitur fieri non per abstractionem, sed per participationem. . . . Secundum quod divina participantur in rebus quae se intellectui nostro offerunt: inquantum scilicet per participationem divinae bonitatis omnia sunt bona, et per participationem divini esse seu vitae, res dicuntur existentes seu viventes: et secundum utramque istarum participationum divina cognoscimus. Ostensum est autem supra, quod Deus ita participatur a creaturis per similitudinem, quod tamen remanet imparticipatus super omnia per proprietatem suae substantiae."—*Com. in lib. De divinis nominibus*, cap. ii. lectio 4, Opusc. vii. (vol. xv. 284).

Again, Dionysius says:

"Haec et nos docti sumus nunc quidem juxta proportionem nostram, per sancta velamina eloquiorum et hierarchicarum traditionum, benignitate sensibilibus intelligibilia et existentibus supersubstantialia circumvelante, et formas et figuras informabilibus et non figurabilibus circumponente, et supernaturalem

et infigurabilem simplicitatem varietate divisibilium signorum et multiplicante et componente."—*De div. nom.*, cap. 1, § 4 (vol. xv. 265a).

And Thomas comments:

"*Per varietatem divisibilium signorum*, inquantum scilicet ipse Deus, qui est supernaturalis et simplex, per diversa nobis manifestatur in Scripturis, sive sint diversae processiones, sive diversae similitudines. Signanter autem dixit; *Benignitate*: quod enim Scripturis exprimuntur nobis intelligibilia per sensibilia, et supersubstantialia per existentia et incorporalia, et simplicia per composita et diversa; non est propter invidiam, ut subtrahatur nobis cognitio divinorum; sed propter nostram utilitatem: quia Scriptura nobis condescendens tradidit nobis quae supra nos sunt, secundum modum nostrum."—*Com. in lib. De divinis nominibus*, cap. 1, lectio 2 (vol. xv. 268b).

And this leads us direct to the doctrine that the *categories* are not applicable to God. We have seen that Aquinas decisively rejects the Platonic conception that abstractions, such as "beauty" and so forth, have an independent existence as *substantiae*. But in the conclusive passage, quoted on p. 86, where this denial is made, is careful to add:

"Et quamvis haec opinio irrationabilis videatur quantum ad hoc, quod ponebat species rerum naturalium separatas per se subsistentes, . . . tamen hoc absolute verum est, quod aliquid est primum, quod per suam essentiam est ens et bonum, quod dicimus Deum."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 6: a. 4. c. (Leon., iv. 70b).

And again:

"Platonici ponentes Deum esse totius esse causam; quia credebant quod idem non posset esse causa plurium secundum propria in quibus differunt, sed solum secundum id quod est omnibus commune, posuerunt quasdam secundas causas, per quas res ad proprias naturas determinantur, et quae communiter esse a Deo recipiunt; et has causas exemplaria rerum vocabant; sicut exemplar hominis dicebant quemdam hominem separatum, qui esset causa humanitatis omnibus singularibus hominibus; et similiter de aliis. Sed Dionysius sicut dixerat Deum esse causam totius esse communis, ita dixerat eum esse causam proprietatis uniuscuiusque: unde consequebatur quod in ipso Deo essent omnium entium exemplaria. Quod quidem hoc modo intelligi oportet. Deus enim etsi sit in essentia sua unus, tamen intelligendo suam unitatem et virtutem cognoscit quidquid in eo virtualiter existit. Sic igitur cognoscit ex ipso posse procedere res diversas. Huiusmodi igitur quae cognoscit ex se posse prodire, res intellectae dicuntur. Non autem omnes huiusmodi rationes exemplaria dici possunt. Exemplar enim est ad cuius imitationem fit aliud. Non autem omnia, quae scit Deus ex ipso posse prodire, vult in rerum natura producere."—*Com. in lib. De div. nom.*, cap. 5, lectio 3 (vol. xv. 352b).

And again:

"Haec igitur Platonicorum ratio fidei non consonat, nec veritati, quantum ad hoc quod continet de speciebus naturalibus separatis: sed quantum ad id quod dicebant de primo rerum principio, verissima

est eorum opinio et fidei christianae consona. Unde Dionysius Deum nominat quandoque ipsum quidem bonum, aut superbonum, aut principale bonum, aut bonitatem omnis boni: et similiter nominat ipsum supervitam, supersubstantiam, *et cet.*"—*Ib.*, prologus (*ib.*, 259b *sq.*).

Dionysius himself, far-going Neoplatonist as he is, allows no compromise on this point: *

"Non enim substantiam quamdem divinam aut angelicam dicimus esse-per-se, quod est causa quod sunt omnia. Solum enim quod sunt existentia omnia, et ipsum esse, supersubstantiale esse est principium et substantia et causa.† Neque vitae generativam aliam Deitatem dicimus, praeter superdeam vitam omnium quaecumque vivunt . . . neque . . . dicimus principales existentium et causativas substantias et personas, quas et deos existentium et causatores per-se-facientes dixerunt: quos vere et proprie dicendum, non existentes, neque ipsi sciverunt; neque patres eorum. Sed per-se-esse et per-se-vitam et per-se-divinitatem dicimus divine et causaliter unum

* So far as I know, Erigena is the only Christian Neoplatonist who retains the doctrine of the ideas (*rationes seminales* or *primordiales causae* in his diction) as actual beings or hypostases, in the proper sense. In the rank of being he places them next above the angels:

"Ab intellectuali siquidem creatura, quae in angelis est constituta, et ut altius ascendamus, a primordialibus causis, supra quas vera ratio nil superius praeter solum Deum reperit, inchoans, *et cet.*"—*De div. nat.*, lib. iii. cap. 1 (620 B).

† *Solum . . . causa* "for the super-essential being alone is the principle, and essence and cause of the existence of all things that are, and of absolute existence itself."

omnium superprincipale et supersubstantiale principium et causam."—*De div. nom.*, cap. 11, § 6.

The translation is that of Sarracenus, restored from the corrupt text given in vol. xv. 393 of the works of Aquinas, at the head of lec. 4 on cap. 11.

Since, then, what we know as qualities or abstractions, such as "goodness," "beauty," "life," are embraced, not as discrete qualities or properties, but as self-existent and unified reality, in the essential being of God, it is manifest that the distinctions of the categories, substance, quality, quantity, position and the rest, can have no place or meaning as applied to the Deity.*

(7) *To pages* 255, 256.—It does not fall within the scope of this work to follow S. Thomas's arguments in detail over this wide field of natural theology, but the following heads of chapters, and groups of chapters, in the second and third books of the *Contra Gentiles*, will give an adequate idea of its range, and will serve as a guide:

Quod oportuit ad perfectionem universi, esse aliquas naturas intellectuales.—Lib. ii. cap. 46.

Quod anima humana, corrupto corpore, non corrumpitur.—*Ib.*, cap. 79.

Quod nulli alii corpori nisi humano unitur substantia intellectualis ut forma.—*Ib.*, cap. 90.†

* On "relation" in the divine economy *vide* p. 353.

† That the existence of man, compounded of body and soul, as distinct from the angelic spirits, is a part of the original design of the universe is implied throughout in the *Contra Gentiles*, and is explicitly stated elsewhere. *Vide* pp. 365, 393. *Cf.* pp. 536 *sqq.*

Quod sunt aliquae substantiae intellectuales corporibus non unitae.—Ib., cap. 91.

The following chapters are included in the long section *De lege divina* in book iii.:

Quomodo paupertas sit bona.—Lib. iii. cap. 133.

Contra eos qui matrimonium virginitati aequabant.—Ib., cap. 137.

De errore eorum qui vota impugnant.—Ib., 138.

De poena quae debetur peccato mortali et veniali, per respectum ad ultimum finem.—Ib., cap. 143.

Quod per peccatum mortale ultimo fine aliquis in aeternum privatur.—Ib., cap. 144.

There are also long sections in the same book *De contemplatione Dei* (capp. 38–63), and *De gratia divina* (capp. 147–163).

(8) *To pages* 258, 259.—The cessation of the rotation of the heavens assured by faith rather than reason:

"Secundum documenta sanctorum ponimus motum caeli quandoque cessaturum; quamvis hoc magis fide teneatur quam ratione demonstrari possit."

He argues, however, that since motion is always for the sake of reaching the place of repose, it would seem more probable (though not demonstrable) that the heavens move for the sake of something other than themselves, which can be definitely accomplished, rather than for some good to themselves inherent in the act of motion. And this, faith teaches us, is the fact:

"Ponimus enim quod motus caeli est propter

implendum numerum electorum."—*De potentia*, q. 5: a. 5. c. (vol. viii. 110a, 111a).

That creation took place at the beginning of time not *ab aeterno* is argued forcibly by Aquinas in the *Contra Gentiles*. But he makes a point of adding a demonstration that the arguments are not conclusive; for we know the truth in this matter by faith, not reason.

He introduces the demonstration thus:

"Has autem rationes, quia usquequaque non de necessitate concludunt, licet probabilitatem habeant, sufficit tangere solum, ne videatur fides catholica in vanis rationibus constituta et non potius in solidissima Dei doctrina; et ideo conveniens videtur ponere qualiter obvietur eis per eos qui aeternitatem mundi posuerunt."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. ii. cap. 38 (vol. v. 93a).

(9) *To pages* 266–276.—It would, of course, be impossible, within reasonable limits, to give either a sketch of the history of the doctrine of the trinity or an adequate analysis of S. Thomas's treatment of it in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, the *Contra Gentiles*, the *Summa Theologiae*, the *Compendium Theologiae*, and the *Quaestio disputata de potentia*; but a few notes may serve to support and illustrate the general representation presented in the text.

Clement of Alexandria anticipates Plotinus chronologically in formulating the Neoplatonic emanational theory of the universe, with its graded divine Trinity, continuous, so to speak, with the ranks of celestial spirits and the world of man:

Ἀπὸ μιᾶς γὰρ ἄνωθεν ἀρχῆς τῆς κατὰ τὸ θέλημα ἐνεργούσης ἤρτηται τὰ πρῶτα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα· εἶτα ἐπὶ τέλει τοῦ φαινομένου τῷ ἄκρῳ ἡ μακαρία ἀγγελοθεσία, καὶ δὴ μέχρις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἄλλοι ὑπ' ἄλλοις ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ δι' ἑνὸς σωζόμενοί τε καὶ σώζοντες, διατετάχαται· ὡς οὖν συγκινεῖται καὶ μακροτάτη σιδήρου μοῖρα, τῷ τῆς Ἡρακλείας λίθου πνεύματι διὰ πολλῶν τῶν σιδηρῶν ἐκτεινομένῳ δακτυλίων, οὕτω καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι ἑλκόμενοι οἱ μὲν ἐνάρετοι οἰκειοῦνται τῇ πρώτῃ μονῇ, ἐφεξῆς δ' ἄλλοι μέχρι τῆς ταλευταίας.—*Strom.*, lib. vii. cap. 2 (vol. iii. 8, ll. 17–25).

The passage is thus paraphrased by Dr Bigg:* "In a famous passage of the *Stromateis* all rational existence is figured as a vast and graduated hierarchy, like a chain of iron rings, each sustaining and sustained, each saving and saved, held together by the magnetic force of the Holy Spirit, which is Faith. It is the belief in the solidarity of all that thinks and feels, which was afterwards the master-thought of Origen. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are succeeded by the orders of Angels, and these in their turn by men."

The last words of the passage may be translated: "Thus virtuous men, under the attractive force of the Holy Spirit, dwell in the lowest 'mansion' [John xiv.], and other beings successively in higher mansions, up to the highest." †

What we might be tempted to regard as an *obiter dictum*, however significant, in Clement (died early in

* *The Christian Platonists, et cet.*, Oxford, 1913, pp. 98 *sq.*

† We return to Clement on pp. 342 *sqq.*

third century) is fully elaborated by Plotinus († A.D. 279). His trinity of τὸ ὄν, νοῦς, and ψυχή appears everywhere in his essays, though receiving its fullest treatment in the fifth and sixth *Enneads*. He is a writer who gains so much from a connected exposition, that I have thought it best to bring together here the illustrations of almost all that is said of him in any part of the Lectures.

The πρῶτος θεός or τὸ ὄν, the first principle of existence, from whom all existence, by a metaphysically conceived necessity flows, must be regarded as absolutely self-sufficing, in no way referring himself to the emanations that proceed from him (whereas they all refer themselves ultimately to him), and as himself being the supreme good, in love of which good he is inly concentrated:

Οὐ πρὸς αὐτὰ [τὰ πάντα] βλέποντος αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων πρὸς αὐτόν. Ὅδ' εἰς τὸ εἴσω οἷον φέρεται αὐτοῦ, οἷον ἑαυτὸν ἀγαπήσας, αὐγὴν καθαρὰν, αὐτὸς ὢν ὅπερ ἠγάπησε.—*Enneas*, vi. lib. 8, cap. 16 (523, ll. 7–10).*

Accordingly the νοῦς, or first emanation, must derive existence from this πρῶτος θεός without in any way affecting or moving him. It is by no act of will on the part of the Supreme that the νοῦς comes into being, nor does the Supreme in any way direct himself towards the νοῦς. But the νοῦς turns to the Supreme, and in virtue of his genesis is his image, and retains "much of him."

* The page and line references are to Creuzer and Moser's edition, Paris, Didot, 1855.

Δεῖ οὖν ἀκινήτου ὄντος, εἴ τι δεύτερον μετ' αὐτό, οὐ προσνεύσαντος οὐδὲ βουληθέντος, οὐδὲ ὅλως κινηθέντος ὑποστῆναι αὐτό. . . .

Εἰκόνα δὲ ἐκείνου λέγομεν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν· δεῖ γὰρ σαφέστερον λέγειν. Πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι δεῖ πως εἶναι ἐκεῖνο τὸ γεννώμενον, καὶ ἀποσώζειν πολλὰ αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιότητα πρὸς αὐτό, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ φῶς τοῦ ἡλίου· ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦς ἐκεῖνο. —*Enn.*, v. lib. 1 : 6, 7 (302 : 41–43, and 303 : 29–33).

Μέγιστον δὲ μετ' αὐτὸν νοῦς, καὶ δεύτερον· καὶ γὰρ ὁρᾷ ὁ νοῦς ἐκείνον, καὶ δεῖται αὐτοῦ μόνου, ἐκεῖνος δὲ τούτου οὐδέν, καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ἀπὸ κρείττονος νοῦ νοῦν εἶναι, καὶ κρείττων ἁπάντων ὁ νοῦς, ὅτι τἆλλα μετ' αὐτόν.—*Ib.*, cap. 6 (303 : 14–18).

The νοῦς contains in itself the whole noëtic order of things, unified but distinct:

Νοῦς μὲν δὴ ἔστω τὰ ὄντα, καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὸν ἔχων, καὶ ἓν ὢν αὐτοῖς. Πάντα δὲ ὁμοῦ ἐκεῖ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον διακεκριμένα.—*Enn.*, v. lib. 9, cap. 6 (364 : 36–39).

The ψυχή again flows off from the νοῦς without producing disturbance in it, and ψυχὴ looks up to νοῦς as νοῦς does to τὸ ὄν. But, unlike νοῦς, she herself, feeling herself impregnated by the noëtic world, is stirred within, and while continuing to look upon the νοῦς looks also in the opposite direction, and produces an εἴδωλον of herself, as she contemplates the noëtic world. This εἴδωλον is the material, phenomenal and secondary order, in which creatures live the vegetable and animal life of assimilation and sense:

Καὶ αὕτη ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἐνέργεια ψυχὴ, τοῦτο [*sc.* εἶδος τοῦ νοῦ] μένοντος ἐκείνου γενομένη· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς, μένοντος τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ἐγένετο, ἡ δὲ οὐ μένουσα ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινηθεῖσα, ἐγέννα εἴδωλον. Ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα, ὅθεν ἐγένετο, πληροῦται, προελθοῦσα δὲ εἰς κίνησιν ἄλλην καὶ ἐναντίαν γεννᾷ εἴδωλον αὐτῆς, αἴσθησιν καὶ φύσιν τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς· οὐδὲν δὲ τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀπήρτηται οὐδ' ἀποτέτμηται.—*Enn.*, v. lib. 2, cap. 1 (308 : 17–25).*

This secondary and lower order of things, a necessary outflow from the higher, is good in its degree, but we must not demand too much from it:

Πρῶτον τοίνον ληπτέον, ὡς τὸ καλῶς ἐν τῷ μικτῷ ζητοῦντας χρὴ μὴ πάντη ἀπαιτεῖν, ὅσον τὸ καλῶς ἐν τῷ ἀμίκτῳ ἔχει, μηδ' ἐν δευτέροις ζητεῖν τὰ πρῶτα· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ σῶμα ἔχει, συγχωρεῖν καὶ παρὰ τούτου ἰέναι εἰς τὸ πᾶν, ἀπαιτεῖν δὲ παρὰ τοῦ λογοῦ, ὅσον ἠδύνατο δέξασθαι τὸ μίγμα, εἰ μηδὲν τούτου ἐλλείπει.—*Enn.*, iii. lib. 2, cap. 7 (123 : 1–6).

This imperfect degree of goodness is all that we can mean by evil. It culminates in the nether ὕλη, which is the entire absence of good. Plotinus always naively assumes that as there must be a highest which is at the absolute top, so there must be a lowest at the absolute bottom:

Ἡ εἰ οὕτω τις ἐθέλει λέγειν, τῇ ἀεὶ ὑποβάσει καὶ ἀποστάσει τὸ ἔσχατον, καὶ μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἦν ἔτι γένεσθαι ὁτιοῦν, τοῦτο εἶναι

* A beautiful passage (*Enn.*, iii. lib. 8, cap. 3) on the silence and dreamy consciousness of φύσις, or nature, is translated in *The Spirit of Man*, No. 165. This φύσις I take to be the collective εἴδωλον of the νοῦς as contemplated by the ψυχή, next in order therefore to the ψυχή herself.

τὸ κακόν· ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ εἶναι τὸ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον. Τοῦτο δὲ ἡ ὕλη μηδὲν ἔτι ἔχουσα αὐτοῦ. Καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀνάγκη τοῦ κακοῦ.—*Enn.*, i. lib. 8, cap. 7 (44: 52–45: 5).

Now, there is a noëtic ὕλη at the lowest verge of the noëtic order, which, however, can claim existence, for all that has precedence of it enjoys superexistence. Its phenomenal εἴδωλον, on the contrary, at the lowest verge of the nether order, is mere negation, for the things that take precedence of it in its own order have bare existence, from the beauty of which existence it is itself wholly alien:

Ἐκείνη δὲ ἡ ὕλη, ἡ ἐκεῖ, ὄν· τὸ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῆς ἐπέκεινα ὄντος· ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς, ὄν· οὐκ ὂν ἄρα αὐτὴ, ἕτερον ὂν πρὸς τῷ καλῷ τοῦ ὄντος.—*Enn.*, ii. lib. 4, cap. 16 fin. (81: 17–20).

This lower ὕλη is mere "otherness" than existing things. To be "other," in all cases except this, implies actually being something else; ὕλη alone is merely "other," and *not* anything else; or, if this is still too definite, the vagueness of the Greek plural may better represent its sheer "otherness":

Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐ μόνον ἄλλα, ἀλλὰ καί τι ἕκαστον ὡς εἶδος. Αὕτη δὲ πρεπόντως ἂν λέγοιτο μόνον ἄλλο· τάχα δὲ ἄλλα, ἵνα μὴ τῷ ἄλλο ἑνικῶς ὁρίσῃς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄλλα τὸ ἀόριστον ἐνδείξῃ.—*Ib.*, cap. 13, fin. (79: 16–19).

But as soon as this vague ὕλη acquires a form (even in the illusory nether order of phenomena), though it remains, in its own nature, negative and evil, yet the thing that nature has made by giving it

form is good, just in proportion to its real existence. Nothing that exists is wholly evil, since it is the non-existent ὕλη alone, *qua* non-existent, that is evil:

Τὸ γοῦν ἐλλεῖπον ὀλίγον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐ κακόν· δύναται γὰρ καὶ τέλεον εἶναι, ὡς πρὸς φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλ' ὅταν παντελῶς ἐλλείπῃ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη, τοῦτο τὸ ὄντως κακὸν, μηδεμίαν ἔχον ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν.—*Enn.*, i. lib. 8, cap. 5 (42: 42–46). Cf. *Enn.*, ii. lib. 4, cap. 16 (especially 80: 51–81: 10).

What, then, is to be our mental attitude towards this ἔλλειψις, or *privatio*, which constitutes evil? We are to imitate the divine ψυχή, who, albeit she produces the nether order of phenomena, regards it only as an image of the supernal order, in its positive aspect, and has therefore no vision of evil or share in it:

Ἡ μὲν οὖν τελεία καὶ πρὸς νοῦν νεύουσα ψυχὴ ἀεὶ καθαρὰ, καὶ ὕλην ἀπέστραπται, καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον ἅπαν καὶ τὸ ἄμετρον καὶ κακὸν οὔτε ὁρᾷ οὔτε πέλαζει· καθαρὰ οὖν μένει ὁρισθεῖσα νῷ παντελῶς.—*Enn.*, i. lib. 8, cap. 4 (42: 27–31).

I must be content to leave without special examination the thesis that the human soul is a wilfully self-detached fragment of this great divine soul (the Plotinian form of the doctrine of the fall of man), and will only give the continuation of the above extract to illustrate the contrast which the detached soul presents to the primal ψυχή:

Ἡ δὲ μὴ μείνασα τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῆς προελθοῦσα, τὸ μὴ τελείῳ μηδὲ πρώτῳ, οἷον ἴνδαλμα ἐκείνης, τῷ ἐλλείμματι, καθόσον ἐνέλιπεν, ἀοριστίας πληρωθεῖσα, σκότον ὁρᾷ, καὶ ἔχει

ἤδη ὕλην, βλέπουσα εἰς ὃ μὴ βλέπει,* ὡς λεγόμεθα ὁρᾷν καὶ τὸ σκότος.—*Ib.* (ll. 31–36).

This perversity we must correct. It is blasphemous for a man to complain of the necessary gradation of the universe, instead of humbly accepting the nature of things, and seeing to it that he himself presses forward towards the prime perfections, banishing all thought that the heavens lay upon us a fate of tragic horror, whereas in truth they frame all things propitiously:

Ὁ ἄρα μεμφόμενος τῇ τοῦ κόσμου φύσει, οὐκ οἶδεν ὅ τι ποιεῖ, οὐδ' ὅπου τὸ θράσος αὐτοῦ τοῦτο χωρεῖ. Τοῦτο δὲ, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι τάξιν τῶν ἐφεξῆς, πρώτων καὶ δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων, καὶ ἀεὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων, καὶ ὡς οὐ λοιδορητέον τοῖς χείροσι τῶν πρώτων, ἀλλὰ πράως συγχωρητέον τῇ πάντων φύσει αὐτὸν θέοντα πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα, παυσάμενον τῆς τραγῳδίας τῶν φοβερῶν, ὡς οἴονται ἐν ταῖς τοῦ κόσμου σφαίραις, αἳ δὴ πάντα μείλιχα τεύχουσιν αὐτοῖς.—*Enn.*, ii. lib. 9, cap. 13 (104: 29–37).

We must not even demand that all men shall be "good"; but must reflect that, since badness is only goodness short of perfection, we might as well on the one hand criticise plants for not being animals, or animals for not being rational, or on the other hand complain of the ψυχή or the νοῦς not being the Supreme, as criticise men, in a necessarily graded universe, for not being all on a level of goodness:

Καὶ οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον πάλιν ἀγαθοὺς πάντας, οὐδ', ὅτι μὴ τοῦτο δυνατὸν, μέμφεσθαι προχείρως, πάλιν ἀξιοῦσι μηδὲν

* "Looking at what it does not see"—because it does not exist.

διαφέρειν ταῦτα ἐκείνων,* τό τε κακὸν μὴ νομίζειν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ ἐνδεέστερον εἰς φρόνησιν, καὶ ἔλαττον ἀγαθὸν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότερον. Οἷον εἴ τις τὴν φύσιν κακὸν λέγοι, ὅτι μὴ αἴσθησίς ἐστι· καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν, ὅτι μὴ λόγος· εἰ δὲ μή, κἀκεῖ τὰ κακὰ ἀναγκασθήσονται λέγειν εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ψυχὴ χεῖρον νοῦ, καὶ οὗτος ἄλλου ἔλαττον.—*Ib.* (105 : 3–12).

Finally, though evil often subserves good, we must beware of saying that it is there *in order* to subserve it. "Evils," that is imperfections, are necessarily there, and it is the supreme exercise of the power of goodness to extort good out of them:

Ἡ δὲ κακία εἰργάσατό τι χρήσιμον εἰς τὸ ὅλον, παράδειγμα δίκης γενομένη καὶ πολλὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς χρήσιμα παρασχομένη· καὶ γὰρ ἐγρηγορότας ἐποίησε, καὶ νοῦν καὶ σύνεσιν ἐγείρει, πονηρίας ὁδοῖς ἀντιταττομένους. Καὶ μανθάνειν δὲ ποιεῖ, οἷον ἀγαθὸν ἀρετὴ, παραθέσει κακῶν, ὧν οἱ πονηροὶ ἔχουσι. Καὶ οὐ γέγονε τὰ κακὰ διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ὅτι χρῆται καὶ αὐτοῖς εἰς δέον, ἐπείπερ ἐγένετο, εἴρηται· τοῦτο δὲ δυνάμεως μεγίστης καλῶς καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς χρῆσθαι δύνασθαι· καὶ τοῖς ἀμόρφοις γενομένοις εἰς ἑτέρας μορφὰς χρῆσθαι ἱκανὴν εἶναι. Ὅλως δὲ κακὸν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θετέον· ἀνάγκη δὲ ἔλλειψιν εἶναι ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοῦ, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ. Τὸ οὖν ἄλλο ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἕτερον ἀγαθοῦ ὂν, ποιεῖ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἦν.—*En.*, iii. 2 : 5 (122 : 7–22).

The last words of this passage may be translated: "We must lay it down universally that evil is defect of good, and that here below such defect of good must needs be; because here good exists in something else [*i.e.* in matter]; and it is that 'else,' in which

* "The nether from the supernal order."

good exists, and which is other than good, that causes the defect, since it is not itself good."

Returning from this long digression to the passages on p. 334, and bearing in mind that Clement was an elder contemporary of Ammonius Saccas († 243), the teacher of Plotinus, we shall see very clearly that the philosophical basis of the Christian doctrine of the trinity has its root in Neoplatonic emanational conceptions. But from the first the Christology of the Church, and the historic element in its tradition, fitted more or less uneasily into the theory.

Thus Clement, like Plotinus, is committed by his general conception to a step-by-step transition from the Supreme to the phenomenal world. Therefore the Son must be second to the Father:

Τελειοτάτη δὲ καὶ ἁγιωτάτη καὶ κυριωτάτη καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτη, καὶ βασιλικωτάτη καὶ εὐεργετικωτάτη ἡ υἱοῦ φύσις ἡ τῷ μόνῳ παντοκράτορι προσεχεστάτη.—*Strom.*, lib. 7, cap. 2 (vol. iii. 5, ll. 20 *sqq.*).

Nevertheless Dr Bigg is justified in saying:* "But the idea of subordination is strictly secondary in Clement. . . . Always he recurs to the essential Unity of the Father and the Son. . . . So complete is the union, that he does not hesitate to transfer to the Son the peculiar titles of the Father." This is very true, but the proposition can not be reversed. There are many titles of the Son that can not be transferred to the Father.

For though the difference between Clement and

* *Christian Platonists*, p. 99.

Plotinus consists partly in the greater definiteness and more advanced development of trinitarian doctrine in the latter, yet it lies much more in the fact that whereas Plotinus is the master of a school of philosophy, Clement is the servant of a Church. Plotinus is primarily interested, as a trinitarian, in developing the doctrine of a philosophically necessary transition from the absolute to the phenomenal order, by a series of emanations, contemplated as issuing from the originating source. Clement looks in the other direction, and regards the emanations as revealing to the Christian the means of spiritual and moral education, unto salvation, that he could not otherwise command. *Cf.* p. 290.

Ἐν δὲ τοῖς νοητοῖς τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἐν γενέσει, την ἄχρονον ἄναρχον ἀρχήν τε καὶ ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ὄντων, τὸν υἱόν· παρ' οὗ ἐκμανθάνειν (ἔστιν) τὸ ἐπέκεινα αἴτιον, τὸν πατέρα τῶν ὅλων, τὸ πρέσβιστον καὶ πάντων εὐεργετικώτατον, οὐκέτι φωνῇ παραδιδόμενον, σεβάσματι δὲ καὶ σιγῇ μετὰ ἐκπλήξεως ἁγίας σεβαστὸν καὶ σεπτὸν κυριώτατα.—*Ib.*, cap. 1 (iii. 4, ll. 4 *sqq.*).

The Son is the saviour, revealer, teacher, and organiser. Such terms could not be transferred to the Father. Of the Son surely we can know, according to Clement, much of what he is, not only of what he is not. It is in harmony with this that we think of Plotinus as a mystic who sees, and tries to help his disciples to see, and of Clement as a believer, who tells the faithful what they are to believe and practise, and tries to present his teaching in a philosophical form.

Origen († 254) was a disciple of Clement, and a younger contemporary of Plotinus;* and we are not surprised to find his doctrine of a graded trinity more advanced than that of his master, though still coloured by the demand of the believer for revelation, rather than by the purely philosophical search for links between the absolute and the phenomenal. The Father's power extends to all existing things, for he gives them existence. The Son's lesser power only reaches rational beings. The power of the Holy Spirit, less again, but greater than that of any other spiritual beings, reaches only to the holy minded:

Ὅτι ὁ μὲν θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ συνέχων τὰ πάντα φθάνει εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων μεταδιδοὺς ἑκάστῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου τὸ εἶναι· ὧν γάρ ἐστιν· ἐλάττων δὲ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὁ υἱὸς φθάνων ἐπὶ μόνα τὰ λογικά· δεύτερος γάρ ἐστι τοῦ πατρός· ἔτι δὲ ἧττον τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐπὶ μόνους τοὺς ἁγίους διϊκνούμενον· ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτο μείζων ἡ δύναμις τοῦ πατρὸς παρὰ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον· πλείων δὲ ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ παρὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον· καὶ πάλιν διαφέρουσα μᾶλλον τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἡ δύναμις παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα ἅγια.—*De principiis*, lib. i. cap. 3, § 5 (vol. i. 62).†

Fortunately this passage survives in the original. It is emasculated in the translation of Rufinus. And that translation is all we have for the next passage. It is perhaps not unfair to suspect that the translator did something towards emphasising the unqualified

* There was another Origen, who was a co-disciple with Plotinus of Ammonius Saccas. This is apt to cause some confusion.

† Paging of the Benedictine edition, by Delarue, Paris, 1733.

similitudo of the Son, and that *equalitas* with the father of which he "emptied" himself (Phil. ii. 7).

"Ut autem plenius adhuc intelligatur quomodo Salvator figura est substantiae vel subsistentiae Dei, utamur etiam exemplo, quod quamvis rem non plene nec proprie significet de qua agimus, tamen ad hoc solum videatur assumptum, quod exinaniens se filius qui erat in forma Dei, per ipsam sui exinanitionem studet nobis deitatis plenitudinem demonstrare. Verbi causa, si facta esset aliqua statua talis quae magnitudine sui universum orbem terrae teneret, et pro sui immensitate considerari a nullo posset: fieret autem alia statua membrorum habitu ac vultus lineamentis, specie ac materia per omnia similis absque magnitudinis immensitate, pro eo ut qui illam immensam considerare atque intueri non possent, hanc videntes, illam se vidisse confiterentur, pro eo quod omnia membrorum et vultus lineamenta, vel ipsam speciem materiamque similitudine prorsus indiscreta servaret: tali quadam similitudine exinaniens se filius Dei de aequalitate patris, et viam nobis cognitionis ejus ostendens, figura expressa substantiæ ejus efficitur."—*Ib.*, cap. 2, § 8 (56b A–C).

It is easy to see how definitely and how far Christian speculation had now departed from the Hebrew conception of the Creator and the creation, sharply distinguished from each other, the latter springing into being at the *fiat* of the former. But we are within three-quarters of a century of the Council of Nice. Surely, enough and more than

enough, has been done (to adopt the language of Gregory of Nazianzus *) by way of guarding Christian doctrine against the "cramped" or "meagre" Jewish conception of a lonely Deity. The next task must be to guard it, without sacrificing the trinitarian doctrine, against flowing off into the vagueness of a modified Ethnic polytheism. It was impossible to harmonise the two schemes of thought. The attempt to do so must end in the compromises and contradictions of the Nicene theology.†

* Τριάδος δὲ ὁρισθείσης . . . ἵνα μήτε στενὴ μένῃ ἡ θεότης, μήτε εἰς ἄπειρον χέηται . . . τὸ μέν Ἰουδαϊκὸν παντελῶς, τὸ δὲ Ἑλληνικὸν καὶ πολύθεον.—Oration xxiii. (i. 430 D). *Cf.* Oration xxv. (i. 467 A). The page references are to the Benedictine edition, Paris, 1778. *Cf.* p. 266 of this volume.

† It may be well here to explain that throughout these Lectures and notes, in speaking of S. Thomas's rejection of all emanational doctrines I use the term "emanational" to signify the conception of a necessary and natural (possibly even unconscious) outflow from the primal unity of absolute being *in the direction* of the multiplex and phenomenal order of being. Aquinas has no objection to the word. He uses it in relation to the processes of generation and procession within the internal economy of the Deity, and also with reference to the causal dependence upon God of all things that are. But in the one case it is of the very essence of his teaching that the "movement" is *not* in the direction of the phenomenal and multiplex, but abides in the Deity; and in the other case he defines emanation as meaning creation:

"Non ergo accipienda est processio secundum quod est in corporalibus, vel per motum localem, vel per actionem alicujus causae in exteriorem effectum, ut calor a calefaciente in calefactum; sed secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod manet in ipso."—*Sum. Theol.*, 1ª. q. 27: a. 1. c. (Leon., iv. 306a).

"Non solum oportet considerare emanationem alicujus entis particularis ab aliquo particulari agente, sed etiam emanationem totius entis a causa universali, quae est Deus: et hanc quidem

The compromise consisted in adopting an emanational conception of the essential nature or being of the Deity, and a creational conception of the origin of nature and man "out of nothing." The contradictions concerned the admittedly mysterious doctrines of the three Persons in the single and undivided Godhead, and the two fully developed natures in the one person of Christ. These contradictions, it was allowed, can not be solved by reason, but certain analogies may be found by the faithful to be helpful and suggestive. Here we are concerned only with the doctrine of the trinity.

When the Nicene theology had triumphed and the Monophysite and Nestorian heretics had been banished even from the Eastern Empire, the bolder spirits were still uneasy under the yoke. Both Erigena and

emanationem designamus nomine *creationis*."—*Ib.*, q. 45 : a. 1. c. (*ib.*, 464a).

Thus when Aquinas insists, in spite of the fact that God's will is identical with his nature and essence, that we are to think of these relations of the Trinity as necessarily involved in the divine being, essence, or nature ; and of creation as *not* necessary and *not* involved in the divine nature, but as the free act of the divine will, he is telling us to be Hebraic and not Hellenic in our conception of the origin of the phenomenal world.

Compare :

"Sicut autem artifex creatus facit aliquid ex materia, ita Deus facit ex nihilo : . . . non quod nihilum cedat in substantiam rei, sed quia ab ipso tota substantia rei producitur, nullo alio praesupposito. Si ergo Filius procederet a Patre ut de nihilo existens, hoc modo se haberet ad Patrem ut artificiatum ad artificem : quod manifestum est nomen filiationis proprie habere non posse, sed solum secundum aliquam similitudinem. Unde relinquitur quod, si Filius Dei procederet a Patre quasi existens ex nihilo, non esset vere et proprie Filius."—*Ib.*, q. 41 : a. 3. c. (*ib.*, 427a).

Abelard found it hard to reconcile themselves to the *filioque*. If the *Spiritus Sanctus* proceeds from the Son, or from the Father *through* the Son, the mind pictures a linear succession, and feels an unbroken gradation. But if the procession be from the Father *and* the Son, the mind forms a triangular image, breaks up the succession, and pictures symmetry and equality. A feeling of this, I am convinced, lay behind the insistence upon the *filioque*.

Erigena is sorely exercised on the subject:

"*Discipulus.* Sed mihi talia cogitanti atque credenti de trina omnium causa alia caligo occurrit. Non enim clare considero, utrum solus Pater causa est Spiritus sancti, an Pater et Filius, ut, quemadmodum fides patetur catholica, a Patre et Filio eum procedere, ita etiam credamus, duas suae processionis causas possidere. . . .

"*Magister.* Vere vere. Densissima caligo est, et non solum te, sed et me ipsum involvit. Et nisi ipsa lux mentium nobis revelaverit, nostrae ratiocinationis studium ad eam revelandam nil proficiet."—*De div. nat.*, lib. ii. cap. 31 (601, B, C).

The one point he is clear about is that there can not be two causes or sources of the *processio*, and with much trepidation he comes at last to the conclusion that the *filioque* does not mean any more than *per Filium*, since:

"Totus Pater gignens et totus Filius genitus in toto Spiritu sancto a Patre per filium procedente [sunt]."—*Ib.*, cap. 32 (609 C, D).

Erigena illustrates this by the succession of *ignis*,

radius, and *splendor*, but Abelard is at once bolder in his assertion and happier in his illustration:

"Quippe cum Spiritus quasi spiramen aspirando dictus sit, et æque ipse tam Patris quam Filii Spiritus appelletur, quis recte abneget ab ambobus eum procedere, a quibus tanquam amborum Spiritus esse habet, atque spirare? Proprie tamen seu principaliter eum a Patre procedere non negamus. . . .

"Inde enim aliquid proprie procedere dicitur, unde primo venire ac moveri cœpit, sicut lacus ex fonte, non ex rivo, sed per rivum procedere dicitur, in quem scilicet rivum aqua ipsius lacus de fonte prodiens per eum transit ac pervenit in stagnum. . . .

"Et hoc fortasse modo, si a solo Patre procedere Spiritum Græci intelligant, eo scilicet quod sic ab ipso sit, quasi a summo et non existente ab alio, nulla est sententiæ controversia, sed verborum diversitas."—*Introductio ad Theologiam*, lib. ii. cap. 15 (1078 B–1080 A).

Abelard is much concerned to approximate the Platonic and the Christian conceptions of the Trinity as far as possible, and therefore he is at pains not only to preserve the linear succession of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but also to explain away any expressions he finds in Plato or Macrobius which seem to imply that the ψυχή, as *anima mundi*, is contemporaneous with the created order and not eternal. He finds the solution in the doctrine that the *Spiritus*, which existed from eternity, assumed the character of anima, *quasi ab animando*, when it began to produce its effects in the created world:

"Spiritus quippe nomen est naturæ, anima vero officii, ab animando scilicet. Sicut ergo ipsos cælestes spiritus semper quidem spiritus, sed non semper angelos esse profitemur, eo quod angelus nomen sit officii, non naturæ, et Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum secundum humanitatem incœpisse, secundum vero divinitatem æternum esse prædicamus: ita et Spiritum sanctum secundum substantiam essentiæ suæ æternum, secundum effecta vero incœpisse dicamus, quod est dicere effecta potius quam ipsum incœpisse. Et hunc quidem philosophi sensum esse arbitror, sub illo animæ typo, quod eam creaturam esse, id est incœpisse perhibet, et quasi temporalem esse, non æternam. Juxta quod et Macrobius animæ ipsi tam Deum quam Νοῦν proferre non abhorreret. Vocet itaque Plato Spiritum sanctum animam secundum effectum operum. Nos vero dicamus Spiritum secundum naturalem suæ bonitatis affectum, quem ita ab æterno habuerit ut ex opere eum impleret quando eum implendum esse providit." —*Ib.*, cap. 17 (1082 B, C).

The other line of escape from the contradictions of the Nicene trinity is to regard the Power, Wisdom, and Love of God simply as three partial and imperfect but mutually supplementing attempts to express the ineffably unified *super-bonitas* of the Creator. This line also (whether consistently or not) is taken by Abelard:

"Sicut autem Dei Patris vocabulo divinæ majestas potentiæ exprimitur specialiter, ita Filii seu Verbi appellatione sapientia Dei significatur, quia scilicet

cuncta discernere valet, ut in nullo penitus decipi queat.

"At vero Spiritus sancti vocabulo ipsa ejus charitas seu benignitas exprimitur, qua videlicet optime cuncta vult fieri seu disponi, et eo modo singula provenire quo melius possunt, in aliis quoque bene utens, et optime singula disponens, et ad optimum finem quoque perducens. Non est autem perfectus in omnibus, qui in aliquo impotens invenitur, nec perfecte beatus est qui in aliquo decipi potest, nec penitus benignus qui omnia optime fieri non velit ac disponi. Ubi vero hæc tria conveniunt, ut tam videlicet potentia quam sapientia, quam bona voluntate sit perfectus, nil boni est quod ejus plenitudini desit. Tale est ergo Deum Patrem ac Filium et Spiritum sanctum nos profiteri, ac si ipsum, ut dictum est summum bonum esse prædicemus, cui, inquam, bonorum omnium plenitudini nil desit, et cujus participatione bona esse cætera constet."—*Ib.*, lib. i. capp. 8, 9 (989 C–990 A).

We have now fully illustrated the contradiction inherent in the Nicene theology. Reason must always either divide the Substance, by graded emanation, or confound the Persons by reducing them to different ways of partially expressing the same Being.

Aquinas knows this, but he will not accept any subterfuge.* The human mind may *approach* the

* For example, he accepts the definition *Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia, Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 29: a. 1. (Leon., iv. 327); and he dares even to use the *analogy* of three individuals

mystery from many sides, but must not trust its own processes or instincts as to how far to go and where to stop in each of them.

The text (*Gen.* i. 26) *faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram* (note the plural) was his warrant in looking to the human mind for specific reflexions of the trinity in unity of the Deity, for whereas the effect must always have some similarity to the cause, and the impress or "footprint" of the Deity is to be found everywhere, it is only in man, and the angels, that there is the *imago*:

"Imago in hoc differt a vestigio: quod vestigium est confusa similitudo alicujus rei et imperfecta; imago autem repraesentat rem magis determinate secundum omnes partes et dispositiones partium, ex quibus etiam aliquid de interioribus rei percipi potest. Et ideo in illis tantum creaturis dicitur esse imago Dei quae propter sui nobilitatem ipsum perfectius imitantur et repraesentant; et ideo in Angelo et homine tantum dicitur imago Divinitatis, et in homine secundum id quod est in ipso nobilius.* Alia autem, quae plus et minus participant de Dei bonitate,

of a species to illustrate the special *proprietates* and the common *essentia* of the three *Personae*:

"In Filio ipsa relatio filiationis tenet locum omnium principiorum individuantium in rebus creatis (propter quod dicitur proprietas personalis), ipsa autem natura divina tenet locum naturae speciei"—*De potentia*, q. 2: a. 1. ad 3^{m} (vol. viii. 15b). On the *principia individuantia*, vide pp. 465 *sqq*. For Aquinas there was no playing with "aspects" or "masks" to escape the difficulties of the doctrine.

* *I.e.* it is only in the soul of man, not in his body, that the *imago* is to be looked for.

magis [et minus *] accedunt ad rationem imaginis." — 1 *Dist.*, iii. q. 3: a. 1. sol. (vol. vi. 38b).

The philosophical conception of the absolute *simplicitas* of the Deity carries with it the conviction that when (following the track of our own complex psychology) we speak of God's powers or attributes, we are using phrases strictly irrelevant to his being; but so far as we are expressing anything we are expressing God himself, though in a way at once partial and, even within its own range, imperfect. But by revelation we know that certain relations, paternity, filiation, and procession (under its twofold aspect of outbreathing and reception of the outbreathing), exist and constitute veritable "Persons" within the divine simplicity. This is a mystery, inaccessible to our reason. But we know that in our own complexity there is some kind of reflection, on a lower plane, of this mysterious relationship within the divine simplicity. Since, in formulating and expounding the revealed truth, we can only use the consciously inapplicable phrases and distinctions of our own thought and language, all that we can do is to see to it that one assertion or conception (admittedly carrying the analysis of our complexity up into the divine simplicity where it has no right to exist) does not too patently, and as it were ostentatiously, suggest the contradiction of some other assertion or conception which will also help us along another path of approach (again admittedly tentative) towards (not to) the truth.

So it is very largely a question of language, often

* Bracketed words supplied.

of grammar, that we are concerned with. The neuter gender best expresses unformed material or substance, common to a number of formed individuals; and therefore the neuter best indicates the undivided Essence. But the masculine or feminine is more appropriate to the distinct Persons:

"Neutrum genus est informe, masculinum autem est formatum et distinctum, et similiter femininum. Et ideo convenienter per neutrum genus significatur essentia communis: per masculinum autem et femininum, aliquod suppositum determinatum in communi natura. . . . Et ideo, quia in divinis distinctio est secundum personas, non autem secundum essentiam, dicimus quod Pater est *alius* a Filio, sed non *aliud*: et e converso dicimus quod sunt *unum*, sed non *unus*." *—*Sum. Theol.*, i^a. q. 31: a. 3. ad 4^m (Leon., iv. 345b).

When a vocable connotating what pertains to *essence* is applied to a *Person* it must be understood adjectivally. There are *tres increati* adjectivally, but only *unus increatus* substantivally:

"Ea vero quae significant essentiam adjective, praedicantur pluraliter de tribus, propter pluritatem suppositorum. Dicimus enim *tres existentes* vel *tres sapientes*, aut *tres aeternos* et *increatos* et *immensos*, si adjective sumantur. Si vero substantive sumantur, dicimus *unum increatum*, *immensum* et *aeternum*, ut Athenasius dicit." †—*Ib.*, q. 39: a. 3. c. (*ib.*, 400b).

* So in John x. 30, *Ego et Pater unum sumus.* The Greek is ἕν.

† So too:

"Unde Filius non potest dici, masculine loquendo, idem Patri, sed neutraliter tantum; ut unitas ad essentiam referatur."—1 *Dist.*, xix. q. 1: a. 1. ad 2^m (vol. vi. 160b).

[Thus our Prayer-book begins well and renders *et tamen non tres aeterni sed unus aeternus*, "and yet there are not three eternals but one eternal," making "eternal" a substantive, with a plural. But apparently this is no more than a piece of translator's luck; for presently we find "nor three uncreated, but one uncreated."]

Or again, an abstract noun should not be used as the grammatical subject of a verb. Joachim was wrong to say *essentia genuit essentiam*; and though no less an authority than Augustine said *Pater et Filius sunt una sapientia, quia una essentia*, such phraseology should not be allowed to spread, and it should be explained that the abstract is here used for the concrete:

"Ad veritatem locutionum, non solum oportet considerare res significatas, sed etiam modum significandi. . . . Licet autem, secundum rem, sit idem *Deus* quod *deitas*, non tamen est idem modus significandi utrobique.

"Essentia divina praedicatur de Patre per modum identitatis, propter divinam simplicitatem: nec tamen sequitur quod possit supponere [be used as a grammatical subject] pro Patre, propter diversum modum significandi."—*Ib.*, a. 5. ob. 1. c. and ad 1^{m}, 4^{m} (*ib.*, 404 *sq.*).

The proprieties of language to be observed are not always grammatical. We may say that the Son is *alius a Patre*, but not that he is *differens*:

"Ad evitandum igitur errorem Arii, vitare debemus in divinis nomen *diversitatis* et *differentiae*, ne

tollatur unitas essentiae: possumus autem uti nomine *distinctionis*, propter oppositionem relativam. Unde sicubi in aliqua scriptura authentica diversitas vel differentia personarum invenitur, sumitur diversitas vel differentia pro distinctione. Ne autem tollatur simplicitas divinae essentiae, vitandum est nomen *separationis* et *divisionis*, quae est totius in partes."—*Ib.*, q. 31: a. 2. c. (*ib.*, 344b).

Still more noteworthy is it that the whole core of the exposition of the doctrine of the trinity is centred in distinctions and relations between the intellect and the will which exist in us and dominate our language but do not exist in God:

"Licet in Deo non sit aliud voluntas et intellectus, tamen de ratione voluntatis et intellectus est, quod processiones quae sunt secundum actionem utriusque, se habeant secundum quendam ordinem. Non enim est processio amoris nisi in ordine ad processionem verbi: nihil enim potest voluntate amari, nisi sit intellectu conceptum."—*Ib.*, q. 27: a. 3. ad 3^{m} (*ib.*, 311b).

Finally, Aristotle's doctrine that the actualising of two potentialities may be one and the same act, and may yet be separably distinguishable by the mind, was a welcome aid to Aquinas. The motion of the iron towards the magnet is the actualising or *actus* alike of the magnet's potentiality to attract and the iron's potentiality of being attracted. Either *actus*, therefore, is identical with the motion, but they are not conceptually identical with each other. So, too, the conveyance of information is at once the

actualising of the teacher's potentiality of giving and the learner's potentiality of receiving the information. But though each *actus* is identical with one and the same event, teaching is not identical with learning. Or, generally, the *actio*, or doing something, and the *passio*, or being done something to, are severally identical with the *actus*, but not with each other. And so with the way from Thebes to Athens and the way from Athens to Thebes. The actual road is the same as each of these severally, but they are distinguishable from each other as opposite relations of the road to the traveller. Aquinas had not studied and commented this passage in vain, and he was easily able to confute the objector who urged—to the ruin of the doctrine as to how the relations constitute the Persons—that since *paternitas* and *filiatio* were both identical with the divine *essentia* they were not two relations, but one.

Yet since every relation is "real" in the Deity (as right and left, or front and back, are real in a man, because inherent in him, but not real in a column which may be to the right or left according to *your* position, not according to anything in itself), we are left after all face to face with the incomprehensible mystery of relations and distinctions not only conceived by us, but existing as realities, within the *simplicitas* of the Deity. Cf. *Commentary* on Aristotle's *Physics*, lib. iii. lecture 5 (Leon., ii. 111 *sqq.*), and *Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 28 : a. 3. ob. 1. ad 1^{m}, a. 4. contra, and ad 5^{m} (Leon., iv. 324, 325a, 326b).

(10) *To pages* 276–278.—The general principle is:

"Dimensiones non possunt intelligi in materia nisi secundum quod materia intelligitur constituta per formam substantialem in esse substantiali corporeo." —*Quaestio disputata de anima*, a. 9. ad 17[m] (vol. viii. 494b).

Dimensions, therefore, are "accidents," not substances; and neither they nor other more specialised accidents can exist without a subject:

"Esse accidentis est inesse et dependere, et compositionem facere cum subjecto per consequens."—1 *Dist.*, viii. q. 4: a. 3. sol. (vol. vi. 78a).

Yet in the Eucharist the accidents of the bread and wine exist without a subject:

"Accidentia panis et vini, quae sensu deprehenduntur in hoc sacramento remanere post consecrationem, non sunt sicut in subjecto in substantia panis et vini, quae non remanet. . . . Neque etiam in forma substantiali, quae non manet. . . . Manifestum est etiam quod huiusmodi accidentia non sunt in substantia corporis et sanguinis Christi sicut in subiecto. . . .

"Et ideo relinquitur quod accidentia in hoc sacramento manent sine subiecto. Quod quidem virtute divina fieri potest. Cum enim effectus magis dependeat a causa prima quam a causa secunda, potest Deus, qui est prima causa substantiae et accidentis, per suam infinitam virtutem conservare in esse accidens subtracta substantia, per quam conservabatur in esse sicut per propriam causam."—*Sum. Theol.*, iii[a]. q. 77: a. 1. c. (Leon., xii. 193 *sq.*).

It is the *quantitas dimensiva* of the bread and wine that takes the place of a subject. To this it is objected:

"Videtur quod in hoc sacramento quantitas dimensiva panis vel vini non sit aliorum accidentium subiectum. *Accidentis* enim *non est accidens*. . . . Sed quantitas dimensiva est quoddam accidens. Ergo quantitas dimensiva non potest esse subiectum aliorum accidentium."

And the answer is:

"Dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum alterius accidentis: quia non per se est. Secundum vero quod est in alio, unum accidens dicitur esse subiectum alterius, inquantum unum accidens recipitur in subiecto alio mediante: sicut superficies dicitur esse subiectum coloris. Unde, quando accidenti datur divinitus ut per se sit, potest etiam per se alterius accidentis esse subiectum."—*Ib.*, a. 2. ob. 1. and ad 1[m] (*ib.*, 196 *sq.*).

As to the doctrine of transubstantiation itself, it may well startle the modern reader, familiar with the comparative study of religions, but not accustomed to the deadly sincerity with which a mediæval theologian took his dogmas, to read the following, in answer to the objection that the accidents of the bread and wine can not persist when their substance has gone:

"Sensu apparet, facta consecratione, omnia accidentia panis et vini remanere. Quod quidem rationabiliter per divinam providentiam fit. Primo quidem, quia non est consuetum hominibus, sed horribile, carnem hominis comedere et sanguinem bibere, pro-

ponitur nobis caro et sanguis Christi sumenda sub speciebus illorum quae frequentius in usum hominis veniunt, scilicet panis et vini.

"Secundo, ne hoc sacramentum ab infidelibus irrideretur, si sub specie propria Dominum nostrum manducemus.

"Tertio ut, dum invisibiliter corpus et sanguinem Domini nostri sumimus, hoc proficiat ad meritum fidei."—*Ib.*, q. 75: a. 5. c. (*ib.*, 172b).

On the devotional aspect of the Eucharist *vide* pp. 527 *sqq.*

LECTURE V

PSYCHOLOGY

We have now reached a point at which it may be as well to survey the ground we have already traversed, and to take stock of our main progress, apart from the complications of details and digressions.

The reactions between dogma and philosophy, as illustrated by the works of Aquinas, is our theme. We have sketched the dogmatic system which Aquinas inherited and the philosophical system which he adopted. We have seen that the conditions, under which he attempted to determine their relations, favoured a more logically complete, a more sharply defined, and a more elaborately worked out theory of the relations of reason and revelation than is to be found in any earlier writer. We have seen that the theory so conceived necessitated a proof of the reasonableness of the expectation of a revelation that should transcend reason, a proof that the Scriptures actually are the promised revelation, and a demonstration that they convey to us truths which do transcend reason, but do not contradict it. Each point in this scheme we have examined, illustrated, and tested.

The course of this investigation has already

brought out very clearly the main characteristic of the Aquinian synthesis. It consists not so much in a harmonising of reason and revelation as in a treaty between them, by the terms of which each is to respect the rights of the other. Reason is to admit that revelation lies outside its domain and is not to be subjected to its canons; but in return, revelation is to promise never to demand assent or submission from reason that its nature and constitution rebel against. Recognising the sharpness of the contrast between them, and with mutual respect for each other's claims, each can adopt an entirely friendly attitude towards the other. Reason points to a revelation beyond itself, and revelation demands the exercise of reason as a preparation for its intelligent acceptance, and in working out its data.

So far we have advanced. But incidentally we have raised the whole problem of the ultimate destiny of man; and, though we have received the formal answer, that it is to "see God," we have not yet followed up its implications, or attempted to fathom its meaning. It will be our next task to do so.

Beyond this lie certain regions of inquiry in which the conflict between the Aristotelian philosophy and the Christian tradition appears to be especially pronounced, and as to which it will be of particular interest to see how Aquinas applies his general principle of division of territory, with mutual respect. To two of these special points our sixth and seventh conference will be devoted.

An examination of the Aquinian psychology, which at present we have only touched upon incidentally, will link these subjects at once to each other and to the matter with which we have already dealt.

Aristotle's treatise on *The soul*, which means "Life and the vital functions," is mainly devoted to human psychology, that is to say, to an analysis of the actual powers and operations of the mind; and, in spite of all its limitations and defects, its teaching is so penetrating and its appeal so masterful, that all subsequent psychology may, I think, be fairly represented as based upon it. At any rate, none of the ancient or mediæval thinkers could escape from it, and even the Neoplatonist and Christian thinkers who differed most widely from Aristotle's theories as to the origin, the nature, and the destiny of the "soul" itself, were forced not only to use his language but to think his thoughts when dealing with its actual manifestations and functionings. In revenge, they often tried to force into his words their own conceptions as to the underlying essence of the "soul" itself.

In this lecture it is with a branch of the functions of the mind, or psychology, that we have to deal; and Professor James* has familiarised a public much wider than that of professed students of philosophy with the idea that this study of the functioning of the mind may be pursued independently of any investigation, or even any theory, as to the nature of the mind itself. To the "soul itself" we shall

* *Principles of Psychology*, London, 1891 (i. 350 and *passim*).

return in the next lecture. At present we have to do with its functionings.

Now the psychology of Aquinas is, broadly speaking, the psychology of Aristotle, sometimes worked out and developed, and harmonised here and there with Platonic conceptions akin to itself. But, on the other hand, human psychology takes its place in the works of Aquinas as an integral part of a scheme of thought and a theory of creation unknown to Aristotle. And into this wider framework it must be made to fit. We have already seen* that S. Thomas's whole scheme rests on the assumption of the self-revelation of the Deity as dictated by the divine wisdom, and the impossibility of a limited and created intelligence rising to the conception of the divine being in his simplicity and unqualified unity. Hence the revelation of the supreme unity must be made through diversity, for the finite can receive even so much as a reflection of the infinite simplicity only through a multiplicity of phases. Now, the self-utterance of the Deity must be addressed to intelligences of some kind; for only such can receive the revelation. Such intelligences are angels and men. And here we must note that it is quite a mistake to think that the Schoolmen exaggerated the importance of man in the scheme of creation, however natural the mistake may be and however much incidental truth it may embody. Theoretically, at least, the angelic hosts were regarded as constituting immeasurably the most numerous, the most varied, and the most intrinsically exalted

* *Vide* p. 244.

and important part of the spiritual creation. It appears to have been currently urged in school discussions that man would not have been created at all had not some of the angels fallen. And since, as we shall see, the material universe was only created for the sake of man, it would follow from this that the original scheme of "creation" was purely spiritual, and that neither "matter" nor "man" were included in it. Aquinas would never admit this. Man, to him, was an essential part of creation. But his title of the "Angelic Doctor" emphasises the prominence in his mind and in his teaching of the thought of the angelic hosts. The truth is that our widened outlook upon the material world and the increased importance we attach to it has indeed dwarfed our conception of the significance of man relatively to the material creation, but at the same time we have, for the most part, exalted him to the position of being the sole spiritual "creature." From the mediæval point of view, to which spiritual being alone has any intrinsic significance, the practical obliteration of the angelic nature from our thought and the vast extension of our material universe, so far from reducing the relative significance of man in creation, would leave him as the only part of it that had any ultimate significance at all, instead of being a quite subordinate item in it.

The modest place taken by man in the mediæval hierarchy of spiritual existences becomes more obvious when we reflect that, according to the scholastic philosophy, every individual angel is really a separate

species, like "humanity," not an individual of a species, like "a man." The grouping of the angels in orders and hierarchies does not mean that two seraphs, for instance, are two individuals of a species; for, though all members of the order have certain characteristics in common, yet each is "specifically" different from each; that is to say, differing in "species." And to all these countless myriads of distinct "forms" of spiritual being, each with its specific vision and specific rapture of contemplation, the species *homo* adds just one more facet in the multiplicity in which the flash of the divine Unity reflects itself.

Yet this one added species has, according to Aquinas, its essential, not incidental, place in the whole revelation; for all the angels in their unimaginable diversity have this in common, that their full tale was created simultaneously in the perfect and instantaneous possession of the plenitude of their natural powers. Those that fell, fell at once, and those that were steadfast instantly received, without further probation, those higher powers and privileges which secured the vision of God to them. They are all purely spiritual creatures, with no kind of material frame, and with no essential relation to place; and they were all made together. Time neither adds to nor subtracts from their number, nor works continuous change in their estate.

Man adds a diversity both to the divine revelation itself and to the reception of it by created intelligences in all these respects. Man, unlike any angelic

spirit, is a species of which there may be an indefinite number of individuals, all of whom remain within the same "specific" range of being. Men spring up one after another in successive generations, by natural propagation; and though our first parents were created in the full possession of their natural powers, their progeny (even had there been no fall) must have grown from helpless infancy, with its mere potentiality of thought, through successive stages of development to their full powers of body and mind. And in actual history, in consequence of the fall, each individual must win his way through long probation back from exile to his home.

Now the central point in this contrast between the angelic and the human psychology is the progressive life of the mind of man, moving by regular process from potentiality to actuality, and building conclusions upon premises, in contrast to the instantaneous and all-embracing intelligence of the angels. It is therefore not intelligence in itself that distinguishes man amongst created things, but the "potentiality" of his intelligence. It is the *intellectus possibilis* or "intelligence that can be, and has to be, developed" that characterises man. Intelligence itself does indeed differentiate man from the brute creation, but it is its progress from potentiality to actuality that differentiates him from the angelic spirits.

In considering the human intelligence, therefore, in distinction from the angelic, we must attend especially to these two points: first, that men are different individuals of the same species; and second,

that the human intelligence is created as a mere potentiality and is only gradually developed into its full actuality. And both of these conditions are involved or made possible by man being a material as well as a spiritual being.

For the more we try to consider "matter" in itself, as distinct from the varied forms which it assumes when clothed with the particular attributes of fire or water or any other special substance, the better shall we understand what the Schoolmen mean by saying that matter is "the principle of individuation." Perhaps it is easiest to see this in the case of manufactured articles. Two chairs or two newly minted sovereigns may be as undistinguishable as you like but will yet remain two and not one, for though we can imagine all the attributes natural and artificial in the two to be identical, yet each is materially itself and not the other; and it is this "numerical" distinctness of the matter in the one from the matter in the other that makes them two, not one. There is, then, a separateness and individuality about a "thing" which puts it under dimensions, and gives it something "ear-marked" as its own—a *materia signata*, the Schoolmen called it—which we cannot resolve into a complex of dimensionless attributes. An attribute, such as ponderosity or blueness, is homogeneous with itself and knows no individuality even if it knows gradation. It can only assume dimensions and individuality when it attaches to a thing or a substance, and the common sense of the average human mind refuses, even under a

philosophical training, to accept a thing or even an element as a mere complex of attributes.

The conception of *prima materia*, or "matter in itself" apart from all its attributes, will give the student of mediæval philosophy trouble enough and to spare, and we shall have to return to it in the next lecture,* but at present we may be content to regard it as an attempt to give a name to this "thingness" or substantiality, which common sense persists in attributing to "things," however hard metaphysical considerations may plead for its elimination. It is that in virtue of which we regard a thing as an entity or substance that *has* the qualities, not *is* them. But though "first matter" may be regarded as a sop thrown to common sense, it is, after all, a metaphysical sop, and common sense hardly knows how to digest it; for it cannot give any account, or form any conception of this naked matter with no qualities at all to clothe or endow it. Here metaphysic takes its revenge. But "matter," however common sense and metaphysics wrangle over it, remains to both the representative of the "thingness" of two or more like but distinct "things" which are not distinguishable from each other otherwise than by their dimensional and spatial independence and separation.

The conception of matter, then, is closely related to that of individuality within a species; and this, as we have seen, differentiates man from the angels. When we add the idea of an intelligence united to

* *Vide* p. 422.

a material organism in such a way as to be dependent upon it for the impressions and experiences upon which it must build up its own development, we are on the highway to understanding the mediæval belief that the whole material creation exists simply and solely for the sake of man. Matter and the material universe seemed to the mediæval psychologist to be involved in the realisation of the divine idea of a single species of intelligences, composed of individuals each one of whom gradually passes from the potentialities to the actualities of its nature.

And so the whole material creation exists only for the sake of man, and one may almost say exists at all only in relation to him. All his intellectual being has to be manufactured, so to speak, out of the data supplied to the mind by the material world through the senses. Man himself is a material as well as a spiritual being, since he must share the nature of the medium through which he is to receive his intellectual sustenance. Thus the material universe, in addition to supplying the actual tissues and organs of man's body, does him a threefold service. It sustains the body that it has formed; it feeds the mind and enables it to set its own processes to work and educate and develop itself; and it provides an instrument for self-expression in the practical and the fine arts. The central function in this enumeration, the education and development namely of the human mind in intercourse with the material universe, brings us to the subject of epistemology, that is to say, the theory of the nature and limits of our knowledge,

and the relation of our thinking to the objects of our thought.

Thomas's epistemology permeates all his system. Nowhere are the reactions between dogma and philosophy more close and penetrating than here, and nowhere is the hand of Aristotle held more strongly and firmly upon his disciple.

The express examination upon which we must now enter will throw much light both back upon the subjects we have already studied, and forward upon those we have still to study.

Our immediate task is to trace the steps by which the data of the senses are harvested and transmuted by the mind. The most important step of all is the first. For, although our sense organs give us direct cognisance of material things alone, and are themselves material, yet our actual sensations are experiences of consciousness and are therefore immaterial. Thus, as soon as we come to consciousness at all, we pass from the material to the immaterial realm, and yet we have not wholly passed away from the material, for Aquinas holds tenaciously to the common-sense idea that the thing we perceive is a material thing outside us, although the mean by which we perceive it is an immaterial counterpart of it in our own consciousness. This mental impression of the thing is called its *species sensibilis*, or its *phantasma*. It is convenient to translate this, when we do not retain either of the Latin words, by "image"; but we must be on our guard against the too exclusive reference to the impressions of the

sense of sight that the word suggests. A *species* or *phantasma* is any sense-impression whatever.

Now, when we deliberately determine to do so, we can turn our attention to the impression itself, just as we can, if we like, think about our thought; but, in the ordinary way, our impression being an impression of the thing, it is the thing which impresses us, and of which we take cognisance. We have cognisance, therefore, of material things, by impressions on the material senses, but, since it is not the things themselves that come into our minds, but an immaterial image of them, it is by something immaterial within itself that the mind perceives material things outside itself.

This is the most important of all the steps from the material to the immaterial, but so far the brute beasts must be allowed to have advanced, and there are many remaining steps to be taken. Of all the senses, that of touch is the most closely implicated with matter; for here the organ of sense itself is affected by the identical material states that affect the things it perceives. If a thing is hot, for example, and we touch it, the sensation of heat, being an experience, is indeed immaterial, but the organ of touch itself becomes hot, and so presents to someone else's touch the same material properties that characterise the hot thing of which it gives us cognisance. According to the ideas of Aquinas, this is a drawback. For it is a disadvantage to the sense organ to be subject to the same kind of physical change as that which affects its object. It ought, so to speak, to

be able to take impartial cognisance of the whole range of the qualities of which it has to judge. Thus the jaundiced eye is an imperfect one, and normally the crystalline lense is colourless so that it may see all colours impartially. In the same way the diseased ear that rings with murmurs is an imperfect ear. Thus, as we all know by experience, the flesh, that has a varying temperature of its own, is an imperfect organ for the perception of heat and cold. It would have been better had the organ of touch been free from the possibility of the very perturbations and changes which it is its business to note in other things. But this was impossible; for the sense organs are by hypothesis material, and we are now dealing with a pair of the qualities, heat and cold, that characterise all matter as such, and must therefore characterise all material organisms. Just so the carpenter would *prefer* to make his saw out of a material that would not rust, but he *must* make it out of a material that will cut, and he must put up with the inconvenience resulting from the fact that the best cutting material is subject to rust. So the organ of touch would be best free from the fundamental qualities of matter, which it has to assay, but it must be material, and therefore it must share the fundamental characteristics of matter. The Creator, then, tempered it as well as was possible within the limits of materiality; thus adapting the body to be the material organism through which the soul should draw its first nutriment.

Before going on to the other senses and showing

how they progressively advance towards immateriality, we must turn aside for a moment to consider the typical nature of the argument that the imperfect character of the organ of touch was inevitable. The analogy of the saw and the carpenter immediately suggests the remark that the only reason why the carpenter cannot help using a material that rusts, if he wants a material that will cut, is that he cannot make his material and must therefore do the best he can with the materials provided for him by the Creator. But the Creator himself is subject to no such control, and it is only the *impossibilia per se* that we may exclude from the options open to him. We have already * seen the perversions of the moral sense that may result from an abuse of this conception of the *impossibilia per se*. It is so easy to confuse a *necessitas ex hypothesi* with a *necessitas per se*, and, when we have once admitted the hypothesis, to regard the escape from any of its consequences as *impossibile per se*. We are at the moment in presence of an instructive instance of the intrusion of this insidious fallacy, to the action of which most of what offends our intelligence or outrages our moral sense, both in Aquinas and in many another theologian, great or small, is due.

To proceed with our psychology. From the sense of touch, which is the most closely connected with matter of all, we pass to the sense of taste, which comes next in the order of materiality. The tongue does not stand in the same relation to the savour

* *Vide* p. 250.

of which it takes cognisance as the organ of touch does to the "active and passive qualities" of which it is the percipient. But yet certain physical modifications or states (notably moisture) are required both in the tongue and in the thing it tastes in order that the perception may be possible. When we come to smell, we find that no material change is either produced or presupposed in the organ itself, but effluvia from its object must come into physical contact with it in order to provoke its action. The sense of hearing takes us yet a step further towards immateriality, for the sounding body neither itself comes into direct contact with the ear nor sends off laminæ or particles to strike it; nor even (according to mediæval physiology) do the vibrations of the sounding body that propagate themselves through the medium produce any physical change on the ear. And lastly, when we come to sight, the least material of the senses, we find that the act of vision involves no kind of physical change either in the organ of vision or its object.

We need not stay to consider what modern physiologists would say to this analysis; for our purpose is to understand the theories on the subject presupposed in the scholastic speculations, not to revise or criticise them. And we may therefore go on at once to consider how this progressive detaching of the perceptions of the mind from their material starting-point relates itself to the qualities of the perceptions themselves and their influence upon our moral and spiritual life. Aristotle points out that the "desire

to know," which he considers natural to man, is chiefly evidenced by our curiosity to see things; and the Schoolmen follow him in regarding sight as the sense that is most akin to the spiritual world. It is from sight that we borrow our terms when we speak of the supra-sensuous world, and call the supreme realisation the "vision" of God. And when we call the spirit world "invisible," we have said the last word in our representation of it as raised above even the most refined and ethereal of the senses. And again "imagination" or "imaging" of things is our typical word for the highest range of the immaterialising of impressions to which our minds have access. And, as we shall see, it is just this fact, that we can go no higher, and that all our loftiest thinking upon earth is based on material "images," which is the clog upon our souls, and prevents our being able to realise a purely spiritual existence, however firmly we may believe in it. Next to sight comes hearing, alike in immateriality and in spiritual significance. Indeed, to many minds it might seem as though "harmony" could dispute the ground with "vision" as the best expression of the ultimate realisation, were it not that we still find ourselves even here asking ourselves whether the "imagery" borrowed from this sense or that is the least inadequate.

Turning to the other extreme, we find that all the grosser temptations come to us through the senses of touch and taste, and that it is they which hold us most relentlessly in contact with the material side

of our nature. Yet we must never forget that, even on this lowest range, though the things we perceive are material, yet the perceptions and even the sensations are themselves experiences of our consciousness, and it is only these experiences that are "ours" at all, or that bring us into any conscious relation to things or excite our interest in them and affect our wills. The first and essential step, then, in the transition and transformation is taken as soon as we realise that, though the thing we feel and touch is material, the sense of warmth or smoothness is a state of consciousness; and we are already anticipating the higher range to which, under the nobler senses, these impressions on the consciousness may lead us when we call them *species*, *imagines* or *phantasmata*, borrowing our language in every instance from the sense of sight.

But even sight in and by itself is far from giving us direct access to the region of intelligence. The impression of blueness is in itself no more an intellectual conception than the impression of warmth. And this at once suggests a curious question which Aristotle tried to answer and which the Schoolmen asked after him, and answered somewhat more fully. Both colour and sound are objects of sense. How do we know the difference between them? And how can we bring them into any kind of relation with each other? Evidently by some sense, for it is sense only that can perceive them. But what sense? Not sight, for it can distinguish between blue and red or the presence and the absence of light, or different

degrees or shades of these things, but how can it discern between a colour of which it has cognisance and a sound of which it can have none? And for like reasons the organ of comparison of the sense data cannot be the hearing either. Yet the power of relating, comparing, and combining the data of the senses is the first step towards passing from mere sensation to intelligence. To meet this case Aristotle, followed by his Greek, Arabian, and scholastic commentators, imagined a generally diffused or "common" sense, that is to say, a sense which had some internal organ capable of receiving from the senses (not direct from their objects) the reports of all alike, and of distinguishing between them and comparing them. And this is the meaning of the term " common sense " in the Schoolmen.

We have already advanced far on the path from sensitiveness to intelligence; but we are still far from the goal. For intelligence is conceived to be a specifically human attribute, and we have not yet given a full account even of the endowments of the higher animals. Many animals have the faculty of memory, that is to say, the power of retaining impressions after the external object has ceased to act upon the senses, and this is obviously another great step towards detachment of the inner life from its material basis. And again, a sheep or a dog can co-ordinate his sense data into what Aquinas and others call *intentiones*, that is to say, concrete attractions or repulsions to or from this or that object. This constitutes the sagacity or instinct of animals, which

performs for them functions analogous to those of the intelligence in man, but which yet is not intelligence (*cf.* p. 121). In other words, animals have no power of abstraction and generalisation, and it is precisely in this faculty that the intellect of man is differentiated from the sagacity of the brute.

Upon this point, then, passing over all further details, we may now concentrate our attention. The recognition of the nature and the supreme significance of the process of abstraction is, surely, the greatest of Aristotle's many great achievements. We have no direct access to anything but concrete existences or beings, whereas knowledge consists in general or abstract truths. These are only to be arrived at by confining our attention to certain aspects of the events, thoughts, or things under consideration, and shutting out all the other elements of their complex being. And thus by discerning likeness amid diversity we can classify and relate things according to certain of their attributes or properties, and arrive at general conceptions, such as that of "humanity," "courage," "length," "conclusiveness," which exist nowhere apart and are only separated out by the abstracting power of the human mind. Yet they exist everywhere as parts or aspects, not separated in nature, but separable in the intelligence, of the complex individuals or cases to which we have direct access, and which are the only things that actually occur or exist objectively.

To repeat, once more, an illustration already employed: there is no such thing as length without

breadth, but every material thing has length. We make abstraction of length when we agree to consider the relations of different objects with respect to their length alone, that is to say, in virtue of extension in one direction only, and so we arrive at a geometry of the line, which deals with something that never existed anywhere apart from breadth and depth, but which exists everywhere in conjunction with them. By resolutely excluding everything that depends upon the consideration of a second dimension, we obtain, in a non-existing world of abstractions, a number of conclusions that hold good for those relations of existing things in the concrete world which depend upon the aspect of them which we have isolated for examination.

The whole of Aristotle's formal logic is an attempt to abstract, from all concrete embodiments of it, the precise quality that establishes "conclusiveness" in a connected process of inference. A great part of his *Ethics* is devoted to the discovery of the precise point of resemblance amid all diversities, that characterises the acts which we consider "courageous," or whatever it may be, or, on a still wider field, the common characteristic of all habits of preference and volition that we regard as desirable. And, in his psychology, he examines the analogies and resemblances of all the things we regard as living, and the characteristics that distinguish the main groups of living things from each other. But nowhere does he suppose either that "length," "courage," "conclusiveness," or "life" has any real objective

existence apart from long things, courageous acts or dispositions, and so forth, or that these things are unreal as intellectually separable aspects of things that are.

This side of the teaching of Aristotle was very fully appreciated and was much insisted upon and developed by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. The power of abstraction was what they understood by the obscure Greek phrase translated into Latin as the *intellectus agens*.* Whatever doubt there may be about its meaning in Aristotle and whatever part it played in the theories of his Arabic expounders, there is not the smallest ambiguity about its meaning to Thomas. It signified the power of abstraction, the most distinctive faculty of man. In the case of the axioms, which are at once the most fundamental and the most obvious of all abstract generalised propositions, this faculty is exercised spontaneously as soon as a concrete instance is offered to the mind. Thus as soon as anything whatever is recognised as the part of a whole, that is to say, as soon as the concepts "part" and "whole" are formed, the mind, in virtue of its *intellectus agens*, becomes possessed of the axiom that "The whole is greater than its part." It is by a severer and more conscious exercise of this same faculty of generalisation, or abstraction, that the mind advances to all its most characteristic activities. It is by the *intellectus agens*, then, that we perceive the point of resemblance between all "courageous" acts or all "beautiful" or "good" things, thoughts, people or

* *Vide* pp. 452 *sqq.*

dispositions, and are enabled not only to feel concrete attractions and repulsions but to understand in virtue of what quality they attract or repel and to pursue them *sub specie boni*. It is on the *intellectus agens*, then, that the whole difference between the concrete and instinctive attractions and repulsions of sagacious animals, and the self-directed actions of man, based upon reasonings and principles, ultimately rests.

Distinct, in the phraseology of the schools, from the *intellectus agens* is the *intellectus possibilis* in the narrower sense. This is a faculty nearer akin to the memory, which man shares with the sagacious animals. It is the faculty of storing, combining, and applying the data supplied by the *intellectus agens*, so that, whereas the *intellectus agens* is a definite faculty or instrument, the *intellectus possibilis* is first a potentiality and then a stored and furnished consciousness, capable of indefinite development and increase of content. Hence not unnaturally the word is often used in a wider sense to include the *intellectus agens*. Thus the specific characteristic of man is said to be that he is intelligent by way of the "possible" or developable intellect (*intellectus possibilis*), the special faculty by which this development is fed (*intellectus agens*) being taken as included in the fact itself of development.

Thus abstractions or generalised conceptions alone are the proper objects of the intelligence. The *phantasmata* furnished by the senses are but the material out of which the *intellectus agens* extracts "intelligible" conceptions. They are not intelligible

in themselves. The senses take cognisance of the concrete by means of *species sensibiles*, and the intellect takes cognisance of ideas or generalisations. These are the *species intelligibiles* which the *intellectus agens* extracts from the *phantasmata* or records of *species sensibiles* and which the *intellectus possibilis* (in the narrower sense) receives. Here, then, is the highest point of dematerialising to which the human powers, as such, can rise.

Now in this region of the *species intelligibiles*, when once acquired, the human mind, or "soul," is independent, in its processes, of all sense organs. We do not think with eyes or ears, still less with touch or taste. In the functions of thought, therefore, the mind has at last asserted its full spirituality. And yet, even at this highest point, it cannot make itself wholly independent of the sense impressions which are the foundation upon which all our thinking rests. However remote our speculations may be from matter, or however firmly we may convince ourselves that there are purely spiritual existences, we are nevertheless always haunted by the *phantasmata* of what the senses presented us with at the beginning, and must support ourselves upon some kind of sensuous image in order to form any definite conception at all. The mathematician knows perfectly well that a line, that is to say, abstracted length, cannot be visible, but he is obliged to make a picture of it in the early stages of his study, and he can never *represent* it to himself as other than a sensuous object, though he *thinks* of it, and knows that it exists, as an

immaterial abstraction. And even he is in better case than the metaphysician or theologian, for mathematical abstractions are properties or forms of material things, though material images misrepresent them. But when we come to our own minds, to the purely incorporeal beings which the reasoning alike of Aristotle and of the Schoolmen led them to believe in, and to God himself, we are dealing with things that do not relate to matter, and that material *phantasmata* do not so much misrepresent as fail to represent at all. It is something else, essentially unlike these spiritual existences, that all *phantasmata* represent; and yet we are still compelled to form some kind of attenuated or vague sensuous image of them in our minds, although we know that it is entirely untrue. At the very best we find our imagination *locating* immaterial beings however vaguely; though we know that only matter can have position. At this point our representative or image-making power entirely fails to support us, and becomes a perturbing and distracting encumbrance. Thus comes the paradox that those things which are altogether free from the unintelligible material and sense basis, by successive removes from which we measure intelligibility, for the very reason that they are purely "intelligible," are inaccessible to our sense-bound "intelligence." We are "blinded by excess of light." (2)

Aquinas holds it to be probable that when the connection of body and soul is severed by death we may be endowed with fresh powers, resembling

those of the angels, and may be able to have direct cognisance of those spiritual essences of which we can now have no adequate conception. In that case the human intelligence, which in its highest workings has already become independent of any material organ, would then become independent of the material *phantasmata* on which by its very nature it had hitherto leant. And it becomes a matter of interest to inquire what kind of idea of this pure intellectual perception Aquinas had formed. This will make a transition to the words that must here be added, in the light of the Aquinian psychology, to what has already been said (*cf.* p. 141) about the beatific vision.

We must base ourselves again upon the observation that Aquinas never loses touch with the common-sense conviction that although we can have no knowledge of things outside us except in so far as they make an impress upon our consciousness, so that it is always through and by something inside us that we know them, yet we know them as outside us, and it is always them themselves and not the image, impression, or *phantasma* of them within our consciousness, that we are thinking of, unless we are expressly engaged in psychological speculation.

And if we men know concrete material things outside us only by the medium of counterparts of them in our consciousness, the analogous truth must hold of the purely intellectual perceptions of the angels and the disembodied souls. They can only know the spiritual essences that are not themselves by means of counterparts of them in themselves.

But, as they have no sense organs, those counterparts cannot come into their consciousness through any material agency. Angels too, therefore, must be conceived as knowing both spiritual and material beings by *species intelligibiles* within their own consciousness, only these *species* are planted within them, as part of their own nature, by God in the beginning. There is no progressive process by which they accumulate them. And they too, by these *species* that are within them, know other beings as not within them. It is these other beings themselves, and not their counterparts, that they are primarily conscious of.

But even these angelic powers can give no knowledge of God except through his effects, and must therefore fall short of giving the blessed spirits, human or angelic, that direct vision of God in his essence which we have seen is the only true goal of human aspiration and the highest privilege of angelic realisation. The angel indeed knows his own being and nature in itself, and therefore can approach the knowledge of God through the highest of all his effects. But even this is not to know him in himself. If we could know our own souls we should be able to approach God through his highest effect on earth. But, unlike the angels, we do not know ourselves, or our souls, or the connection between our souls and our bodies. It is a mistake to call the mind or soul of man "self-conscious," for, if we had direct knowledge of our souls in themselves, how could the philosophers have disputed and speculated on the

nature of the soul throughout the centuries? And to what conclusions have these speculations brought us after all? What conception have they given us of the soul in itself? That soul in itself is a mere potentiality, and is as unintelligible to us as first matter. We are conscious of the *operations* of our souls, for these we can observe and classify just as we can the operations of anything else. But the soul itself, as a being, out of whose nature all these operations follow, so that we could predict them because we know their source and cause—what do we know of that? Here on earth, then, we do not so much as know our own souls. But let it be supposed that, hereafter, we shall really be self-conscious, and further, that by means of a new range of *species intelligibiles* we shall also know each other's souls and the angelic spirits directly and in themselves. How far will this knowledge of his highest effects take us towards the knowledge of God in himself?

Let us summarise the results we have already reached. We have seen that our intellectual vision springs from the "light" of the *intellectus agens*, shining upon the appearance (*species*) of the concept. But as in the physical world it may happen that the "appearance" in our sense organs, by the instrumentality of which we see, is wakened in us not directly by the object itself but by its reflection in a mirror, so in the intellectual world it may be not the object of speculation itself that "appears" to our minds by a *species* but only some effect of it. In the case of

spiritual beings, including our own "souls," and most of all in the case of God, it is always thus, so long as we are on earth. We can receive no direct *species* or "appearance" of these spiritual entities. It is only of their effects that we can have such.

Now we have seen that, after death, Aquinas anticipates that, as far as human and angelic spirits are concerned, our minds may be made capable of receiving a direct perception, no longer through their effects, of the beings themselves, by means of a *species* or "appearance" implanted by God in our consciousness, which is an adequate reproduction of the spirit itself that it enables us to perceive. There will then be the light of our own minds, no longer haunted by material *phantasmata*, under or in which light we see, and the divinely implanted *species*, by means of which we see each other's souls, and the angelic spirits, in their essence.

If we are to see God, there must be some equivalent of the light *under* which and the "appearance" or "species" *by* which we see these spirits.

But the value or efficacy of a *species* depends entirely upon its adequacy. And no manner of *species* of God, either in our glorified spirits or elsewhere, can conceivably be adequate. God himself, in his essential being, must be seen by us, without the medium or instrumentality of any "appearance," if we are to see him at all. The distinction, then, that rules elsewhere, between the thing seen and the *species* or "appearance" by the instrumentality or mediation of which it is seen, fails in this supreme

experience. Here there can be no medium by the instrumentality of which we see, for it must be God himself that we see, and we must see him directly, and not by a *species*. But, on the other hand, there must be something equivalent to the light, *under* which we see in every other case, to enable us to see at all. The light of the *intellectus agens* is clearly inadequate to enable us to see God. Only under his own light can we see him, for he alone can see himself. God, then, must form and mould our souls into the likeness or similitude of his own essential being in order that we, in our measure, may see him as he sees himself. And this deiformity, or similitude to God, is the "light of glory" in which we shall see God in his essence.*

In attempting to deal with this subject Aquinas adheres manfully to his intellectualism. He never seeks refuge in vaguely emotional suggestion, or ecstatic self-contradiction, or appeal to incommunicable and ineffable experience. He is honestly attempting, with whatever degree of success or failure, to give an account in terms of human reason of exactly what it is that he supposes will take place, just as if he were giving an account of some process in a laboratory, or in some secret place of nature, the outcome of which is known to be of extreme beauty, but with the conditions of the occurrence of which, not the experience of it, we are at the moment concerned. And from this point of view we gather

* The subject is more fully dealt with and relevant passages are cited in *Excursus* ii. at the end of this volume.

that the essential characteristics of his theory of mysticism are, first, that there can be no vision of God by a soul still in the earthly body; and secondly that, while it is impossible for even the glorified soul to have direct access to God, yet God has direct access to the soul. The creature cannot pierce into the presence-chamber of the Creator, but the Creator can, in his very essence, so enter and permeate the creature as to transform that creature into a similitude of himself. This similitude constitutes the "light of glory" in which the transfigured creature sees God, not in similitude, and not by the instrumentality of a *species intelligibilis*, but directly, and in his actual and essential being. "In his light shall we see the light."

I am not versed in mystic lore. But, so far as I know, this sharp distinction between the experiences of the soul on earth and the soul in heaven is characteristic of the Christian Peripatetics. Plotinus and the Arabians believe that the supreme vision is the realisable goal of a moral and mental discipline on earth. Augustine, Erigena, Bernard, Hugh and Richard of St Victor, and Bonaventura all seem to speak as though, in moments of supreme enlightenment, the soul on earth might anticipate the state which will be permanent in heaven. In Albert alone I have found the same interpretation of the text "in his light shall we see the light" as that which is so fully elaborated by Aquinas.

This is the most striking instance of the cleavage by which Aquinas habitually seeks to save and even

to exalt the mystic treasure of the Church, and at the same time to remain uncompromisingly true to his Aristotelianism, by drawing a sharp line between the natural and the supernatural corresponding to the realms of reason and revelation.

But in this connection, and especially in view of the attempt of S. Thomas to remain throughout on the intellectual plane, even in his exposition of the supreme vision, it is impossible not to recall the well-known testimony (on the authority of his friend and secretary) reported at the process of his canonisation. Some two years before his death, we learn, when his great work the *Summa Theologiae* was still incomplete, though well advanced in its third and concluding section, as Thomas was celebrating mass in Naples, he had some experience the nature of which is not further specified, which made him put his pen and inkhorn on the shelf and never write another word of his treatise. When he was reminded of the incomplete state of his great work and was urged to go on with it, he only replied, "I have seen that which makes all that I have written and taught look small to me." (3)

NOTES TO LECTURE V

(1) *To pages* 364–371.—If God is to reveal himself, there must be intelligences to receive the revelation:

"Ad hoc igitur quod similitudo Dei perfecte esset in rebus modis possibilibus, oportuit quod divina bonitas rebus per similitudinem communicaretur, non solum in essendo, sed etiam in cognoscendo. Cognoscere autem divinam bonitatem solus intellectus potest. Oportuit igitur esse creaturas intellectuales." —*Contra Gentiles*, lib. ii. cap. 46 (vol. v. 101b).

"Ergo non esset perfecta Dei similitudo in universo, si esset unus tantum gradus omnium entium. . . .

"In Deo autem est bonitas et diffusio bonitatis in alia. Perfectius igitur accedit res creata ad Dei similitudinem, si non solum bona est, sed etiam ad bonitatem aliorum agere potest, quam si solum in se bona esset. . . . Non autem posset creatura ad bonitatem alius creaturae agere, nisi esset in rebus creatis pluralitas et inaequalitas."—*Ib.*, cap. 45 (*ib.*, 100a).

Man has his own spiritual place (though the lowest) in the scheme of things, independently of the fall of the angels; and all the material universe exists for his sake.

In the discussion, *Utrum omnia sint facta propter hominem*, it is urged:

"Non est sapientis artificis facere multa magna instrumenta propter aliquod parvum. Sed humana natura est quasi quoddam minimum in universo. Ergo videtur ridiculum quod totum universum propter hominem factum sit."

The answer is that the material universe is *not* of higher significance than man; and the angels (who are) were not made for his sake, in the sense of the objection; though good comes to him from them:

"Omnis creatura corporalis, quantumque sit magna quantitate, est tamen inferior homine ratione intellectus. Unde non est inconveniens, si omnis creatura talis etiam in assimilationem ejus tendit, inquantum per hoc summae bonitati assimilatur. Sed angeli sunt nobiliores homine secundum conditionem naturae; unde non sunt propter hominem praedicto modo, sed solum sicut ex quibus provenit homini utilitas; sicut si diceretur regem esse constitutum propter aliquem rusticum, cui provenit utilitas pacis propter leges regis."—2 *Dist.*, i. q. 2: a. 3. ob. 3. and ad 3^{m} (vol. vi. 398a, 399a).

And again it is urged elsewhere in an *objectum*:

"Praeterea, homo fuit factus ad reparandam ruinam angelicam, ut sancti dicunt. Ergo, *et cet.*"

But the answer is:

"Homo non est simpliciter factus propter reparationem ruinae angelicae; sed propter fruitionem Dei et perfectionem universi, etiam si nunquam fuisset ruina angelica."—*Quaestio disputata de malo*, q. 16: a. 4. ob. 16. and ad 16^{m} (vol. viii. 400a, 402b).

This independent significance of man, though on a

lower plane than that of the angels, is higher than that of the material creation.

On the one hand, then:

"Hoc ipsum quod anima quodammodo indiget corpore ad suam operationem, ostendit quod anima tenet inferiorem gradum intellectualitatis quam angelus, qui corpori non unitur."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 75: a. 7. ad 2^{m} (Leon., v. 207b).

On the other hand:

"Ponimus enim quod motus caeli est propter implendum numerum electorum. Anima namque rationalis quolibet corpore nobilior est, et ipso caelo. Unde nullum est inconveniens, si ponatur finis motus caeli multiplicatio rationalium animarum: non autem in infinitum, quia hoc per motum caeli provenire non posset; et sic moverentur ad aliquid quod consequi non potest; unde relinquitur quod determinata multitudo animarum rationalium sit finis motus caeli. Unde ea habita motus caeli cessabit."*—*De pot.*, a. 5. c. (vol. viii. 111a).

* Here in truth Aquinas has a great advantage over Aristotle. It is never clear in the Greek philosopher's writings how the movement of the heavens can satisfy or even express their longing towards the immaterial "principle." Aristotle is content to know that motion in intelligent beings signifies desire, and that in the case of the heavens that desire must be intellectual. To Aquinas the movement of the heavens serves mankind and is effected by angelic spirits in obedient love of God. It is therefore an expression on their part of rapturous love, but will cease when its goal has been reached. Thomas quite sees the inadequacy of Aristotle's conception:

"Assimilari Deo secundum hoc quod acquirat actu successive diversos situs ad quos prius erat in potentia, non potest esse finis motus caeli; tum quia hoc infinitum est; . . . tum quia sicut ex

And:

"Si igitur motio ipsius caeli ordinatur ad generationem, generatio autem tota ordinatur ad hominem sicut in ultimum finem hujus generationis, manifestum est quod finis motionis caeli ordinatur ad hominem sicut in ultimum finem in genere generabilium et mobilium."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. cap. 22 (vol. v. 174b).

So the natural trend of things is for the material to serve the spiritual world:

"Sic autem videmus res cursu naturae currere quod substantia intellectualis omnibus aliis utitur propter se: vel ad intellectus perfectionem, quia in eis veritatem speculatur; vel ad suae virtutis executionem et scientiae explicationem, ad modum quo artifex explicat artis suae conceptionem in materia corporali; vel etiam ad corporis sustentationem quod est unitum animae intellectuali, sicut in hominibus patet. Manifestum est igitur quod propter substantias intellectuales omnia divinitus providentur."—*Ib.*, cap. 112 (*ib.*, 253a).

Thus the human soul is the horizon, or *confinium*, which both unites and parts the worlds of matter and of spirit:

"Homo enim, cum sit constitutus ex spirituali et corporali natura, quasi quoddam confinium tenens

una parte per motum acceditur ad divinam similitudinem, per hoc quod situs qui erant in potentia, fiunt actu; ita ab alia parte receditur a divina similitudine, per hoc quod situs qui erant in actu, fiunt in potentia."—*De pot.*, ubi supra, ad 4^{m} (vol. viii. 111b).

Dante (if it be Dante) does not seem to have felt this difficulty. —*Epistola*, x. (26) 474–482.

utriusque naturae, ad totam creaturam pertinere videtur."—*Ib.*, lib. iv. cap. 55 (*ib.*, 351a).

"Et inde est quod anima intellectualis dicitur esse quasi quidam horizon et confinium corporeorum et incorporeorum inquantum est substantia incorporea, corporis tamen forma."—*Ib.*, lib. ii. cap. 68 (vol. v. 119b). *Cf.* p. 433.

On the subject of the development of infants, had man not fallen, Aquinas has some quaint and rather pleasing remarks. Premising that we have no revealed knowledge on the subject, and can therefore only argue from human probabilities, he concludes in the first place that girls would have been born as well as boys:

"Sicut autem ad perfectionem universi pertinent diversi gradus rerum, ita enim diversitas sexus est ad perfectionem humanae naturae."

Aquinas was no friend of the exaggerated depreciation of the relations of sex which runs like an evil trail over so much ecclesiastical writing. In answer to the suggestion that since Adam and Eve would never have died had they not fallen, they could have peopled the world with men up to the foreordained number, and there would have been no need for any more of the female sex, he answers:

"Proles fuisset genita vivens vita animali, ad quam sicut pertinet alimento uti, sic etiam generare. Unde conveniebat quod omnes generarent, et non solum primi parentes. Ad quod consequens videtur quod tot fuissent generatae feminae, quot et mares."

In the fallen state, however, Aquinas held the general ecclesiastical view that the state of virginity was higher than that of matrimony. *Cf.* p. 488.

As to powers of the body we read:

"Manifestum est autem naturale hoc esse, utpote et principiis humanae naturae competens, quod pueri mox nati non habeant sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra. Quia homo naturaliter habet cerebrum maius in quantitate, secundum proportionem sui corporis, quam cetera animalia. Unde naturale est quod, propter maximam humiditatem cerebri in pueris, nervi, qui sunt instrumenta motus, non sunt idonei ad movendum membra. . . .

"Dicendum est ergo quod pueri mox nati non habuissent sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra ad quoslibet actus: sed ad actus pueritiae convenientes, puta ad sugendum ubera, et ad alia huiusmodi."

As to intellectual development we have a picture that must make both teachers and taught long for a return to Eden:

"Est autem naturale homini ut scientiam per sensus acquirat, . . . et ideo anima unitur corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem; quod non esset, si statim a principio scientiam haberet non acquisitam per sensitivas virtutes. Et ideo dicendum est quod pueri in statu innocentiae non nascerentur perfecti in scientia; sed in processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent, inveniendo vel addiscendo."

As for Adam:

"Esse perfectum in scientia fuit individuale

accidens primi parentis, inquantum scilicet ipse instituebatur ut pater et instructor totius humani generis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, non generabat filios similes sibi; sed solum quantum ad accidentia naturalia vel gratuita totius naturae."

Apparently, then, Milton was a good Schoolman in making Adam the tutor of Eve.

Sum. Theol., i^{a}. q. 99: a. 2. c. and ad 3^{m}, a. 1. c. q. 101: a. 1. c. and ad 1 (Leon., v. 441a, 442b, 440, 446).

On individuality within the same species:

" . . . materiae quae est individuationis principium."—*Com.* in lib. i. *Posteriorum analyticorum*, Lect. 38 (vol. xviii. 161b).

" Videtur enim quod omnis forma quae est una secundum speciem et multiplicatur secundum numerum, individuetur per materiam; quae enim sunt unum specie et multa secundum numerum, conveniunt in forma et distinguuntur secundum materiam."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. ii. cap. 75 (vol. v. 127b).

" Ipsae enim essentiae vel quidditates generum vel specierum individuantur secundum materiam signatam huius vel illius individui."—*Ib.*, cap. 21 (*ib.*, 18a). *Cf. infra*, pp. 465 *sqq.*

" First matter " and the " thingness " or " substantiality " of things.

It was not that *materia prima* had any " thingness " in itself, except potentially; but when it received a *forma* (*vide infra*, pp. 418 *sqq.*) it became the ultimate

subjectum underlying all the attributes and characteristics included in the *forma* and, together with the *forma*, making the thing:

"Materia enim dicitur substantia, non quasi ens aliquid actu existens in se considerata, sed quasi in potentia ut sit aliquid actu."—*Com.* in librum octavum *Metaphysicorum*, Lect. 1 (vol. xx. 514a).

Aristotle is not affected by this problem, for he starts from the concrete and recognises the analysis into matter and form as a mental act. The world of things, and of the elemental substances out of which they are formed and into which they are resolved, he regards as objective and eternal; and he does not attempt to go behind it. The elements are the simplest bodies we know, and since they can be transmuted into each other, and under certain conditions are so transmuted, it follows that by our faculty of abstraction we can centre our thoughts upon the differentiating qualities which distinguish them from each other, or upon the common property of mutual transmutability in which they are all alike. But we have no experience and can have no knowledge either of the one or the other, except as combined with each other in the thing. If we call the permanent and common aspect of them "matter," and their changing and characteristic aspects "form," then both matter and form are selected aspects, or abstractions, mentally distilled out of things, but neither of them is itself a thing. We are not called upon to construct things out of pre-existing abstractions that are not things, for the

things must be there already before we can make the abstractions.*

Gregory of Nyssa, on the other hand, accepting the doctrine of creation, is concerned with the allegation that if God is purely spiritual it is inconceivable that he should create matter, and also with difficulties as to the resurrection of the body. Scripture, he says, is good enough for him, but lest he should seem to have nothing at all to say to these objectors, he will take some notice of their arguments. Thereupon he boldly questions the necessity of any such conception as that of objectively existing matter at all, and seems, completely, to anticipate Berkeley's idealism:

Εἰ τοίνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ χρῶμα, νοητὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία,

* We have been dealing only with the elements, but in other cases, of which manufactured articles are the most convenient example, the *materia* may be a thing or substance though the form can never, in any case, be such. Thus Parian marble may be the material of a statue of Apollo or of a casket: and we may regard either of these objects as so much marble, which might have been made into something else, or as a statue or casket, which might have been made of some other material. Here both form and matter are selected aspects of the thing, but the form is an abstraction and the matter a substance. The mind unconsciously carries over this analogy into the case of the elements, and when we are told that we may call the mutual transmutability of the elements their material or matter we involuntarily think of it as an independent substance. It may help us to get rid of this obsession if we remember Aristotle's declaration that matter may be either sensible or conceptual, so that any material or conception that can be differentiated may be regarded as the matter out of which its various products or divisions are differentiated. Thus a genus, though a pure abstraction, that has no independent objective existence, is nevertheless the matter out of which its several species (in which alone, if at all, it exists) are differentiated.—*Met.*, H 6, I 2, Z 12, Δ 24 (1045a, 34; 1053b, 21, 22; 1038a, 4–8; 1023b, 1, 2).

καὶ ἡ ποσότης, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἰδιωμάτων, ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων εἰ ὑφαιρεθείη τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, πᾶς ὁ τοῦ σώματος συνδιαλύεται λόγος· ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη, ὧν τὴν ἀπουσίαν τῆς τοῦ σώματος λύσεως αἰτίαν εὕρομεν, τούτων τὴν συνδρομὴν ἀποτίκτειν τὴν ὑλικὴν φύσιν ὑπολαμβάνειν. ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα, ᾧ τὸ χρῶμα, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία καὶ ἡ διάστασις, καὶ τὸ βάρος, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἰδιωμάτων οὐ πρόσεστι, ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων σῶμά οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὸ σῶμα, κατὰ τὸ ἰδιάζον εὑρίσκεται· οὕτω κατὰ τὸ ἀντίστροφον, ὅπου δ' ἂν συνδράμῃ τὰ εἰρημένα, τὴν σωματικὴν ὑπόστασιν ἀπεργάζεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ νοητὴ τῶν ἰδιωμάτων τούτων ἡ κατανόησις, νοητὸν δὲ τῇ φύσει τὸ θεῖον· οὐδὲν ἀπεικὸς, ἐκ τῆς ἀσωμάτου φύσεως τὰς νοερὰς ταύτας ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων γένεσιν ὑποστῆναι, τῆς μὲν νοητῆς φύσεως τὰς νοητὰς ὑφιστώσης δυνάμεις, τῆς δὲ τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα συνδρομῆς τὴν ὑλώδη φύσιν παραγούσης εἰς γένεσιν.—Gregorius Nyssæus, *De opificio hominis*, cap. 24 (vol. i. 107 D *sq.*).

"If, then, it be true that colour is a mental impression, and so with resistance and quantity and all other such attributes, and that if they were all subtracted from the subject the whole conception of "body" would vanish, it seems reasonable to suppose that material nature is constituted by the confluence of these very attributes the removal of which effects its dissolution. For just as that is not body which presents neither colour, shape, resistance, extension, weight, nor other attributes (and none of these itself is body, but all turn out to be something other than body, when taken separately), so conversely wherever the aforesaid properties converge, the corporeal subject is instituted. But surely if the perception of these

attributes is mental, and the Deity, in his very nature, is apprehensible only by the mind, it is not unreasonable to suppose that these mental constituents, derived from the Immaterial, build up bodies; since the Being whom we conceive in our mind, institutes in us these conceptual faculties, and their confluence constitutes the genesis of material nature." *

Thus Gregory, like Berkeley, believes that our

* In this translation I have followed in the main the Latin version of Zinus in the Paris edition. Erigena doubtless had this passage in view when he said:

"Omnes igitur categoriae incorporales sunt per se intellectae. Earum tamen quaedem inter se mirabili quodam coitu, ut ait Gregorius, materiem visibilem conficiunt. Quaedam vero in nullo apparent, semperque incorporales fiunt. Nam οὐσία, et relatio, locus, tempus, agere, pati, nullo sensu corporeo attinguntur. Quantitas vero, qualitasque, situs et habitus, dum inter se coeuntes materiem, ut praediximus, jungunt, corporeo sensu percipi solent."

But his conception is complicated by his stubborn adherence to the philosophy of ideas. What I have called the "thingness" or "substantiality" of things is due, in his conception, to their remote participation in the *generalissima essentia*, or supreme noëtic "thingness." Fire, for instance, in the sense of the essential fire, *qui simplex et invisibilis, et per se ipsum incomprehensibilis, omnia visibilia penetrat atque movet,* though contrasted with the fire we know, which is *visibilis et corporalis, tangibilisque, et materialiter nutritus*, is yet itself but one of four noëtic elements of which it can be said:

"Simplicissima etiam et purissima et sensum corporeum fugientia quatuor hujus mundi elementa ad unam simplicem et individuam causam solique intellectui perfectissimorum sapientum cognitam referruntur, hoc est, ad generalissimam, et in se ipsam semper manentem substantiarum omnium ad visibiles effectus procedentium essentiam."

And in like manner the primordial and proper attributes of the several elements are referred to the

"Generalissimam . . . omnium qualitatum qualitatem, ex qua mirabili naturae opere ad efficienda haec corpora corruptibilia

senses tell us of something external to ourselves; but both philosophers alike regard that something as a direct utterance, so to speak, of God. They recognise no material medium between spirit and spirit. The existence of such a medium is to them an unnecessary and illusory hypothesis. Not so Aquinas. (*Cf.* pp. 422 *sq.*) To him material things have a materially objective existence. They are amongst the *alia*, the things "other than himself," that God created out of nothing. Our sense impressions rise immediately from the impact of these material things upon our material bodies, and only mediately and ultimately from the act of God. And it is to the material thing and not to themselves that these sense impressions direct us:

"Id enim quod intelligitur non est in intellectu secundum se, sed secundum suam similitudinem; *lapis enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis ut dicitur* in iii. *de Anima.* Et tamen lapis est id quod intelligitur, non autem species lapidis, nisi per reflexionem intellectus supra seipsum: alioquin scientiae non essent de rebus, sed de speciebus intelligibilibus."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 76: a. 2. ad 4^{m} (Leon., v. 217b).

But angels and disembodied souls have no material

et solutioni obnoxia procedunt, et in qua ineffabili universalis naturae pacifica concordia sibi invicem, remota omni contrarietate, consentiunt."

It is very noteworthy that in this scheme the οὐσία of the thing is not even one of the elements in its composition that go to making up the illusion of its material existence."—*De divisione naturae*, lib. i. cap. 34, lib. ii. cap. 31 (478 D *sq.*, 604 C, 606 C, D).

existence, and the *species* that tell them of things external to themselves cannot come either from or through matter. In purely spiritual existences, therefore, the *species* are implanted by the direct act of God; but here too the consciousness goes straight out to its external object, and does not rest on the internal *species*. The angel is directly conscious of other angels by means of the implanted *species*.

On the other hand, the *species intelligibiles* which the human mind abstracts or distils out of the *species sensibiles* (or rather their *phantasmata* preserved by the senses) are manufactured by the mind itself, and are recognised by it as mental facts to which no external or objective reality corresponds. They do not therefore direct the mind primarily to anything outside itself; and in this they differ alike from the *species sensibiles* in the human and the *species intelligibiles* in the angelic consciousness; for both of these latter are *media quibus* (means, or instruments, "by which") of cognition; whereas the abstractions, or general conceptions, of which we are now speaking, are themselves the direct objects of thought, out of which the mind must build up its conclusions and convictions; just as the sensations of colour, sound, taste, and so forth are the elements out of which the "common sense" constructs its representation of concrete external objects. It is true that in such a general conception as that of a stone, or in a defined concept such as that of a "rational animal," or even in grasping an axiom, such as that the whole is greater than its part, the mind is vaguely haunted by "images"

derived from the *phantasmata* or concrete perceptions out of which the "generals" have been extracted. But the mind recognises this as a congenital weakness, and knows very well that this vague image is not what it is really thinking about, but something that at once supports the weakness and perturbs the clarity of its processes. We know that there is nothing anywhere in nature that corresponds to the general idea of "a fish" in the conceiving mind, without being any particular fish, or of any particular kind. (*Cf.* pp. 38, 86.)

There are, however, actual beings that *answer to the definitions* of "fish" or "man," though none that coincide with them. But such a conception as that of a "genus" or a "species," in the abstract (not any particular genus or species) cannot even find any actual being in nature to comply with its definition:

"Formae universales non sunt subsistentes in rerum natura."—3 *Dist.*, xxiv. q. 1: a. 1. sol. 1. ad 4^{m} (vol. vii. 261a).

"Anima autem intellectiva non est in potentia ad similitudines rerum quae sunt in phantasmatibus, per modum illum quo sunt ibi, sed secundum quod illae similitudines elevantur ad aliquid altius, ut scilicet sint abstractae a conditionibus individuantibus materialibus, ex quo fiunt intelligibiles actu; et ideo actus intellectus agentis in phantasmata praecedit receptionem intellectus possibilis, ac sic principalitas actionis non attribuitur phantasmatibus sed intellectui agenti."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. ii. cap. 77 (vol. v. 132b).

On the still higher degree of immateriality:

"Sunt autem quaedam rationes quibus in re intellecta nihil respondet; sed ea quorum sunt hujusmodi rationes, intellectus non attribuit rebus prout in seipsis sunt, sed solum sicut prout intellectae sunt; sicut patet in ratione generis et speciei, et aliarum intentionum intellectualium: nam nihil est in rebus quae sunt extra animam, cujus similitudo sit ratio generis vel speciei. Nec tamen intellectus est falsus: quia ea quorum sunt istae rationes, scilicet genus et species, non attribuit rebus secundum quod sunt extra animam, sed solum secundum quod sunt in intellectu. Ex hoc enim quod intellectus in seipsum reflectitur, sicut intelligit res existentes extra animam, ita intelligit eas esse intellectas; et sic sicut est quaedam conceptio intellectus vel ratio, cui respondet res ipsa quae est extra animam; ita est quaedam conceptio vel ratio, cui respondet res intellecta secundum quod hujusmodi; sicut rationi hominis vel conceptioni hominis respondet res extra animam; rationi vero vel conceptioni generis aut speciei, respondet solum res intellecta."—*Quaest. de pot.*, q. 7: a. 6. c. (vol. viii. 164a).

These passages will form an introduction and transition to the following section of the text (pp. 371 *sqq.*) on the progressive dematerialising by the mind of the impressions it receives from the material world.

(2) *To pages* 371–384.—The main thread of the exposition contained in these pages may be traced

in the *Quaestio disputata de anima*, a. 13 (vol. viii. 505 *sq.*), but the passage, although of extreme importance, is too long to quote. The text of the Lecture is a faithful paraphrase of it.

On the *phantasmata* and "vision" consult *Excursus* ii. at the end of this volume. On the *intellectus agens, et cet., vide* note (1) to Lecture vi. on pp. 449 *sqq.*

The illustration of the saw (p. 373):

"Et per istum modum ratio dispositionis humani corporis est assignanda quantum ad singula quae sunt homini propria; sed tamen consideranda est, quod in his quae sunt ex materia, sunt quaedam dispositiones in ipsa materia, propter quas talis materia eligitur ad hanc formam; et sunt aliquae quae consequuntur ex necessitate materiae, et non ex electione agentis; sicut ad faciendam serram artifex eligit duritiem in ferro, ut sit serra utilis ad secundum; sed quod acies serrae hebetari possit et fieri rubiginosa, hoc accidit ex necessitate materiae. Magis enim artifex eligeret materiam ad quam hoc non consequeretur, si posset inveniri; sed quia inveniri non potest, propter hujusmodi defectus consequentes non praetermittit ex hujusmodi materia convenienti facere opus. Sic igitur et in corpore humano contingit; quod enim taliter sit immixtum et secundum partes dispositum, ut sit convenientissimum ad operationes sensitivas, est electum in hac materia a factore hominis; sed quod hoc corpus sit corruptibile, fatigabile, et hujusmodi defectus habeat, consequitur ex necessitate

materiae. . . . Nec potest obviari per hoc quod Deus potuit aliter facere: quia in institutione naturae non quaeritur quid Deus facere potuit, sed quid rerum natura patitur ut fiat."—*Quaestio disputata de anima*, a. 8. (vol. viii. 489a).

I have met somewhere in Augustine (but I cannot recover the passage) the beautiful and profound remark that the figures in a text-book of geometry stand in the same relation to geometrical concepts and demonstrations as that in which a boat stands to an island, for the figures can take you *to* the region of mathematical science, but they cannot take you *into* it.

This illustrates the different relation of *phantasmata* to mathematical abstractions and to spiritual substances (*cf.* pp. 383 *sq.*); for when we come to the consideration of purely spiritual beings, the *phantasmata* cannot even bring us *to* the region we would explore, but rather tend to pull us back from it.

(3) *To page* 391.—The story is told, with some variants, in William of Tocco's life of Thomas, and in the record of the proceedings at his canonisation.

Raynaldus, his *socius*, we are told, had with difficulty aroused Thomas from a kind of trance or stupor:

"Qui suspirans dixit: Raynalde fili, tibi in secreto revelo, prohibens ne in vita mea alicui audeas revelare. Venit finis scripturæ meæ, quia talia sunt mihi revelata, quod ea, quæ scripsi et docui,

modica mihi videntur, et ex hoc spero in Deo meo, quod sicut doctrinæ, sic cito finis erit et vitæ."—(William of Tocco.)

"Post ipsam Missam non scripsit: neque dictavit aliquid, imo suspendit organa scriptionis. . . . Et post multas interrogationes omni importunitate factas per ipsum Fr. Raynaldum . . . subjunxit illi: Omnia quæ scripsi, videntur mihi paleæ respectu eorum, quæ vidi et revelata sunt mihi." (Testimony of Bartholomew of Capua, Protonotary of the Kingdom of Sicily. Given September 18, 1319.) Vide *Acta Sanctorum:* Martii, tom. i. pp. 672b, D, E, 711a, C, D.

A fuller treatment of Thomas's teaching on the *Visio Dei* will be found in *Excursus* ii.

LECTURE VI

THE DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL

The hardest of all the purely philosophical reconciliations that Aquinas had to effect was that between the Aristotelian and the Platonic doctrines of the soul. I have called it purely philosophical, because Aquinas does not appeal, or think it necessary to appeal, to Scripture or to the authority of the Church in dealing with it. He regarded the belief in the immortality of the soul, and the possibility of its separate existence, independently of the body, as a part of the general stock of truth accessible to the human intelligence in virtue of its own powers, and already firmly grasped by the Pagan philosophers. Nevertheless, the form in which this belief was held by the Platonists was deeply rooted in the Christian consciousness, and it was extremely difficult to find room within it for the Aristotelian conception of the organic relation between the body and soul of man. It is at least doubtful whether Aristotle himself really held the clear view as to the immortality of the soul which Aquinas attributes to him, and it is very certain that his greatest Arabian interpreter, Averrhoes,

neither believed the doctrine himself nor found it in Aristotle. So that Aquinas had to defend the teaching of Aristotle against the deep-rooted and far from ill-founded suspicions of the theologians at the very time at which he was attempting to substitute it for the far simpler and more primitive conceptions of Plato, which were perfectly suited to the requirements of the Church and were firmly established in her traditions.

He could, however, find one fulcrum, on which to rest his lever—I mean the tenacity with which the Church had always clung to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. This primitive and material belief, which put the scientific conscience, even in the times of Aquinas, to such extraordinary shifts, has, by a curious irony, served to check to some extent one of the worst aberrations of Christian ethics, by insisting on the ultimate holiness of the very body that the ascetic was taught to hate and persecute; and it was also a great support to the scientific Aristotelian view of man as an organic whole.

So Aquinas found to his hand an unshaken conviction that, however independent of the body the soul might be, the union of the two was essential to the complete life of man, who just in this respect differed from the angels. The intermediate state of the disembodied soul was universally regarded as merely provisional and incomplete, and Aquinas would shock no prejudices when he declared that a disembodied soul has not a "complete nature," and

is not a "man." When we invoke "Holy Peter," he allows that we are using a figure of speech, for S. Peter was and will be body and soul in one being, and as such he does not now exist. Our invocation ought in strictness to be "O soul of holy Peter." So, too, when Moses and Elijah are said to have appeared on the Mount of Transfiguration, Elijah, we may suppose, was really there, because he had never died and could come from the earthly paradise or Garden of Eden to the mountain; but "Moses" could not come from anywhere, for he was not anywhere. His soul could manifest itself through a phantasmic form, but he could not himself be there.

Aquinas, then, had the support of tradition in regarding the body as an essential part of human nature, but this falls very far short of the organic conception of the relation of body and soul to each other which is so marked a feature of the philosophy of Aristotle. Aristotle tells us that, if we thought of a saw as alive, its material would be its body, and its "cuttingness" would be its soul; and elsewhere he speaks with quiet amusement of the conception of the soul as poured into the body, like a liquid into a vessel, "as if any other body would have done just as well." If we expand the analogy of the saw, in the light of this remark, we may put it thus:—It would be idle to say that the cuttingness is the essential saw, and that any other material would do for it to reside in as well as steel. For, though it is true that the power of cutting in a particular way is what gives its significance to the

saw, yet the saw itself is neither the steel nor the shape nor the cuttingness, but a suitable material, suitably shaped for a special kind of cutting. And so it is with the body and the life, or "soul," of man. "Man" is the living organism as a living whole. No one would have appreciated better than Aristotle the clever modern gibe against the creed that regards man as a "mechanical union of a corpse and a ghost." (1)

Now to find a place for this organic conception of the being of man, without relinquishing any of the fundamental ideas of the Christian tradition, presented a problem closely analogous to that which faced the latter half of the nineteenth century, when orthodoxy encountered the Darwinian theory of evolution. Indeed, we might perhaps go further and say that the problem is the same; for, as has often been pointed out, the Darwinian direction of thought to the question, "At what period of the evolution of the human race did 'man' become immortal?" did but emphasise the question already there, "At what period of embryonic development does 'a man' become immortal?"

Aquinas, as we have seen, had no kind of doubt or difficulty as to the fact of immortality, nor did he anticipate any on the side of his readers. He relied partly on metaphysical arguments from the "simplicity" of the composition of the soul, which precluded the very conception of dissolution, but chiefly upon the universal demand of humanity for a continued life, the promise of which seemed to

be involved in human nature. His difficulty was not in allaying any doubts as to the fact, but in squaring with it the Aristotelian philosophy (which had captured his intelligence, and which he could not and would not relinquish) and in averting from Aristotle the opprobrium of being opposed to it. (2)

It is of very special interest to note how he deals with this problem and the yet deeper problem that underlies it, and to see how closely parallel are the lines on which he works to those on which modern theologians have sought a solution of the analogous problem of a later age.

The difficulty of the exposition of this part of our subject is great, although it is caused not so much by the ideas that we have to deal with themselves as by the misleading associations suggested by the only words which we can employ. For what Aquinas has to explain is that the human soul is truly a "form," but, at the same time (unlike any other form associated with matter), is an independent "something," which is capable of existing by itself and without the body. Now, to understand either the problem or the attempted solution, we must enlarge our idea of the connotation of "soul"; we must establish ourselves in easy command of the significance of the Aristotelian term "form" — a feat which, for some reason not quite clear to me, seems to present extraordinary difficulty to the average student—and finally, we must try to understand why Aristotle, and Aquinas after him, said that the soul was the "form of man."

We will begin with the term "soul." It is the translation of the Greek ψυχή or Latin *anima*, but these words cannot be translated intelligibly into English at all, because there is no word in English that even roughly coincides with them, and the student has, by a sustained effort of the intelligence and the imagination, to think of something else for which he has no name whenever he reads the word "soul." *Anima* means the collectivity of the vital functions of any live thing, whether you think that they constitute a separable being or not. And it in no way prejudices this momentous question, or suggests one answer to it rather than the other.

Thus a plant is alive and therefore has an *anima* or aliveness, because it has vital functions; but to call these functions the plant's *anima* does not even suggest that the plant has in it a vital spirit that might be conceived as wandering away from it and returning to it. Nor is speaking of an *anima vegetabilis* to be taken as metaphorical or analogical or in any way stretching the meaning of the word *anima*. It does not involve any theory of what the anthropologists—as if for the express purpose of making our present task harder—have agreed to call "animism." If an Englishman of to-day were to speak of the "soul" of a plant, it would inevitably suggest some such belief or idea. But to speak in Latin of a vegetable *anima* suggests nothing of the sort, though neither does it exclude it. It is a purely non-committing word. It asserts that the plant is alive and nothing else. As a matter

of fact, neither Aristotle nor Aquinas would dream of thinking that the life or *anima* of the plant had a separate existence, or could survive the death of the plant itself. As long as it is alive, it has life, and when it dies, its life does not go somewhere else, but ceases to be.

Now, according to Aquinas and his master Albertus, no being has two "souls." The precise meaning and importance of this will be seen when we pass to the general doctrine of forms, of which it is a part; but meanwhile we may note that all the vital functions of a living being are included in its *anima*, and that the singular number is always used in speaking of a single being. All its vital functions are one single "life." An animal's "soul," then, includes a wider range of functionings than a plant's "soul" does, for the plant's life consists only in powers of assimilation and reproduction, whereas the animal's includes wider powers of motion and also sensitiveness, and some degree of consciousness and self-direction with a view to pleasant or unpleasant consequences, as well as in obedience to directer impulse. But its vitality also includes the vegetable soul's powers of nutrition and reproduction. The animal's digestive functions and the power of the mother to develop the fœtus in her womb are just as much due to the one "soul" or "vitality," as are the higher powers, not included in vegetable vitality. And here again it is in no way suggested, by the use of the word *anima*, that "animals have souls" in the meaning that the words

would carry if heard on modern lips. Of course they have "souls," if by "soul" we mean *anima*. To say so is merely to say that they are alive. But the statement that there are animal souls no more excludes than it suggests the theory that the souls of animals are separable or immortal, though here, as before, as a matter of fact Aquinas has no such theory.

When we come to man, the term *anima* is still as non-committing as before. It means the whole collectivity of the vital functions of man. These are indefinitely wider and higher than the vital functions of other animals. They include the specifically human powers of love of the beautiful, the true, and the good, conceived in the abstract as well as perceived in the concrete. But, if we are to translate *anima* by "soul," then we must realise that it is in virtue of his "soul" not only that a man aspires, and loves, and admires, but also that he tastes, feels a burn, and digests his food. He does all these things because he is alive, and alive with a human aliveness that embraces all the powers of brute or plant life and other powers as well.

And here, too, the question of the independent existence of the soul is not prejudiced either way by the use of the word. Aquinas, of course, believed that the soul survived the death of the body, and, pending the resurrection, lived an independent life, though not a complete one. He believed that the action of some of the powers of the soul was suspended and that it acquired certain new powers,

and so on. But this, or anything like this, was not implied in saying that man has a "soul." Other thinkers, notably Averrhoes, did not believe in personal immortality at all. Aquinas would refute them, but he would not dream of disputing their right to speak of man's soul; for to say that a man has a soul is only to say that he is alive. Indeed all careful readers of the New Testament are already familiar with the difficulty arising out of the use of the word soul, sometimes to imply an entity, and sometimes not. In expounding Luke xii. 20: "Thou fool! this night thy soul shall be required of thee," we have to explain that "soul" only means "life"; but it is the very same word ψυχή that occurs in the text: "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." *

Passing now to the word "form," † we have again to guard against misleading associations. We speak of a distinction as being "merely formal" as opposed to essential or significant. Or we say that this is the same as that in substance and only differs from it in form. In such cases the meaning of "form" is not only different from that which it bears in the scholastic philosophy, but is almost exactly the opposite to it. For there the "form" of a thing is precisely its essential characteristic, that makes it itself and not something else.

Perhaps we can get at it in this way. We know that ice is a "form" of water. But it is just its

* Matt. x. 28. † Compare *Dante and Aquinas*, cap. i.

"form" that makes it ice, as distinct from steam. And though perhaps we might be inclined to admit, if pushed, that ice *is* water all the time, we should hardly venture to say that ice is steam or that steam is ice. Ice, then, is ice and not steam, or steam is steam and not ice, exactly in virtue of its "form." But, in this case, we have some conception of a substance that is identical under the different forms. We find no difficulty in saying that water and ice are different forms of H_2O; and we have only a few easily defined qualities to add by way of determination of the several forms of ice, water, and steam. But, when we come to sugar and fat, if we say that they are only different forms of a certain carbon compound, we begin to feel that, in that case, the "form" covers some very essential aspects of the substances. Carry the process further and imagine (as indeed seems to be the drift of present speculation) that all substances are ultimately one, and that the dream of the alchemists that the metals and all the elements might be transmuted one into the other was unpractical rather than unscientific, and you may then regard all substances as different "forms" of an underlying matter which must always take some form or another and cannot exist except as manifesting some properties, but can nevertheless change *all* its properties and assume any others whatever, so that the difference not only between ice and steam but between ice and flame, or between a sufficient number of humming birds and a walrus is nothing but a difference in the "form," which a portion of the same

ultimate matter assumes in the several cases. You will then be in possession of something very like the Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy of "form" and "matter." And you will see that, whereas the underlying matter remains a very mysterious thing, that we can never get at in itself, it is the "form" that makes this or that thing what it is and not something else. We must understand by "form," then, all that makes any creature what it is, that is to say, its essential and distinctive nature; and by "matter" the unknown but indispensably necessary principle that enables it to be not this or that specific thing, but *any* kind of "thing" at all.

We can now begin to see what may be meant by saying that "the rational soul is the form of man." For what distinguishes man from all other beings is that he is alive with a kind of life that has reasoning as one of its functions. But we must go a good deal further into it yet. For we have to examine the dogma of the "unity of substantial forms" upon which both Albert and Thomas laid great stress, and which has a close bearing upon our present inquiry. We need not trouble ourselves about the qualification of "substantial," for we shall naturally keep within it, so long as we confine ourselves to the consideration of "substances." The term "substance" includes all actual beings that have an individuality of their own, such as men or trees, or even stones, and also what we moderns too are more accustomed to call substances, such as air, water, treacle, or what not. Attributes such as blueness, and experiences such as

pain or love, are not substances, but are technically described as "accidents" in the scholastic philosophy. Accidents are not beings, but happenings or pertinences. A man exists, but weight must always have someone or something to happen or pertain to. An accident need not be "accidental" in our use of the word, but it must be incidental to some being or "substance."

What is meant by the rational soul being the form of man? We must lay regular siege to the fortress, and must carry it by successive approaches. We begin with the supposed elements or simple bodies (*corpora simplicia*), which we think of as differentiated but not exactly as individualised. They are characterised by what are known as the "active and passive qualities" only, namely, heat and cold, wetness and dryness, denseness and rarity. These qualities, in their various combinations, constitute the "forms" of the elements which make each what it is, as distinct from all the others. They are called "active and passive" qualities, because they act and are acted upon by each other. Heat (proper to fire) and wetness (proper to water) are "active"; and cold (which heat can act on) and dryness (which moisture can act on) are "passive." Fire is hot and dry, air (never clearly distinguished from vapour) is hot and wet, water cold and wet, and earth cold and dry. All that we know of matter is that it is identical under all these "forms," that it never exists or can be conceived as existing except under some form or other, and that it has not so much as dimensions or extension except

as it is clothed in some "form." But, neither can the form exist alone, inasmuch as it can only be expressed or conceived as such and such qualities and attributes, implying the "substrate" which they qualify, and this substrate is no other than matter; for no mere combination of attributes can in itself constitute the "thing," "substance," or "being" that *has* the attributes. It is matter then that assumes the different forms, and is the "thingness" of everything; but, as it must be some particular thing in order to be "thing" at all, it can only be defined in itself as the potentiality of everything, but the actuality of nothing. Fortunately, as it never exists in itself, and is unintelligible in itself, we need not try to understand it! In considering the human faculty of intelligence, however, we have seen (p. 368) that there, too, we must start with the conception of a faculty which is a pure potentiality, a capacity for receiving certain impressions, none of which have been actually received. This analogy between "first matter" and "mind in itself" strongly impressed the mediæval thinkers, and it may give the modern student some support in his journey through these weird regions. But to return to the elements and the active and passive qualities which constitute their forms. Not only are the elements constituted by the active and passive qualities, but the underlying "matter," common to them all, is "disposed" by this first differentiation to receive more complex "forms" when the elements themselves combine into "mixed bodies," such as the load-stone. These more complex

forms have other properties or virtues, beyond their merely elemental ones of heat and dryness, etc. And, in due course, by successive "disposings" and combinings, we arrive at beings which we think of definitely as individuals, such as plants. But still the "form" of the magnet-stone, for instance, or of the oak tree, includes the whole collectivity of the qualities that characterise it; and the "matter" which is essential to its thingness or objective existence has in itself no qualities.

Thus "form" and "matter" are alike incapable of separate existence, and you cannot properly speak of the form of matter any more than of the matter of form, but you can speak of the form or of the matter of the "substance" or "thing," for it is only the thing that really exists; the matter and form into which it can be conceptually resolved are mere abstractions.

Now, this would all be comparatively easy and consistent were it not for the conception of the individuals of a species. When we are dealing with an elemental substance such as air, or fragments of a mixed body such as the magnet-stone, all is plain. We know the collectivity of attributes that make air air and not fire or water; and that collectivity is its form. But when we come to oak trees or men, or other distinctly recognisable individuals of a species, we are told that it is the human "form" that makes Socrates a man, and not a brute or an angel, but that it does not make him Socrates as distinct from Plato. Apparently, then, an individual tree, man, or

lion has attributes which are not part of his form. This is a real difficulty, and I have nowhere found it expressly dealt with either by Thomas Aquinas or by Albert the Great. It is hazardous to try to explore and expound an implicit theory that is never formally set out, especially if it seems to involve an inconsistency. But in this case there seems to be no choice, so we must make the venture.

The whole difficulty arises from the attempt of the Schoolmen to give too much rigidity and objectivity to the essentially fluid and conceptual Aristotelian doctrine of form and matter. There are repeated references in Aquinas and in his master to the *principia individuantia* that distinguish one man from another. In one sense, matter itself is the individuating principle, as form is the intelligible principle. But this does not take us far enough. If every man were an exact replica of every other man, they would not all be the same man. His pain, joy, consciousness of existence, and so forth would be each man's own, and, though his fellow-man might have exactly similar experiences, they would not be "numerically identical" with his. And this is all that need be meant by the general statement that matter is the individuating principle. But what we are now dealing with is something else. The *principia individuantia* or individuating principles that distinguish Socrates from Plato are something other than numerical distinctness of matter, and we shall find, by the casual references that are all we have to go upon, that they depend

upon "dispositions" of matter, which are independent of the specific human "form." We shall further discover that the active and passive qualities we have already met with are to be regarded as "dispositions" of matter. When we recollect what these active and passive qualities are, we shall at once be struck by the fact that they account for what we still call "temperament." The system, I believe, is ultimately derived from Galen, but it persisted until comparatively recent times as a physiological theory, and still persists in the popular use of such phrases as "It is a question of temperament." Now the choleric temperament, we are told, is hot and dry, the sanguine temperament hot and moist, the phlegmatic cold and moist, and the melancholic cold and dry. The "individuating principles" then would seem to be very much what we speak of as "differences of temperament," and we have noted that, on the material side, these underlying active and passive qualities are spoken of as "dispositions" of matter. It seems probable, therefore, that, when we speak of a man's "disposition," we are borrowing from the philosophy that made the "temperament" of his mind depend upon the "disposition" of the material of his body.

This reconstruction fits admirably with all that we read about the "individuating principles" in Aquinas and his teacher, but it leaves us with a serious philosophical difficulty. Let us go back for a moment to the elements. Fire was supposed to be able, in virtue of its heat, to convert, let us say, air into its

own nature under suitable conditions. As long as the air was only being heated, it remained air, but was all the time being "disposed" to become fire. But, since it retained the active nature of air, if the fire were withdrawn, it would lose its heat and resume its natural "disposition." If, on the other hand, the action of the fire were continued to the point of making the air actually become fire, then at a certain moment the form of air would be lost, and the form of fire assumed, not by two successive steps but simultaneously, so that the matter would at no time be either without form or with two forms (of air and fire) simultaneously. Here the distinction between the disposition to assume the form of fire and its actual assumption is intelligible enough, and so is the doctrine that, although the form of air included a passive potentiality of being first disposed to become fire and then actually becoming fire, yet, when once the transformation has taken place, the form of fire must not be regarded as superimposed upon the form of air but as having replaced it. There is nothing remaining between the "form of fire" and the "matter" which it informs. This is the doctrine of the "unity of forms."

The doctrine springs into new significance when we are considering the embryonic development of the human fœtus. Before it has any kind of vitality it is being disposed to take a vital form, and, when the moment comes, it actually assumes a vital form on the level of that possessed by plants. At this moment its previous form disappears and

this vital form animates the matter without any intermediary. This being, living a vegetative life, at once begins in its turn to be disposed to receive a form on the level of that of animals, and at a given moment the vegetative life disappears and animal life takes its place. It is neither true to say that the new life is superimposed upon the old nor that the old life becomes or is transformed into the new. The "matter" loses one form and simultaneously receives another, which possesses and exercises all the functions of the lower form as well as those peculiar to itself. Then, again, this being which is living the animal life begins to be disposed to receive the human life and, at a given moment, receives it, and this new form in its turn exercises all the functions of the animal form that it has superseded; for they are as much a part of its own functions as are the higher powers special to itself.

So now there is nothing between the human form and the matter which it animates. And, if we call all these kinds of aliveness "souls," then we shall say that the form of a man is a rational soul, but that it is in virtue of this soul not only that he prays and aspires but also that he fights and eats,* and that he could not have such a soul if he had not such and such tissues, thus compounded, out of matter thus disposed.

We see then that it is not strictly correct to speak of the soul as the form of the "body." It is the

* *Cf.* p. 417.

form of the "man." The body indeed reaches its goal and fulfils its end when its organs are held by the human form, and this is expressed in Aristotelian language by calling the soul, or vital functionings, the "entelechy" or "goal-fulfilment" of the body. But it is the man, not the body, of which these functionings are the form. In the last analysis there are only two elements, the form and the matter which it informs, that make up the man. There is no other form to mediate between them.

But the question that troubles us now is how the dispositions of matter, involved in the balance of the active and passive qualities, which constituted the lower forms, survive the loss of those forms and yet lie outside the final form, and constitute the *principia individuantia* or temperament of the man.

The matter is really one of commanding importance, for it is to suit the body, as already organised in the womb, that the soul is created, so that the spiritual personality itself seems to be determined by the dispositions brought about by the active and passive qualities that preceded all other forms in the history of the fœtus. Yet, vital as the question is, it seems never to be directly treated by Aquinas. All we can say is that the resultant situation is fairly clear, however difficult it may be to reconcile it with some of the fundamental doctrines of the Christian Peripatetics. It may be stated thus:—

A hard-and-fast line is to be drawn between the characteristics that constitute an individual a

member of a species and those that distinguish him from other individuals of that same species. Those characteristics that differentiate the species belong to the "form" of the species and of all the individuals in it. But, though all these individuals have the same form, they are not the same individuals, because they are not formed out of the same matter numerically. It is their material therefore that makes them individuals. But further, they are not only different from, but unlike each other, yet these unlikenesses are not formal. Here the *principia individuantia* come in, and they seem to be due to the dispositions of the matter under one form before it came under another. If it is the form of leonicity that makes this individual beast lion and not tiger, and if it is "earmarked" matter under dimension that makes him an individual lion, it is the disposition of this matter, his *principia individuantia*, that makes him just such a lion as he is. (3)

We can now go on to a statement of the theory of Aquinas as to the relation of the human soul to the human body. The soul is a form. So much must be granted to Aristotelianism and the organic conception of man. But it is also an entity capable of independent existence as an immaterial spirit, and every man's soul is his own individually. So much is claimed not only by the Christian consciousness and tradition but by philosophy as based on human reason also. But is it not of the very essence of Aristotelianism that a form cannot exist

separately, and also that all members of a species have one identical form, only differentiated in them by the numerically distinct matter which it informs? Thus, even if the human form could exist apart, would there not be one only disembodied soul of humanity, not one for each man? It is in answer to these questions that Aquinas elaborates his theory of the soul, and boldly declares, in spite of the seeming contradiction, that the soul is indeed a "form," but, unlike all other forms associated with matter, is an independent entity (*hoc aliquid*), capable of separate existence as well.

To make this contention intelligible and philosophically acceptable, he goes through an ascending series of "forms," as generally accepted and understood, and tries to show that the way in which one transcends the other leads straight up to the conception of such a self-existing form as the soul of man, and makes it seem the natural, almost the inevitable, next term of the series. The underlying conception is that each successive order of "forms" partakes more largely of the celestial nature and is raised higher above mere materiality than the one below it. And, in following the exposition, we must always remember that according to the Aristotelian and mediæval physics the animated or angel-moved heavens are the source of all earthly or elemental motion.

Taking, then, the series of forms in succession, we find that the forms of the elemental or simple bodies manifest no properties beyond the purely material

ones of the active and passive qualities; but, as soon as we come to the "mixed substances," we encounter properties or virtues which already show a certain kinship with the heavens. The "form" of the magnet-stone, for instance, manifests the property of being able to attract iron from a distance, wherein it resembles the attractive power by which the moon raises the tides and by which all the other heavens operate. The form of a plant manifests yet higher powers, for, just as the heavens are self-moving in virtue of their vitality, so a plant contains within itself a principle of "movement" (in the larger sense of the term) which, under suitable influences, will enable it to grow, to assimilate nutrition, and to reproduce its like. Yet higher stand the forms of brute beasts, for the vital principle in them resembles that of the heavens, not only in its power to move the body it animates, but further in its awareness of things, or power of cognition. But the brute can only take cognisance of material things and only through the agency of material organs, and so its cognitions are wholly dependent upon its bodily sense organs. Whereas the rational soul which is the form of man can, by abstraction, take cognisance of immaterial things, and so is of still closer kin with celestial forms. It is still held to its material organs by the fact that, though it can transcend them and rise to intellectual conceptions and operations that are independent of them, yet it can only acquire the *phantasmata*, out of which it sublimates these immaterial cognitions, through the agency of the

material senses. And so, above these human forms again are the purely immaterial or angelic forms, which have cognisance of immaterial things by direct and immaterial perceptions and have no dependence at all upon matter or bodily organs. Thus the human soul or the form of man has passed beyond dependence upon material organs and has found itself akin to the celestial beings, and has therefore, in its own spiritual consciousness, a principle of individuality independent of the individuating matter of its associated body. It is therefore an entity in itself. But, seeing that it can only rise to this higher range of functions by having its potentialities actualised by the impressions that come to it through the senses, it cannot be equipped with all that is essential to its specific being except through its union with the body. It is therefore the "form" of man in the sense that it is a reasoning and cognitive vitality that holds a certain portion of matter together as an organised body, just in the same way as a cognitive but unreasoning vitality holds together a portion of matter as the organised body of a beast, and a non-cognitive vitality does the same with respect to a plant. It is in strictly analogous fashion, too, that the lower forms give to the mixed bodies or the elements such degree of stability and definition as they enjoy.

Thus, according to Aquinas, does the human soul take its place in the series of forms, filling a place that would have cried out for an occupant had it been vacant; and thus does its dependence-upon-matter

for its self-realisation and the independence-of-matter of the self that it realises, constitute it the "horizon" between material and immaterial beings. Hence, too, the reasonable hope and anticipation that the disembodied soul may acquire powers of directly perceiving spiritual beings by spiritual modes of cognition. (*Cf.* pp. 384 *sq.*, 395 *sq.*)

This statement must now be supplemented by a few words as to the theory of the origin of the individual soul. All philosophers or philosophical theories of biology have to face the problem of where life, and again where consciousness, begins. At what point of the cosmic, racial, or individual evolution, or at what point of the horizontal section of the cosmos, is the organism that has the direct potentiality of developing a rational consciousness divided or differentiated from the organism that has not? And at what point does the potentiality become actualised? And what are the answers to the corresponding questions as to the organic and inorganic forms, or the vital and non-vital ones?

To say that the transition is continuous, though it does not either solve the problem or get rid of it, may easily conceal it from the unwary. But, in any case, such a refuge or evasion was barred by the whole spirit and system of the scholastic philosophy. This philosophy recognises a certain kind of continuity, as we have seen, but it is committed beyond escape to the theory of definite divisions and transitions. An organism either is a man or it is not. A form either is an entity or it is not. A soul either is immortal

or it is not. There is no evading or blurring these questions. Nor is there really any room for doubt as to what Aquinas must say in the matter. Aristotelian as he is, he regards the soul primarily as an entity, and, the more we study his teaching on the subject, the more we feel that, however deep the Aristotelian conception of man as an organism and his "soul" or vitality as a collectivity of functionings, may have sunk into his thought, you have only to go deep enough into his consciousness in order to find that Plato, after all, and not Aristotle, reigns there. No one can be more convinced than he that the body, in its physiological development, cannot really evolve by natural process an immortal soul independent of itself. On the contrary, he holds quite definitely that each individual soul is created as an entity, *de novo* and *ex nihilo*, by the divine act, just as much as the angels were created or as the world was created "in the beginning" of time. The human "form" is not propagated from parent to offspring as is the human body, or as is the whole being, body and soul alike, in the case of brutes and plants. So much is this so, that even the taint of original sin does not directly attach to the soul, for that soul is not propagated by fallen man. The taint attaches to the flesh, and the soul, in its turn, is tainted by the very fact of its commerce with the flesh, and further by its inevitable yielding at least to the venial sins that the flesh incessantly suggests.*

But how, we ask once again, can this be reconciled

* *Cf.* note (5) to Lecture vii. on p. 514.

with the conception of the soul as a "form"? Frankly, I do not think it can be reconciled with it. But what Aquinas says is this: At a given moment in the development of the embryo, when the vegetable form has already been replaced by an animal form, and the embryo is exercising animal functions, God creates a form which, unlike all other forms, is an entity. But it is not created apart from the body as having a separate existence, but in the body, and, moreover, it is so created as to match and harmonise with that particular body. Even as it is in the act of being created it embraces, as actualities, the collectivity of all the functional powers which the embryo already enjoys; but it is also the potentiality, to no degree as yet actualised, of all the specifically human experiences and functionings which, in the natural course of things, will be duly developed. At this stage, the soul, *so far as the specifically human attributes are concerned*, is the potentiality of everything and the actuality of nothing, but with respect to all other vital functions it is already actualised; and at and in the very moment of its creation it actualises the body to which it is linked, and so there comes to be a man. The being thus constituted is at once material and spiritual, and is destined to eternal weal or woe. The spirit of man rests on matter and is supported by it, but yet claims kindred with an immaterial world that he could not have reached save from his material basis, but a world that already promises to "glorify" the material body by assimilating it to itself. Then the earthly body shall no longer

weigh down the spirit, but the spirit shall transfigure and uplift the body. (4)

And with this imperfect account we must be content as far as the direct treatment of the teaching of Aquinas goes. But shall we not lose its deepest significance if we do not supplement it with some kind of questioning of ourselves as to the underlying problem, the Thomist solution of which I have endeavoured to trace? It is nothing less than the problem of the relation between mind and matter. The earliest Greek philosophers had not yet escaped from a naive confusion between the objective elemental world and the subjective realm of consciousness. They all held that the "life" or "soul" of a man could only have cognisance of the physical world because it was itself composed of the physical element or elements. For only like could be supposed to know like. Then that Anaxagoras, whom Aristotle compares to "a sober man coming into a room full of babblers,"* swept this whole conception away, and declared that "intelligence" (νοῦς) is utterly *unlike* the material things of which it has cognisance, but is akin to an immaterial principle that lies behind them. Ever since that first and conclusive recognition of the truth that mind and matter cannot be expressed in terms of each other, the problem of their relation has exercised the human intelligence; and it is yet unsolved. Objectively it is easy to observe and establish

* Arist., *Metaphys.*, lib. i. capp. 3, 7 (984^b. 15–18, 989^b. 14–16). *De anima*, lib. i. cap. 2, secc. 15, 16 (405^b. 15–21).

the connection, but subjectively it is impossible to explain or understand it. Intelligence, as we know it, always emerges in connection with a series of physical changes and developments, and the transition from the unconscious to the conscious organism appears to be continuous. In the individual development, we seem to pass from the "gametes" to the perfected organism, with its manifestations (in the case of man) of thought, admiration, and effort of the will, through an unbroken chain of physical changes, while the equally continuous vital and mental developments that accompany them appear to be by-products.

If we endeavour to reconstruct the cosmic history, we can only do so on the same lines. We conceive vast æons of cosmic development during which there was nothing that we should call life at all, and yet there was something that we can now recognise as the preparation for life; and then came the long progress which issued at last in the emergence of a consciousness that could attempt to read the universe of which it was a part. Or yet again, if we take the safer course of moving across rather than along the stream of phenomena, we find ourselves in presence of the same continuity. We can, I suppose, hardly say that every step of the supposed evolution is represented by some surviving or recorded witness that can still be called up for examination. But so many of the links can still be detected as to suggest almost irresistibly an ideally continuous chain, that has been subject to accidental causes of actual discontinuity. If man can only conjecture the path

actually taken by that portion of his history which his embryonic development does not preserve and repeat, he can at least trace in the present world a broken path that it may have taken. On the historical side then, the dependence of mind upon matter, however unintelligible, seems to rest on an unassailable basis of observation.

But, on the metaphysical side, we note not only that our whole knowledge of the world comes from its impression upon our consciousness, but that by far the greater and more vital part of our relations with it can only be expressed or conceived at all in terms of consciousness. It is true that most men not only find it easy to believe that matter-in-motion can and does exist in itself, apart from all consciousness of it, but find it difficult or impossible to believe otherwise. But as soon as we come to the next step and begin to think of such things as sound or colour, we must be on our guard against a very subtle illusion. The physicists, whose business is with matter-in-motion, rightly consider that they have not completed their investigation of any phenomenon until they have adequately explored and set forth the material movements that accompany it, and that appear to be the occasion of its emergence. But, in doing so, they have deliberately (and quite rightly) emptied it of its experiential or conscious content. Vibrations can be expressed in terms of matter-in-motion; but the experience of hearing, the sense of colour, or the perception of harmony, whether of sound or colour, cannot be conceived as existing

anywhere except in consciousness; and cannot be expressed except in terms of consciousness. Hence, when the materialist, basing himself upon the study of physics, attempts to express the phenomena of consciousness in terms of matter-in-motion, and professes thus to have "explained" them, both common sense and philosophic reflection declare him to be out of court; for he seeks, and professes to find, the explanation of mental phenomena on a field from which all consideration of them has been deliberately excluded. Thus the more important part of our conceptions of the universe, and the more important part of our relations with it and our interest in it, not only comes to us through consciousness (as everything we know or experience must come), but can only be expressed at all in terms of consciousness.

Some aspects, then, of the universe, as consciously conceived, most men believe that they can project out of their mind and consciousness into independent existence apart from it. But all the more important and interesting aspects of it they cannot even conceive of save as something in it, other than matter-in-motion, that is so related to consciousness as to have no meaning without it, and no possibility of being detached from it without losing its identity.

No wonder, therefore, that reflective man must always feel himself akin to the universe, and at home in it, through his mind yet more than through his material composition.

Now this sense of kinship with something that lies within and behind the world of matter-in-motion, by

no means necessarily carries with it a theistic creed, and still less a belief in the immortality of the human soul. But it must be the matrix of every form of these beliefs that is not open to attack as a survival; and it seems—whether supported by claims to direct mystic perception and experience or not—to be the bed-rock of all spiritual conceptions of the universe and of the relation of man to it.

I have already called your attention to the "argument from design" as the second of the mainstays of Thomas's demonstration of the existence of God. In its crudest and best known form, this argument rests on the analogy between the "mechanisms" of nature and the mechanisms of man. The contention is that, just as a human mechanism postulates a human mechanic, so does a natural mechanism postulate a divine mechanic. In Aristotle, it takes the less definite and more refined form of a recognition of an analogy between the doings of man and the doings of nature, in that they both tend towards some goal that justifies and explains them, so that the human intelligence finds something akin to itself working in nature and making it intelligible.

This sense of kinship linking us with the universe through our consciousness, as distinct from our material frames, is the ultimate and most general form of the mental trend that has often narrowed its expression into the easily assailable form of the "argument from design."

This sense of access by the mind to something akin to itself in the universe, which it cannot

approach through its conception of matter-in-motion, has always barred the general body of philosophic thought from accepting the contention of the materialist that the world of matter-in-motion "accounts for" or "explains" the world of mind.

But the matter is obscured by the different senses in which we habitually use the words "explained" and "explanation." We often say that a thing is "explained," if we learn that something has happened, upon which, as a matter of fact, it is usually or frequently found to follow. In this sense, no doubt, the existence of a normal human embryo or infant "explains" the dawn of a human intelligence; for experience leads us to expect the one to follow upon the other, and we should be surprised if it did not do so. But such an "explanation" may leave us without any conception of the intimate nature of the connection between the two things. Experience may lead us to expect the one to follow upon the other, but reason cannot show us that one is involved in the other; and this alone would be an "explanation" in the deeper sense.

Again, we say that a phenomenon is "explained" when it is brought under a formula that already includes a number of things that we accept as undisputed facts, even if we do not in any deep sense understand these accepted facts themselves. Thus, to revert to the classical example, when Newton brought the movements of the planets under a single formula, and that formula one which included a host of familiar terrestrial phenomena, he

was said to "explain" the said planetary movements, although the formula itself, the "law" of gravitation to wit, remained a mere epitome of observed facts and was itself unexplained.

In such a case, by means of the formula, the mind can itself travel, by its own inherent laws, from the one set of facts to the other, and can see that the statement of the one not only leads us to expect the other, because we have experienced the succession, but logically involves and includes it, so that in asserting the one we implicitly assert the other, and can predict any event that depends upon its truth, apart from experience of its occurrence. If this is what we mean by "explanation," surely to tell us that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile," or (to borrow an illustration from Professor James) to say that the vibrations of matter in the profound darkness of the chamber of the skull "explain" our sense of light and of the external world, is but to trifle with us. (5)

But the fullest and truly conclusive "explanation" of anything is only reached when the processes of our mind force us to accept it as included or involved in facts or truths that we cannot cancel or blot out, even in thought. Of this, mathematical science is the type; and mystics have sometimes dared to aspire to reaching a point of insight in which the totality of things should be thus embraced in one single and simple act of vision.

But my present contention goes no further than to assert that it is only in the conceptual world of

logic and mathematics that we can find the highest grade of "explanation," and that, everywhere else, we are compelled to start from some observed fact that we can conceive at least as cancelled or as being other than it is. We can, however, admit that a thing is "explained" in a very real sense when it is brought within an already known formula corresponding to a group of ascertained and accepted facts; whereas the lower grade of "explanation," which is a mere appeal to observed concomitance or succession, where there is no bridge or link mentally uniting the explained phenomenon to its antecedent, is not properly an explanation at all.

If this be so, then the phenomena of our consciousness are not "explained" by our physical constitution. Our access to the universe by our sense of correspondence with it and kinship to it on the spiritual or conscious side cannot be expressed in terms of the phenomena of matter-in-motion, and remains as one of the ultimate data of experienced fact.

In conclusion, therefore—not as an objective proof of any creed or dogma, and least of all as a solution of the "problem of evil," but as an attempt to relate the system of Aquinas to a wider and deeper stream of human thought and experience—I will ask you to allow me to indicate, though I cannot develop, a few of the lines along which this sense of kinship seems specially to assert itself.

When we approach the relationships with things outside ourselves, that can only be expressed or

conceived in terms of mind, we feel, not that we are creating but that we are finding. The world reveals itself to the intelligence as intelligible; and, when we think of that world before human history, we think of it as waiting to be interpreted and understood by us. We think of that into which our human consciousness will ultimately enter in recognition and consciousness of kinship *as already there*. For, deep in the mind not only of simple folk but of great philosophers and metaphysicians, abides the instinctive belief that "nothing can come out of nothing," that what is to be in some sort already is, and that a progress is best understood in relation to the goal it reaches. In Aristotelian phrase, the potential can only be actualised by that which is already actual. Hence the fact that the intelligence can, in a measure, interpret the universe, has inevitably produced and fostered the belief that the world is intelligible because something analogous or akin to intelligence lies behind and within it.

But we may go a little further. The emotional significance of mathematics, as we have seen, is but seldom realised, and has still more seldom found its poet. But when Pythagoras sacrificed a bull to Zeus on completing his demonstration of the equality of the square on the hypotenuse to the sum of the squares on the containing sides; when Plato warned off all who were unacquainted with geometry from entering his school; when Kepler fell upon his knees in a rapture of devotion on discovering the third law of planetary motion; when Auguste Comte spoke

of the rush of emotion with which a feeling heart recognises the most elementary mathematical truth; when Coleridge taught that the mathematical faculty was the one comparatively untarnished power which could still give us a hint of the state of unfallen man; and when Wordsworth found in mathematics

> A type, for finite natures, of the one
> Supreme Existence,

—these great souls felt the rapture and the awe of realised kinship between the mind of man and the inmost informing principle of the universe. And to Aristotle and Aquinas it was in the mathematical (and logical) axioms alone that the "first in reference to us" and the "first in reference to nature," that is to say, the "most familiar and easy of access" and the "most intellectually luminous" coincide.

I am keenly aware of the extreme treacherousness of amateur attempts to utilise little scraps of science in support of spiritual instincts or convictions; and yet I cannot refrain from recording the profound impression I have received from the point of view that we are now occupying from certain developments of mathematics, dating from a period long subsequent to that of Aquinas. I refer particularly to the study and applications of what are commonly called "imaginary" quantities, and perhaps I might add the "geometry of position." Imaginary quantities arise in the study of many problems, but, as a rule, they can receive no interpretation. The "imaginary" points cannot be located anywhere; the "imaginary" lines

cannot be drawn, and the "imaginary" numbers, in spite of their name, cannot really be so much as "imagined." Yet they spontaneously present themselves to the mathematician in the course of his investigations, and if he deals faithfully with them, according to the constitution of the human mind, takes nothing out of them that has not legitimately and necessarily come into them, and at last succeeds in eliminating them and obtaining an intelligible result, that result, reached by steps that have no intelligible relation to facts, will itself be true. The solid fact will be there to receive the traveller, who has lost sight of all fact in his weird voyage, but has been true to the compass of his thought. That thought, for a time, had no factual or conceptual content to steady it, but was guided by the spirit of its own "form" alone. I confess that such reflections have given a new meaning for me to the word that "man is the child of God," and have taught me to think of the mind as reflecting far more explicitly than the senses ever can do the inner meaning and constitution of the universe, and as giving us a directer as well as a deeper access to reality than the composition of our animal frame from the elements can open up to us. (6)

It is no bathos to add that, when I am told that a system of electric lighting has been worked out on the basis of "imaginary" quantities, or that the most economical construction of a bicycle rests upon a theorem of "the geometry of position," I turn again to Wordsworth, and with him

> Meditate
> On the relation those abstractions bear
> To Nature's laws, and by what process led,
> Those immaterial agents bowed their heads
> Duly to serve the mind of earth-born man.

Less capable of precise illustration is another line along which this sense of kinship with the universe advances. I refer to our perception of the loveliness of things, and especially of so many of the fundamental forms of things. Not only in the glow of a sunset, or the tracery of the twigs of a winter tree, but in such shapes of beauty as those in which the sound of a violin will arrange the sand grains on a plate that responds to its call, we seem to enter into a kind of intimate sympathy of kinship with nature. We have learned from Bergson to think of the development of our intelligence as accomplished at the expense of the direct and organic union with our environment which the instinct of less advanced intelligences still retains; but surely this sense of loveliness independent of any interest of our material appetites, or gratification of animal instincts, may be regarded as attaining to a wider "sympathy" than the one we have lost, and as finding a deeper and a more disinterested kinship with the universe than that from which our intelligence has seduced us.

And, lastly, there is the moral sense. It is true that it has often gone astray. Conscience sometimes has seemed to urge men to follies and even to cruelties almost beyond the reach of carelessness or unscrupulousness. But the like may be said of the

intelligence also. In its early stages of development the human mind peopled the universe with hostile presences, invented such abominations as witch-finding, and filled itself with superstitions and illusions of every kind; but nevertheless it contained within itself the principle that was to lead man to find a secure home in a friendly, if awful, universe. May it not be so with the moral sense also? Do we not already see how often the untaught moral sense leads men to apprehend the essential facts and relations that the expert and the diplomatist have missed? May not the developed conscience, nay, does it not already, bring us into an intimate sense of relationship with the creative lines along which the world is moving?

In the search for truth, in the love of beauty, in the devotion to right, are we not finding in the scheme of things something that we did not create but which is there calling us into conscious fellowship with itself? Aristotle's animated heavens are gone, and the elaborate scheme of Aquinas has gone with them. But still, as we realise our relations with goodness, beauty, and truth, we are conscious not only of a thrust from below but of a call from above, and can understand the language of those who declared the human soul to be akin to the heavens, and there to have its true and only home.

NOTES TO LECTURE VI

(1) *To pages* 410–413.—The general theme of this sixth lecture, namely, the connection of mind and matter, as conceived by Aquinas, seems to offer the best connection in which to examine more at length the Aristotelian doctrines of the vital "quintessence," and of the "separable and immortal" element in the human ψυχή (*cf.* pp. 18 *sq.*); for it is specifically with this portion of the Aristotelian philosophy that Thomas has here to make his terms.

The two passages in which Aristotle touches directly upon the connection of the human νοῦς with the noëtic principle of the cosmos are the fourth and fifth chapters of the third book of the *De anima*, and the equally important but much less generally known third chapter of the second book of the *De generatione animalium*. The first of these is obscure, vague, and sketchy; but the second, though apparently mutilated and obviously corrupt, is explicit enough in its main contention, and we are fortunate in having a valuable restoration, translation, and exposition of the text from Professor Platt.*

I think there can be little doubt that Aristotle

* *De generatione animalium.* Translated into English by Arthur Platt. Oxford, 1910. *Vide* lib. ii. cap. 3 (736ª. 24–737ª. 6).

regarded the human intelligence as rising out of some kind of contact between the animal organism of man and some immaterial noëtic principle outside it; and that he believed this contact to be broken by death, the individual consciousness or personality being thereby dissipated. It is not so clear whether this noëtic principle is to be identified with the supreme immaterial principle "upon which all heaven and nature hang" or with some secondary but still purely immaterial principle. But in any case the nature of the connection was conceived as analogous to that between the ethereal fifth element, that entered into the bodies of all animals (and plants?), and the earthly elements with which it was there associated.*

* Aquinas rejects the theory of the "quintessence" as a mediating element in the union of body and soul; but I have not noted that he anywhere attributes it to Aristotle. He has left no commentary on the *De generatione animalium* himself, and in Albert's elaborate and interesting commentary it is difficult to find any evidence that he realised the distinction drawn by Aristotle between the *calor*, akin to the celestial ether, and the elemental *ignis*. The whole theory had received elaborate developments since Aristotle's day. *De animalibus*, lib. xvi. tract. 1, especially capp. 6, 7 (vol. xii. 146 *sqq.*).

The words of Aquinas are:

"Unde patet esse falsas opiniones eorum qui posuerunt aliqua corpora esse media inter animam et corpus hominis. Quorum quidam Platonici dixerunt quod anima intellectiva habet corpus incorruptibile sibi naturaliter unitum, a quo nunquam separatur, et eo mediante unitur corpori hominis corruptibili.—Quidam vero dixerunt quod unitur corpori mediante spiritu corporeo.—Alii vero dixerunt quod unitur corpori mediante luce, quam dicunt esse corpus, et de natura quintae essentiae: ita quod anima vegetabilis unitur corpori mediante luce caeli siderei; anima vero sensibilis, mediante luce caeli crystallini; anima vero intellectualis, mediante luce caeli empyrei. Quod fictitium et derisibile apparet: tum quia

In the case of these lower forms of life the several elements, including the fifth, were dissipated by death and returned to their kind.

In the case of man an analogous but not identical relation between the animated body itself, with its ethereal factor of composition, and the higher immaterial principle outside it, confers the power of thought and abstraction; but it is not to be supposed that in this case the individual man has, so to speak, a cut-off portion of the noëtic principle appropriated to himself, as his body has an allowance of the fifth or celestial element; for in the case of an immaterial thing such a partition is impossible. The connection must be conceived as a kind of contact from below or influence from above which does not in any way partition, or indeed affect or modify, the higher principle. But when the body is dissolved in death, and the receptive possibilities of the lower intelligence thereby cease to exist, the contact with the higher noëtic principle which constituted the human personality is automatically broken. There is thus no personal immortality for the human soul.

I believe it is only by so understanding Aristotle that it is possible to find any coherent and consistent meaning in his tantalisingly brief and inadequate utterances; but the distinction that he draws in the *De anima*, iii. 5, between the receptive intelligence

lux non est corpus; tum quia quinta essentia non venit materialiter in compositionem corporis mixti, cum sit inalterabilis, sed virtualiter tantum; tum etiam quia anima immediate corpori unitur ut forma materiae."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 76: a. 7. c. (Leon., v. 231b).

which is intermittent and capable of development and the active or forming intelligence which is essentially and unbrokenly in continuous activity, is so expressed as to leave it in doubt whether the receptive intelligence and the forming intelligence (the *intellectus possibilis* and the *intellectus agens* of the Schoolmen)* are two distinct faculties or powers

* Aristotle's own terminology (in the *De anima*, iii. 5) is not at once recognisable under these disguises, for he himself never uses the term νοῦς ποιητικός, which corresponds to the *intellectus agens*. It was introduced (quite legitimately and usefully) by the Greek commentators, from whom it descended to the Arabians and the Schoolmen. And, on the other hand, the term νοῦς παθητικός, which Aristotle does use (though only in this passage), is not regarded by the later writers as representing their *intellectus materialis* or *possibilis*.

The matter stands thus. Aristotle recognises in the constitution of the νοῦς a kind of microcosmic analogy to the cosmic order of things at large. He therefore distinguishes between a νοῦς that corresponds to the causative and efficient principle of nature generally (τὸ αἰτιὸν καὶ ποιητικόν) and a νοῦς corresponding to the undeveloped possibilities on which the causative principle works. The first, he says, is like art, and the second like the material that it shapes and develops. He characterises them thus: Ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν (in the Latin: *Et est intellectus hic quidem talis in omnia fieri, ille vero in omnia facere*). This latter *intellectus*, inasmuch as it is *capable of becoming* everything, is called by the Schoolmen *possibilis*; and because it is analogous to the *matter* which art has to develop into form, it is called by the Arabians *materialis* (though it is purely spiritual). All agree in calling the other the *intellectus agens*.

Aristotle himself, so far, has not given either of the two a name. But a few lines further down he says: Καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγής (in the Latin: *Et hic intellectus separabilis, et impassibilis et immixtus*). He goes on a little later to say that it is immortal, and adds: Ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός (in the Latin: *Passivus vero intellectus, est corruptibilis*).

It seems clear to me that in these words Aristotle is still speaking of the same two elements or aspects of the νοῦς as before, and that

of the human mind, or two noëtic principles in the cosmos; or whether the receptive intelligence is personal to the man and the forming intelligence a cosmic principle. Of these alternative ways of understanding the passage Avicenna took the last Aquinas the first, and Averrhoes the second.

I have already implied that Avicenna's interpretation

the νοῦς παθητικός is identical with the intellect characterised just above as *talis in omnia fieri*. And in this interpretation I am able to appeal to the authority of Zeller (*Phil. der Griechen*, vol. ii. part ii. ed. 3, Leipzig, 1879, p. 571, note 2). A great weight of authority, however, is opposed to this view, and holds the νοῦς now described as ἀπαθής to include both the two kinds or aspects of νοῦς contrasted just before. In this view the νοῦς παθητικός is yet a third faculty. Obviously anyone wishing to form an independent judgment must look into the whole matter for himself; but fortunately, though the difference of opinion is of importance in reference to Aristotle's belief concerning the immortality of the human soul, it does not affect the question of terminology upon which we are now engaged.

For it is obvious that neither Averrhoes nor Thomas could admit that the *intellectus materialis* or *possibilis* can be *corruptibilis*. Averrhoes, though he did not believe in personal immortality for man, yet held the *intellectus materialis* to be an immaterial Intelligence (this is no contradiction in terms, for, as we have seen, the *materialis* only means spiritually receptive, as opposed to spiritually active); and Aquinas, though he believed the *intellectus possibilis* to be a faculty of the individualised human soul, yet could not allow that any purely intellectual faculty of man could perish. Both Averrhoes and Aquinas, therefore, were under pressure to draw a distinction between their *intellectus talis in omnia fieri* and the *intellectus passivus* (or *passibilis*); and accordingly they both identify it with the *vis cogitativa*, which is the lowest step on the intellectual ladder, and is the next-door neighbour to the *aestimativa* of the higher animals. The *aestimativa* enables an animal to receive an *intentio*, or concrete attraction or repulsion, from objects of sense, beyond the mere sense impressions themselves, but it only attracts them to separately perceived individuals or repels them

seems to me to be the only admissible one. In the *De generatione animalium* we are distinctly told that the part of the soul with which we think comes from outside; and in the *De anima*, iii. 4, we are told that the forming or active intelligence is in its full energy of realised thinking continuously, but this is only true of it in its detached or immaterial state. To this I can assign no other meaning than that man's thinking takes place in virtue of the intermittent contact of his mind with a noëtic principle that is continuous in its intellectual activity.

Aquinas is quite clear, however, that this *intellectus agens* is simply the power of abstraction possessed by the individual soul. It is a faculty in man, not a principle acting upon him from outside. But he is rather put to it to explain in what sense it can be said to be continuously in action; and he sees no great harm in Avicenna's view that it is a principle or entity outside the individual soul, and one and the same for all mankind, provided that in that case it is not regarded as any other than the Deity himself. But the opinion of Averrhoes that the *intellectus possibilis* also is a

from them. The *cogitativa*, on the other hand, distinguishes between individual *intentiones* and compares them, but still concerns itself only with material objects.

For Averrhoes *vide* p. 84, and for Aquinas:

"Dicit Averrhoes quod homo differt specie a brutis per intellectum quem Aristoteles vocat passivum, qui est ipsa vis cogitativa quae est propria homini, loco cujus alia animalia habent quemdam æstimativam naturalem. Hujus autem cogitativæ virtutis est distinguere intentiones individuales et comparare eas ad invicem . . . de qua medici dicunt quod habet sedem in media cellula capitis."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. ii. cap. 60, princ. (vol. v. 113).

separate and universal noëtic emanation excites the contemptuous anger of both Albert and Thomas, no doubt because it would make their contention that Aristotle believed in the immortality of the individual soul quite impossible to maintain. I think they are mistaken in their own interpretation of Aristotle, but right in rejecting that of Averrhoes; for Avicenna's Aristotelian exegesis alone is sound.

Averrhoes held that as the interaction between the *intellectus agens* and the *intellectus recipiens* which takes place by means of the *continuatio* of each of them with the *phantasmata* in the *intellectus passibilis* in the human brain, the eternity of the human race is necessary for the eternal realisation of thought in the *intellectus recipiens*. Axioms and generalisations therefore, *i.e.* all abstract thought and knowledge, as distinct from individual experiences based on sense impressions, are one and continuous in the *intellectus recipiens*, but multiple and perishable in the human mind:

"Quoniam, quia opinati sumus ex hoc sermone quod intellectus materialis est unicus omnibus hominibus: et etiam ex hoc sumus opinati quod species humana est æterna, ut declaratum est in aliis locis: necesse est ut intellectus materialis non sit denudatus a principiis naturalibus communibus toti speciei humanae, scilicet primis propositionibus, et formationibus singularibus communibus omnibus: haec enim intellecta sunt unica secundum recipiens, et multae secundum intentionem receptam, *et cet.*"—*De anima*, lib. iii. *com.* 5. (vol. vi. 149 E, F).

Relevant citations for Aquinas on the *intellectus agens* are:

"Quidam posuerunt intellectum agentem, substantiam separatam, et quod differt secundum substantiam ab intellectu possibili. Illud autem non videtur esse verum. Non enim homo esset a natura sufficienter institutus, si non haberet in se ipso principia, quibus posset operationem complere, quae est intelligere: quae quidem compleri non potest, nisi per intellectum possibilem, et per intellectum agentem. Unde perfectio humanae naturae requirit, quod utrumque eorum sit aliquid in homine. Videmus etiam, quod sicut operatio intellectus possibilis, quae est recipere intelligibilia, attribuitur homini, ita et operatio intellectus agentis, quae est abstrahere intelligibilia."—*Com. in libros de anima*, lib. iii. lectio 10 [§ 19] (vol. xx. 123a).

"Nos enim, per virtutem intellectus agentis, abstrahimus species universales a particularibus conditionibus."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 44: a. 3. ad 3^{m} (Leon., iv. 460b).

He tries vainly to show that Aristotle's words *non aliquando intelligit et aliquando non intelligit* do not refer to the *intellectus agens*, but adds:

"Vel, si intelligatur de intellectu agente, hoc dicitur quia non est ex parte intellectus agentis hoc quod quandoque intelligimus et quandoque non intelligimus."—*Ib.*, q. 79: a. 4. ob. 2. ad 2^{m} (Leon., v. 267a, 268a).

The meaning of this phrase is that when the *intellectus agens* has made the abstractions that constitute

the *species intelligibiles*, and has lodged them in the *intellectus possibilis* for it to work upon, these *species* are permanently established in the mind, even when the *intellectus possibilis* is not for the moment attending to them. This is well brought out elsewhere in a discussion as to the possibility of acquired knowledge surviving death in the disembodied soul:

"Quidam ergo posuerunt quod species intelligibiles non conservantur in intellectu possibili nisi quamdiu intelligit, conservantur autem species phantasmatum in potentiis animae sensitivae, puta in memorativa et imaginativa: ita scilicet quod semper intellectus possibilis quando de novo vult intelligere etiam quae prius intellexit, indigeat extrahere a phantasmatibus per lumen intellectus agentis; et secundum hoc consequens est quod scientia hic acquisita non remaneat post mortem. Sed haec propositio est primo quidem contra rationem. Manifestum est enim quod species intelligibiles in intellectu possibili recipiuntur ad minus dum actu intelligit. . . . Cum ergo substantia intellectus possibilis sit immutabilis et fixa, consequens est quod species intelligibiles remaneant in eo immobiliter."—*Com. in Epist.* 1 ad *Corinthios*, cap. 13, lectio 3 (vol. xiii. 263b).

As to the *intellectus agens*:

"Intellectum agentem esse unum et separatum plus videtur rationis habere quam si hoc de intellectu possibili ponatur. . . . Ideo quidam Catholici posuerunt, quod intellectus agens sit ipse Deus. . . . Sed haec positio, si quis diligenter consideret, non videtur esse conveniens, *et cet.*"

In any case:

"Si intellectus agens ponatur aliqua substantia separata praeter Deum, sequitur aliquid fidei nostrae repugnans: ut scilicet ultima perfectio nostra et felicitas sit in conjunctione aliquali animae nostrae, non ad Deum, ut doctrina evangelica tradit dicens: *Haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te Deum verum*; sed in conjunctione ad aliquam aliam substantiam separatam." — *Quaestio de anima*, a. 5. c. (vol. viii. 478b *sq.*).

It may save the student some perplexity if I add a few words here on the different senses which Aquinas assigns to the word *intelligere*.

Wherever the *intellectus agens* has created by abstraction a *species intelligibilis* we may be said in a certain sense to "understand" the objects from which it has been abstracted. Thus we have seen that Aquinas could use the phrase *intelligere lapidem* (p. 403), because we know a stone when we see one, and may therefore be supposed to have a practical answer to the question, *Quid est lapis*? and in that sense we understand the *quidditas* of a stone. But if we can give a precise definition of a thing we may be said to understand it in a higher sense. In answer to the question *Quid est homo*? for instance, we can reply *Homo est animal rationale*. And this power of giving a clear definition of a thing is, I believe, what Aquinas generally means by "understanding" it, or knowing its *quidditas*. But this, after all, is but an imperfect kind of understanding; for in the first place the very reason for our

having bodies at all is that our intellect, though it needs no bodily organ for the exercise of its proper operations, is nevertheless dependent upon the senses for the material upon which it works; and this dependence means that it is incapable of direct perception of the only truly "intelligible" beings that really and completely exist, to wit, God and the angels; for the *species intelligibiles* which we say we "understand" are created by the intellect itself, and have no independent existence; and this indeed is in itself sufficient reason to believe that other beings of a higher order of intelligence must exist:

"Intelligere autem cum sit operatio per organum corporeum non exercita, non indiget corpore, nisi inquantum intelligibilia sumuntur a sensibilibus. Hic autem est imperfectus modus intelligendi; perfectus enim modus intelligendi est ut intelligantur ea quae sunt secundum naturam suam intelligibilia; quod autem non intelligantur nisi ea quae non sunt secundum se intelligibilia,* sed fiunt intelligibilia per intellectum, est imperfectus modus intelligendi. Si igitur ante omne imperfectum oportet esse perfectum aliquid in genere illo, oportet quod, ante animas humanas, quae intelligunt accipiendo a phantasmatibus, sint aliquae intellectuales substantiae intelligentes ea quae sunt secundum se intelligibilia, non accipientes cognitionem a sensibilibus, ac per hoc omino corporibus secundum suam separatam naturam separatae."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. ii. cap. 91 (vol. v. 151b).

* *Quod autem non intelligantur nisi*, et cet. = but the very fact that only those things are understood which, *et cet.*

And in the second place, even within the range of material objects, we do not understand, from the inside, the nature of the things we define. We only know how they affect us. It is otherwise with the angels:

"Intelligentia nostra multiplicationem habet, quia ex multis sensibilibus veritatem intelligibilem quasi congregamus; est etiam mutabilis, quia ex uno in aliud discurrendo procedit, ex notis ad ignota proveniens; est etiam defectibilis propter permixtionem phantasiae et sensus, ut errores hominum ostendunt. Angelorum autem cognitio est uniformis, quia ab ipso uno veritatis fonte scilicet Deo, accipiunt veritatis cognitionem; est etiam immobilis, quia non discurrendo ab effectibus in causas aut e converso; sed simplici intuitu puram veritatem de rebus intuentur; est etiam indefectibilis, cum ipsas rerum naturas seu quidditates intueantur per seipsas, circa quas non potest intellectus errare, sicut nec sensus circa propria sensibilia; nos autem quidditates rerum ex accidentibus et effectibus cognoscimus."—*Ib.*, lib. iii. cap. 91 (*ib.*, 232b).

It is because Erigena uses *intelligere* exclusively for the process of marking a thing off, by definition, from other things akin to it but differing from it, that he declares that God is "unintelligible to himself" (*cf.* p. 47). God cannot mark off the limits of his own nature, because there are none. This, so far from asserting that God is ignorant of himself, asserts the very opposite: How could God answer the question "Quid est Deus?" since he knows that there is nothing

which includes himself and other than himself, from which he is separated out by a *differentia*?

"Creatrix vero totius universitatis natura, quoniam infinita est, nullis finibus sursum vel deorsum concluditur; ipsa siquidem ambit omnia, et a nullo ambitur. Nec mirum, dum nec a seipsa ambiri sinitur, quia universaliter nescit ambiri; quemadmodum universaliter a seipsa, quanto magis ab alio, comprehendi, seu in aliquo definito vel definibili supernaturaliter effugit intelligi. Nisi forte quis dicat, in hoc solo se ambit, dum se sapit ambiri non posse; in hoc se comprehendit, dum se sapit comprehensibilem non esse; in hoc se intelligit, dum sapit, in ullo se intelligi impossibile esse, quia omne quod est, et potest esse, superat."—*De divisione naturae*, lib. iii. cap. 1 (620 C, D).

The question with reference to Peter (p. 412) rises in a curious connection. If the disembodied soul is not a man, we have to ask whether Christ was true man as well as true God during the three days' interval between his death on the cross and his resurrection? It is urged in the affirmative:

"Petrus est nomen cujusdem singularis in natura humana. Sed post mortem Petri invocamus eum dicentes: *Sancte Petre, ora pro nobis.* Ergo post mortem potest dici homo; et sic videtur quod eadem ratione Christus."

The authority of Peter Lombard is cited in support of the same conclusion, but nevertheless the verdict goes the other way:

"Ad hoc quod sit homo, oportet quod sint anima et corpus conjuncta ad constituendum naturam unam; quod fit per hoc quod [corpus] informatur anima; quod in illo triduo non fuit, *et cet.*"*

And in answer to the objection:

"Illae locutiones sunt synecdochicae, quia ponitur totum pro parte."—3 *Dist.*, xxii. q. 1: a. 1. ob. 6. sol. and ad 6^{m} (vol. vii. 226b *sq.*).

A similar conclusion is reached in the *Sum. Theol.*, iii^{a}. q. 50: a. 4. (Leon., xi. 483).

The appearance of Elijah and Moses on the mount of transfiguration is discussed on the same principle in several passages:

"Non . . . quasi anima Moysi suum corpus resumpserit: sed quod anima eius apparuit per aliquod corpus assumptum, sicut angeli apparent. Elias autem apparuit in proprio corpore, non quidem de caelo empyreo allatus, sed de aliquo eminenti loco, in quem fuerat in curru igneo raptus."—*Ib.*, q. 45: a. 3. ad 2^{m} (Leon., xi. 432b).

Compare:

"Elias sublevatus est in caelum aereum: non autem in caelum empyreum, qui est locus beatorum. Et similiter nec Henoch: sed raptus est ad paradisum terrestrem, ubi cum Elia simul creditur vivere usque ad adventum Antichristi."—*Ib.*, q. 49: a. 5. ad 2^{m} (*ib.*, 476b).

(2) *To page* 414.—The metaphysical argument for the immortality of the soul is briefly this. Anything

* I have supplied the bracketed *corpus*.

compounded of form and matter may perish by the separation of them; for neither form nor matter can exist alone; and though the matter will receive another form, the form it had before has perished. But the human soul, although it is the form of the *compositum*, man, is also a *hoc aliquid* itself (*cf.* p. 432); and not being compounded, it cannot be resolved into its component parts:

"Si ergo sit aliqua forma quae sit habens esse, necesse est illam formam incorruptibilem esse. Non enim separatur esse ab aliquo habente esse, nisi per hoc quod separatur forma ab eo; unde si id quod habet esse, sit ipsa forma, impossibile est quod esse separatur ab eo."

The whole argument is summed up thus; at the conclusion of the article from which the above citation is taken:

"Signum autem hujus ex duobus accipi potest. Primo quidem ex parte intellectus; quia ea etiam quae sunt in seipsis corruptibilia, secundum quod intellectu percipiuntur, incorruptibilia sunt. Est enim intellectus apprehensivus rerum in universali, secundum quem modum non accidit eis corruptio. Secundo ex naturali appetitu, qui in nulla re frustrari potest. Videmus enim in hominibus appetitum esse perpetuitatis; et hoc rationabiliter: quia cum ipsum esse secundum se sit appetibile, oportet quod ab intelligente qui apprehendit esse simpliciter, et non hic et nunc, appetatur esse simpliciter, et secundum omne tempus. Unde videtur quod ipse appetitus non sit inanis; sed quod homo secundum animam intel-

lectivam sit incorruptibilis."—*Quaestio disputata de anima*, a. 14. c. (vol. viii. 508b *sq.*).

Thus the soul, alone of forms, has an independent *esse* or "being" of its own; and it is into this very "being" that it receives the material of the body as a constituent. The "being," therefore, of the *compositum* is the identical "being" that belongs of primary right to the soul, and therefore it is not destroyed by the dissolution of the body:

"Dicendum quod anima illud esse in quo subsistit, communicat materiae corporali, ex qua et anima intellectiva fit unum, ita quod illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiam ipsius animae. Quod non accidit in aliis formis, quae non sunt subsistentes. Et propter hoc anima humana remanet in suo esse, destructo corpore: non autem aliae formae."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 76: a. 1. ad 5^{m} (Leon., v. 210b). *Cf.* note (4).

But it is only those intellective powers which have no bodily organ (*vide* p. 383) that can continue to operate, or be actualised, when the soul is separated from the body:

"Quaedam potentiae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad subiectum, ut intellectus et voluntas. Et huiusmodi potentiae necesse est quod maneant in anima, corpore destructo. Quaedam vero potentiae sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto: sicut omnes potentiae sensitivae partis et nutritivae. Destructo autem subiecto, non potest accidens remanere. Unde corrupto coniuncto, non manent huiusmodi potentiae actu; sed virtute tantum manent in anima,

sicut in principio vel radice."—*Ib.*, q. 77 : a. 8. c. (*ib.*, 249a).

Hence the brute beasts who have no such intellective powers, and for whose bodies there is no expected resurrection, perish utterly :

"Nulla operatio sensitivae partis esse sine corpore potest. In animabus autem brutorum non est invenire aliquam operationem superiorem operationibus sensitivae partis; non enim intelligunt neque ratiocinantur; quod ex hoc apparet quia omnia animalia ejusdem speciei similiter operantur, quasi a natura motae et non ex arte operantes; omnis enim hirundo similiter facit nidum, et omnis aranea similiter telam. Nulla igitur operatio est animae brutorum quae possit sine corpore esse. Cum igitur omnis substantia aliquam operationem habeat, non poterit anima bruti absque corpore esse; ergo, pereunte corpore, perit."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. ii. cap. 82 (vol. v., 138a).

(3) *To pages* 423–429.—The examination here submitted of the doctrine of the *principia individuantia* may be compared with what has already been said by anticipation on pp. 368 *sq.* as to form and individuality.

The *principia individuantia* are material, and not formal to the species the individuals of which they characterise. Our idea of a genus does not tell us the characteristics of the several species it embraces, nor our idea of a species those of the individuals composing it :

"Sicut similitudo naturae generis non potest ducere in cognitionem generis et differentiae, ut per eam species cognoscatur, ita similitudo naturae speciei non potest deducere in cognitionem speciei et principiorum individuantium * quae sunt principia materialia, ut per eam individuum in sua singularitate cognoscatur." — *Contra Gentiles*, lib. ii. cap. 100 (vol. v. 158b).

"In creaturis proprietates manifestant distinctiones individuorum, quae fiunt per materialia principia." *Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 40 : a. 2. c. (Leon., iv. 413a).

Any concrete subject (*suppositum*), *e.g.* "a man," has a special physical frame of his own, and that frame has special characteristics. Another man, with another frame, and other characteristics, shares his humanity, but not his individuality :

"In rebus compositis ex materia et forma, necesse est quod differant natura vel essentia et suppositum. Quia essentia vel natura comprehendit in se illa tantum quae cadunt in definitione speciei : sicut *humanitas* comprehendit in se ea quae cadunt in definitione hominis : his enim homo est homo, et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scilicet quo homo est homo. Sed materia individualis, cum accidentibus omnibus individuantibus ipsam, non cadit in definitione speciei : non enim cadunt in definitione hominis hae carnes et haec ossa, aut albedo vel nigredo, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Unde hae carnes et haec ossa, et accidentia

* I have emended the text of this passage, which reads in all the printed editions I have seen "in cognitionem principiorum speciei et individuantium." I think it is clear that the parallelism requires genus : differentia :: species : principia individuantia.

designantia hanc materiam, non concluduntur in humanitate. Et tamen in eo quod est homo, includuntur: unde id quod est homo, habet in se aliquid quod non habet humanitas."—*Ib.*, q. 3: a. 3. c. (*ib.*, 39b *sq.*).

To form a conception of the origin of these individuating principles we must go back to the beginning of the process of evolution and differentiation from "first matter," at the summit of which the human body stands.

First come the *qualitates activae et passivae* which characterise the elements:

"Calidum et frigidum, quae sunt qualitates activae, sunt priora humido et sicco, quae sunt qualitates passivae."—*Com. in libros physicorum*, lib. i. cap. 5, lectio 10 [§ 48] (Leon., ii. 35a).

In his *De generatione et corruptione*, lib. ii. cap. 2: 4, 5 (329^{b}. 24–330^{a}.12), Aristotle derives all other tangible qualities from these four. The commentary on this treatise that appears in the collected editions of S. Thomas is now regarded as authentic only up to the seventeenth lecture on book i.* We will therefore turn to Albert for an exposition of this point:

"Redeamus ergo et dicamus quod subtile et grossum, et lubricum et aridum, durum et molle, et aliæ omnes differentiæ tangibilium qualitatum sunt ex his quatuor dictis, scilicet calido, frigido, humido, sicco. . . .

"Manifestum est quod omnes aliae differentiae

* *Vide* Preface to vol. iii. of the Leonine edition, p. xxi.

contrarietatum reducuntur ad primas quatuor differentias. . . .

"Illae ergo quatuor constituunt quatuor essentias primas quae elementa dicuntur: et haec sequuntur rationem suorum primorum corporum simplicium, secundum quod apparet in suis qualitatibus, scilicet ignis, aquæ, aeris, et terræ: quia nos videmus quod ignis est calidus et siccus, aer est calidus et humidus, eo quod aer est velut evaporatio quædam: evaporatio autem ex materia habet humidum, et ex causa efficiente habet calidum: et ideo aer est calidus et humidus: aqua autem frigida et humida, terra vero frigida et sicca."—Albertus Magnus, *Com. in libros de generatione et corruptione*, lib. ii. tract. 1, capp. 7, 8 [§§ 10, 15, 16] (vol. iv. 422a, 423b, 424a).

Returning to Thomas, we find that the weaving together, or *complexio*, of the elements, with their primary and secondary qualitities, may vary continuously. The *complexio*, however, which constitutes a body as belonging to such and such a kind, though it may vary within limits that admit of wide diversity, is sharply defined at its boundaries:

"Cum enim alicui generi deputatur aliqua complexio, hoc non est secundum aliquem indivisibilem gradum, sed secundum latitudinem quamdam; ita quod est invenire aliquos terminos ultra quos non salvatur complexio illius generis. Sed inter illos terminos est multa diversitas, secundum quod acceditur ad unum vel alterum: verbi gratia, complexio debita corpori humano est complexio temperatissima; et tamen sunt multi gradus temperamenti, secundum

quos quidam dicuntur melancholici, quidam cholerici, et sic de aliis, secundum propinquitatem ad terminos complexionis humanae speciei vel in calore vel in frigore; ita tamen quod est aliquis gradus caloris vel frigoris, quem non transit humana complexio."—2 *Dist.*, xv. q. 2: a. 1. sol. (vol. vi. 516b *sq.*).

Thus (to take the simplest kind of instance) though air may be "disposed" to become fire by gradual heating, we have seen (p. 426) that there is no intermediate grade between air and fire, and therefore no gradual change from the form of air to the form of fire. The transition is *at* a point in time, which point is a division in time but occupies no time itself. The analogy is with a point which divides the line A B at C. A C and C B meet at C; but there is nothing between them and they do not overlap. The point C is at once the end of A C and the beginning of C B. Thus the old form goes and the new form arrives simultaneously; and the material is never either without form or with two forms at once. So there is, strictly speaking, no "movement" across the point or line, for movement is over space, however small, and there is no space *at* a point. There is only a spaceless division. All this is good mathematics but bad physics, and in its application to forms it is the most conspicuous illustration of the way in which Aristotle's relativity and fluidity of doctrine are qualified by the rigidity and absoluteness of his scholastic disciples and, as I think, even by one of his early editors.*

* I refer especially to the fifth book of the *Physics*. I am convinced (though I can make no claim to authority) that in its present

The transition, then, from one substantial form to another is abrupt; and it is in this sense that we are to understand the assertion:

"Cum esse substantiale cuiuslibet rei sit in aliquo indivisibili, non potest aliqua continuitas attendi in formis substantialibus, ut motus continuus possit esse de una forma in aliam." *

And:

"Esse substantiale cuiuslibet rei in indivisibili consistit."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 76: a. 4. ad 4^{m} (Leon., v. 224b).

A contrary supposition is regarded as a *reductio ad absurdum*:

"Sed hoc stare non potest . . . quia sequeretur quod generatio animalis esset motus continuus, paulatim procedens de imperfecto ad perfectum."—*Ib.*, q. 118: a. 2. ad 2^{m} (*ib.*, 566b *sq.*).

Now, in the embryo, the higher form, when it replaces the lower, takes over all its functions, as well as exercising its own:

"Et ideo dicendum est quod, cum generatio unius semper sit corruptio alterius, necesse est dicere quod tam in homine quam in animalibus aliis, quando perfectior forma advenit, fit corruptio prioris: ita tamen quod sequens forma habet quidquid habebat

form it is neither directly due to Aristotle nor consistent with his teaching. The same (as will perhaps be more readily admitted by the authorities) is true of the seventh book. Much of the more rigid treatment of "forms" in the Schoolmen is based on this fifth book.

* I regret that I took down a wrong reference in my note of this passage, and I have not been able to recover it.

prima, et adhuc amplius. Et sic per multas generationes et corruptiones pervenitur ad ultimam formam substantialem, tam in homine quam in aliis animalibus."—*Ib.* (*ib.*, 567).

"Unde dicendum est quod nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva; et quod ipsa, sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nutritivam, ita virtute continet omnes inferiores formas, et facit ipsa sola quidquid imperfectiores formae in aliis faciunt.—Et similiter est dicendum de anima sensitiva in brutis, et de nutritiva in plantis, et universaliter de omnibus formis perfectioribus respectu inferiorum."—*Ib.*, q. 76: a. 4. c. (*ib.*, 224a).

And note particularly that these virtues include all the "disposings" of the material made under the lower forms as it is being prepared for the higher. These disposings are taken over by the higher form as an inheritance, and kept by it. Thus, when it has once come into possession, it is the higher form itself that holds the matter in its proper disposition; and in this sense it disposes its own matter for itself, though (as we shall see) it could not re-dispose it essentially otherwise than it finds it:

"Ab una et eadem forma materia recipit diversos gradus perfectionis; et secundum quod materia perficitur inferiori gradu perfectionis, remanet adhuc materialis dispositio ad ulterioris perfectionis gradum."—*Quaestio de anima*, a. 11. ad 18^{m} (vol. viii. 501a).

Thus, through a continuous succession of "dispositions" and "complexions," and a discontinuous succession of "forms," the human body is at last

elaborated to the point at which it is ready to be informed by the rational soul:

"Successive corpus formatur et disponitur ad animam: unde primo tanquam imperfecte dispositum, recipit animam imperfectam; et postmodum, quando perfecte est dispositum, recipit animam perfectam."—*Sum. Theol.*, iii[a]. q. 33: a. 2. ad 3[m] (Leon., xi. 342b).

Thus we have traced up the *principia individuantia*, that distinguish one man from another, all the way from the prime distribution of the elements which ultimately determines his "temperament," through successive elaborations as the material passes through the intermediate forms, and have seen that there is room everywhere for wide diversity, provided always that the fixed limits are not passed.

And now we learn, not without amazement, that the relation which subsists between the general characteristics of the human frame and the human soul, subsists also between the individual variations (within the limits allowed by the human frame) and the individuated soul that is united to it; so that the soul of Socrates could no more enter the body of Plato than the soul of a dog could enter that of a wolf:

"Sicut enim animae humanae secundum suam speciem competit quod tali corpori secundum speciem uniatur, ita haec anima differt ab illa numero solo, ex hoc quod ad aliud numero corpus habitudinem habet; et sic individuantur animae humanae."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. ii. cap. 75 (vol. v. 128a).

"Sicut de ratione speciei hominis sunt carnes et

ossa, non tamen hae carnes et haec ossa, quae sunt principia Socratis et Platonis."—*Ib.*, cap. 92 (*ib.*, 153a).

"Non est igitur possibile quod anima canis ingrediatur corpus lupi, vel anima hominis aliud corpus quam hominis. Sed quae est proportio animae hominis ad corpus hominis, eadem est proportio animae hujus hominis ad corpus hujus hominis. Non est igitur possibile animam hujus hominis ingredi aliud corpus quam istius hominis." — *Ib.*, cap. 73 (*ib.*, 122b).

It is true that the immediate reference of this last passage is to the impossibility of the transmigration of souls, but the impossibility of the soul of Plato originally uniting with the embryonic body of Socrates without having the very *habitudo* that constitutes the soul of Socrates, equally follows. If there were any doubt in the matter, it would be removed by such a passage as this:

"Manifestum est enim quod quanto corpus est melius dispositum, tanto meliorem sortitur animam: quod manifeste apparet in his quae sunt secundum speciem diversa. Cujus ratio est, quia actus et forma recipitur in materia secundum materiae capacitatem. Unde cum etiam in hominibus quidam habeant corpus melius dispositum, sortiuntur animam majoris virtutis in intelligendo."—*Sum Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 85: a. 7. c. (Leon., v. 344b).

Finally, we have to realise the full implications of this doctrine by noting that not only the intellectual powers of the soul but its moral predispositions are

conditioned, like its temperament, by the physical constitution of the body:

"Quanto organum tactus fuerit magis reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis, tanto perceptibilior erit tactus. . . .

"Et propter hoc homo inter omnia animalia melioris est tactus.—Et inter ipsos homines, qui sunt melioris tactus, sunt melioris intellectus: cuius signum est, quod *molles carne bene aptos mente videmus.*"—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 76: a. 5. c. (Leon., v. 228a).

"Diversitas complexionis est ex diversa dispositione materiae, quae principium individuationis est; quae quanto magis est disposita, tanto perfectius naturam speciei consequitur, secundum quod est principium personalium operationum: et per hunc etiam modum potest esse fomes* in quibusdam intensior in comparatione ad operationes quae individuo debentur; non autem absolute prout naturam respicit."—2 *Dist.*, xxxii. q. 1: a. 3. ad 2^{m} (vol. vi. 680a).

Original sin, as sin, has its seat indeed in the soul, but it is inherited only through the flesh. The soul catches it from the flesh by infection. In itself it comes clean from its creative source in God:

"Semen autem carnale sicut est instrumentalis causa traductionis humanae naturae in prolem, ita est instrumentalis causa traductionis peccati originalis; et ita peccatum originale est in carne, id est in carnali semine, virtute, sicut in causa instrumentali. . . .

* "Fomes nihil aliud dicit quam pronitatem quamdam ad inordinate concupiscendum."—*Ib.*, ob. 2 (*ib.*, 679b).

"Anima rationalis non habet immunditiam peccati originalis, nec a se, nec a Deo, sed ex unione ad carnem: sic enim fit pars humanae naturae derivatae ab Adam.

"Anima unitur corpori ut forma, et ideo comparatur luci incorporatae, quae inquinatur ex admixtione; sicut patet de radio transeunte per aerem nubilosum, qui obscuratur."—*De malo*, q. 4: a. 3. c. ad 1^{m}, 3^{m} (vol. viii. 289).

(4) *To pages* 429–436.—The leading passage on the continuous series of forms, from those of the elements to the angelic spirits, explaining how the soul is *hoc aliquid* as being capable of independent existence, but is the *forma corporis* as being the life of the body, and together with it constituting the individual man, is so important as to justify the citation of long extracts:

"Hoc aliquid proprie dicitur individuum in genere substantiae. . . . Individuum autem in genere substantiae non solum habet quod per se possit subsistere, sed quod sit aliquid completum in aliqua specie et genere substantiae: unde Philosophus etiam in Praedicamentis, manum et pedem et hujusmodi nominat partes substantiarum magis quam substantias. . . . Duobus igitur existentibus de ratione ejus quod est hoc aliquid; quidam utrumque animae humanae abstulerunt. . . . Sed haec positio stare non potest. . . . Et propter hoc posteriores philosophi judicaverunt partem animae intellectivam esse aliquid per se subsistens: dicit enim Philosophus, in iii. *De*

anima, quod intellectus est substantia quaedam et non corrumpitur. Et inidem redit dictum Platonis ponentis animam immortalem et per se subsistentem. . . . Sed ulterius posuit Plato quod anima humana non solum per se subsisteret, sed quod etiam haberet in se completam naturam speciei. Ponebat enim totam naturam speciei in anima esse, dicens hominem non esse aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, sed animam corpori advenientem: ut sit comparatio animae ad corpus sicut nautae ad navem, vel sicuti induti ad vestem. Sed haec opinio stare non potest. Manifestum est enim, id quo vivit corpus, animam esse; vivere autem est esse viventium: anima igitur est quo corpus humanum habet esse actu. Hujusmodi autem forma est. . . . Relinquitur igitur quod anima est hoc aliquid, ut per se potens subsistere; non quasi habens in se completam speciem, sed quasi perficiens speciem humanam ut forma corporis; et sic similiter est forma et hoc aliquid.

"Quod quidem ex ordine formarum naturalium considerari potest. Invenitur enim inter formas inferiorum corporum tanto aliqua altior, quanto superioribus principiis magis assimilatur et appropinquat. Quod quidem ex propriis formarum operationibus perpendi potest. Formae enim elementorum, quae sunt infimae, et materiae propinquissimae, non habent aliquam operationem excedentem qualitates activas et passivas, ut rarum et densum, et aliae hujusmodi, quae videntur esse materiae dispositiones. Super has autem sunt formae mixtorum corporum, quae praeter praedictas operationes, habent aliquam operationem

consequentem speciem, quam sortiuntur ex corporibus caelestibus; sicut quod adamas attrahit ferrum, non propter calorem aut frigus aut aliquid hujusmodi, sed ex quadem participatione virtutis caelestis. Super has autem formas sunt iterum animae plantarum, quae habent similitudinem non solum ad ipsa corpora caelestia, sed ad motores corporum caelestium, inquantum sunt principia cujusdam motus quibusdam seipsa moventibus. Super has autem ulterius sunt animae brutorum, quae similitudinem jam habent ad substantiam moventem caelestia corpora, non solum in operatione qua movent corpora, sed etiam in hoc quod in seipsis cognoscitivae sunt; licet brutorum cognitio sit materialium tantum, et materialiter; unde organis corporalibus indigent. Super has autem ultimo sunt animae humanae, quae similitudinem habent ad superiores substantias etiam in genere cognitionis, quia immaterialia cognoscere possunt intelligendo. In hoc tamen ab eis differunt, quod intellectus animae humanae habet naturam acquirendi cognitionem immaterialem ex cognitione materialium, quae est per sensum. Sic igitur ex operatione animae humanae, modus esse ipsius cognosci potest. Inquantum enim habet operationem materialia transcendentem, esse suum est supra corpus elevatum, non dependens ex ipso; inquantum vero immaterialem cognitionem ex materiali est nata acquirere, manifestum est quod complementum suae speciei esse non potest sine corporis unione. Non enim aliquid est completum in specie, nisi habeat ea quae requiruntur ad propriam operationem ipsius

speciei. Si igitur anima humana, inquantum unitur corpori ut forma, habet esse elevatum supra corpus non dependens ab eo; manifestum est quod ipsa est in confinio corporalium et separatarum substantiarum constituta."—*Quaestio disputata de anima*, a. 1. c. (vol. viii. 466a *sq.*).

Compare the citations of passages on man as the horizon between corporeal and incorporeal beings on pp. 395 *sq.* To which may be added the prologue to the third book of the Commentary on the *Sentences* (vol. vii. 5b). Compare further the passages on the progressive dematerialisation of *species* on pp. 371 *sqq.*

(5) *To page* 442.—On the mysterious nature of the connection of mind and matter in man, and on the relative significance of each as relating us directly to reality, I have found nothing more striking than the words of Gregory of Nyssa. The mind, he tells us, neither embraces the body nor is embraced by it, but in some inexplicable way it so approaches it and is connected with it as to think both in it and about it. All we can say is that the bodily organs, without transgressing their own physical limitations, in some unspeakable and unthinkable manner lay down the tracks along which the mind realises its energies, so that if anything goes wrong with them the mind too limps and stumbles.

Ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ πρὸς τὸ σωματικὸν κοινωνία, ἄφραστόν τε καὶ ἀνεπινόητον τὴν συνάφειαν ἔχει, οὔτε ἐντὸς οὖσα· οὔτε γὰρ

ἐγκρατεῖται σώματι τὸ ἀσώματον· οὔτε ἐκτὸς παριέχουσα· οὐ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει τι τὰ ἀσώματα. ἀλλὰ κατά τίνα τρόπον ἀμήχανόν τε καὶ ἀκατανόητον εγγίζων ὁ νοῦς τῇ φύσει, καὶ προσαπτόμενος, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν θεωρεῖται, οὔτε ἐγκαταθήμενος, οὔτε περιπτυσσόμενος· ἀλλὰ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἢ νοῆσαι. πλὴν ὅτι κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον αὐτῆς εἱρμὸν εὐοδουμένης τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἐνέργος γίγνεται. εἰ δέ τι πλημμέλημα περὶ ταύτην συμπέσοι, σκάζει κατ' ἐκεῖνο καὶ τῆς διανοίας ἡ κίνησις.—*De opificio hominis*, cap. 15 (vol. i. pp. 82 D *sq.*).

And again:

In connection with the account of the creation of man in Genesis, he brings out with great beauty the intimate nature of man's twofold access to the material and spiritual universe in virtue of his twofold nature. God established man, he says, upon two principles, or constituents, clay and the divine inbreathing, in order that he might have the home feeling of kinship alike in his intercourse with God and in his enjoyment of earthly blessings:

Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διπλᾶς αὐτῷ τῆς κατασκευῆς τὰς ἀφορμὰς καταβάλλεται, τῷ γηίνῳ τὸ θεῖον ἐγκαταμίξας· ἵνα δι' ἀμφοτέρων συγγενῶς τε καὶ οἰκείως πρὸς ἑκατέραν ἀπόλαυσιν ἔχῃ, τοῦ Θεοῦ μὲν διὰ τῆς θειοτέρας φύσεως, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν γῆν ἀγαθῶν διὰ τῆς ὁμογενοῦς αἰσθήσεως ἀπολαύων.—*Ib.*, cap. 2 (*ib.*, 51 C).

LECTURE VII

ETHICS

With the exception of the doctrine of the human soul as an entity, there is perhaps no region of speculation on which a harmony between the Aristotelian philosophy and the body of Christian tradition seems to be more urgently required or more difficult to establish than is the field of Ethics. The two systems differ in their approach to the subject, in the spirit that animates them, in the motives to which they appeal, and in their positive contents. And yet they must be brought into relation with each other; for the Christian ethic was of course established in the inmost citadel of the loyalty, conviction, and affections of Aquinas; and the Aristotelian ethic is so true to fact, gives such a convincing analysis of that conduct and character which as a matter of fact we admire, and is such a faithful reflex of our practical efforts after a well-ordered life, that, however little it may rouse the enthusiasm or satisfy the aspirations of many types of mind, it cannot possibly be ignored in any philosophical theory of human conduct and its regulating principles.

Perhaps we shall best begin our examination of

the problem before us by remarking that to Aquinas Ethics is a branch of Theology, whereas to Aristotle it is a branch of the study of Nature. Aristotle divides the speculative sciences into the Mathematical, the Natural, and the Theological. And he tells us that Theology is concerned with all that is separated (or separable) from matter, and so from motion. Metaphysics belongs to it. The doctrine of the heavens touches upon it. But Ethics, closely associated with politics, lies well within the domain of Natural science. Whereas to Aquinas, God being the origin and the goal of all things, and specifically of rational creatures, and man being made after the image of God, and Ethics being concerned with his progress towards God, by the divinely appointed way, it follows that Ethics is an integral part of Theology.

The distinction strikes deep. There can be no absolute standard or test and no appeal to authority for Aristotle. We can only define right conduct as the conduct which we admire, and which we wish to see prevalent. And, on examination, we find it to consist in giving due weight, and no more, to every relevant consideration. But different men admire different kinds of conduct, and have different ideas of what weight is due to this or that consideration. All we can do is to eliminate from our ideals the wilful and passionate element that enters into our own conduct, by contrasting the conduct towards which we are impelled with that which we admire, and trying to regulate the former by the latter

whenever they diverge. Deliberate formation of an ideal depends upon estimates and proportions; and estimates and proportions are necessarily relative.

From the point of view of Aquinas, on the other hand, ethical conduct has an absolute standard behind it. The way that we are to tread is appointed for us. We must learn the divine behests, and obey. It is true that there is a meeting ground for the two systems in the very conception that man is made after the image of God. So that Thomas's divine command and Aristotle's natural admirations at any rate may overlap each other even if they cannot wholly coincide. And we shall see in the next lecture that unfallen man, though the fate of himself and his progeny depended upon his obedience to a command the meaning of which he could not understand, nevertheless could clearly read in his own nature and in his own impulses all that part of the will of God that concerned his natural and human relations. To some extent this remained true even after the fall, for the image of God was not wholly obliterated by the first sin, however much it was troubled by it. But, now that the passions and impulses of man have become rebellious and corrupt, he must be incessantly on the watch against the sin that lies at the door to surprise him, and he is in constant need of help, even when he sees the true path. The thought of sin was indeed in danger of becoming an obsession to the Christian moralist. It is on the side of this constant preoccupation with sin and the means of removing its stains and averting its consequences that the ethics

of Aquinas connect themselves with the sacrament of penitence. The formal distinction between mortal and venial sins, and the whole system of the miraculous or sacramental restoration of the sinner, lie wholly outside the Aristotelian ethics, and find their analogy in the Mysteries, if anywhere, in the Pagan world. But the very feature that distinguishes the Christian from the Pagan mysteries is the intimate connection of the former with ethics. Christianity, when all is said and done, has never wholly dissipated the priceless inheritance of ethical monotheism which it received from Israel. (1)

If we turn, from this constant fear of alienation from the love of God by sin, and the incessant demand for expiation and reinstatement, to Aristotle, we shall be struck by the calm and objective manner in which he approaches the express treatment of evil habits and dispositions in the seventh book of the *Ethics*. He opens it with a classification of the several "kinds of conduct to be avoided" (or we might perhaps go so far as to translate it "shunned"), but there is no trace of the Christian horror of "sin."

Moreover, the Christian conception of a prescribed way to a goal that lies beyond the grave, combined with the conception of right conduct as obedience to a law against which our corrupt nature is in constant rebellion, gives rise to the "otherworldliness" that seems constantly to refer conduct to standards that are not intrinsic to itself and its human relations. "What will its effect be in getting me to the goal?" becomes a perpetually pressing question; and conduct

tends to be looked at rather in its personal aspect than in its social bearings. Both systems, however, find their ultimate ideal in a life of supreme mental fruition, conceived in one case as the vision of God, and in the other as the fullest intercourse with truth to which man, within the limit of his own nature, can attain. But while Thomas looks beyond the grave for a fruition of which human nature, as we know it, is incapable, Aristotle's effort and aspiration is always directed to living the divine and immortal life to the utmost capacity of our nature here and now. (2)

The thought of rewards and punishments beyond the grave as an incentive to moral conduct is directly suggested by what has been said of otherworldliness. It is indeed one of the most marked distinctions between the Aristotelian and the Christian ethics. The conception and the phraseology of rewards and punishments pervade the Christian exhortations, and sometimes obscure the intrinsic significance of right conduct. But in Aquinas, at any rate, the motive of fear is hardly at all appealed to. His ghastly treatment of the subject of Hell taints, as we have seen, the spiritual aspects of his teaching in other and deeper ways, but not in this. And even the conception of reward, though far more prominent, is absorbed almost completely into the motive of love, and is transfigured by it.

Thus it is recorded of Thomas by his biographer William of Tocco, that as he drew near to the completion of the *Summa Theologiae* he was seen by brother Dominic of Caserta "elevated," as he wept

in prayer before the Crucifix, and the said brother heard a voice from the image saying, "Thomas, thou hast written well concerning me. What wage wilt thou receive from me for thy toil?" to which Thomas answered, "Lord, naught but thee." *

And this leads us directly to the last great distinction of principle that flows from the difference of approach by which Aristotle and Aquinas lead us to the problems of ethics. The ethical writings of Aquinas are full of the idea of "merit." But no actions are "meritorious" unless they are inspired by the love of God. We shall return to this subject on its own account a little later on (p. 505). What we have to note now, in apparent conflict with so much that we have just observed, is that the deepest of all the contrasts between the Aristotelian and the Christian ethic is that the latter finds its supreme motive in love; primarily in love of God, and then secondarily in love of man without distinction of race or status.

As to the disinterested love of God as the supremely good, there is a lovely mediæval story which shows it in all its beauty, and at the same time illustrates the way in which it was sometimes crossed and thwarted by teaching concerning the rewards and punishments of heaven and hell.

Again I draw upon Joinville's *Life of S. Louis*: "And as they were passing from their lodging to that of the Sultan, brother Yves saw an old woman crossing the street with a chafing dish of fire in her

* *Acta Sanctorum*, Martii, vol. i. p. 669a, B.

right hand and a cruse of water in her left. And he asked her, 'What do you mean to do with them?' And she answered that she meant to burn up heaven with that fire so as to make a clean end of it, and to put out hell with the water and make a clean end of it too. And he asked her why she would do that. And she answered, 'Because I would never have any man do right for the reward of heaven or for fear of hell, but just to win the love of God whose worth is so great, and who can do us all possible good.'"

The naive reversion of the old woman's thought after all, to the securing of what God can "do for us," hardly disturbs our sense of the beauty of the story; but the theologians were well aware of the distinction between loving God because he is "good to us" and loving him because he is "good" in himself, and it is in this higher grade of love that they found the supreme inspiration not only of their devotions but of their conduct. (3)

Ultimately it must, according to Aquinas, be the love of God that inspires all conduct that really counts as good; but love of God implies love of the image of God in man, and therefore the Christian is inspired by love of his fellow-man. This is a distinctive feature of the New Testament teaching, the germs of which are already to be found in the Old. Before Paul's great saying, that in the image of God in man "there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free," Aristotle's halting defence of the institution

of slavery and his kindly, even tender, attitude of superiority towards women, shrivel up or melt away. They cannot live in the Christian atmosphere.

It is of course too obvious to need assertion that there has never been such a thing as a "Christian nation" in the sense of a nation that adopted, or desired to adopt, any recognisable approximation to the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount in actual practice. But some of its conceptions, however readily abandoned, or even repudiated, under stress of passion, by professors of Christianity, have always retained or reasserted their power over Christian ideals, and it is of the introduction into the Occidental consciousness of new ideals and aspirations, for good or ill, that I am now speaking. Thus the association of women and slaves in our last illustration may naturally lead up to the consideration of a final group of characteristic differences between Christian and Aristotelian ethics. It concerns not only the approaches or the spirit and motives but the positive contents of the two systems. The sexual ethics of the Græco-Roman world rested upon a differentiating between the standards for men and for women, and upon the institution of slavery; and whatever doubts may be thrown upon the extent to which Christianity, or any other influence, has modified the fundamental facts, there can be no doubt that Christian ideals, efforts, and aspirations have, from the first, been constant in refusing to sanction a code whereby a class of men is entitled to exact chastity in one rank of womanhood to support their dignity, and its

absence in another rank to further their convenience or satisfaction. However much the traditions of Christian chastity may be challenged in our day, even by high-minded men, the Christian ideal of a spiritual democracy, which is the soul of it, is not open to their attack.

This uplifting of the ideal of sexual relations, however, is, in the mediæval ethic, closely associated with asceticism. The Christian demand for self-restraint and self-discipline was severe. The things of the flesh were sharply separated from the things of the spirit. The suspicion of all natural impulses, fostered by the doctrine of the fall, was deep. And the habit of dwelling upon a heavenly state, in which there would be no material wants or appetites at all, was ardently cultivated. All these influences combined to enforce the idea that celibacy was a higher spiritual state than matrimony.

"Matrimony" always appears to occupy a somewhat equivocal position amongst the "sacraments." It is a sacrament, Aquinas tells us, as a type of the union of Christ and the Church; and it is even meritorious when entered upon for the sake of the production and due education of children to worship God; but, seeing that this function ranks below that of the celibate self-dedication, one cannot get rid of the feeling that matrimony is the lifting of a taboo rather than a consecration, and should rank with dispensations rather than with sacraments. All the other sacraments are directly and positively spiritual in their working, and lift the believer

upwards; but this allows him to accept a second best blamelessly. (4)

That the union of man and maid, even at its highest and best, should itself be a sacrament, is hardly within the range either of the Hellenic or the Ecclesiastical mind. Nevertheless it would have been easy to find the root from which it might spring in the Christian inheritance from Israel.

Aquinas is far from being a typical ascetic. Though he glows with a rare enthusiasm when he sings the praises of "poverty," or defends the institution of the "orders" that profess it, the extreme forms of asceticism are never, that I have observed, lauded or sanctioned by him. But he is quite sufficiently affected by the general spirit of asceticism to make his attitude towards the natural appetites markedly different from that of Aristotle. The popular idea that the sternness of self-discipline was entirely absent from the Greek ideal of the moral life, and that self-abnegation is foreign to it, is indeed a grotesque error; but it is true that asceticism, in the proper sense, finds no place in the Greek ethic. Both sides of my contention are illustrated by the remarkable passages in which Aristotle explains, on the one hand, that excessive love of pleasure is one of the most insidious sources of evil conduct, and one against which we must be so incessantly on our guard that we shall do well to hold any course that is pleasant under suspicion; but declares, on the other hand, that though, theoretically, there is another opposite vice, to wit the excessive indifference to pleasure, yet but

as no one ever falls a victim to it, it has never had a name given to it,* and we need not trouble ourselves about it. One can imagine how repulsive and unnatural a vice the asceticism so often lauded as a super-virtue in Christian hagiography would have appeared to him.

Nor is this the only instance in which what Aristotle counted a vicious extreme ranks as a high virtue with the Christian teachers. The vice opposite to arrogance did not exist to the Christian saint, for humility and self-abasement could not be carried to a point at which it would be regarded as an abject or spiritless want of self-respect. And again, some forms at least of reckless prodigality (though not those directly contemplated by Aristotle) would rank as virtues to most of the mediæval writers, but would assuredly have been condemned by Aristotle.

These are some of the most striking differences between the two systems of ethics that Aquinas had to relate to each other. In many respects the sympathies of the modern student will incline towards the Pagan rather than the Ecclesiastical ideal. But we are always tempted to exaggerate the relative importance of those features of any system which supplement the defects of the one we stand most closely related to, or which strengthen us in our revolt against what we resent in it. This is a natural and even harmless incident in our ethical development, for it is simply a turning to the spiritual food, wherever

* He seems to suggest "insensibility" as a possible one. Cf. *Eth. Nic.*, ii. 9 : 6. iii. 11 : 7.

we find it, that our organism needs at the moment. Yet, in any philosophical attempt to estimate the historical or intrinsic significance of the great movements of civilisation, whatever else we do we must not fail to pay due reverence to what Seeley called the "enthusiasm" and Auguste Comte the "religion" of humanity. We cannot go back in our sympathies to ideals that accepted slavery as the permanent basis of human society. And we cannot retreat from the admirations and the affections of that "charity" which "beareth all things, hopeth all things, believeth all things, endureth all things." Auguste Comte and his disciples are right in regarding the mediæval Church and its ideals as the main influence in educating the deeper and broader affections of humanity.

May I suggest as an extreme illustration—so extreme that it can only be justified as a corrective and a provocative—the placing of two well-known characters side by side in the imagination. They resemble each other pretty closely in the external conditions of their lives, grounded in both cases on their indifference to the objects that most men pursue. But Diogenes was actuated by scorn, and Francis of Assisi by love, and no one thinks of the Cynic and the Saint as of the same spiritual fraternity.

Even in the saints of Stoicism or Neoplatonism, an Epictetus, a Marcus Antoninus or a Plotinus, we are conscious of a certain spirit of ethical aristocracy which contentedly guards its own superiority on the one side and accepts the inferiority of the mass

of men on the other as a natural and permanent fact that must be acquiesced in calmly, or even cheerfully.

Faith in the high possibilities of ordinary human nature has assumed many shapes, and has found many forms of expression and has met, and meets, thwartings and betrayals without number, but it has not died, and cannot die, in communities that have been touched by the Christian ideal of a spiritual democracy.

The analogies suggested by previous branches of our enquiry will have prepared us for the general principle by which Aquinas relates to each other the two systems of ethics with which he has to deal. Just as, in right thinking, human reason is sound as far as it goes but does not go far enough, and revelation is needed to carry it further, and also to give it a heightened strength and security even on its own ground, so we shall expect to find that right feelings and a sense for right conduct are a part of human nature even as we know it. Our expectation is not disappointed. Aquinas repeatedly declares that a general goodwill towards his fellow-men is natural to man. An indifferent stranger may be expected to help up a man who has fallen down, or to direct him on his way; and our natural admirations and aspirations stretch up indefinitely beyond such elementary manifestations of helpfulness. There is, in short, a natural ethic, beautiful, exalted, and strenuous, parallel to the natural religion and theology which carried the Ethnic philosophers to such noble heights. Of this natural ethic Aristotle is the classical ex-

ponent, though by no means the only one, and there is no reason to expect that Aquinas should have any difficulty in principle in incorporating the whole of this natural system of ethics, for what it is worth, in his ideal of Christian conduct. For what it is worth; but it does not reach the height of the Sermon on the Mount or of the thirteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians. This more exalted ethic can only be reached by divine grace, and the virtues that aspire to it are "infused," not natural.

Some readers of Aquinas seem to equate these "infused" virtues with the "theological" virtues of faith (in revealed truth), hope (of everlasting life), and love (of God as revealed by faith). But this is a mistake. The theological virtues are indeed beyond the range of natural ethic and must be infused by divine grace, but when so infused they can raise the Aristotelian virtues to a higher degree of intensity and carry them beyond their sober limitations into a region of more aggressive and enthusiastic activity, for they take down into the very springs of action and the inmost sense of values a transforming spirit of charity. It is the higher moral and intellectual virtues thus built upon the theological virtues that are specifically spoken of as "infused virtues."

Thus the relation of the natural or Aristotelian ethic to the specifically Christian ethic corresponds to that borne by reason to revelation. In both cases the higher level can only be reached by grace not by the action of man's natural powers; and in both cases the gifts of grace not only lift man

beyond the range of his nature, but also guide him with firmer hand and enlighten him with clearer vision even within that range.

But the parallel is not complete. The fall of man weakened his intelligence, but it introduced no directly antagonistic principle into his mental processes. On the other hand, the disturbance of that natural harmony or balance of the desires and impulses which characterised the life of Eden (of which I shall speak again in a concluding lecture) did indeed leave man with a perception and admiration of goodness still active, though weakened, but it also subjected him to the attacks of every form of "concupiscence" in active opposition to his moral impulses. There is always the *fomes*, or tinder, of unregulated desires ready to catch any spark of evil. This *fomes* is so essential a part of the nature of fallen man that, according to Aquinas, it was present even in the constitution of the Blessed Virgin herself, though it was miraculously kept in permanent and complete inaction in her. (5)

Of course the judgment also may be perverted by passion; but this is an attack upon it from outside, whereas the attack by the passions upon the will is direct and internal. And again, the feeble intelligence can accept, by implicit faith, the conclusions of the stronger intelligence, even when it cannot either follow the reasoning or even fully understand the resulting truths. But the weaker will cannot take over the triumph of the stronger will, ready made, and adopt it as its own.

Aristotle's ideal of a balance or harmony, that allows to every impulse or desire just as much as it ought to have and no more, was to be supported, in his system, by a sound education, sound public institutions, and deliberate self-direction and self-control. It was an aspiration towards something that had never yet been completely realised, but to which the civilised man's own nature directed and urged him.

To Aquinas, man before the fall had spontaneously realised it. And now, in our fallen state, every deflection from it must be regarded by the believer as a pollution and an apostasy.

Thus we find that Aquinas can expound, enforce, and illustrate Aristotle's *Ethics* without embarrassment or protest; but when he is developing his own system of ethics he draws comparatively little upon Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, which was evidently, in his eyes, too palpably inadequate to control and redeem the warring and rebellious passions of fallen man.

In a word, the conception of sin is never absent. The cry: *Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis hujus?* * with its theological and sacramental answer, colours the whole ethical system of Aquinas. But it is balanced, and often transfigured, by his sense of *caritas* as the ultimate and dominating principle of a harmonious and triumphant life.

We may now proceed to an orderly exposition of the main principles of the ethical teaching of Aquinas.

* Rom. vii. 24.

We will begin with the psychological basis upon which it rests. This basis, though strongly influenced by the Christian conceptions of merit and of rewards and punishments, is yet essentially Aristotelian, as is the ground-tissue of the Thomist psychology generally.

The very conception of moral or immoral conduct rests upon the fact that man is a free agent. A stone has no choice. Its conduct is rigidly determined by its nature and the conditions to which it is subject. God could of course make a stone rise instead of falling, but that would be a miracle, for it would be a case of the immediate action of God superseding and reversing his mediate action through nature. An animal adapts its means to its ends, which a stone does not, for a stone has no end of its own at all, since it only fulfils the ends of nature; nor does it take any note of the consequences of its action, and therefore it could not in any case act with reference to them. But the animal does this or that not merely because something has taken place already, but also in order that something else which it desires may take place in the future. Yet (according to the then prevalent ideas on the psychology of animals) the brute has really no choice of *ends*, but responds to the suggestion of his senses without exercising any judgment. And, though he adapts his *means* to his ends, and therefore exercises choice between different alternatives, either of which could be adopted without violation of his nature, yet he has not "free" choice, since he has no choice at all of

ends, and will inevitably choose the means that appear to lead most directly to the end suggested at the moment from without.

Man, on the other hand, within certain limits, chooses his own ends, and therefore exercises not only choice, but free choice; and, since the desire or love of something dictates all our ends, moral conduct is rooted in the steadfast cleaving to *right* desires or loves; and thus the will is an "intellectual appetite," *i.e.* a love or desire cherished because its object is deemed good.

Man is free to choose his ends "within certain limits"; but all men necessarily desire conclusive blessedness, though they may have false or confused ideas as to that wherein conclusive bliss consists, or they may allow themselves to shut out of sight the bearing of their conduct upon the supreme end, because they are swayed by some imperious longing for a partial and temporal good that does not really conduce to complete and conclusive bliss.

Thus there is a close parallel between moral and intellectual aberrations, only they act in different directions or "senses" (in the mathematical meaning of the term). What we have given us intellectually is a stock of axioms from which we cannot escape, and certain powers of arriving at other truths by affiliating them to these axioms. Error consists in accepting the delusive appearance of a concatenation, that does not really exist, between the axioms and the conclusion. Broadly speaking, both the perception of the axioms and the processes of abstraction and

reasoning by which further truths are won come under the intelligence or understanding (*intellectus*), but, more narrowly, that term may be confined to the perception of the truth of the axioms, and the term reason (*ratio*) may be appropriated to the process of relating other truth to them. We may choose any subject for enquiry we like, but it must always be the axioms, or what has already been deduced from them, that we take as our fixed point. We must start with what we already have and find out the conclusion which it justifies.

But, in conduct, it is the other way. We find our fixed point in the end which is not yet within our reach, and we work down from it by connecting it with the things that will lead up to it, until at last we come to the immediate choice open to us at the moment as the first step towards reaching our end. In the intellectual problem, it is the beginning or foundation that is fixed, and the conclusions must be reached by building up *from* it. In questions of conduct, it is the end that is fixed, and our action must be determined by considering what will lead up *to* that end. In conduct, the goal of conclusive bliss takes the same place that the axioms take in matters of reasoning.

The work of the intelligence, then, is to guard the threshold of intellectual assent by rooting out at every step statements that appear to follow from the axioms, directly or indirectly, but do not really do so. And, at last, to the perfectly trained and illuminated intellect, nothing would ever appear to follow from

the axioms that does not really do so, and vigilance or effort would be needed no more. And in like manner, to the perfectly trained and illuminated moral sense nothing would ever appear to be conducive to conclusive bliss that is not so really, and there could be no temptation and no need of vigilance. Intellectual and moral effort are thus superseded in the system of Aquinas when the Beatific Vision gives to the redeemed the full grasp of collective truth, goodness and beauty, because they see God. (6)

Meanwhile the stimulus of the flesh, the blazing up of vindictive passions, and the illusions of worldly ambition are perpetually blurring our sense of the very nature of the final goal itself—just as if we were liable, in the other case, to constant illusion and uncertainty about the very axioms of truth. But, for such steady perception of the goal and fidelity to it as are possible in this life, we are dependent not only upon the natural perceptions and impulses that have survived the fall, but still more upon the "infused" virtues which can only come to us through the "gifts of the Spirit."

The associated doctrines of "gifts" and of "infused virtues" are expounded by Aquinas in his commentaries on the suitable passages in the Gospel of Matthew and in the Book of Isaiah, but are best and most fully developed in the passages of the *Summa Theologiae* that deal especially with the Beatitudes. These passages are a beautiful example of the way, at once naive and pedantic, at once profound and ingenious, in which Aquinas brings his Christian

fervour under the forms of his philosophical technique; and since, to my thinking, they also come nearer to an exposition of "Christianity in its simplest and most intelligible form" than almost anything else in the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, I will analyse them at some length.*

As for the actual promises, or rewards, "for they shall see God," "for theirs is the kingdom of heaven," and the rest, Aquinas regards them all as essentially identical, and refers their complete realisation to the consummate bliss of heaven. Even in the promise "for they shall inherit the earth" he regards the "earth" merely as a symbol of the eternal inheritance. But the "merits," or dispositions, on which the blessings are pronounced, stand in different relations to the consummation up to the attainment of which they all conduce. And some of them more than others feel by anticipation the glow of the ultimate fruition. Altogether they furnish a complete scheme of the progress of the exiled children of Eve on their pilgrimage (*in via*) towards their home (*patria*), and embrace, while they transcend, all the ethical wisdom of the Pagan sages.

Note, first, that he who has certain hope of a promised blessing already in some sort enjoys it by anticipation. And so the faithful Christian, even

* It should be premised that, in the Vulgate, the order of the blessings upon the "gentle" and the "mourners" is reversed, and also that Greek εἰρηνοποιοί, rightly rendered "peacemakers" in our versions, is represented by *pacifici* in the Latin. And this word suggests "peacefulness" more directly than "peace-making," though it will bear either meaning.

when on earth, may in a sense become a participator in the final triumph, in different degree according to the security with which he feels that he is advancing to it and has caught some breath of its fragrance. For though you rejoice in the ultimate harvest at every stage of its approach, yet your rejoicing is not so full when the leaves appear as it is when the fruit begins to swell. Thus, when living the contemplative life, you enjoy the fullest anticipation of heavenly bliss which is possible to you on earth. When living the active life, in practice of the cardinal virtues, you already have the traveller's anticipation, for you know that you are on the way. When you are fighting against evil dispositions and banishing unworthy impulses and affections, you are at least clearing away obstacles ; and, though this is the stage remotest from the consummation, even so it already anticipates a measure of the blessing.

If we take the Beatitudes in their order we shall find that they take us through the whole journey, and that in doing so they relate all the Pagan wisdom and philosophies to themselves. But at the same time they add to this natural ethic the breath of the Holy Spirit, "infusing" the higher virtues which are its "gifts," and lifting us into a higher region of aspiration and of anticipated attainment of fruition.

Amongst the Pagan philosophers some have found the *summum bonum* in the contemplative or speculative life, and they were right, had they but known how to find access to the supreme object of contemplation.

Some have found it in the active life of virtue, and they had chosen a real good to pursue, only they had stopped short upon the way and had not looked upon the final goal. But others again found it in the life of pleasure, and since pleasure, when sought for its own sake as the supreme goal, positively impedes our progress and leads us astray, these set up as objects of pursuit what are really obstacles to be overcome; and of this the better sort of Pagan philosophers were themselves aware.

Now, those who seek the life of pleasure may pursue wealth and honours, and natural ethic will teach them to observe moderation in this, but the gift of the Spirit will raise them to a point when such objects of ambition become utterly contemptible. "Blessed," then, "are the lowly ones who exult in poverty, by gift of the Spirit" (for so Aquinas appears to have understood the text).

Again, the pleasure-seeker will be angry when thwarted or pained, and will find relief in explosions of temper. Natural virtue will teach him to restrain such passions within the limits prescribed by reason, but the gift of Spirit will lift him above being angered at all. "Blessed are the gentle."

Yet again the pleasure-seeker yields to the blandishments of all the senses and rejoices in all that flatters them. He cannot "endure hardness." Natural virtue will tell him not to be a slave to his desires, and to his shrinking from pain, but the gift of the Spirit enables us utterly to disregard all indulgences, and even to plunge ourselves eagerly

into pain and grief when needful occasion arises. "Blessed are they who are acquainted with grief."

So far the blessings have been pronounced upon those who are getting rid of the obstructions to the blessed life and triumphing over them. We pass on to those who are actively virtuous in their relations to others. Justice is the chief of all the social or civic virtues, and we may remember that to Aristotle the "active life" is pre-eminently the life of the citizen. Now justice, the most central of the virtues of the active life, consists in giving every man his due, and from this the good man, according to the standard of natural virtue, will never shrink, whatever abnegation it may involve; but the Spirit infuses a higher virtue that makes a man not *comply* merely with the demands of justice, but pursue justice with a kind of passion. "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness."

But, though justice is the central virtue of the civic life, it does not cover all the ground of social relations. There are "dues" to friendship and affection, for example, that lie beyond the region of justice. There is a joy in giving, and he who has the natural virtue of liberality will seek opportunities for indulging it, for the benefit of his friends and others with whom he is related. But the gift of the Spirit will infuse into him the longing to minister to those whose sole claim is their need, and whose sole appeal is to the reverence due to God in his image in man. "Blessed are the pitiful."

Lastly, the contemplative life is not any more

an "earning," but is already an incipient fruition of the conclusive bliss; and therefore the concluding Beatitudes are pronounced, not on any kind of "merit," but on the first-fruits of the blessed state itself, to which the merits have already brought us. For, if a man had overcome all disturbing passions, was ready to face all hardship, hungered and thirsted after righteousness, and went out to seek those that were in need, he would already be inwardly disposed to the fruition of the contemplative life, for his heart would be free from disturbing passions, and he would be at peace with all men. "Blessed are the pure in heart. Blessed are they who are at peace."

We can now consider, as it were from the height, the central principle of the ethics of S. Thomas, and we shall be able to relate it to his casuistry, with its distinction between mortal and venial sins, and his doctrine of the sacrament of penitence. The phraseology of "merit" and "prize" or "reward" does not attract us, or dispose us to a sympathetic approach to the system of Aquinas. But what "merit" he really allows us is but our own participation, by self-discipline and self-surrender, in the processes by which the free grace and gifts of God confirm and transfigure our love of beauty, goodness and truth, and lift us above ourselves into a nobler life in him. And the "reward" is just that life itself. And thus the distinction between what is meritorious and what is admirable without being meritorious gains a definite meaning, and the hard saying that only

those actions which are inspired by conscious love of God can have any merit, even if it still fails to win our sympathy, will at least be intelligible to us. It is true that the love or pity that is a natural and spontaneous "passion" or emotion owes its very charm to the fact that there is no effort in it, and therefore no deliberate self-submission and no co-operation of our own self-forming will (as distinct from the self-uttering will) with the divine impulse to good within us. But, on the other hand, wherever there is a distinct recognition of a demand that we do not yet spontaneously meet, whenever we feel a call which lays on us a burden or demands an effort of self-restraint, there our vision is higher than our impulsive loves and hates. And it is only then that the conception of so co-operating with the divine call, as to "earn" by our own effort a higher degree of inward conformity to the divine demand, can find place. And yet, so long as the self-discipline and the effort last, the work is incomplete. Until the spontaneity that characterised our love on the lower plane has been recovered on the higher, there is something lacking. Hence the passion of love, even of good things, that has been from the first spontaneous, however admirable it may be, is not "meritorious." But the merit of submitting ourselves to love a higher and more widely embracing than we spontaneously obey, has not borne its fruit till it has ceased to be self-submission at all and has become in its turn self-expression. Hence we are told by Aquinas that the healthy passions have no merit if

they precede the love of God, but the highest of all merit if they follow it.

We understand the meaning of this when we read, in the biographies of S. Francis, of the loathing of his refined senses for the foulness of the disease of leprosy which made him turn away his glance and his very thoughts, and hold his hand to his nose, if he saw a leper house even miles away. And yet when the great change had come to him and a leper suddenly broke in upon his meditations with his plea for alms, Francis, after the first involuntary shudder and shrinking back, sprang from his horse and, not content with relieving the leper's poverty, caught him in his fraternal embrace, and was thenceforth filled with an unquenchable love for the unhappy outcasts from whom all others shrank.

The biography of many another saint, ancient and modern, will enforce the meaning of this story, and many a one who is very far from a saint but who has learnt to understand the blindness of the spirit of vengeance, and something of the meaning of the Apostolic precept, "be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good," knows full well that the higher reaches not only of love but of wisdom and knowledge of the truth can never be reached until even the best of our spontaneous resentments and the purest of our spontaneous loves have felt the fostering and the restraint of a devotion to a more far-reaching Good, and a shrinking from a more subtly pervading and deep-lying Evil than they can spontaneously recognise and respond to. (7)

And now we can understand the distinction between mortal and venial sin. A mortal sin is one that involves the deliberate aversion of the soul from the love of God, in obedience to some lower and more partial love. Such a turning away from the very source of the soul's vitality kills it; and that soul is dead. Nothing but a miracle can restore it to life, any more than anything but a miracle could restore Lazarus to the life of the body when he had been four days dead. The miracle nevertheless is performed every day, and every properly ordained priest, irrespective of his own life or morals, has the power to perform it, and to prescribe the actions to be done in order that, after the guilt has been removed, the fine may also be paid off. There can be no schedule of the mortal sins, though it may be said that this or that disposition or action seems naturally to involve the aversion of the affection from God. But the question always is, "Did this particular sin involve it?" If it did, it was mortal.

A venial sin is committed whenever any thought rises in the mind, or any word is uttered, or any action done which, if deliberately accepted by the will, would have involved mortal sin, but which is resisted or rejected as soon as we become aware of it. It does not, so to speak, rust our souls, but only tarnishes their lustre. Such venial sins we cannot but commit. We may anticipate, and so prevent, any one of them, but not all of them. The "fomes" is too inflammable for that to be possible. But confession and absolution cover them, though they cannot be confessed in

detail. And, in Purgatory, the lustre of our souls, so far as it has been dulled since the last absolution, will be restored.

Aquinas is a severe casuist; and perhaps his severity, and at the same time the distinction between mortal and venial sins, may be best illustrated by an example. That terrible text about our being called to account for every "idle word" exercised the mediæval saints severely; the more so because the Latin *verbum otiosum* may be translated "superfluous" just as well as "idle." Now, I gather that Aquinas had an altogether commendable detestation of the kind of conversational buffoonery of which the habitual punster (now happily almost extinct) was the typical development. In his commentary on Aristotle's ethics, when he comes to the passage about the grace of being good company, and finds that the extremes between which it is the mean are respectively moroseness and buffoonery, he connects the etymology of the latter word in Greek (quite correctly) with "altar," and proceeds to say that the altars in old times were infested by rapacious birds, that were always on the pounce to snatch away the morsels that had been laid on the altar. So, he says, there are people who obtrude themselves upon any conversation, not for the purpose of joining in and helping it forward, but to find opportunities for pouncing upon a word and carrying it off with a clatter in some disturbing jest. He returns frequently elsewhere to this subject of jesting. One gathers that he saw perfectly well how jesting at

the proper time might be an innocent and refreshing relaxation, and even sometimes a help in a serious investigation by bringing home the point neatly and tellingly; but it may also be woefully disturbing. Now, if a man has so interrupted a serious conversation because his witticism rose to his mind and was out of his mouth before he had time to stop it, he has committed a venial sin. But if he deliberately and habitually interrupts in order to show his wit and to make a personal score at the expense of the progress of the discussion, are we not to think that, through vanity, he has suffered his love to be averted from God and has sinned mortally? Aquinas comes near to saying so; for he declares that irrelevant jesting is a venial sin; and again, that venial sins, when persisted in till they become a habit, are apt ultimately to be committed for their own sake, and so to become mortal. I hope I have not myself sinned even venially in taking this illustration of the fine perception and precision of analysis that can always be traced beneath the casuistry of S. Thomas. In spite of his obsession by the thought of sin and the "magical" nature of his provision against its consequences, I can never feel that his casuistry is unwholesome, or that the study of it can tend to divert the soul from "the love of God" into the tithing of mint and anise, or the self-seeking sophistries of the spiritual huxter. (8)

NOTES TO LECTURE VII

(1) *To page* 483.—A general treatment of the sacrament of penitence, with citations, willl be found in my *Dante and Aquinas*, Appendix to Chapter viii.

(2) *To page* 484.—Aristotle develops this ideal in a magnificent passage at the close of the seventh chapter of the tenth book of the *Ethics*, in protest against the proverbial warning that "mortal man should regulate himself by his mortality and should think the thoughts of humanity." Aquinas in his commentary catches and reflects his exalted enthusiasm, but significantly adds:

"Sic ergo patet, quod ille qui vacat speculationi veritatis, est maxime felix, quantum homo in hac vita felix esse potest."—*In libros ethicorum*, lib. x. lectio xi. (vol. xxi. 351b).

There could hardly be a better example of the whole-hearted way in which Aquinas accepts Aristotle, with such qualification as is implied in a supplement, sometimes unobtrusive and sometimes elaborate but always vital.

(3) *To page* 486.—Bernard's four degrees of love are well known: A man first loves himself, then

loves God because he is good to him, then loves God because he is good, and finally loves himself only "propter Deum." Cf. *De diligendo Deo*, capp. 8–10.

On fear as a motive and impulse Aquinas is explicit and instructive.

In answer to the question, *Utrum timor convenienter dividatur in filialem, initialem, servilem et mundanum*:

"De timore nunc agimus secundum quod per ipsum aliquo modo ad Deum convertimur vel ab eo avertimur. Cum enim objectum timoris sit malum, quandoque homo, propter mala quae timet,* a Deo recedit: et iste dicitur timor *humanus* vel *mundanus*. Quandoque autem homo per mala quae timet ad Deum convertitur et ei inhaeret. Quod quidem malum est duplex: scilicet malum poenae, et malum culpae. Si igitur aliquis convertatur ad Deum et ei inhaereat propter timorem poenae, erit timor *servilis*. Si autem propter timorem culpae, erit timor *filialis*: nam filiorum est timere offensam patris. Si autem propter utrumque, est timor *initialis*, qui est medius inter utrumque timorem."

In answer to the question, *Utrum timor servilis remaneat cum caritate*:

"Timor servilis ex amore sui causatur: quia est timor poenae, quae est detrimentum proprii boni. Unde hoc modo timor poenae potest stare cum caritate sicut et amor sui: eiusdem enim rationis est quod homo cupiat bonum suum et quod timeat eo privari. Amor autem sui tripliciter se potest habere ad caritatem.

* Commas inserted.

Uno enim modo contrariatur caritati: secundum scilicet quod aliquis in amore proprii boni finem constituit. Alio modo in caritate includitur, secundum quod homo se propter Deum et in Deo diligit. Tertio modo a caritate quidem distinguitur, sed caritati non contrariatur: puta cum aliquis diligit quidem seipsum secundum rationem proprii boni, ita tamen quod in hoc proprio bono non constituat finem. . . .

"Sic igitur et timor poenae includitur uno modo in caritate: nam separari a Deo est quaedam poena, quam caritas maxime refugit. Unde hoc pertinet ad timorem castum.—Alio autem modo contrariatur caritati: secundum quod aliquis refugit poenam contrariam bono suo naturali sicut principale malum contrarium bono quod diligitur ut finis. Et sic timor poenae non est cum caritate.—Alio modo timor poenae distinguitur quidem secundum substantiam a timore casto, quia scilicet homo timet malum poenale non ratione separationis a Deo, sed inquantum est nocivum proprii boni: nec tamen in illo bono constituitur eius finis, unde nec illud malum formidatur tanquam principale malum. Et talis timor poenae potest esse cum caritate. Sed iste timor poenae non dicitur esse servilis nisi quando poena formidatur sicut principale malum. . . . Et ideo timor inquantum servilis non manet cum caritate: sed substantia timoris servilis cum caritate manere potest, sicut amor sui manere potest cum caritate."

In answer to the question, *Utrum timor sit initium sapientiae*:

"Timor enim servilis est sicut principium extra disponens ad sapientiam: inquantum aliquis timore poenae discedit a peccato, et per hoc habilitatur ad sapientiae effectum; secundum illud *Eccli.* 1 [27]: *Timor Domini expellit peccatum.* Timor autem castus vel filialis est initium sapientiae sicut primus sapientiae effectus. Cum enim ad sapientiam pertineat quod humana vita reguletur secundum rationes divinas, hinc oportet sumere principium, ut homo Deum revereatur et se ei subiiciat: sic enim consequenter in omnibus secundum Deum regulabitur."

In answer to the question, *Utrum crescente caritate diminuatur timor*:

"Timor autem filialis necesse est quod crescat crescente caritate, sicut effectus crescit crescente causa: quanto enim aliquis magis diligit aliquem, tanto magis timet eum offendere et ab eo separari.

"Sed timor servilis, quantum ad servilitatem, totaliter tollitur caritate adveniente: remanet tamen secundum substantiam timor poenae. . . . Et iste timor diminuitur caritate crescente, maxime quantum ad actum:* quia quanto aliquis magis diligit Deum, tanto minus timet poenam. Primo quidem, quia minus attendit ad proprium bonum, cui contrariatur poena. Secundo, quia firmius inhaerens magis confidit de praemio, et per consequens minus timet de poena."

Finally, in answer to the question, *Utrum timor remaneat in patria*:

* *I.e.* it diminishes as a capacity, but diminishes still more rapidly as an actual experience.

"Fuga igitur huius mali quod est Deo non subiici, ut possibilis naturae, impossibilis autem beatitudini, erit in patria. In via autem est fuga huius mali ut omnino possibilis."

I.e. the blessed will be more perfectly conscious than ever of the terrible possibilities of their nature in itself, but will know that, through grace, they will never be realised. This is the transformation or perfecting of *timor filialis*. All other fear has vanished.

Sum. Theol., ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 19 : aa. 2. c., 6. c., 7. c., 10. c., 11. c. (Leon., viii. 139, 143, 144b, 147, 149a). Compare note (7), p. 519.

(4) *To page* 489.—Aquinas treats of the sacrament of matrimony at length in 4 *Dist.*, xxvi. *sqq.* (vol. vii. 916 *sqq.*). He rejects the belief, of many earlier theologians, that there was no marriage or differentiation of sex before the fall (*cf.* p. 396); but since the fall, he admits :

"De aliis sacramentis est praeceptum vel consilium, sicut de bonis perfectioribus ; sed de matrimonio est indulgentia, sicut de bono minus perfecto."—4 *Dist.*, xxxiv. q. 1 : a. 1. ad 1^{m} (vol. vii. 983a). Cf. *Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. cap. 138 (vol. v. 273a).

(5) *To page* 494.—Aquinas felt a theological objection to the Virgin's complete restoration to the state of innocence before the incarnation :

"Posset tamen intelligi quod totaliter fuit sublatus fomes hoc modo, quod praestitum fuerit Beatae Virgini, ex abundantia gratiae descendentis in ipsam,

ut talis esset dispositio virium animae in ipsa quod inferiores vires nunquam moverentur sine arbitrio rationis: sicut dictum est fuisse in Christo, quem constat peccati fomitem non habuisse; et sicut fuit in Adam ante peccatum per originalem justitiam; ita quod, quantum ad hoc, gratia sanctificationis in Virgine habuit vim originalis iustitiae. Et quamvis haec positio ad dignitatem Virginis Matris pertinere videatur, derogat tamen in aliquo dignitati Christi, absque cuius virtute nullus a prima damnatione liberatus est. Et quamvis per fidem Christi aliqui ante Christi incarnationem sint secundum spiritum ab illa damnatione liberati, tamen quod secundum carnem aliquis ab illa damnatione liberetur, non videtur fieri debuisse nisi post incarnationem eius, in qua primo debuit immunitas damnationis apparere. Et ideo, sicut ante immortalitatem carnis Christi resurgentis nullus adeptus fuit carnis immortalitatem, ita inconveniens etiam videtur dicere quod ante carnem Christi, in qua nullum fuit peccatum, caro Virginis matris eius, vel cuiuscumque alterius, fuerit absque fomite, qui dicitur *lex carnis*, sive *membrorum*. Et ideo melius videtur dicendum quod per sanctificationem in utero non fuit sublatus Virgini fomes secundum essentiam, sed remansit ligatus: non quidem per actum rationis suae, sicut in viris sanctis, quia non statim habuit usum liberi arbitrii adhuc in ventre matris existens, hoc enim speciale privilegium Christi fuit; sed per gratiam abundantem quam in sanctificatione recepit; et etiam perfectius per divinam providentiam sensualitatem eius ab omni inordinato

motu prohibentem. Postmodum vero, in ipsa conceptione carnis Christi, in qua primo debuit refulgere peccati immunitas, credendum est quod ex prole redundaverit in matrem totaliter a fomite subtractio."—*Sum. Theol.*, iii[a]. q. 27: a. 3. c. (Leon., xi. 293).

(6) *To pages* 495–499.—Illustrative citations will be found in *Excursus* ii. On the "infused virtues" (p. 493), *vide* the next following note.

(7) *To pages* 492, 499–506.—On the moral instincts, the natural, theological, and infused virtues, the gifts of the Spirit, the Beatitudes, and charity:

"Est autem omnibus hominibus naturale ut se invicem diligant; cujus signum est quod, quodam naturali instinctu, homo cuilibet homini etiam ignoto subvenit in necessitate, puta revocando ab errore viae, erigendo a casu et aliis hujusmodi, ac si omnis homo homini esset familiaris et amicus."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. cap. 117 (vol. v. 255b).

The moral and intellectual virtues rest upon certain natural principles in man which are so related to them as to furnish them with an adequate basis. The infused virtues, on the contrary, can find no adequate support in any principles natural to man, but the theological virtues take the place of such natural principles, and become the basis upon which the infused virtues can rest:

Theological virtues : infused virtues :: natural principles : moral and intellectual virtues.

So these infused virtues, though based on the theological virtues, are not identical with them.

In answer to the question, *Utrum aliquae virtutes morales sint in nobis per infusionem*:

"Respondeo dicendum quod oportet effectus esse suis causis et principiis proportionatos. Omnes autem virtutes tam intellectuales quam morales, quae ex nostris actibus acquiruntur, procedunt ex quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis praeexistentibus. . . . Loco quorum naturalium principiorum, conferuntur nobis a Deo virtutes theologicae, quibus ordinamur ad finem supernaturalem. . . . Unde oportet quod his etiam virtutibus theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii habitus divinitus causati in nobis, qui sic se habeant ad virtutes theologicas, sicut se habent virtutes morales et intellectuales ad principia naturalia virtutum."

Accordingly, in answer to the *objectum*:

"Videtur quod praeter virtutes theologicas, non sint aliae virtutes nobis infusae a Deo. Ea enim quae possunt fieri a causis secundis, non fiunt immediate a Deo, nisi forte aliquando miraculose. . . . Sed virtutes intellectuales et morales possunt in nobis causari per nostros actus."

We read:

"Aliquae quidem virtutes morales et intellectuales possunt causari in nobis ex nostris actibus: tamen illae non sunt proportionatae virtutibus theologicis." *

* They are only the lower range of such virtues, built upon the natural *principia*, not the higher range built upon the theological virtues.

And in answer to the further objection :

"Ad ordinandum nos in bonum supernaturale, sufficiunt virtutes theologicae."

It is said :

"Virtutes theologicae sufficienter nos ordinant in finem supernaturalem, secundum quandam inchoationem, quantum scilicet ad ipsum Deum immediate. Sed oportet quod per alias virtutes infusas perficiatur anima circa alias res, in ordine tamen ad Deum."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 63 : a. 3. obb. 1. 2. c. ad 1^{m}, 2^{m} (Leon., vi. 409).

Still more explicit is the body of the article, *Utrum virtutes morales possint esse sine caritate* :

"Virtutes morales prout sunt operativae boni in ordine ad finem qui non excedit facultatem naturalem hominis, possunt per opera humana acquiri. Et sic acquisitae sine caritate esse possunt : sicut fuerunt in multis gentilibus.*—Secundum autem quod sunt operativae boni in ordine ad ultimum finem supernaturalem, sic perfecte et vere habent rationem virtutis ; et non possunt humanis actibus acquiri, sed infunduntur a Deo. Et huiusmodi virtutes morales sine caritate esse non possunt. Dictum est enim supra quod aliae virtutes morales non possunt esse sine prudentia ; prudentia autem non potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus, inquantum virtutes morales faciunt bene se habere ad quosdam fines, ex quibus procedit ratio prudentiae. Ad rectam autem rationem prudentiae multo magis requiritur quod homo bene se habeat circa ultimum finem, quod fit per caritatem,

* On *caritas = amor Dei*, vide infra, p. 520.

quam circa alios fines, quod fit per virtutes morales: sicut ratio recta in speculativis maxime indiget primo principio indemonstrabili, quod est *contradictoria non simul esse vera.* Unde manifestum fit quod nec prudentia infusa potest esse sine caritate; nec aliae virtutes morales consequenter, quae sine prudentia esse non possunt."—*Ib.*, q. 65: a. 2. c. (*ib.*, 423).

The *dona* of the Holy Spirit, enumerated in *Isaiah* xi. 2, 3, would doubtless have been identified with the *virtutes infusae* had it not been for certain technical difficulties:

"Quidam posuerunt quod dona non essent a virtutibus distinguenda.—Sed eis remanet . . . difficultas: ut scilicet rationem assignent quare quaedam virtutes dicantur dona, et non omnes; et quare aliqua computantur inter dona, quae non computantur inter virtutes, ut patet de timore."—*Ib.*, q. 68: a. 1. c. (*ib.*, 446b).

The rather artificial solution of this difficulty by certain formulæ of proportion, after the model of the one given above, need not concern us; especially as the *dona* and the *virtutes infusae* both alike are bestowed on man in a state of grace by the Holy Spirit, to lift him above the level of his own human virtue.

The whole of qq. 68 and 69 in the *Summa Theologiae*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}., deserve careful study, but my paraphrase of the section on the Beatitudes is drawn especially from aa. 3, 4 of the latter.

It must be constantly kept in mind that *caritas* is primarily and specifically *amor Dei.* The human side, so prominent in 1 *Cor.* xiii., is strictly derivative:

"Cum igitur sit aliqua communicatio hominis ad Deum secundum quod nobis suam beatitudinem communicat, super hac communicatione oportet aliquam amicitiam fundari. . . . Amor autem super hac communicatione fundatus est caritas. Unde manifestum est quod caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum."—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 23: a. 1. c. (Leon., viii. 163b).

"Caritas est amicitia quaedam hominis ad Deum fundata super communicationem beatitudinis aeternae. Haec autem communicatio non est secundum bona naturalia, sed secundum dona gratuita. . . . Unde caritas non potest neque naturaliter nobis inesse, neque per vires naturales est acquisita, sed per infusionem Spiritus Sancti."—*Ib.*, q. 24: a. 2. c. (*ib.*, 175).

"Quia vero nihil potest amari nisi sit cognitum, ideo ad amorem caritatis exigitur primo cognitio Dei. Et quia hoc est supra naturam, primo exigitur fides, quae est non apparentium; ne homo deficiat vel oberret, exigitur spes, per quam tendat in illum finem sicut ad se pertinentem."—*In epistolam i. ad Corinthios*, cap. xiii. lectio iv. (vol. xiii. 265b fin.).

There can indeed be a kind of true but imperfect virtue without caritas:

"Ultimum quidem et principale bonum hominis est Dei fruitio . . . et ad hoc ordinatur homo per caritatem. . . .

"Sic igitur patet quod virtus vera simpliciter est illa quae ordinat ad principale bonum hominis. . . . Et sic nulla vera virtus potest esse sine caritate.—

Sed si accipiatur virtus secundum quod est in ordine ad aliquem finem particularem . . . si . . . illud . . . sit verum bonum, puta conservatio civitatis vel aliquid hujusmodi, erit quidem vera virtus, sed imperfecta, nisi referatur ad finale et perfectum bonum."—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 23 : a. 7. c. (Leon., viii. 171).

But it is only virtues inspired by *caritas* that can be "meritorious" in the sense of qualifying to receive the heavenly reward :

"Isti autem actus non sunt condigni quasi pretium respectu vitae aeternae, nisi secundum quod sunt gratia et caritate informati. Unde, ad hoc quod aliquis actus sit per se meritorius, oportet quod sit actus voluntatis vel imperantis vel elicientis ; et iterum quod sit caritate informatus."—*De veritate*, q. 26 : a. 6. c. (vol. ix. 400b).

The "passions," *i.e.* the natural impulses or restraints, such as love, pity, shame, fear, hate, and the rest, even if they make for good, are in no way laudable if they anticipate the action of the will. On the contrary, they detract from the goodness of an act, even if we determine to do it on its own merits, for they tend to make it inconsiderate, and only good by chance. But if, on the other hand, they follow as a reflex from the will and are called into existence by it, they increase the goodness of the act, and that on two accounts :

"Passiones animae in duplici ordine se possunt habere ad voluntatem, vel ut praecedentes, vel ut consequentes : ut praecedentes quidem, inquantum passiones impellunt voluntatem ad aliquid volendum ;

ut consequentes vero, prout ex ipsa vehementia voluntatis per quamdam redundantiam commovetur inferior appetitus secundum has passiones, vel etiam inquantum ipsa voluntas has passiones procurat sponte et excitat. Secundum igitur quod sunt praecedentes voluntatem, sic diminuunt de ratione laudabilis: quia laudabilis est actus voluntatis, secundum quod est per rationem ordinatus in bonum secundum debitam mensuram et modum. Qui quidem modus et mensura non servatur, nisi cum actio ex discretione fit: quae discretio non servatur cum homo ex impetu passionis ad aliquid volendum, etiamsi sit bonum, provocatur; sed erit circa modum actionis, secundum quod impetus passionis est magnus vel parvus; et sic non nisi a casu continget quod debita mensura servetur. Secundum vero quod consequuntur ad voluntatem, sic non diminuunt laudem actus vel bonitatem: quia erunt moderatae secundum judicium rationis, ex quo voluntas sequitur. Sed magis addunt ad bonitatem actus, duplici ratione. Primo per modum signi: quia passio ipsa consequens in inferiori appetitu est signum quod sit motus voluntatis intensus: non enim potest esse in natura passibili quod voluntas ad aliquid fortiter moveatur, quin sequatur aliqua passio in parte inferiori. . . . Secundo per modum adjutorii: quia quando voluntas judicio rationis aliquid eligit, promptius et facilius id agit, si cum hoc passio in inferiori parte excitetur; eo quod appetitiva inferior est propinqua ad corporis motum."—*Ib.*, a. 7. c. (*ib.*, 403b).

(8) *To pages* 508 *sq.*—On the words of Aristotle:

"Circa delectabile autem, quod quidem in ludo, medius quidem, eutrapelus, et dispositio eutrapelia. Superabundantia autem, bomolochia, et qui habet eam, bomolochus. Qui autem deficit, agroicus quis, et habitus agroichia."

Aquinas comments:

"Et dicit quod . . . ille qui medium tenet vocatur eutrapelus, quasi bene se vertens ad omnia; et dispositio vocatur eutrapelia. Ille autem qui superabundat, vocatur bomolochus a *bomos* quod est altare et *lochos* quod est raptus. Et dicitur ad similitudinem milvi, qui semper volabat circa aras idolorum, in quibus volabant, ut aliquid raperent. Et similiter ille qui excedit in ludo, semper insistit ad hoc quod rapiat verbum vel factum alicujus, ut in ludum convertat."—*In libros decem ethicorum*, lib. ii. lectio ix. (vol. xxi. 64a, 65).

On *verba jocosa* and *otiosa*:

"Sciendum tamen quod secundum Gregorium, otiosum est quod caret intentione piae voluntatis, aut ratione justae necessitatis; unde non omne verbum jocosum est otiosum, si ad recreationem referatur: quia etiam in jocis contingit esse virtutem eutrapeliam."—2 *Dist.*, xl. q. 1: a. 5. ad 8^{m} (vol. vi. 752a).

Elsewhere the question is raised whether a man should sin venially in order to save another from sinning mortally, and the answer, as is so often the case, incidentally throws light beyond the immediate subject under discussion:

"Unde si aliquid fit quod nullo modo possit non esse peccatum, non debet fieri; nec etiam bonum est fieri, nec licitum, ut alius a peccato mortali liberetur; quamvis ad hoc ex quadam pietate animi etiam multi boni inclinentur. Sed potest hoc contingere ut aliquid quod alias est peccatum veniale, ex tali causa factum desineret esse peccatum; sicut dicere aliquod verbum jocosum quod non esset otiosum si diceretur causa piae utilitatis."—4 *Dist.*, ix. q. i: a. 4. ad 3^{m} (vol. vii. 613b).

On the other hand:

"Quandoque vero voluntas peccantis fertur in id quod in se continet quandam inordinationem, non tamen contrariatur dilectioni Dei et proximi: sicut verbum otiosum, risus superfluus, et alia hujusmodi. Et talia sunt peccata venialia ex suo genere.

"Sed quia actus morales recipiunt rationem boni et mali non solum ex objecto, sed etiam ex aliqua dispositione agentis: . . . contingit quandoque quod id quod est peccatum veniale ex genere ratione sui objecti, fit mortale ex parte agentis: vel quia in eo constituit finem ultimum; vel quia ordinat ipsum ad aliquid quod est peccatum mortale ex genere, puta cum aliquis ordinat verbum otiosum ad adulterium committendum."

It is the first of these two cases *quia in eo constituit finem ultimum* that concerns us now, and light is thrown on it in the next following article:

"Augmentata enim dispositione vel habitu per actus peccatorum venialium, intantum potest libido peccandi crescere, quod ille qui peccat, finem suum

constituet in peccato veniali: nam unicuique habenti habitum, inquantum hujusmodi, finis est operatio secundum habitum. Et sic, multoties peccando venialiter, disponetur ad peccatum mortale."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 88: aa. 2. c., 3. c. (Leon., vii. 135, 136a). *Cf.* p. 594.

LECTURE VIII

POETRY AND IMAGINATION

THE special line that our investigations have followed has given us little opportunity for dwelling upon the poetic and imaginative side of the genius of Aquinas, and to-day I shall ask you to let me turn a little aside from our direct course in order, not indeed to do justice to this aspect of the works of S. Thomas, but to offer a tardy recognition of the fact that there is such a side. This is not altogether unnecessary, for although Aquinas is the author of some of the most magnificent hymns in the Breviary, it is usual to express even the admiration which no one can withold from his hymnology under the form of unmeasured amazement that one so "aridly intellectual" as he appears to be in his prose writings should suddenly reveal such a mastery of poetic form and diction and such a glowing poetic inspiration.

For my part I can neither share the wonder nor accept the estimate of the body of the work of Aquinas on which it rests.

Thomas is never rhetorical. He never seeks out strong or passionate expressions in the hope that they may suck after them corresponding emotions.

When his language moves us, it is because it is moulded by experience and feeling that will not be denied. The emotion manifests itself not as much as it can, but as much as it must. It is always under restraint, and every word bears upon it the stamp and pressure of reality.

Thus the diction of Aquinas has at all times perfect fitness and economy. It is clean, direct, felicitous. To anyone who can overcome his classical prejudices these qualities give to the eloquence of some few passages of the *Summa Theologiae*, and of many pages in the *Contra Gentiles*, a moving power closely akin to that of poetry.

Something of all this I must endeavour to arrest, or at least to indicate, before we close our study. We will begin with the actual hymns. They all occur in the "Office for the festival of Corpus Christi," which Thomas drew up at the request of Urban the Fourth.

The Office, in its entirety, represents the highest point of devotional fervour, and of the interpenetration of dogma and mystic rapture that the ritual of the Mass has ever attained.

It finds its inspiration in the doctrine of transubstantiation; but it is itself the record and culmination of a process of transformation, transubstantiation, and transfiguration which have vitally affected it, from centre to circumference, both in its form and in its content. As to the institutional origin of the Eucharist, modern scepticism, as is well known, has sometimes gone so far as to reject

the whole of the Gospel narrative of the Last Supper as a mere effort of constructive etiology; that is to say, it regards it as a legend that arose in explanation of a practice that was firmly established but did not explain itself. It is difficult to see how this view can be maintained in the face of Paul's express testimony in his first Epistle to the Corinthians (xi. 23–26). But the instructed defender of the authenticity of the tradition will, in his turn, find it impossible to believe that the early Agape, or love feast, of the Church was not influenced by the feasts of the "initiated" in the various "mystery" religions of the Pagan world, or that it could have developed into the Mass except in an environment permeated, directly or indirectly, by the ideas of a slain, dismembered, and re-born deity, and of the possibility of participating in the divine spirit by the actual consumption of the divine flesh and blood. To the reverent student there is a veritable "transubstantiation" in this fusion of the most spiritual of religions with beliefs that have their roots in barbarous superstition, and the absorption by subtlest intellectual dogma of the naivety of primitive beliefs. It is noteworthy that within the New Testament itself, that Gospel that expresses the conception of eating the flesh and drinking the blood of the divine being in the crudest form, and in complete independence of any record of the institution of the rite (John vi. 51–56), is also the one that utters the declaration, "God is spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in

spirit and in truth" (iv. 24). Thomas Aquinas and Thomas à Kempis represent, amongst the great Christian writers, almost the extreme limits of the cultivation or neglect of pure intellectualism, yet they are alike in finding their supreme inspiration just in that sacrament which has retained at its very heart, undisguised and yet transfigured, the clearest notes of its historic relation to the weird imaginings of primitive man.

It seems both significant and appropriate that the *Office* on its literary side should bear the impress of the transforming and assimilating process which has worked upon the central conception which it embodies. Large portions of it are a kind of cento of passages from the Old Testament, in which any reference to bread or wine or a table, or to the manna of the wilderness, or to any food that God gives or gave, may be caught up and translated into a type or symbol of the Eucharist. The bread and wine that Melchizedek offered to Abraham, the wine that the "Wisdom" of Proverbs mixed, and the table that she spread, and the table round which the children of him who fears the Lord cluster like young olive shoots, come, so to speak, of themselves; but even Job's enemies, who cry in their ferocity "Who will give us his flesh to eat?" become unwilling witnesses to the truth; and when the Israelites declared that their souls "loathed this light bread"—that bread that had been sent down from heaven that men might eat of angels' food—they were but anticipating the neglect of the holy Eucharist by

their infatuated successors in Christian times. In the New Testament, too, the references to this central rite are found everywhere. Not only is it set forth in the parable of the rich man who prepared a supper, but in the Virgin's song it is the Eucharist that fills the hungry with good things, and from which the scornful rich are sent empty away. But of all Scripture it is the Psalms which are most freely drawn upon, and as one after another is chanted, the Antiphony that precedes and then again follows it selects the particular text on which the emphasis is to be laid, and draws out its hidden meaning. "Multiplied by the fruit of corn and wine, the faithful repose in the peace of Christ," for Ps. iv.; or "The Lord, at the season of his death, bore fruit to be tasted unto salvation," for Ps. i.; and so with the rest. Passages from the Gospels, telling of the Last Supper, prayers, exhortations, and expositions of doctrine, are woven in; and from time to time the triumphant ring of the great hymns breaks through, and dogma, history, and devotion are welded together by the magic of poetic diction. Nay, the very forms of the verses once more carry with them associations running back centuries deep, and linking classical and Pagan to mediæval and Christian times. The first of the hymns of Aquinas is written in the metre invented near two thousand years before by Archilochus. It is the metre in which he declared his contempt for "a great straddling warrior, with his clustered locks and clean-shaven face," and his preference for "a little bandy-legged fellow that sets his feet down

firm and is full of pluck." It is the metre in which the ghost of Darius is made to chant the woes that are coming upon his people in the play of Æschylus, and in which hot passion or agitation breaks through the even flow of the iambics of Sophocles or Euripides. The earlier Latin poets just kept it alive for their late successor to find it, ready to his hand, when he sang the loveliest of Spring songs, with its refrain,

"Let the loveless love to-morrow, let the lovers love again."

In this poem (the *Pervigilium Veneris*) the prosody is still correct, with its longs and shorts, but the principle of stress already dominates it. When Aquinas wields it, quantity may be neglected whenever it so happens, for stress has triumphed over it; and the fascination of rhyme, unknown to Greeks and Latins, has enforced the cadence of the line and added the cadence of the stanza:

Pange lingua gloriosi
Corporis mysterium,
Sanguinisque pretiosi,
Quem in mundi pretium,
Fructus ventri generosi
Rex effudit gentium.

There are four hymns in the Office, and this first one by no means holds the undisputed primacy amongst them. (1)

But it is not only in his poems that Aquinas shows his imaginative power. There are a number of problems with which the mediæval thinker had to deal, as to which he supposed himself to have certain data precise enough in their way but entirely

dependent upon the exercise of moral and spiritual imagination for any vital realisation of their meaning. I refer to what may be called the hypothetical psychologies into which the mediæval theologian must endeavour to penetrate. What was the intellectual and moral consciousness of unfallen man? What are the modes of perception or emotion of the angels? What will be the nature of the faculties and the experiences of the human soul when disembodied at death, and again when united to the glorified body of the resurrection? What is the psychology of ecstasy and inspiration? Can we form any conception of the experiences, and especially the volitions and the sufferings, of that human soul which was a part of the true humanity of the incarnate Word?

On all these matters Aquinas conceived himself to be in possession of authoritatively defined data; but he had, and knew that he had, nothing but his own human psychology to go on in his attempt to realise all these states as experiences. And in his expositions of these points of doctrine he often shows an insight which leaves us not only with a sense of spiritual expansion of soul, but with clarified moral and spiritual ideals at once stimulating and restful.

For example, if we have to ask ourselves what the true state of unfallen man was, we start with the conception that Adam knew everything without having learned anything; and yet what his mind held was natural not supernatural knowledge, and his wisdom

was typical and normal, though no one has ever attained to it since. Moreover, all his passions and appetites were free from any taint of sinfulness or smirch of evil, and yet he sinned. And again, our present state is just what his state was, barring the natural and inevitable modification which the very fact of sin wrought in it. How is all this to be made intelligible and realisable by being directly related to our own experience and self-knowledge?

As to the nature of Adam's knowledge in itself, the answer comes in a flash. It was miraculously infused, and was not acquired; but the knowledge thus infused was not miraculous but natural, for it was within the range of human faculties, not outside it. Analogous cases meet us everywhere if we accept the general beliefs of the Christian tradition. The historical statements and personal details in the Scriptures are miraculously guaranteed, but they are of the nature of the knowledge that in other cases we have to acquire and to test. The man born blind had his sight miraculously given to him, but the sight so given was natural not supernatural sight. And in like manner all Adam's "endowments" were of the same nature as other men's "attainments" are.

But what was the nature of his innocence? What is innocence? The freshness and untainted beauty of the appetites and desires of unfallen man were many-fold more delightsome in their fulfilment than they can ever be to us; but they were so perfectly balanced and so completely under the control of reason—which means not the ratiocinative faculty alone, but the

whole range of faculties that lead us to the recognition of the good, the beautiful, and the true—that they never clamoured for any gratification that would disturb the harmony of the whole being.

I suppose we may bring this conception within the range of actual or conceivable experience by thinking of ourselves as keenly hungry and conscious that eating would satisfy a pressing want, but at the same time—because we realise the urgency of some other impulse or business of our own that will not brook an instant's delay, or because, like Orlando, we are full of the sense of some other's greater need, or for any other reason—the gratification of our own appetite at the moment would be such an outrage upon the collectivity and harmony of our nature that we have not to resist an unworthy impulse to eat, but feel no impulse at all towards the act, but a strong repulsion from it. Universalise this conception, and so deepen it that even the self-submission of any disturbing appetite shall be anticipated by its not only not clamouring for satisfaction but by its not even suggesting itself, except when it is the very note demanded by the complete harmony, and you will have, as I take it, the conception of the state of innocence as held by Aquinas, and as expressed in the parting words of Virgil to Dante at the entrance of the Earthly Paradise.

But, it will naturally be asked, if this was the state of innocence, how was there room in the nature of unfallen man for sin to find a lodgment? The answer seems to be that man is not only a whole made up of

parts that must be harmonised with each other, but is also a part of a greater whole with which he, in his turn, must be harmonised. That greater whole, the complete divine scheme of self-revelation in the hierarchy of created Intelligences, lay beyond the range of human faculties even in their primitive and uncorrupted beauty. And so, whereas Adam was a perfect judge of the demands of his own nature as a whole, and could not seek any partial good which in itself would conflict with his total weal, yet he did not understand why he might not at once receive that higher measure of spiritual insight which God's purpose in fact held in store for him, but which the serpent had promised at once. Apparently he had no direct sense of that larger scheme of which his being, even in its totality, was but a part. What he sought was, in itself considered, good for him to have —good for him in his totality—and therefore he sought it. But it was not good for the totality of which he was but a part that he should have it at that time and should get it in that way; and in presumptuous self-reliance he disobeyed the injunction for which he saw no reason, and felt no inward support. He fell through pride.

Such was the sin; and the consequence was an exact repetition, or imitation, of the sin itself on the part of each one of the appetites and impulses of human nature. Each one of them, too, now asserted itself independently, and clamoured for that which corresponded to its own demand, irrespective of its relation to the harmony of man's life as a whole.

Each passion and impulse declared itself competent to judge of its own good, and resented the command to take heed of anything else that did not immediately concern it; and instead of a harmony man's soul became a sea of tempestuous and warring impulses, while reason must now struggle to maintain its tottering throne over the rebellious passions, instead of itself being the expression of their perfect harmony, the aroma of their very breath. (2)

The anthropologists leave no room in the modern creed for a belief in the story of the Garden and the Fall. But Coleridge's contention that the fall of man is a reality, though it may never have taken place at a definite time or in a definite event, stands for a universal experience or sense that man is not *de facto* what he is *de jure*, and that our customary is not our normal life or conduct. And I find it hard to conceive that anyone can read Aquinas on the state of innocence and the Fall without having his vision cleared and his aspirations quickened, or without feeling that he has for a moment drawn a breath of the air of the homeland to which he inalienably belongs, even should it be the fact that neither he nor any other has ever yet dwelt there. (*Cf.* p. 563.)

Let us pass to another subject. Thomas is known in the Schools as "the Angelic Doctor"; and this is because of the beauty and subtlety of the angel-lore which takes such a prominent place in his writings. The subject is one that exercised a constant fascination over Christian writers; and we have already seen

that Aristotle's doctrine of the animated heavens and the immaterial beings towards whom they yearn became a centre round which Platonic and Christian ideas gathered and intertwined, so that the three traditions are nowhere more closely associated than here. The two writers whose angelology is regarded as most authoritative are the pseudo-Dionysius and Aquinas himself. Both are Platonic, inasmuch as the doctrine of eternity, which dominates their conception of angelic psychology, is distinctively Platonic. But the human psychology from which their speculations start is Aristotelian alike in its terminology and its fundamental analyses.

Aquinas, then, inherited a body of traditional data concerning the angelic spirits which had been elaborated by the Church upon a Platonic and Aristotelian basis under a Christian inspiration, with constant reference to scriptural texts; and his own psychological system, in terms of which he must interpret the tradition, was essentially Aristotelian.

We have already had occasion to contrast the intelligence of man, growing up from a bare potentiality, and dependent for its development upon the data of the senses, with the angelic intellect, created at the full height of its natural capacities and independent of all matter and material images. I must deliberately pass over the whole system of orders and hierarchies on which so much labour was bestowed by Aquinas and others, and I put aside the refinements and qualifications connected with the doctrine of the instantaneous probation of

the angels, the fall of some and the confirmation of others, the expansion of the natural powers of the faithful angels by added gifts of grace, and the distinction between the matutinal and the vespertinal cognition of the angels, derived from that singularly unfortunate attempt of Augustine's to allegorise the opening chapters of Genesis.

Nor will I enter upon the curious and fascinating conception that since form is the intelligible principle in virtue of which every individual is the kind of creature he is—beech-tree, tiger, man, for instance—and matter the individuating principle, in virtue of which the man Peter is other than the man Paul, and since angels having no material are pure form, all differences between angel and angel must be formal differences. Thus since all individuals of the same species are identical in form, it follows that every angel is of a different species from every other angel.

But when we have put all these things aside, we are left with the central conception of beings that have, in themselves, a life intrinsically unrelated to space, or to time as measured by material changes and successions. The angel, having no material body, cannot be regarded as being in any place, for it is body only that occupies space or has position. And in like manner the angel's life and understanding must be thought of, as in imagination we ascend through rank after rank, more and more completely in terms of eternity, rather than of time; that is to say, in terms of all-at-onceness, rather than in terms of succession; for the angelic conceptions

are directly infused by God and partake of his eternal life; and I think everyone who tries to follow Aquinas in his attempt to bring us into some kind of experiential or imaginative approximation to the angelic consciousness must be aware of a certain state of spiritual tension or outreaching that it is difficult to characterise more definitely. I have elsewhere * tried to elucidate the conception of eternity, not as endless time but as an existence having no relation to time, since it finds its completeness not in passing from one fragment to another but in holding all the parts at once. This conception permeates the angel-lore of Aquinas. When Mozart, or whoever it was that spoke for him, declared that a composition would often come to him and shape itself as in a lovely dream, until, as the eye sees in one glance a beautiful picture or a beautiful human form, so his spirit would survey the whole composition as one, not in the succession in which it would have to be instrumentally produced but as it were all at once, he would have known, had he been a student of Aquinas, that he was escaping from the life of time into the life of eternity, and that his human mind touched upon the angelic privilege. Indeed, the more we reflect upon it the more clearly do we perceive that in order to have any perception of even the simplest melody we must all have some measure of the all-at-onceness of Mozart's perception. The note that is now being sounded derives its organic significance

* *The Religion of Time and the Religion of Eternity*, London, 1899.

from some still present sense of the notes that are sounding no longer, and from some sense of implication, at least, concerning the notes to come.

Modern scientific conceptions do not readily lend themselves to the idea of mental or spiritual experience apart altogether from a material organism, but if we try imaginatively to put ourselves into the position of men to whom this idea was constantly present we shall perhaps be able to understand that to them as they pondered upon the difference between past, present, and certainly anticipated and defined future, it would resolve itself into a mere difference between the presence or absence of material impacts upon the organs of sense, and would tend (as it surely does) to lose much of its significance on the field of memory, where the all-at-onceness of coexistence goes shares at least with the come-and-go of succession. Hence possibly the extended use of the word "memory" to include a whole group of active faculties, and the sense of its exalted spiritual significance, that sometimes puzzles the modern reader of mediæval literature or its sources.

We may perhaps further illustrate the relation of memory to eternity, and to experiential approximations to the conception of eternal life, by contrasting the excitement with which we read a story because we do not know what is coming, with the volume of emotion with which we read the opening scenes of *Macbeth* or *King Lear* because we do know what is coming; or still better with the collective sense of greatness and tragedy with

which we think of those works as wholes. In such a case we do not run through the plays rapidly in our minds, but, like Mozart, we feel and live them all at once. Let us conceive of this vague but massive and intense perception raised to vivid and detailed intensity, and we may perhaps gain some insight into the mediæval conception of the angelic psychology. And note this further point: Imagine yourself contemplating the tragedy of *Macbeth*, not as a work of art but as actual history. Think of yourself as seeing not only it, but the whole sequence of the life of man upon earth of which it is a part, in its all-at-onceness. You would see, as an essential characteristic of humanity, that to the agents themselves the events were successive, though to you they were coexistent. The successions of time would exist for you as a feature of human experience, but a feature that had no significance to you except in relation to human psychology.

In these general illustrations of the conception of eternity I have not attempted to keep in direct touch with such examples or propositions as might be drawn from the words of Aquinas. But our next steps may follow very closely in his footprints. The higher the human intelligence rises, the more general and comprehensive are its conceptions. A few axiomatic truths are given us from the first dawn of conscious thought, and we gradually rise to the perception of their implications. Logic and mathematics are the best types of this process. The whole body of mathematical truth is involved in the

axioms, and it is just as directly and inevitably true as they are, but it is not as directly perceptible by us. If the conclusion of a syllogism is not involved in the premises, the syllogism is false. But it does not follow either that you have seen that the conclusion follows from them until they have been put together and set before you, or that you would have been able to recognise the truth of the conclusion at all had you not been shown that it was already involved in the truth of the premises. Mathematical research consists entirely in discovering, and mathematical teaching in showing, that you have already admitted the conclusion in admitting the premises. The most advanced mathematical theorem is to a sufficiently high intelligence as obvious as the axioms, because it is only another way of stating them.

Again in the concrete sciences, as our generalisations mount higher and higher our statements may become more and more comprehensive, and a vaster range of facts can be embraced in a single statement. Once more to return to the classical illustration: The three laws of planetary motion discovered by Kepler are seen to be statements not of three facts but of one fact when it is shown that they all (and incalculably more too) are included in the law of gravitation as formulated by Newton. Now to the Divine mind absolutely, and to the angelic mind far in excess of the farthest stretch of human intelligence, there is an all-at-onceness of *perception*, like Mozart's, that is independent of time and succession in the phenomenal world; and an

all-comprehensiveness of synthetic *conception*, like that of the man of science or the mathematician, that grasps as one what to the rest of us appears as many; and to which what appear to us as derived truths are directly obvious as integral parts of a co-evident whole. Thus the higher the angel in the ranks of spiritual being the fewer are his concepts, but the richer and wider they are in their embrace. Each loftier angel approximates more nearly to what has been set forth in modern books as the ideal but unattainable goal of science and philosophy, namely, the embracing in one single statement, or thought, of the whole possible range of material fact and mental experience.

To the angel, then, a body of truth is not an erection that is sustained by its sure foundation, and would fall in ruins were that shaken; for its "parts," as they seem to us, are mutually sustained by their own vital and collective truth; and if we speak of support at all, we must say that what to us is the remote deduction supports the axiom, as much as the axiom supports the deduction.

So to the angel there is no logic as such, but all our logic is included, from a higher point of view, in his divine intelligence. It must follow that the angel, understanding the human mind, understands logic as a phenomenon of that mind, and knows what must come first to us and what must be presented as derived from it. Can any teacher—and we must all be teachers in one way and at one time or another—ponder on these things without being at once chastened and stimulated? Truly the task he has

undertaken is one which none but an angel could fully accomplish. For he should see the field of knowledge as a whole, in which every part supports and is supported by every other, and he should so understand the mind of his pupil as to know just where in that field he is, where his nature and his purposes demand that he should be, and what path will best and most fruitfully lead him there.

And so, too, in the matter of spiritual and moral truth. There are no false values to the angelic mind. There is no room for illusions. There is nothing that promises blessedness but does not give it. The angel looks upon God, and in him sees things as they are and, in knowing and loving, has eternal fruition.

The classical definition of eternity is derived from Boetius, and is quoted again and again by the Schoolmen. It runs: "Eternity is the embracing and possession of the whole plenitude of unlimited life all at once." (3)

Another field on which Aquinas shows high powers of spiritual perception and imagination is that of harmonising scriptural sayings which appear to contradict each other or the general principles of his faith. It must be admitted that this is an unpromising field, and that Aquinas is quite capable of acquiescing in the most violent and wilful methods of the harmonist where the problem is, so to speak, mechanical and does not touch upon any spiritual or experiential matter. Thus he has nothing better to suggest by way of reconciling Matthew's statement

that the Sermon on the Mount was delivered to the disciples from a mountain with Luke's statement that it was delivered to a general public on a plain than to suppose that there was a mountain with a level summit, on which however a little elevation rose. Jesus gave the discourse to his disciples at the summit of the small elevation, and repeated it to the multitude on the exalted plain.

But where some significant idea is involved, it goes hard if Aquinas cannot carry us to some deep conception which will permanently enrich us. Exegetically he will probably be quite unconvincing, but he will have vitally illustrated some thought, or cleared up some ambiguity.

Take, for example, his comment on the words, "Which things the angels desire to look into." Now, *desiderium*, or desire, is defined as the yearning for some good thing that you do not possess. So as long as it is a desire, it must be to some extent at least unfulfilled. The state of having the thing you love is fruition, not desire. But the very nature of the angels' bliss, and the bliss of the redeemed, is that they desire nothing that they do not possess, and are in a state of triumphant and full fruition. How, then, can the angels desire to look into these things? Aquinas finds the answer in a conception with which we are already familiar. Human language can never be fully adequate to describe divine things. When any assertion is made about God it must always carry with it at least an implication of what is not true, for it must always be in some way

limiting. If you say that God does not move, you at once suggest something rigid, unresponsive, non-vital, which is not what you intend. You mean to assert constancy, but you suggest inertness. Or if you say that God moves through all things, you call up the image of a physical permeation of the universe by some kind of flowing substance. You have suggested a material image when you meant to convey a spiritual idea. We cannot altogether escape this, but we can be on our guard against being misled by it. And the same difficulties occur in a lesser measure when we are speaking of angels. So here. There is no illusion that reasserts itself more obstinately than the illusion that attainment must ultimately bring satiety, and that the real zest of life is in the pursuit. So the word "desire" is used here to emphasise the keenness and eagerness, the unflagging intensity which we associate with desire rather than with attainment; but we must guard against the suggestion which the word contains, that the angels have not attained the vision. The spirit that looks upon God is filled eternally with wonder. And wonder, so long as it is wonder, cannot dull.

Take another instance. Jesus said to the penitent thief on the cross, "This day shalt thou be with me in paradise." But Christ himself "descended into hell," and rose only on the third day. Then how could the thief be with him in paradise "that day"? To understand this, let us consider what paradise or heaven is and what hell. We are dealing

only with the unseen world, but the physical theory which Aquinas held concerning the position of hell and purgatory affects his representations, for he supposed hell to be situated at the centre of the earth, the limbo of unbaptized infants apparently being its highest portion; then immediately above it came purgatory, and above that the limbo of the Old Testament believers. Now, all these may be included in the conception of "the region below," *infernum*, or hell. In none of these regions is there fruition of the divine aspect, which is essential and consummate bliss, and therefore all this "region below" is contrasted with the "region above," where the redeemed and the angels look upon God. It is not strictly necessary for the solution of the seeming contradiction we are considering to go into any further examination of the distinctions between these various "regions below," but it will be worth while to do so. Hell proper is characterised by the absence of grace and the presence of pain; the limbo of infants by the absence of grace and the absence of pain. For Aquinas, though he does not dogmatise, inclines to the milder doctrine concerning the fate of these innocents. He thinks that they are in fact perfectly happy, their sole "penalty" consisting in exclusion from the beatific vision; and since they know why they are excluded therefrom, they entirely acquiesce in it, and no more desire the "grace" which would bring them to heaven than a wise man wishes to be a king or a bird. In purgatory there is the presence of grace and

the presence of pain. And in the limbo of the Fathers there is the presence of grace and the absence of pain. These are all states, and the places that we call by the names of hell, purgatory, and so forth are but the localities in which these states are normal. Indeed, in the case of purgatory instances have been revealed of souls receiving their purgation in the locality especially associated with their sin, somewhere upon the earth. We must distinguish, then, between local hell, in the larger sense, and essential hell. In like manner essential heaven is a state, consisting in the fruition of the divine aspect. Local heaven (for Aquinas believed in locality in heaven) was the place where such fruition was normal.

Now when Christ was crucified and dead he descended into hell, but only as far as the limbo of the Fathers, where he "preached to the spirits in prison," that is to say, revealed himself to the Old Testament believers, in his deity. In the limbo, then, when he descended there, there was fruition of the divine aspect, and that day the penitent thief was with his saviour and his God in essential paradise, though he had descended with him into local hell.

Here I must close this tardy and inadequate indication of the side of the teaching of Aquinas which will most richly reward the student, but which could only take a secondary place in the special treatment of the reactions between philosophy and dogma which has been the immediate object of our study. (4)

EPILOGUE

We have reached the end of our journey. Our path has often been devious, and we may sometimes have seemed to lose ourselves in detail, or to be neglecting the compass and forgetting our goal. But certain general impressions may perhaps stand out, or at least be recognisable, as we look back.

We have seen how the same fundamental problems constantly reassert themselves under changing forms; how the conflict between the material and spiritual interpretations of the universe appears to be perennial; and how the attempt to interpret matter and spirit in terms of each other seems never to be abandoned and yet never to succeed. In this perennial warfare, as understanded by the people (though it may be otherwise with the philosophers), the attack generally comes from the material side of experience, and it is the spiritual side that is put on the defensive.

Our conception of the material universe changes more rapidly than do our conceptions of life, of conduct, and of spiritual values. The command over material forces which the study of matter-in-motion has given us in recent times is so impressive, that it is difficult always to keep in mind how little importance it has in itself if it cannot be directed to vital and non-material ends. The real certainty of its practical discoveries, and the delusive appearance of certainty, or even finality, which its speculations assume, each

in its turn, are always promising it the victory in the philosophical rivalry between materialism and spiritualism. But that victory it can never win, for it is self-excluded from the very region over which it aspires to rule. I need not repeat what has already been urged on this topic in its proper connections. Only let me add, that in our interpretation of the material and of the spiritual worlds alike we often think of things as abandoned or superseded which are in reality only translated into a new idiom, and which still live in the successors that seem to have destroyed them.

Familiarity with any great system of thought that is not our own, when sympathy and respect guide our study, will sometimes tempt us to believe that any facts can be fitted into any hypothesis, and that changes of fashion are all that the emancipated spirit can find in the history of thought. But there is another side to that.

There is always more or less uneasiness, somewhere, in the fit between hypothesis on the one hand and fact and experience on the other. It is felt now at this point and now at that, and hypothesis is stretched to cover fact, or facts are twisted and squeezed to bring them within the hypothesis. But the strains and pressures that thus arise, with the concentrations in this or that direction and the reactions that they provoke, are the condition of the continuous life of the spirit and the preservation or recovery of its true wealth. The sceptical contention that one theory is as good as another must yield

to the recognition of a stream of permanent and vital truth that has flowed continuously through changing intellectual idioms.

If the facts can always be expressed and arranged in a more or less convenient and suggestive way in the language of any system that is not self-contradictory, we must not conclude either that the hypothesis of the day is thereby established as final, or that all hypotheses are equally futile. Each hypothesis is useful in its turn, and each must yield when it has itself enabled us to take a wider and deeper survey than it can fully express in its own terminology.

But I must resist the temptation to develop these thoughts, except so far as they connect themselves with a line of reflection more immediately related to the special theme of our studies.

As I look back over the ground we have covered, these discourses seem more and more to resolve themselves into a commentary on the initial statements that Aquinas was essentially engaged in arranging an *alliance* between the ecclesiastical tradition and the Aristotelian philosophy, and that he was urged to his task by his deep love of them both and his firm conviction that both were true. His love made him feel that they ought to be friends everywhere as they were in his own heart; while his conviction of their truth taught him that in the deepest nature of things they actually were friends.

But he loved the church tradition more deeply than he loved Aristotle, and his conviction of its truth stood on a different plane and reached a higher

level of certainty. For to him the tradition must be unconditionally true, whatever its content might be, because it was divinely authenticated. Whereas the bulk of the Aristotelian philosophy was accepted because it contents approved themselves to the natural faculties of man.

In the last resort therefore, should a conflict arise, it was Aristotle and not the Church that must yield; only Aquinas held that such a case never could arise in its extreme form; for the tradition, however much it might limit, supplement, and interfuse the workings of reason, could not, and would not, contradict reason itself. Because both the tradition and reason came from God, and Aristotle had no authority except so far as he was the mouthpiece of reason.

Such being the task of S. Thomas, his method was to draw a sharp line between the natural powers of man, with the truths accessible to them and the life that could be realised by them, on the one hand, and the powers beyond the scope of human nature, on the other hand, fed by truths inaccessible to reason, and leading to ideals of conduct and hopes of spiritual realisation unknown and unknowable to natural man.

If we wish to restate the problem in more general terms, and to understand the method of Aquinas in its widest application, I suppose we may say that the theologian, whatever his church or his system, must in the first place substitute for Aristotle the much less definite and manageable conception of the body of ascertained scientific truth and reasonable philo-

sophical conviction that appeals to him on its own merits, or that he accepts on the authority of experts. Finding in himself, by hypothesis, a working harmony between this body of scientific and philosophic conviction and his own theological dogmas, he must first formulate and define the nature of this harmony to himself, and must then try to bring it home to all who share his scientific and philosophical principles, and so lead them on to his theology.

Again, the method of Aquinas as well as his problem may, I think, be fairly expressed in general terms. For in technical language it may be described as the application to the spiritual life of the theory of *epigenesis*; and that theory is defined as the belief that the life-germ must be planted in an organism from without, before it can be developed from within.

It is clear that a very large part of the teaching of Aquinas can be brought within this formula. He consistently maintains, as we have seen again and again, that the higher truths and the higher virtues are alike incapable of being evolved from human nature till something that does not belong to it has been given it from above. It is given first as a potentiality only. But as it develops it not only realises itself, but so reacts upon the lower levels of perception and passion upon which it has been grafted as to make them unite with itself in one organic whole.

But Aquinas is an extremist, for he holds that not only the vital germ itself but the very capacity to

receive it must be added to the native endowment of the organism from outside; and yet further, that a system of supernatural sacraments, and agents with supernatural powers to enable them to administer them, are needed not only for the implanting of the germ but for its development and protection.

Short of these extremes the doctrine of spiritual *epigenesis* itself is no more than the belief that "every good gift and every perfect boon is from above." It was the creed not only of Plato but of Aristotle. It is a creed which I suppose will seem alien to few theists, and to still fewer mystics (whether theists or no); and in some form, however vague, it is recognised in Matthew Arnold's stream of tendency in the not-ourselves, and in the instincts and experience of almost every man who has been definitely conscious of spiritual aspirations or moral effort.*

The church of Rome, as a living force, has to find its own solution of the universal problem amid the changing elements and conditions that define it. It cannot, and does not, regard the solution of Aquinas as definitive. Modern science and philosophy can no longer be even roughly equated with the teaching of Aristotle; and the theology of Aquinas cannot be equated with the theology of the Church. Strictly speaking indeed, Aquinas has no authority. But the

* Perhaps it is the uncompromising boldness with which Bergson proclaims as "creative evolution" what others regard as "evolutionary creation" that constitutes at once the fascination and the terror of his speculations. Yet is not Bergson, so far as he has yet revealed himself, more of a mystic and a seer than a coherent system-builder?

council of Trent adopts and systematises his defence of the authority of Scripture, and of the Church as founded upon it. The Vatican council rather advanced than withdrew the dogmatic line at points from which all hope of support from human reason seems to be further and further receding; while the Curia has in recent times shown the full effectiveness of its disciplinary powers, and its determination to allow no laxity or compromise in its official teaching. The Eucharist is still as central to the dogma and the cultus of the Church as it was in the time of Aquinas; and it still involves belief in a miracle daily performed, and the continuous transmission of the power to perform it within a sharply defined body of men. They alone can impress the official seal that opens or closes the gates of heaven. But whereas these dogmas, as professed beliefs, show little sign of openly yielding to the pressure of modern thought, yet a growing sense of brotherhood and recognition of spiritual kinships more and more openly defies the barriers which these dogmas once successfully erected and defended. The doctrine of the innocence of "invincible ignorance," that is to say, the doctrine that a man is not held guilty on account of ignorance that he could not help, spreads the cloak of charity over a multitude of "heresies" (no longer regarded as the worst of "sins"), and practically reaches out towards a doctrine of "uncovenanted mercies" which to Aquinas would have destroyed the very conception of the Church.

There is a beautiful saying in Thomas's com-

mentary on that terrible text in Math. xii. 31. 32 on the unpardonable sin. Its spirit is carrying the Church far on the path of peace and reconciliation. How much further will it carry it? It runs:

"To the Father is specially assigned as his own, power; to the Son, wisdom; to the Holy Spirit, goodness. So he is said to sin against the Father who sins from weakness; against the Son who sins from ignorance; against the Holy Spirit who sins from wickedness." *

How long can the Church, while ceasing to regard heresy (as defined by herself) as necessarily wicked, retain unsoftened her conviction that her own orthodoxy gives her exclusive possession of a casket that holds the deputed power and the revealed truth of God?

But the problem of the church of Rome is her own. What more immediately concerns us is the question how the foundations on which Aquinas reared his edifice of belief present themselves to those who tread the open road with such light as the open day may give them.

Obviously the solidity of the whole scheme depends upon the firmness of the foundation upon which the authority of the tradition itself can be shown to rest. It is here that Thomas himself feels most secure, but it is here too that he seems most open to challenge. An alliance arranged on such terms as have been expounded in these lectures must obviously be subject to strain or disturbance

* Vol. x. 117 (bis) b.

as the claims and prestige of the contracting parties shift. It will hardly be denied that the conception of the range of the human faculties, taken in their fullest extent, has broadened since the days of Aquinas. The comparative study of religions has forced us to recognise outside the Christian tradition spiritual and moral experiences and aspirations that were supposed to be its peculiar privilege. The proof by miracle of the authenticity, and consequent unique authority, of every portion of the canonical Scriptures, survives, if anywhere, only in the Schools. The textual arguments which claim to base belief in the authority of the Church on belief in the authority of the Scripture are barely held in their place by the very edifice they are supposed to support; and modern exegesis has relegated to the region of fancies—often quaintly pleasing, sometimes of revealing beauty, sometimes grotesque or repulsive—the allegorical interpretations by which alone the whole body of Scripture was kept in touch with the actual life and teaching of the Church.

Whither does this lead us? To my mind there is but one reply. To modern thought there is no such science as theology, in the sense in which Aquinas taught it. For there is, and there can be, no body of ascertained, approved, and accurately defined truth, or even any principles and data, concerning the First Cause and the suprasensuous world, which imposes itself upon us by an authority that we may not question. I am very far from saying that there are no sincere believers in such a

theology, or no sincere teachers of it; but wherever there are such, I suppose they will be the first to acknowledge, while they deplore, that the flow of modern thought is against them. Theology is not, and never was, religion. It is a body of beliefs or dogmas concerned with the religious life and experience; and since philosophy, in its widest acceptation, attempts to formulate or relate *all* the truths that can be established by human thought, or that are involved in or rest upon human experience, it includes in its domain the whole field claimed by theology. But it claims no authority that its appeal to the reason and experience of man cannot give it. Aquinas assures us, and endeavours to prove to us, that there is an authority above our reason which our reason itself tells us it would be foolish not to accept. How does his argument relate itself to our ways of thinking?

Surely the scheme of the *Contra Gentiles* and of the *Summa Theologiae* must appear to modern thought as an inverted pyramid, for Aquinas rests the credit of the Gospels upon the miracles, and the authority of the Church upon that of the Scriptures (compare pp. 169 *sqq.*).

But to Aquinas himself, whose faith was as firm as a rock, his pyramidal proof seemed to rest on a basis well and truly laid. This is what gives the wonderful sense of reality to his work which every reader feels. It is impossible not to contrast it with the uneasy attitude of modern apologists. How much of what passes in our day for theology

is a half-hearted attempt to maintain the credit of traditional formulæ or practices, not by showing how firmly they stand, but by showing how little weight they are really called upon to bear! They are valuable historical documents that it would be a pity to lose sight of (so that *credo* is reduced to the rank of a rather violent grammatical "figure" for *crediderunt*); or we are asked to feel that they are not now dogmas but symbolic expressions of truths that we all acknowledge. Beliefs that owe all their impressiveness to the supernatural sanctions they carried are saved by a plea that they can be justified on natural analogies. And often we hear the all but open acknowledgment that the pyramid is indeed inverted, but are besought to leave it as it is, because if we attempted to put the apex at the top and the base at the bottom the whole structure would fall in dust and ruin. The difference between the atmosphere one breathes with Aquinas and that of modern apologetic theology is physically palpable.

Outside the church of Rome we have only broken fragments of the great tradition of the mediæval church. For those of us, then, who *are* outside it, what will become of the spiritual treasures gathered by that tradition when it is left to rely upon its own elements of beauty, strength, and truth? Suppose we were frankly to say, "Let history be history; let art be art; let utterance come fresh minted with the stamp of conviction; and let human love, belief, and admiration claim and be claimed by their own"?

Suppose we were once for all to repudiate the doctrine of Aquinas that imposes Christianity upon us as a miraculously authenticated system which the human spirit must accept and may not judge, and were to accept the teaching of the sages of Greece that it is in our own souls that we hold the clue to the interpretation of the universe so far as we can penetrate its mystery, and that it is in our own souls too that we recognise a kinship with the power that lies veiled in the mystery beyond? What if we were to try the Christian tradition itself, not by the strength of its claim to dominate the human spirit, but by the depth of the response it wakes in it? "O testimony of the soul, Christian by its very nature!" cried Tertullian.* What would become of the accumulated wealth of the tradition of Rome if it made its appeal to that testimony only?

The question does not stand alone. Will the sun of Hellas dwindle for us in England into a star of the tenth magnitude when the flower of our leisured youth is no longer forced or bribed into the study of Greek? Will the Psalmists and the Prophets of Israel go dumb once for all, and will Hebrew legend and history cease to fascinate when the last afterwash of the belief in the miraculous efficacy or merit of reading the Bible has passed away? These are questions which the man who understands their import can hardly ask himself without "tremblings of the heart." But *contra* we may well ask whether the spirit of Hellas is less fruitfully active in the life

* *Apologeticus*, cap. 17.

and thought of England to-day than it was when editing a Greek text was the approved method of gaining the highest preferments in the Church; or whether Catullus and Lucretius were more read and better understood than they are now in the days when every "gentleman" could repeat a few lines of Horace, and every member of Parliament could point his wit or round his eloquence by a tag from the Eton Latin Grammar. Or again, can we seriously hope that Shakespeare will enter more effectively into the life of England if we turn out teachers by the gross qualified and required to take "literature" as a school subject?

The answer to such questions may be doubtful and disputable enough. But as far as our immediate subject is concerned, I think the auguries are favourable. As the system of Aquinas in its integrity becomes less and less tenable even in his own church, his influence speads, and respect for him grows outside it. In instructed circles the Schoolmen are no longer a byword for hair-splitting futility. As we recede from mediæval forms of thought we recede still further from the Renaissance contempt for all that was associated with them. It is by no accident that Dante has come to his own in the age furthest removed from his physical science, and least bound by his theological dogmas, that there has been since his day. Is it vain to hope that when the ecclesiastical tradition, alike in its Roman wealth and its attenuated derivative streams, no longer has to carry the weight of unbelievable dogmas, and sanctions that will bear no

scrutiny, its true power will be felt in wider circles? When it has ceased to rely on its priests and its apologists will it find its true interpreters? Will the gathered wealth of the Breviary (little rills from which have already trickled out into a larger world), will the splendours of the *Rituale* and the *Pontificale* take the place that is their own in the literature and the devotions of the world, when they have ceased to be the prescribed exercises of a spiritual aristocracy or the professional instruments of an order of wonder-workers?

Who shall answer these questions? But must we not at least believe that convictions sincerely held by great souls, in reverence for their own highest powers and instincts, will, by the very force of the natural affinity between sincerity and truth, gather to themselves, with whatever admixture of alloy, a treasure of associated beauty, truth, and goodness? When men strive to maintain the credit of beliefs, the sincerity of which has faded, for the sake of retaining the treasures associated with them, they are cutting the very roots from which the sap of health and vitality flows, and are striving to keep the living in vigour by chaining them to the dead. On the other hand, if living truth has once been found and has recorded itself in living utterance, its power depends not on the history that tells us how it was reached but on the "testimony of the soul" that tells us what it is.

Our study of Aquinas has enforced these convictions. It was because he believed in the literal truth

of the story of Eden and the state of innocence that he could not believe he understood its meaning or even its naivest statements until he had brought them into relation with the deepest inward truth that his heart and experience recognised. Nor was he alone in this. Can anyone study the great series of reliefs and frescoes that survive from the ages of faith without having it borne in upon him that the artists, while telling a tale that they believed exactly as it had been told them, were brought by it to acutest sense of the contradiction between the harmony of man with man and of man with his environment that exists *de jure*, and the discords that exist *de facto*?* The artists knew that the harmony we have not is more natural and more real than the discords that we have, and their work bears the message still. It does not make us believe the story, but it makes us understand what it meant to those who did believe it; it finds the response to that meaning in our hearts, and it draws us, as with the penetrating force of a melody, towards a worthier response to it in the temper of our lives.†

I need not further elaborate illustrations that we have but now dwelt upon, on the field of angelology and elsewhere, of this natural tendency of a great mind to see every belief, however transient as a dogma, in a *light*, at least, that will not fade. But

* Perhaps the story of the creation and the fall, as told in the reliefs on the façade of Orvieto Cathedral, is the most perfect example and illustration of this.

† I leave it to others to suggest or discuss the ultimate place of music in this process of freeing the soul from the body of religious tradition, and helping this mortal to put on immortality.

there is a limiting condition. I spoke but now of beliefs held by a soul "in reverence for its own highest powers and instincts." The soul that is to make convictions that are destined to pass away lead it to truths that will abide, must not allow its own nature to be violated. As far as reason is concerned, Aquinas recognises this truth in theory. Revelation may transcend reason, but it cannot outrage it. Yet we have seen that it is just here that he swerves most conspicuously from his own principles. Hence a strange and instructive phenomenon. Thomas, as we have seen, sometimes carries the submission of his reason beyond the appointed line and allows it to be violated. When he does so he is but too apt to accept as revelation doctrines which the historian and the anthropologist cannot but recognise as being themselves the products of some primitive form of reasoning, but imported into an alien system where they are yoked with rivals against which they may strain but with which they cannot pull together.

Again, conviction, if it is to develop its natural affinity with truth and reality, must reverence not only our intellectual but our moral nature. Aquinas shocks us so deeply when he speaks of hell, not because he believes in it, but because he seeks to show that *to our human judgment* its existence approves itself as good. Dante believed in hell as firmly as Aquinas did, but he conceals neither from himself nor from his reader the revolt of his feelings against its apparent injustice. In my *Dante and Aquinas* I have tried to show the connection of this

difference between the two great teachers with the fact that, to most readers of the Comedy, Dante's hell is a vision of the nature of sin that withdraws the mind from dwelling on the mere consequences of the evil choice by flashing upon it a new perception that the evil inheres in the choice itself; whereas here, and here almost alone, Aquinas teaches us nothing.

And yet it is Aquinas himself who has formulated the principle for which I am pleading, and fidelity to it is the soul of his greatness. His occasional swervings from it emphasise by contrast its vital significance. The form he gives to it is seen in his distinctive doctrine, that though revelation transcends reason it cannot contradict it. May I, greatly daring, strive to extend and generalise it and say: Our sense for truth, beauty, and goodness may be warped, deformed, or blighted by arrogance; it may be fostered, strengthened, and uplifted by reverent humility; but if we allow it to *abdicate* we are self-betrayed.

NOTES TO LECTURE VIII

(1) *To page* 531.—With a single exception, to be mentioned presently, I believe that I have reproduced the remarks on the metre of this hymn just as I made them when delivering the lecture. But my friend Dr James Edwin Odgers, who was one of my hearers, soon afterwards called my attention to the beautiful paper on the *Pervigilium Veneris* which was printed as No. 6 of the "Occasional Publications of the Classical Association."* The affiliation of the hymn in the *Office* of Aquinas is traced in this paper, down from Archilochus and through the *Pervigilium*, with all the resources of patience and learning; and I would specially draw the notice of any student interested in the matter to the further illustrations from Suetonius, Vopiscus, Florus, Nemesianus, Prudentius, and Venantius Fortunatus which he will find there.

I have "lifted" (this is the exception!) Professor Dobson's rendering of the refrain, for which I hereby ask his forgiveness.

The *Officium de festo corporis Christi* will be found in vol. xv. (pp. 233–238) of the collected works of

* *A Study of the Pervigilium Veneris*, by J. F. Dobson, M.A., Professor of Greek in the University of Bristol. Cambridge, 1916.

Aquinas; and, with some alterations, including the omission of one of the hymns, in the *Breviarium Romanum. Pars Æstiva.*

As to the *Antiphonies*, I can once more refer the reader, for examples of this beautiful form, to the Poet Laureate's *Spirit of Man*, Nos. 415 (together with the note), 438, 445, 449.

(2) *To pages* 533–536.—On the state of innocence, the fall, and the fallen state.

Natural powers may have been supernaturally acquired:

"Sicut et caecus miraculose illuminatus naturaliter videt."—*Sum. Theol.*, iii^a. q. 77: a. 4. ad 3^m (Leon., xii. 199b).

"Passiones animae sunt in appetitu sensuali, cuius objectum est bonum et malum. Unde omnium passionum animae quaedam ordinantur ad bonum, ut amor et gaudium; quaedam ad malum, ut timor et dolor. Et quia in primo statu nullum malum aderat nec imminebat; nec aliquod bonum aberat, quod cuperet bona voluntas pro tempore illo habendum, ut patet per Augustinum xiv *de Civ. Dei:* omnes illae passiones quae respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant, ut timor et dolor et huiusmodi; similiter nec illae passiones quae respiciunt bonum non habitum et nunc habendum, ut cupiditas aestuans. Illae vero passiones quae possunt esse boni praesentis, ut gaudium et amor; vel quae sunt futuri boni ut suo tempore habendi, ut desiderium et spes non affligens; fuerunt in statu innocentiae. Aliter

tamen quam in nobis. Nam in nobis appetitus sensualis, in quo sunt passiones, non totaliter subest rationi: unde passiones quandoque sunt in nobis praevenientes iudicium rationis, et impedientes; quandoque vero ex iudicio rationis consequentes, prout sensualis appetitus aliqualiter rationi obedit. In statu vero innocentiae inferior appetitus erat rationi totaliter subiectus: unde non erant in eo passiones animae, nisi ex rationis iudicio consequentes."—*Ib.*, i^{a}. q. 95: a. 2. c. (Leon., v. 422). Cf. *ib.*, q. 98: a. 2. ad 3^{m} (*ib.*, 438b).

Note particularly the phrases *pro tempore illo habendum* and *non habitum et nunc habendum*. It was as to the *how* and the *when* rather than the *what* that Eve, and then Adam, sinned. This is very clearly stated by Anselm:

"Eva similis voluit esse diis prius quam Deus hoc vellet."—*De casu diaboli*, cap. iv. (vol. i. 332 C). *Cf.* capp. xiii. *sqq.*

Aquinas himself is less explicit and convincing than usual. Both Satan and Adam were right in desiring to be "like God" so far as it was within the possibility of their respective natures to be so. Satan sought *power* inordinately, but Adam *knowledge*. In any case Adam's sin was spiritual or intellectual, not carnal.

And it was God's purpose to give Adam, in his grace, the means of gaining the very blessedness which Adam sinfully desired to be able to attain by his own natural powers.

Again, Adam and Eve did not deliberately think

that what God had told them of the consequences of their sin was false, but apparently they hoped they might interpret it with some latitude, for they were too much elated by the prospect opened to them by the serpent to attend to the prohibition!

"Sic autem erat homo in statu innocentiae institutus ut nulla esset rebellio carnis ad spiritum. Unde non potuit esse prima inordinatio appetitus humani ex hoc quod appetierit aliquod sensibile bonum, in quod carnis concupiscentia tendit praeter ordinem rationis. Relinquitur ergo quod prima inordinatio appetitus humani fuit ex hoc quod aliquod bonum spirituale inordinate appetiit. Non autem inordinate appetivisset, appetendo illud secundum suam mensuram ex divina regula praestitutam. Unde relinquitur quod primum peccatum eius fuit in hoc quod appetiit quoddam spirituale bonum supra suam mensuram. Quod pertinet ad superbiam."—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 163: a. 1. c. (Leon., x. 328b).

"Homo vero qui creaturis inferioribus superpositus erat, ut eas regeret, et eis uteretur, non tam per potentiam quam per prudentiam, hoc modo appetiit ut per naturae suae conditionem et ligni prohibiti edulium tantam scientiae plenitudinem consequeretur ut ex lumine propriae rationis (quod tamen a Deo sibi collatum esse credebat) et se ipsum regeret in omnibus, et inferiora sibi subjecta."—2 *Dist.*, xxii. q. 1: a. 2. sol. (vol. vi. 580a).

"Et ideo cum uterque, scilicet diabolus et primus homo, inordinate divinam similitudinem appetierint, neuter eorum peccavit appetendo similitudinem

naturae.* Sed primus homo peccavit principaliter appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad *scientiam boni et mali*, sicut serpens ei suggessit: ut scilicet per virtutem propriae naturae determinaret sibi quid esset bonum et quid malum ad agendum; vel etiam ut per se praecognosceret quid sibi boni vel mali esset futurum. Et secundario peccavit appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad propriam potestatem operandi, ut scilicet virtute propriae naturae operaretur ad beatitudinem consequendam."—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 163: a. 2. c. (Leon., x. 330).

"Dicendum, quod non crediderunt Deum falsum dixisse . . . sed crediderunt forte alio modo intelligendum fore metaphorice, vel ad aliquid significandum esse dictum. Vel dicendum, quod ex ipsa elatione qua illud quod promittebatur appetebant, oculus mentis impeditus fuit ne actualiter veritatem divini dicti attenderent."—2 *Dist.*, xxii. q. 1: a. 1. ad 1^{m} (vol. vi. 578b).

As to the congruity between the sin and the resultant degradation:

"Si aliquis propter culpam suam privetur aliquo beneficio sibi dato, carentia illius beneficii est poena culpae illius. Sicut autem in Primo dictum est, homini in prima institutione hoc beneficium fuit collatum divinitus, ut quamdiu mens eius esset Deo subiecta, inferiores vires animae subiicerentur rationali menti, et corpus animae subiiceretur. Sed quia mens

* *I.e.* neither of them aspired to be of the same, or like, nature with God; for they knew that no such thing was possible or conceivable. (*Cf.* p. 244.)

hominis per peccatum a divina subiectione recessit, consecutum est ut nec inferiores vires totaliter rationi subiicerentur, unde tanta est rebellio carnalis appetitus ad rationem; nec etiam corpus totaliter subiiceretur animae, unde consequitur mors, et alii corporales defectus."—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q 164: a. 1. c. (Leon., x. 334b).

"Per iustitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat inferiores animae vires, et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur, ei subiecta. Haec autem originalis iustitia subtracta est per peccatum primi parentis. . . . Et ideo omnes vires animae remanent quodammodo destitutae proprio ordine, quo naturaliter ordinantur ad virtutem: et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturae dicitur. Sunt autem quatuor potentiae animae quae possunt esse subiecta virtutum: . . . scilicet ratio, in qua est prudentia; voluntas, in qua est iustitia; irascibilis,* in qua est fortitudo; concupiscibilis, in qua est temperantia. Inquantum ergo ratio destituitur suo ordine ad verum, est vulnus ignorantiae; inquantum vero voluntas destituitur ordine ad bonum,

* *Irascibilis* is a rather misleading translation of the Platonic (and Aristotelian) *θυμικός*. It means the enterprising spirit that rises up to meet a challenge when some good is to be gained or some evil averted at the price of difficulty or danger:

"Objectum irascibilis est bonum difficile, quod quandoque habet bonitatem ex ordine ad aliud."

The last words mean that the *irascibilis* may rejoice in a painful means which assures the desired end.

Thus victory purchased with pain and wounds is good; but only with reference to the object gained by it. Hence the speciality of the *irascibilis* as distinct from the *concupiscibilis*:

"Sicut quando aliquis delectatur de hoc quod vincit, quamvis

est vulnus malitiae; inquantum vero irascibilis destituitur suo ordine ad arduum, est vulnus infirmitatis; inquantum vero concupiscentia destituitur ordine ad delectabile moderatum ratione, est vulnus concupiscentiae.

"Sic igitur ista quatuor sunt vulnera inflicta toti humanae naturae ex peccato primi parentis. Sed quia inclinatio ad bonum virtutis in unoquoque diminuitur per peccatum actuale, . . . et ista sunt quatuor vulnera ex aliis peccatis consequentia: inquantum scilicet per peccatum et ratio hebetatur, praecipue in agendis; et voluntas induratur ad bonum; et maior difficultas bene agendi accrescit; et concupiscentia magis exardescit."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 85 : a. 3. c. (Leon., vii. 112b *sq.*).

(3) *To pages* 532, 536–544.—All hypothetical psychology must be based on our knowledge of our own minds:

"Cum enim de substantiis separatis hoc quod sint intellectuales quaedam substantiae cognoscamus, vel per demonstrationem vel per fidem, neutro modo hanc cognitionem accipere possemus, nisi hoc ipsum quod est intellectuale anima nostra ex seipsa cog-

simpliciter sensibilem dolorem de vulneribus sustineat, et de fatigatione tristitiam habet; et ideo haec delectatio non est concupiscibilis, sed est proprie irascibilis."

The ultimate object, on the other hand, is always something desirable in itself:

"Hoc autem est aliquid quod secundum seipsum est conveniens et delectabile, sicut quod animal postquam vincit aliud animal, utitur ad libitum propria voluntate; et haec delectatio pertinet ad concupiscibilem."—3 *Dist.*, xxvi. q. 1 : a. 2. ad 5^{m} (vol. vii. 280a).

nosceret; unde et scientia de intellectu animae oportet uti ut principio ad omnia quae de substantiis separatis cognoscimus."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. cap. 46 (vol. v. 193a).

On eternity and the synthetic intelligence of the angels:

Mozart's (?) experience is recorded in Dr Karl Storck's *Mozarts Briefe in Auswahl.** The passage is headed "Aus einem fingierten Brief"; but the note adds "Diese berühmte Stelle aus einem zweifellos in dieser Art nie geschriebenen Briefe aus dem Jahre 1789 durfte hier nicht fehlen, weil in ihr die äuszeren Eigentümlichkeiten Mozarts bei seinem Komponieren gut zusammengefaszt sind." After describing the gradual process of formation of a work in the mind, the writer goes on, "Und das Ding wird im Kopf wahrlich fast fertig, wenn es auch lang ist, so dasz ich's hernach mit einem Blick, gleichsam wie ein schönes Bild oder einen hübschen Menschen im Geist übersehe und es auch gar nicht nacheinander, wie es hernach kommen musz, in der Einbildung höre, sondern wie gleich alles zusammen. Das ist nun ein Schmaus! Alles das Finden und Machen geht in mir nun nur wie in einem schönen, starken Traum vor. Aber das Überhören, so alles zusammen, ist doch das Beste."

On memory:

A good instance of the extended conception of memory as including the whole treasure in the mind is furnished by the celebrated passage in Augustine's

* Stuttgart (no date), No. 179, pp. 268 *sq.*, 287.

Confessiones, lib. x. capp. 8 *sqq*. But the most formal recognition of it I have met with is in Erigena:

"Nil aliud restat, nisi ut intelligamus, numeros intellectuales ex monade duplici modo fluere, et in memoria factos acie mentis multiplicari, dividi, comparari, colligi, uniri. Aut enim . . . per intellectum in rationem, et ex ratione in memoriam descendunt, aut per species rerum visibilium in sensus corporeos, iterumque ex ipsis in eandem memoriam confluunt, in qua fantasticas accipientes formas fiunt, interioribusque sensibus succumbunt."—*De div. nat.*, lib. ii. cap. 12 (660 B, C).

This is equivalent, in Erigena's language, to saying, that all which is stored in the mind, whether it consist of remembered experiences or of assimilated principles or intuitions, is to be regarded as "memory."

Angels compared with each other and with man:

"In omnibus enim substantiis intellectualibus invenitur virtus intellectiva per influentiam divini luminis. Quod quidem in primo principio est unum et simplex; et quanto magis creaturae intellectuales distant a primo principio, tanto magis dividitur illud lumen et diversificatur, sicut accidit in lineis a centro egredientibus. Et inde est quod Deus per unam suam essentiam omnia intelligit; superiores autem intellectualium substantiarum, etsi per plures formas intelligant, tamen intelligunt per pauciores et magis universales, et virtuosiores ad comprehensionem rerum, propter efficaciam virtutis intellectivae quae est in

eis; in inferioribus autem sunt formae plures, et minus universales, et minus efficaces ad comprehensionem rerum, inquantum deficiunt a virtute intellectiva superiorum. Si ergo inferiores substantiae haberent formas in illa universalitate in qua habent superiores, quia non sunt tantae efficaciae intelligendo, non acciperent per eas perfectam cognitionem de rebus, sed in quadam communitate et confusione. Quod aliqualiter apparet in hominibus: nam qui sunt debilioris intellectus, per universales conceptiones magis intelligentium non accipiunt perfectam cognitionem, nisi eis singula in speciali explicentur. . . . Sicut homines rudes ad scientiam induci non possunt nisi per sensibilia exempla."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^a. q. 89: a. 1. c. (Leon., v. 371).

Thus the higher intelligence can minister to the lower, for it can recognise its limitations, though not itself subject to them. This holds between man and man, and also between angel and angel:

" In omnibus scientibus et artibus, sive speculativis sive operativis, oportet quod illa quae est altior et ordinativa aliarum, consideret rationes magis universales, eo quod principia sunt parva quantitate, et maxima virtute, et simplicia ad plura se extendunt: verbi gratia, sub civili scientia est militaris, et sub militari equestris, et sic deinceps; civilis autem sub consideratione boni humani absolute; militaris autem considerat hoc idem, secundum quod determinatur ad res bellicas, et sic deinceps: et propter hoc inferior accipit principia sua a superiore. . . . Hoc autem sic est in Angelis, et secundum omnes philosophos, et

secundum nos: quia superiores per suam scientiam ordinent actus et officia inferiorum, illuminantes eos, et perficientes, et purgantes."

"Quia superiores perfectius et clarius cognoscunt idem cognitum quam inferiores, unde illuminant eos."—2 *Dist.*, iii. q. 3: a. 2. sol. et ad 2^{m} (vol. vi. 423a).

But it also holds as between angels and men, although here there is a difference in the quality of the intelligences concerned, as well as in the degree of their endowment:

"Est autem haec differentia inter caelestia et terrena corpora, quod corpora terrena per mutationem et motum adipiscuntur suam ultimam perfectionem: corpora vero caelestia statim, ex ipsa sua natura, suam ultimam perfectionem habent. Sic igitur et inferiores intellectus, scilicet hominum per quendam motum et discursum intellectualis operationis perfectionem in cognitione veritatis adipiscuntur; dum scilicet ex uno cognito in aliud cognitum procedunt. Si autem statim in ipsa cognitione principii noti, inspicerent quasi notas omnes conclusiones consequentes, in eis discursus locum non haberet. Et hoc est in angelis: quia statim in illis quae primo naturaliter cognoscunt, inspiciunt omnia quaecunque in eis cognosci possunt.

"Et ideo dicuntur *intellectuales*: quia etiam apud nos, ea quae statim naturaliter apprehenduntur, *intelligi* dicuntur; unde *intellectus* dicitur habitus primorum principiorum. Animae vero humanae, quae veritatis notitiam per quendam discursum

acquirunt, *rationales* vocantur.—Quod quidem contingit ex debilitate intellectualis luminis in eis. Si enim haberent plenitudinem intellectualis luminis, sicut angeli, statim in primo aspectu principiorum totam virtutem eorum comprehenderent, intuendo quidquid ex eis syllogizari posset. . . .

"Angeli syllogizare possunt tanquam syllogismum cognoscentes; et in causis effectus vident, et in effectibus causas: non tamen ita quod cognitionem veritatis ignotae acquirunt syllogizando ex causis in causata, et ex causatis in causas."—*Ib.*, q. 58: a. 3. c. and ad 2^m^ (*ib.*, 83 *sq.*).

"Nam species intelligibiles superioris intellectus sunt universaliores; et ideo non possunt comprehendi per species intelligibiles inferioris intellectus; et ideo inferior intellectus non potest eas perfecte cognoscere, potest autem perfecte cognoscere ea quae sunt in inferiore intellectu tanquam magis particulares, et secundum suas universaliores species potest de eis judicare. Et secundum hoc, cum intellectus angelicus sit superior ordine naturae nostro intellectu, possunt Angeli boni vel mali species in anima nostra existentes cognoscere."—*Quaestio disp. de malo*, a. 8. c. (vol. viii. 415b).

Thus, too, in carrying out the decrees of divine providence the angels adapt their own continuous and comprehensive vision not only to the limitations of less synthetic minds, but even to those of time and space.

In reading the following passages the reader must understand that *oblique* is a translation of ἑλικοειδῶς,

and means "in a spiral." *Obliquum* of course carries a corresponding meaning.

"Et ideo in operationibus intelligibilibus id quod simpliciter habet uniformitatem, attribuitur motui circulari; operatio autem intelligibilis secundum quam proceditur de uno in aliud, attribuitur motui recto; operatio autem intelligibilis habens aliquid uniformitatis simul cum processu ad diversa, attribuitur motui obliquo. . . .

"Obliquum autem motum ponit [*sc.* Dionysius] in angelo, compositum ex recto et circulari, inquantum secundum contemplationem Dei inferioribus providet."—*Ib.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 180: a. 6. c. and ad 2^{m} (Leon., x. 430b, 431b).

"Est autem in motu circulari duo considerare: unum scilicet quod est uniformis, aliud vero quod motus circularis est sine principio et fine. Intellectualis ergo operatio, qua mentes angelicae Deum contemplantur, circulari motui comparatur, quia uniformiter se habent in Dei contemplatione, et ipse Deus est sine principio et fine. Et ideo dicit [Dionysius], quod mentes angelicae, quae sunt divina participatione uniformes, *dicuntur moveri circulariter* intelligendo Deum, inquantum moventur *unite*, idest uniformiter, per illuminationes ex pulcro procedentes et bono, quae sunt sine principio et sine termino. De proprietate autem motus recti est quod inveniatur in eo principium et finis, et quod sit in eo ordo et difformitas * secundum propinquitatem ad principium

* The text of this treatise is pre-eminently bad. I have here restored *difformitas* for *uniformitas*.

et finem: unde motus rectus in eis dicitur secundum quod intendunt ad providendum inferioribus; cujus quidem providentiae principium fit ab ipso Angelo providente; terminus autem est in eo ad quod ultimo providentia pertingit. Et in hoc motus non invenitur uniformitas, quia propinquioribus perfectiva prius provident: et hoc est quod dicit, quod in directum moventur per hoc quod procedunt ad providendum inferioribus: eorum enim providentia transit per omnia inferiora ad modum cujusdam rectae lineae. De proprietate autem motus obliqui est quod sit medius inter circularem et rectum, habens aliquid de utroque: et hic motus convenit Angelis, inquantum regulariter moventur ad providendum inferioribus (quod ad motum rectum pertinet) ex ipsa contemplatione Dei (quod pertinet ad motum circularem): et hoc est quod dicit, quod oblique moventur angelicae mentes, per hoc quod dum providentinferioribus, non egediuntur ab uniformitate sui motus: quae quidem uniformitas vel identitas, eis convenit ex hoc quod *indesinenter* circumeunt quasi chorizantes per uniformem contemplationem circa causam totius identitatis, quae est pulcrum et bonum divinum."—*Comm. in lib. de div. nominibus*, Opusc. Theol., vii. cap. iv. lect. 7 (vol. xv. 309).

(4) *To pages* 544–548.—On harmonisings.

The *desiderium* of the angels:

"Desiderium est rei non habitae. Sed desiderium est in beatis, secundum illud 1 Petri i. 12: *In quem desiderant Angeli prospicere.*"

Answered:

"Desiderium ibi ponitur non quidem proprie, secundum quod est rei futurae; sed secundum quod excludit fastidium; per modum quo Eccli. xxiv. 29, dicitur: *Qui edunt me, adhuc esurient.*"—*Quaestio un. de spe*, a. 4. ob. 1. and ad 1[m] (vol. viii. 623b, 625a).

Compare:

"Nihil quod cum admiratione consideratur potest esse fastidiosum, quia, quamdiu sub admiratione est, adhuc desiderium manet. Divina autem substantia a quolibet intellectu creato semper cum admiratione videtur, cum nullus intellectus creatus eam comprehendat. Impossibile est igitur quod substantia intellectualis illam visionem fastidiat, et ita non potest esse quod per propriam voluntatem ab ista visione desistat."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. cap. 62 (vol. v. 205b).

On "He descended into hell," *et cet.*, and "This day shalt thou be with me in paradise."

"Quadruplex est infernus. Unus est infernus damnatorum, in quo sunt tenebrae et quantum ad carentiam [divinae visionis et quantum ad carentiam]* gratiae, et est ibi poena sensibilis; et hic infernus est locus damnatorum. Alius est infernus supra istum, in quo sunt tenebrae et propter carentiam divinae visionis, et propter carentiam gratiae, sed non est ibi poena sensibilis; et dicitur limbus puerorum.† Alius

* I have supplied the bracketed words.

† Aquinas gives three opinions as to the fate of unbaptized infants. The third and mildest of these here follows:

"Et ideo alii dicunt, quod cognitionem perfectam habebunt eorum quae naturali cognitioni subjacent, et vita aeterna [*i.e.* visione Dei] se

supra hunc est, in quo sunt tenebrae quantum ad carentiam divinae visionis, sed non quantum ad carentiam gratiae, sed est ibi poena sensus; et dicitur purgatorium.* Alius magis supra est, in quo est tenebra quantum ad carentiam divinae visionis, sed non quantum ad carentiam gratiae, neque est ibi poena sensibilis; et hic est infernus sanctorum patrum; et in hunc tantum Christus descendit quantum ad locum, sed non quantum ad tenebrarum experientiam."

"Paradisus est triplex. Unus paradisus terrestris, in quo Adam positus est; alius corporalis caelestis, scilicet caelum empyreum; alius spiritualis, scilicet gloria de visione Dei; et de isto paradiso intelligitur quod Dominus latroni dixit: quia statim peracta passione et ipse latro et omnes qui in limbo patrum erant Deum per essentiam viderunt."—3 *Dist.*, xxii. q. 2: a. 1. sol. 2, sol. 3 ad 3^{m} (vol. vii. 229b *sq.*).

privatos esse cognoscent, et causam quare ab ea exclusae sunt; nec tamen ex hoc aliquo modo affligentur: quod qualiter esse possit videndum est. Sciendum ergo, quod ex hoc quod caret aliquis eo quod suam proportionem excedit, non affligitur, si sit rectae rationis; sed tantum ex hoc quod caret eo ad quod aliquo modo proportionatus fuit: sicut nullus sapiens homo affligitur de hoc quod non potest volare sicut avis vel quia non est Rex vel Imperator, cum sibi non sit debitum."—2 *Dist.*, xxxiii. q. 2: a. 2. sol. (vol. vi. 691b).

The remainder of the article is a defence of this opinion.

* On the probable locality of purgatory, and the exceptional dispensations by which certain souls endured their purgation elsewhere, *vide* 4 *Dist.*, xxi. q. 1: a. 1. sol. 2. (vol. vii. 852a).

EXCURSUS I

INTELLECT AND WILL. KNOWING AND LOVING *

THE soul or *anima* of man shares with the *anima* of brutes all powers directly connected with bodily organs; and it shares with angels powers of intelligence. But the "soul," that *has* these diversified powers, *is* in itself one and "simple," *i.e.* uncompounded:

"Potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae, sed proprietates ejus."—*Quaestio de anima*, a. 12. c. (vol. viii. 502b).

"Patet quod quamvis animal sit genus hominis, et rationale sit differentia constitutiva eius, non tamen oportet quod sit in homine alia anima sensitiva et alia intellectiva.

"Oportet igitur quod anima humana habeat aliquas vires sive potentias quae sunt principia operationum quae exercentur per corpus, et has oportet esse actus aliquarum partium corporis; et hujusmodi sunt potentiae vegetativae et sensitivae partis. Habet

* This essay and the treatment of the Beatific Vision that follows it are intended to systematise and place in their mutual relations all the aspects of the subjects with which they deal that have been taken up severally in the Lectures as occasion demanded or allowed; and also to substantiate and expand, by ample citations, the views which have been expressed.

etiam aliquas potentias quae sunt principia operationum quae sine corpore exercentur; et hujusmodi sunt intellectivae partis potentiae, quae non sunt actus aliquorum organorum."—*Compendium Theologiae*, Opusculum i. cap. 92 (vol. xvi. 22b *sq.*).

These intellectual or rational powers, which are contrasted with the sensitive or corporeal powers, or with the aggressive or craving elements in the soul, are the closely intertwined and mutually reacting powers of the intellect and the will:

"Interior pars animae est intellectiva et sensitiva. Intellectiva autem continet intellectum et voluntatem."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 80: a. 2. c. (Leon., vii. 83b).

"Quaedam vero vires animae nostrae sunt quarum operationes per organa corporea non exercentur, ut intellectus et voluntas."—*Ib.*, i^{a}. q. 54: a. 5. c. (Leon., v. 52a).

"Rationale includens intellectum et voluntatem dividitur contra irascibile et concupiscibile."—*De veritate*, q. 22: a. 10. ad 2^{m} (vol. ix. 327b).

Thus it is the *anima* itself that knows or loves, through the exercise of the suitable *potentiae*, not the *potentiae* themselves that know or love. But, in current philosophical language, to avoid perpetual circumlocution and repetition the faculties themselves are spoken of as acting upon each other. In the same way, too, the *anima*, as a whole, is often spoken of as doing or feeling things when really it is the *man*, the organic being made up of body and soul (the *compositum*), that acts or feels through his *anima*:

"Compositum igitur est videns et audiens, et omnia sentiens, sed per animam."—*Quaest. de anima*, a. 19 : c. fin. (vol. viii. 525a).

This being premised, our next business (whether it is the Trinity, or the freedom of the will, or meritorious actions, or the nature of beatitude and the relation of the knowledge to the love of God that we are considering) must be to form a precise conception of the meaning of the word *voluntas*. This is not easy, for we can only translate *voluntas* by "will," and the word "will" (as was noted on p. 124) at once entangles us in false associations, for it suggests primarily the output of some kind of force or effort, whether of command, resistance, tenacity, control or what not, whereas, in scholastic language, the primary function of my *voluntas* is the naked "choice," or *electio*, by which I recognise, take to myself, and accept as *my* good (that is to say, as desirable to get and delightful to be had *by me*), that which my intelligence has already indicated as good in the abstract. Hence the associations of the *voluntas* are with love rather than with effort.*

The object of the *intellectus*, to which it tends by a connatural affinity, is the *verum*, and the movement

* The student must not be misled by the word *conatus* sometimes used in connection with the will (*e.g.* in *Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 24 : a. 3. ad 3^{m}); for *conatus* in this connection, as often in the Classics (e.g. *dedit natura belluis . . . sensum . . . ut conatum haberent ad naturales pastus capessendos.* Cic. *De natura deorum*, lib. ii. cap. 47 [§ 122]) means *impetus* or "drift." If the "choice" of a thing is impetuous and vehement, the *conatus* towards the goal will be pronounced and weighty. But this rather excludes or diminishes effort in the executive powers than implies it in the will. *Cf.* pp. 521 *sq.*

towards it is "thinking," the rest in it is "knowing." Thinking is for the sake of knowing, and therefore knowledge is the *finis* or goal of the *intellectus*. And since knowing takes place within the *intellectus* itself, it follows that the *finis* or goal of the *intellectus* is an *actus* (actualising or realisation) of something within the *intellectus* itself. Knowing, then, is at once the *finis* and the *actus* of the intelligence.

"Perfectio . . . intellectus in hoc consistit quod species rei intellectae in ipso consistit intellectu ; cum secundum hoc intellegat actu."—*De veritate*, q. 22 : a. 11. (vol. ix. 328b).

"Intelligere autem est propria operatio substantiae intellectualis. Ipsa igitur est finis ejus."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. cap. 25 (vol. v. 177b).

But the object of the *voluntas* is the *bonum*, and its *actus* is an *electio*, or "choice." Therefore the *actus* of my will consists in the recognition of something outside itself as desirable for me to *possess* ; and thus it pronounces the possession of this outside thing, or union with it, to be "good," not in the abstract but *for me*. Now, this is nothing else than *amor*, or love, and it expresses itself in *desiderium* for the loved thing, when absent (not possessed) and *gaudium*, or *delectatio* in it, or *fruitio* of it, when present (possessed).

Hence it follows that the act of the will (*actus*), or love, cannot itself be a goal (*finis*), as the act of the *intellectus* is, for love cannot in itself secure the possession or union which the will "chooses" or desires. The will is in full action when the loving choice is made, but it only reaches a goal when the possession

is secured. This point is of central importance, as the student will at once perceive, in relation to the essential conditions of ultimate blessedness (*cf.* pp. 127 *sqq.*, 596 *sqq.*); but our present business is to pursue our investigation of the general reactions between the intelligence and the will:

"Sciens vero habet et cogitationem, et assensum; sed cogitationem causantem assensum, et assensum terminantem cogitationem. Ex ipsa enim collatione principiorum ad conclusiones assentit conclusionibus resolvendo eas in principia, et ibi figitur motus cogitantis et quietatur. In scientia enim motus rationis incipit ab intellectu principiorum, et ad eumdem terminatur per viam resolutionis; et sic non habet assensum et cogitationem quasi ex aequo: sed cogitatio inducit ad assensum, et assensus quietat."—*De veritate*, q. 14: a. 1. c. (vol. ix. 228a).

"In motibus autem appetitivae partis, bonum habet quasi virtutem attractivam, malum autem virtutem repulsivam. Bonum ergo primo quidem in potentia appetitiva causat quandam inclinationem, seu aptitudinem, seu connaturalitatem ad bonum: quod pertinet ad passionem *amoris*. Cui per contrarium respondet *odium*, ex parte mali.—Secundo, si bonum sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum: et hoc pertinet ad passionem *desiderii* vel *concupiscentiae*. Et ex opposito ex parte mali est *fuga*, vel *abominatio*.—Tertio, cum adeptum fuerit bonum, dat appetitus quietationem quandam in ipso bono adepto: et hoc pertinet ad *delectationem* vel *gaudium*. Cui opponitur ex parte mali,

dolor vel *tristitia.*" — *Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 23: a. 4. c. (Leon., vi. 176b *sq.*).

"Consecutio autem finis non consistit in ipso actu voluntatis. Voluntas enim fertur in finem et absentem, cum ipsum desiderat; et praesentem, cum in ipso requiescens delectatur. Manifestum est autem, quod ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis, sed est motus ad finem. Delectatio autem advenit voluntati ex hoc quod finis est praesens: non autem e converso ex hoc aliquid fit praesens, quia voluntas delectatur in ipso. Oportet igitur aliquid aliud esse quam actum voluntatis, per quod fit ipse finis praesens volenti.

"Et hoc manifeste apparet circa fines sensibiles. Si enim consequi pecuniam esset per actum voluntatis, statim a principio cupidus consecutus esset pecuniam, quando vult eam habere. Sed a principio quidem est absens ei; consequitur autem ipsam per hoc quod manu ipsam apprehendit."—*Ib.*, q. 3: a. 4. c. (*ib.*, 29).

Beyond the characteristic act of choice, then, the will does not go. It loves, desires, or rejoices, but it cannot itself gain possession of the desired thing. This must be accomplished by other powers, and the effort and persistence must be theirs, though always exercised at the bidding, or representations, of the *voluntas.* This general relation of the will to all other powers applies equally to its relations with the intellect. The object of the intellect, as we have seen, is the *verum*; but this includes every kind and branch of truth, and so the intellect natur-

ally moves towards a knowledge of the *bonum* as of everything else. The object of the intellect, then, includes the *bonum*, in so far as the knowledge of its nature is a part of the *verum*. On the other hand, the *voluntas* may recognise and take to itself by *electio* any and every *verum* as a *bonum* in which it recognises a connatural affinity to itself, so as to desire its possession. In that case, my mind or soul which has perceived, by its intelligence, that the possession of truth on a certain point would be good in the abstract, and has chosen it and desired it by the election of its *voluntas* as good for me, will now pursue it through the exercise of the only power that can pursue it, namely, the intelligence. Thus the will, having chosen and desired a *verum* as *bonum* on the representation of the intellect, the intellect will pursue it on the suggestion or at the command of the will. Hence their intimate reactions:

"Nam verum est quoddam bonum, et bonum est quoddam verum. Et ideo quae sunt voluntatis, cadunt sub intellectu; et quae sunt intellectus, possunt cadere sub voluntate."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 87: a. 4. ad 2^{m} (Leon., v. 363b).

"Ex his ergo apparet ratio quare hae potentiae suis actibus invicem se includunt; quia intellectus intelligit voluntatem velle, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere."—*Ib.*, q. 82: a. 4. ad 1^{m} (*ib.*, 303b).

"Unde et ipsum bonum, inquantum est quaedam forma apprehensibilis, continetur sub vero quasi quoddam verum; et ipsum verum, inquantum est finis

intellectualis operationis, continetur sub bono ut quoddam particulare bonum. Si ergo consideremus motum potentiarum animae ex parte objecti specificantis actum, primum principium motionis est ex intellectu: hoc enim modo bonum intellectum movet etiam ipsam voluntatem. Si autem consideremus motus potentiarum animae ex parte exercitii actus, sic principium motionis est ex voluntate."—*De malo*, q. 6: a. 1. c. med. (vol. viii. 310b).

But the effort must be made by the intellect, whereas the command issues from the will.

If we hold these clues firmly, we shall be able to thread our way with comparative ease through the labyrinthine discussions, ethical, theological, and mystic, of the relations of the will and the intellect.

First as to the freedom of the will, on which the whole doctrine of merit, rewards, and punishments rests. No action can be meritorious unless it is voluntary, or voluntary unless it is free. The term *libertas voluntatis* does occur in Aquinas, though it is not frequent:

"Libertas voluntatis augetur et minuitur."

"Libertas voluntatis in tribus considerabitur."

—*De veritate*, q. 22: a. 5. ob. 14. a. 6. c. (vol. ix. 320a, 323a), and elsewhere.

But *libertas arbitrii* and *liberum arbitrium* are far more frequent expressions, and Aquinas often explains that the freedom consists in the power of "choice" (*electio*):

"Proprium liberi arbitrii est electio: ex hoc enim liberi arbitrii esse dicimur, quod possumus unum

recipere, alio recusato, quod est eligere. Et ideo naturam liberi arbitrii ex electione considerare oportet."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^a. q. 83: a. 3. c. (Leon., v. 310).

It is in its own characteristic act of choice, then, that the freedom of the will is exercised.

A trend or natural *inclinatio* to its goal is characteristic of every creature. Thus the stone inclines to the centre by connatural affinity to it as its proper place; but it is unconscious in its action. An animal's appetite, on the other hand, is conscious, and the animal determines its own action. Thus, under any given conditions, there is only one course that the stone can take without a violation of its nature, which would constitute a miracle. But, under given conditions, there may be many courses open to an animal, none of which would violate its nature, and the animal determines its course, perhaps on mere impulse, perhaps in view of consequences, which latter point is all-important in differentiating its action from that of a stone. But the animal (according to scholastic psychology at any rate) exercises no free choice, for it always acts on a concrete suggestion of appetite that dictates both the end and the means, and leaves no room for judgment between the alternatives, any one of which is possible to its nature, should there be a change in the object presented to it; for no one of these different courses chosen by the animal, as provoked by different external suggestions, would involve any violence done to the animal's nature, and each in its turn obeys an inward

impulse. It is otherwise with a stone projected upwards in violation of its natural trend downwards.

But the human will is free in its *electio*, for, although the *voluntas* is an appetite, just as truly as hunger is, yet it is an appetite for the *bonum* at large; and it "chooses" any concrete *bonum* in virtue of its participation in the nature of the *bonum per se*, *i.e.* the abstract or absolute "good." Judgment, therefore (*arbitrium*), is needed to appraise the several claimants, and the election between them is free, for no choice would violate the nature of the *voluntas*. And since the conception of the *bonum* is intellectual, because abstract, the *voluntas* is not only an *appetitus*, but an *appetitus intellectivus* or *rationilis*. And such is its definition:

"Est enim quidam appetitus non consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed alterius: et huiusmodi dicitur *appetitus naturalis*. Res enim naturales appetunt quod eis convenit secundum suam naturam, non per apprehensionem propriam, sed per apprehensionem instituentis naturam. . . . Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed ex necessitate, non ex iudicio libero. Et talis est *appetitus sensitivus* in brutis: qui tamen in hominibus aliquid libertatis participat, inquantum obedit rationi.—Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem appetentis secundum liberum iudicium. Et talis est appetitus rationalis sive intellectivus, qui dicitur *voluntas*.*

"In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor

* This is further elaborated in the passage quoted on pp. 598 *sqq.*

dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis: sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis. Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetito intellectivo."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}-ii^{ae}. q. 26: a. 1. c. (Leon., vi. 188).

"Vis sensitiva non est vis collativa diversorum, sicut ratio, sed simpliciter aliquid unum apprehendit. Et ideo secundum illud unum determinate movet appetitum sensitivum. Sed ratio est collativa plurium: et ideo ex pluribus moveri potest appetitus intellectivus, scilicet voluntas, et non ex uno necessitate."—*Ib.*, i^{a}. q. 82: a. 2. ad 3^{m} (Leon., v. 297).

It is of course true that the will may make its choice at the dictate of an animal or sensuous appetite, and that the choice may be wrong and irrational; but, if the act is free and voluntary, the object of desire must have been chosen *sub specie boni*, on the ground, that is, that it seems good at the time to the corrupted will. It is therefore still a judgment, and still intellectual. If all judgment is excluded by the blind intensity of the passion, there is no choice, and the action is not voluntary. But, on the other hand, if every alternative is excluded,

not by blind passion but by the conclusive, comprehensive, and final supremacy of the ultimate *finis*, when attained, the will is freer than ever in its adhesion thereto, and rest therein; just as the intellect moves freely at the suggestion of the will when it selects its premises with a view to investigating this truth in preference to that, but would show its weakness, not its freedom, if, having selected its premises, it still regarded different conclusions as to the truth in hand as open alternatives:

"Indeterminatio voluntatis est respectu ordinis ad finem, inquantum voluntas potest appetere id quod secundum veritatem in finem debitum ordinatur, vel secundum apparentiam tantum; et haec indeterminatio ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex indeterminatione circa objectum in his quae sunt ad finem, et iterum ex indeterminatione apprehensionis, quae potest esse recta et non recta; sicut ex aliquo principio vero dato non sequitur falsa conclusio nisi per aliquam falsitatem rationis vel assumentis aliquam falsitatem, vel falso ordinantis principium in conclusionem. Ita ex quo inest appetitus rectus ultimi finis, non posset sequi quod aliquis aliquid inordinate appeteret, nisi ratio acciperet aliquid inordinate in finem quod non est ordinabile in finem; sicut qui appetit beatitudinem appetitu recto, nunquam deduceretur in appetendam fornicationem, nisi inquantum apprehendit eam ut quoddam hominis bonum, inquantum est quoddam delectabile bonum, et sicut ordinabilem in beatitudinem, velut quamdam imaginem eius. Et ex hoc sequitur

indeterminatio voluntatis, qua bonum potest vel malum appetere."

"Voluntas vult naturaliter bonum, sed non determinate hoc bonum vel illud; sicut visus naturaliter videt colorem, sed non hunc vel illum determinate. Et propter hoc, quidquid vult, vult sub ratione boni; non tamen oportet quod semper hoc vel illud bonum velit."—*De veritate*, q. 22: a. 6. c. and ad 5[m] (vol. ix. 323).

"Sed ad hoc quod aliquis intantum velit aliquod bonum commutabile, quod non refugiat averti a bono incommutabili, potest contingere dupliciter: uno modo ex eo quod nescit illi bono commutabili talem aversionem esse conjunctam: et tunc dicitur ex ignorantia peccare; alio modo ex aliquo interius inclinante voluntatem in bonum illud. Invenitur autem aliquid in alterum inclinari dupliciter: uno modo quasi ab alio passum, sicut cum lapis projicitur sursum; alio modo per formam propriam; et tunc ex seipso inclinatur in illud, sicut cum lapis cadit deorsum. Et similiter voluntas inclinatur in bonum commutabile, cui adjungitur deformitas peccati: quandoque quidem ex aliqua passione, et tunc dicitur ex infirmitate peccari; . . . aliquando autem ex aliquo habitu, quando, per consuetudinem, inclinari in tale bonum est ei jam versum quasi in habitum et naturam; et tunc ex proprio motu absque aliqua passione inclinatur ad illud; et hoc est peccare ex electione, sive ex industria, aut certa scientia, aut etiam ex malitia."—*De malo*, q. 3: a. 12. c. (vol. viii. 275b *sq.*).

"Ista definitio beatitudinis quam quidam posuerunt, *Beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult*, vel, *cui omnia optata succedunt*, quodam modo intellecta est bona et sufficiens; alio vero modo, est imperfecta. Si enim intelligatur simpliciter, de omnibus quae vult homo naturali appetitu, sic verum est quod qui habet omnia quae vult est beatus: nihil enim satiat naturalem hominis appetitum, nisi bonum perfectum, quod est beatitudo. Si vero intelligatur de his quae homo vult secundum apprehensionem rationis, sic habere quaedam quae homo vult, non pertinet ad beatitudinem, sed magis ad miseriam, inquantum huiusmodi habita impediunt hominem ne habeat quaecumque naturaliter vult: sicut etiam ratio accipit ut vera interdum quae impediunt a cognitione veritatis. Et secundum hanc considerationem, Augustinus addidit ad perfectionem beatitudinis, quod *nihil male velit.* Quamvis primum possit sufficere, si recte intelligeretur, scilicet quod *beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult.*"—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 5: a. 8. ad 3^{m} (Leon., vi. 54b).

"Liberum arbitrium sic se habet ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem, sicut se habet intellectus ad conclusiones. Manifestum est autem quod ad virtutem intellectus pertinet, ut in diversas conclusiones procedere possit secundum principia data: sed quod in aliquam conclusionem procedat praetermittendo ordinem principiorum, hoc est ex defectu ipsius. Unde quod liberum arbitrium diversa eligere possit servato ordine finis, hoc pertinet ad perfectionem libertatis eius: sed quod eligat aliquid divertendo ab ordine

finis, quod est peccare, hoc pertinet ad defectum libertatis. Unde major libertas arbitrii est in Angelis qui peccare non possunt, quam in nobis qui peccare possumus."—*Ib.*, i^{a}. q. 62 : a. 8. ad 3^{m} (Leon., v. 118b).

This last point will repay further attention, and it will naturally lead us deeper into the investigation of the reactions between the two *potentiae*. However free a volition or act of accepting and adopting may be, it must act within one all-controlling limitation ; for everything (including every power or faculty of any being) is limited by its own nature and its connatural affinities. The *voluntas*, then, wills the *bonum* by internal necessity, which however is no *coactio* or *violentia*, for compulsion and violence always act against the nature of the thing they force. The freedom of the will is exercised in its selection of the concrete embodiments of the *bonum* and of the means for gaining possession of them, but always within the field of the *bonum* itself, and always *sub specie boni*.

In like manner the intellect is limited by its connatural affinity to the *verum*, which is expressed in its acceptance by internal necessity of the axioms ; but it can exercise itself along any line of deduction from these axioms, or towards the arrival at truth on any particular subject, and this it may do either on its own proper motion, analogous to gravitation, or at the bidding of the will. Thus the act of the intellect seems to follow the act of the will, because the will dictates the special point it is to investigate ; but, on the other hand, it is only because the intellect has

already represented the knowledge of truth on this subject as a *bonum* that the will leans to it at all, or commands the intellect to investigate it. But ultimately the initiative belongs to the intellect, for, apart from any command of the will, it finds an *objectum* in its own *actus*:

"Sicut actus intellectus videtur sequi actum voluntatis, inquantum a voluntate imperatur; ita e converso actus voluntatis videtur sequi actum intellectus, inquantum per intellectum praesentatur voluntati suum objectum, quod est bonum intellectum. Unde esset procedere in infinitum, nisi esset ponere statum vel in actu intellectus vel in actu voluntatis. Non autem potest status poni in actu voluntatis, cum objectum praesupponatur ad actum; unde oportet ponere statum in actu intellectus, qui naturaliter intellectum consequitur; ita quod a voluntate non imperatur."—*De potentia*, q. 2: a. 3. ad 3[m] (vol. viii. 19b).

"Quod autem quinta ratio proponit, voluntatem esse altiorem intellectu quasi eius motivam, falsum esse manifestum est. Nam primo et per se intellectus movet voluntatem. Voluntas enim, inquantum huiusmodi, movetur a suo objecto, quod est bonum apprehensum; voluntas autem movet intellectum quasi per accidens, in quantum scilicet intelligere ipsum apprehenditur ut bonum et sic desideratur a voluntate; ex quo sequitur quod intellectus actu intelligit, et in hoc ipso voluntatem praecedit; nunquam enim voluntas desideraret intelligere, nisi prius intellectus ipsum intelligere

apprehenderet ut bonum. Et iterum voluntas movet intellectum ad operandum in actu per modum quo agens movere dicitur; intellectus autem voluntatem, per modum quo finis movet, nam bonum intellectum est finis voluntatis: agens autem est posterior in movendo quam finis, nam agens non movet nisi propter finem; unde apparet intellectum simpliciter esse altiorem voluntate, voluntatem vero intellectu per accidens et secundum quid."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. cap. 26, fin. (vol. v. 180b).

"Quanto enim aliqua natura est Deo propinquior, tanto expressior in ea divinae dignitatis similitudo invenitur. Hoc autem ad divinam dignitatem pertinet ut omnia moveat et inclinet et dirigat, ipse a nullo alio motus vel inclinatus vel directus. Unde, quanto aliqua natura est Deo vicinior, tanto minus ab alio inclinatur, et magis nata est se ipsam inclinare. Natura igitur insensibilis, quae ratione suae materialitatis est maxime a Deo remota, inclinatur quidem in aliquem finem, non tamen est in ea aliquid inclinans, sed solummodo inclinationis principium. . . .

"Natura autem sensitiva ut Deo propinquior, in se ipsa habet aliquod inclinans, scilicet appetibile apprehensum; sed tamen inclinatio ipsa non est in potestate ipsius animalis quod inclinatur, sed est ei aliunde determinata. Animal enim ad aspectum delectabilis non potest non concupiscere illud; quia illa animalia non habent dominium suae inclinationis; unde non agunt, sed magis aguntur, secundum Damascenum; et hoc ideo quia vis appetitiva sensibilis habet organum corporale, et ideo vicinatur dis-

positionibus materiae et rerum corporalium, ut moveatur magis quam moveat. Sed natura rationalis, quae est Deo vicinissima, non solum habet inclinationem in aliquid sicut habent inanimata, nec solum movens hanc inclinationem quasi aliunde ei determinatam, sicut natura sensibilis; sed ultra hoc habet in potestate ipsam inclinationem, ut non sit ei necessarium inclinari ad appetibile apprehensum, sed possit inclinari vel non inclinari; et sic ipsa inclinatio non determinatur ei ab alio, sed a se ipsa. Et hoc quidem competit ei inquantum non utitur organo corporali: et sic recedens a natura mobilis, accedit ad naturam moventis et agentis. Quod autem aliquid determinet sibi inclinationem in finem, non potest contingere nisi cognoscat finem, et habitudinem finis in ea quae sunt ad finem; quod est tantum rationis. Et ideo talis appetitus non determinatus ex aliquo alio de necessitate, sequitur apprehensionem rationis; unde appetitus rationalis, qui voluntas dicitur, est alia potentia ab appetitu sensibili."

"Natura autem et voluntas hoc modo ordinata sunt, ut ipsa voluntas quaedam natura sit; quia omne quod in rebus invenitur, natura quaedam dicitur. Et ideo in voluntate oportet invenire non solum id quod voluntatis est, sed etiam quod naturae est. Hoc autem est cujuslibet naturae creatae, ut a Deo sit ordinata in bonum, naturaliter appetens illud. Unde et voluntati ipsi inest naturalis quidam appetitus sibi convenientis boni: et praeter hoc habet appetere aliquid secundum propriam determinationem, non ex necessitate; quod ei competit inquantum voluntas

est. Sicut autem est ordo naturae ad voluntatem, ita se habet ordo eorum quae naturaliter vult voluntas, ad ea respectu quorum a se ipsa determinatur, non ex natura. Et ideo, sicut natura est voluntatis fundamentum, ita appetibile quod naturaliter appetitur, est aliorum appetibilium principium et fundamentum. In appetibilibus autem finis est fundamentum et principium eorum quae sunt ad finem; cum quae sunt propter finem, non appetantur nisi ratione finis. Et ideo, quod voluntas de necessitate vult quasi naturali inclinatione in ipsum determinata, est finis ultimus, ut beatitudo, et ea quae in ipso includuntur, ut est cognitio veritatis, et alia hujusmodi; ad alia vero non de necessitate determinatur naturali inclinatione, sed propria dispositione absque necessitate. Quamvis autem quadam necessaria inclinatione ultimum finem velit voluntas; nullo tamen modo concedendum est quod ad illud volendum cogatur. Coactio enim nihil aliud est quam violentiae cujusdam inductio. *Violentum* autem, secundum Philosophum in 3 Ethic. (capit. 1 in princip.) *est cujus principium est extra, nil conferente vim passo*; sicut si lapis sursum projiciatur; quia nullo modo, quantum est de se, ad hunc motum inclinatur. Sed cum ipsa voluntas sit quaedam inclinatio, eo quod est appetitus quidam; non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid velit, et inclinatio eius non sit in illud; et ita non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid coacte vel violenter velit, si aliquid naturali inclinatione velit.

"Patet igitur quod voluntas non necessario aliquid

vult necessitate coactionis, vult tamen aliquid necessario necessitate naturalis inclinationis."

"Intellectus aliquid naturaliter intelligit, sicut et voluntas aliquid naturaliter vult; sed coactio non est contraria intellectui secundum suam rationem, sicut et voluntati. Intellectus enim si habeat inclinationem in aliquid, non tamen nominat ipsam inclinationem hominis, sed voluntas ipsam inclinationem hominis nominat. Unde quidquid fit secundum voluntatem, fit secundum hominis inclinationem, et per hoc non potest esse violentum. Sed operatio intellectus potest esse contra inclinationem hominis, quae est voluntas; ut cum alicui placet aliqua opinio, sed propter efficaciam rationum deducitur ad assentiendum contrario per intellectum."*—*De veritate*, q. 22: a. 4. c., a. 5. c. and ad 3^{m} (vol. ix. 319a–321a).

* This last citation (a. 5. 3^{m}) will bear expansion. Indeed it would be easy to fill many pages with illustrations of it. But we will put aside all cases in which material interests or self-esteem are concerned, and will only consider such a situation as arises when a man finds his intellect *proprio motu* making for a conclusion that will upset a favourite and consolatory theory, which after all may have something in it, and which at any rate promises still to serve him if it is left alone. Let us suppose him to be a man who has already recognised the *verum* as a *bonum*, and the situation will then be that his intelligence has represented the pursuit of the line it is spontaneously taking as likely to secure the *bonum* of a further insight into the truth, if it is driven through to the end. But that same intelligence also represents its conclusions as likely, when reached, to be productive of a great disturbance of mental ease. The will must then decide whether to command the intellect to pursue its course and, so far as in it lies, to secure the truth, or to command it resolutely to divert itself from its present course and preoccupy itself with other matters. In the latter case, of course, the intellect may or may not obey the will; but any way,

A further difference between the "necessities" of the will and of the intellect is this, that it is the supreme *goal* which is determined by the necessity of its nature for the will, whereas it is the *starting point* (the axioms) that are imposed upon the intellect. The freedom of the will is expressed in its choice of means to reach the comprehensive *bonum*, the intellect is already in possession (in the axioms) of the comprehensive *verum*, and its free play is based on the variety of lines along which derivative truths may be evolved from them. The will selects *bona* in a chain downwards from the supreme *bonum* till it comes to the *bona* within the immediate reach of the human faculties, and so finds the first step to be taken towards the ultimate realisation. The intellect selects inferences and deductions from the axioms and primary experiences, starts with these certainties, and builds up the deductions that will lead to the special truth to be investigated:

"Cum finis sit secundum se volitus, id autem quod est ad finem, quantum huiusmodi, non sit volitum nisi propter finem *et cet.*"

But in the case of the intellect:

"Primo aliquis intelligit ipsa principia secundum

both the attraction and the aversion which the will feels rise from the representations of the intellect; whereas the whole movement of the mind rose in the intelligence independently of the will, and may possibly be pursued in defiance of it.

The case is complicated if the intelligence is previously committed to the belief that even the consideration of the particular question on which it is now exercising itself is probably, or certainly, a suggestion of the devil. *Cf.* p. 194.

se, postmodum autem intelligit ea in ipsis conclusionibus, secundum quod assentit conclusionibus per principia."

In either case, however, the process may be baulked or broken off:

"In executione operis, ea quae sunt ad finem se habent ut media, et finis ut terminus. Unde sicut motus naturalis interdum sistit in medio, et non pertingit ad terminum; ita quandoque operatur aliquis id quod est ad finem, et tamen non consequitur finem: sed in volendo est e converso; nam voluntas per finem devenit ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem; sicut et intellectus devenit in conclusiones per principia, quae *media* dicuntur. Unde intellectus aliquando intelligit medium, et ex eo non procedit ad conclusionem. Et similiter voluntas aliquando vult finem, et tamen non procedit ad volendum id quod est ad finem."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 8: a. 3. c. and ad 3^{m} (Leon., vi. 72).

The parallel is strict, though the movements are always in the opposite "senses" (in the mathematical meaning of the word).

Thus the "intellectus" proper (compare Kant's *Vernunft* and Coleridge's "reason") cannot escape the axioms; and though it needs an occasion, it needs no process to reach them. But the *ratio* (*cf.* Kant's *Verstand* and Coleridge's "understanding") builds upon axiomatic truth a structure of derivative convictions, in embracing which it must accept or reject this or that pretender, on the ground of its being involved in the axioms or excluded by them.

In like manner the *voluntas* is the faculty in virtue of which man is drawn to desire conclusive blessedness or "good," and as to that he has no freedom, for this desire is a part of his inmost nature and constitution; but to gratify this desire he must adopt many diverse means; and since "blessedness," full and conclusive, is not realisable at all on earth, he must seek partial and incipient blessedness here by his self-directed action, along such lines as shall lead him towards the ultimate realisation which he cannot immediately grasp. And all this must be the work of free choice among alternatives. Thus *voluntas* or "will" is parallel to *intellectus*, and *electio* or "choice" to *ratio*. And in both cases the selections of the faculty that has free play amongst alternatives should be ruled by their relation to the fixed data in the case of the intellect, and the fixed goal in the case of the will. In both cases, too, the more fundamental and ruling faculty may, when extreme accuracy of distinction is not necessary, be taken to include the subordinate one.

Thus *intellectus* as a general term includes *intellectus* proper and *ratio*, while *voluntas* as a general term includes *voluntas* proper and *electio*:

"Sicut autem ex parte apprehensionis intellectivae se habent intellectus et ratio, ita ex parte appetitus intellectivi se habent voluntas et liberum arbitrium, quod nihil aliud est quam vis electiva. Et hoc patet ex habitudine obiectorum et actuum. Nam *intelligere* importat simplicem acceptionem alicujus rei: unde intelligi dicuntur proprie principia, quae sine colloca-

tione per seipsa cognoscuntur. *Ratiocinari* autem proprie est devenire ex uno in cognitionem alterius: unde proprie de conclusionibus ratiocinamur, quae ex principiis innotescunt. Similiter ex parte appetitus, *velle* importat simplicem appetitum alicujus rei: unde voluntas dicitur esse de fine, qui propter se appetitur. *Eligere* autem est appetere aliquid propter alterum consequendum: unde proprie est eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sicut autem se habet in cognitivis principium ad conclusionem, cui propter principia assentimus; ita in appetitivis se habet finis ad ea quae sunt ad finem, quae propter finem appetuntur. Unde manifestum est quod sicut se habet intellectus ad rationem, ita se habet voluntas ad vim electivam, id est ad liberum arbitrium.—Ostensum est autem supra quod eiusdem potentiae est intelligere et ratiocinari, sicut eiusdem virtutis est quiescere et moveri. Unde etiam eiusdem potentiae est velle et eligere. Et propter hoc voluntas et liberum arbitrium non sunt duae potentiae, sed una."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 83: a. 4. c. (Leon., v. 311).

As regards the application of these general principles to the special subjects that have engaged our attention in the lectures, or have been suggested by them:

1. I have examined at length in another work * the question of Thomas's actual determinism in relation to his persistent and vehement insistence on the freedom of the will.

2. The analysis now completed has a sufficiently

* *Dante and Aquinas*, pp. 190–195 and 203–212.

obvious bearing upon the psychological approach to the doctrine of the trinity. The intellective *potentia* (Father, Power, Source), the conception, thought, or consciousness (Son, Word, Act of Knowing, Wisdom), and the uniting love (Holy Spirit), are all involved in the conception of the supreme Good as conscious of itself, and therefore willing itself; and the self-willing (*Spiritus Sanctus*) proceeds not only from the intellective power (*Pater*), but also from the self-knowing (*Filius*) of the Deity. Hence the *Filioque*. But all these movements are internal and self-contained, so that while the relations are "distinct," the related are not "different."

3. The thesis that blessedness consists primarily in the knowledge, rather than in the love, of God remains for consideration here, and it demands further examination and exposition.

Let us return, then, to the point reached on p. 586, the relation of which to our present enquiry was indicated by anticipation.

It must be premised that every consciously acting faculty rests upon love in its proper sense; and all movement or activity of any kind rests upon love in its extended or derivative sense; for even the stone may be said to fall because of its "love for the centre" to which it tends:

"Nulla alia passio animae est quae non praesupponat aliquem amorem. Cujus ratio est quia omnis alia passio animae vel importat motum ad aliquid, vel quietem in aliquo. Omnis autem motus in aliquid, vel quies in aliquo, ex aliqua connaturali-

tate vel coaptatione procedit: quae pertinet ad rationem amoris."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 27: a. 4. c. (Leon., vi. 195b).

"In appetitu autem naturali hoc manifeste apparet, quod sicut unumquodque habet naturalem consonantiam vel aptitudinem ad id quod sibi convenit, quae est amor naturalis; ita ad id quod est ei repugnans et corruptivum, habet dissonantiam naturalem, quae est odium naturale. Sic igitur in appetitu animali seu in intellectivo, amor est consonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut conveniens: odium vero est dissonantia quaedem appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut repugnans et nocivum."—*Ib.*, q. 29: a. 1. c. (*ib.*, 203).

In this passage *appetitus animalis* = the appetite of the sensitive soul; *appetitus intellectivus* = *voluntas*. Compare:

"In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis: sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis. Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu intellectivo."—*Ib.*, q. 26: a. 1. c. (*ib.*, 188b).

Thus the intelligence, as we have seen, has its

innate and proper "love," directed to the *verum*. It desires to find the truth about any and every thing, including the *bonum*. It rests in the truth, when found, for its own sake, and is satisfied by it. If the truth in question is the truth about the *bonum*, then the intelligence has got all it wants, for it does not pursue, or desire to possess, the *bonum* under any other aspect, or in any other sense than as the *verum*, and under this aspect, and in this sense, it now possesses it. But the *voluntas* desires to possess every kind of *bonum*, and therefore to possess the *verum*, when it is shown by the *intellectus* to be a branch of the *bonum*.

It is the *connaturalitas* or *convenientia* existing between the goal-seeker and the goal that causes the motion of the one towards the other and its rest in it. It is not the motion or the rest that causes the *connaturalitas*. It only indicates it. In all cases, therefore, the reaching of the goal is the essential good of the goal-seeker, and the *quietatio* and *dilectatio* are consequent on its attainment.

Thus the goal of a heavy body is the centre. Its motion is given it to get it there, and its rest, or *quietatio*, results from its being there. The *quietatio* is not the goal, but is derivative from the attainment of the goal :

"Ridiculum est autem dicere quod finis motus corporis gravis non sit esse in loco proprio, sed quietatio inclinationis qua in hoc tendebat; si enim hoc principaliter natura intenderet ut inclinatio quietaretur, non daret eam; dat autem eam ut per hoc in locum proprium tendat; quo consecuto quasi

fine, sequitur inclinationis quietatio; et sic quietatio talis non est finis sed concomitans finem."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. cap. 26 (vol. v. 180a).

In like manner, when we pass from unconscious to conscious trends, it is plain enough that the goal must always be some *conveniens* which in itself satisfies the goal-seeker, and that the *dilectatio* or *gaudium* is not the goal but a *concomitans* of it.

Now, the specific good of any nature must obviously be related by *convenientia* to its specific rather than its generic nature, and since men and angels alone are intellectual beings, and to them alone blessedness is presented as the goal, the fundamental *convenientia* must lie between this goal of blessedness and some intellectual faculty. But the *intellectus* itself is the primarily and directly intellectual faculty; whereas the *voluntas*, which is in itself an appetite, is a *potentia intellectiva* only by participation in the *intellectus*:

"Voluntas igitur, secundum quod est appetitus, non est proprium intellectualis naturae, sed solum secundum quod ab intellectu dependet: intellectus autem secundum se proprius est intellectuali naturae. Beatitudo igitur vel felicitas in actu intellectus consistit substantialiter et principaliter magis quam in actu voluntatis."—*Ib.* (*ib.*, 179a).

It is, then, in knowing God that blessedness consists essentially and in its substantive content. It is in knowing or seeing, therefore, which is the act of the intelligence, that the soul rests; and the rest itself, or "love of the possessed," which is an act of the will, is the concomitant, not the substance, of *beatitudo*:

"Considerandum est autem, quod cum procedere de potentia in actum, vel sit motus, vel sit simile motui; circa processum [ad finem] hujus beatitudinis consequendum similiter se habet sicut in motu vel in mutatione naturali. In motu enim naturali primo quidem consideratur aliqua proprietas per quam proportionatur* vel inclinatur mobile ad talem finem, sicut gravitas in terra ad hoc quod feratur deorsum: non enim moveretur aliquid naturaliter ad certum finem, nisi haberet proportionem ad illum. Secundo autem consideratur ipse motus ad finem. Tertio autem ipsa forma† vel locus. Quarto autem quies in forma vel in loco. Sic igitur in intellectuali motu ad finem, primum quidem est amor inclinans in finem; secundum autem est desiderium, quod est quasi motus in finem, et operationes ex tali desiderio provenientes; tertium autem est ipsa forma, quam intellectus consequitur; quartum autem est delectatio consequens, quae nihil est aliud quam quietatio voluntatis in fine adepto. Sicut igitur naturalis generationis finis est forma, et motus localis [finis est] locus, non autem quies in forma vel loco; sed hoc est consequens finem; et multo minus motus est finis, vel proportio ad finem:‡ ita ultimus finis creaturae intellectualis est videre Deum, non autem delectari in ipso; sed

* *proportionatur* = "is related," here "is related by *convenientia*."

† *forma* = the actualisation towards which the potentiality has been moving, in the case of the things capable of internal change; corresponding to the *locus proprius* of things that find their goal simply in being in the *locus conveniens*.

‡ *vel proportio ad finem* is an extension of the subject (*motus*), not of the predicate (*finis*).

hoc est concomitans finem, et quasi conficiens * ipsum; et multo minus desiderium vel amor possunt esse ultimus finis, cum etiam hoc ante finem habeatur."—*Compendium Theologiae*, i^a. cap. 108 (vol. xvi. 28b). I have supplied the bracketed words.

This passage is so important that it may be well to repeat it in an English paraphrase and expansion:

"Observe, then, that since passing from potentiality to actuality is either a motion or a modification which is analogous to motion, the passing to the attainment of the supreme goal, which consists in blessedness, will be analogous to that of a natural movement or modifying change. Now, in a natural movement we have first to consider some property whereby the thing that moves is related or inclined to the goal that it approaches, as weight in the element of "earth" to its downward trend, for nothing would naturally move towards a certain goal if it had not some affinity to it. Secondly, we must consider the motion itself towards the goal. Thirdly, the actualised form (in the case of a modification or change) or the place (in the case of a bodily movement) which is sought. And fourthly, the rest in the attained form or place. And so in an intellectual movement towards a goal: first, there is the love that inclines us to it; second, the longing for it, and the active steps or operations that proceed from this longing, analogous to the movement towards a goal; thirdly, the form, or realised experience, to which the intellect attains; and fourthly, the delight that follows thereon, which

* *conficiens* = "completing" or "rounding off," *vide infra*.

is no other than the appeasing of the will in the end obtained. And so, just as the goal of the coming of any natural being into existence is the realising of the form of that thing, and the goal of the local motion of a thing is the place to which it has an affinity, and not the cessation of motion which follows on the attainment of that form or place; and just as the movement towards the goal, or the affinity between the moving thing and the goal, is still further from being the goal itself than the rest in it is; just so the goal of the intellectual creature is to see God, and not that rejoicing in him which accompanies the attainment of the goal and in a way completes it; and much less can longing, or love (in the sense of affinity to the goal), be the ultimate goal itself; for all this is possessed before the goal is reached."

To sum up, then. In every case the *quietatio*, or rest in the attained goal, follows, and is dependent upon its *connaturalitas* to the being that moves towards it and rests in it. The object of the movement is not its own cessation, but the attainment of that on the possession of which the cessation follows. And so, too, in the cases in which the "motion towards" is *desiderium*, and the "rest in" is *delectatio*, it is the *connaturalitas* which causes *desiderium* and *delectatio* alike, and it is antecedent to them. It is not the *desiderium* and the *delectatio* that constitute the *connaturalitas*.

Thus the direct and essential object of love itself is to get the loved thing, not to delight in it when got. Now, the *visio Dei* is the only possible attain-

ment or possession of God, and it is the knowledge of God that primarily and essentially constitutes that *visio*. The delight, which is the act of love, follows.*

It is now perhaps sufficiently clear that it is in the *visio Dei* itself, which is an "act," or realised attainment and functioning of the intellect, that *beatitudo* consists essentially and *substantialiter*; that is to say, blessedness, the ultimate goal of men and of angels, consists in the knowledge of God, not in the resultant or concomitant love of him.

There is no escaping from the analysis that lands us in this conclusion; and yet, as might be expected, this attempt to express the final triumph *in patria* under the terms of human experience *in via* leaves us only half satisfied. There are many reasons for this. To begin with, we have seen that the whole theory rests on the principle that the *finis* of the *intellectus* is its own *actus*, and is therefore realised in itself, whereas the *finis* of the *voluntas*, being something outside its own *actus*, takes it outside itself. But this very fact, when God himself is the object outside ourselves to which our love carries us, seems to make love higher than knowledge. And that is admitted by Aquinas himself. The love of that which is above the lover, he tells us, is higher than

* Cf. *Paradiso*, xxviii. 106–111:

"E dei saper che tutti hanno diletto,
quanto la sua veduta si profonda
nel vero, in che si queta ogn' intelletto.

Quince si può veder come si fonda
l' esser beato nell' atto che vede,
non in quel ch' ama, che poscia seconda."

knowledge, for the very reason that it takes him out of himself to that which is above himself. And in like manner the knowledge of that which is below the knower is higher than his love of it, because his knowledge takes its object up into his mind, which is above it. But his love takes him out of himself towards its object, which, in this case, is beneath it. It would seem, then, that although the knowledge of God is the primary and essential element in the consummate state of blessedness, yet the derivative joy, that is the expression of love, gives it a higher perfection. And this is in fact the meaning of expressions that often occur in Aquinas, such as that the love of God is *altior* or *eminentior* than the knowledge of him; or that, whereas beatitude consists *essentialiter* in the *visio Dei*, it consists *formaliter* in the *amor Dei*, where "*formaliter*" is used in the special sense of "perfecting" or "adorning." (*Cf.* note on p. 616.)

"Perfectio autem et dignitas intellectus in hoc consistit quod species rei intellectae in ipso consistit intellectu; cum secundum hoc intelligat actu, in quo eius dignitas tota consideratur. Nobilitas autem voluntatis et actus eius consistit ex hoc quod anima ordinatur ad rem aliquam nobilem, secundum esse quod res illa habet in se ipsa. Perfectius autem est, simpliciter et absolute loquendo, habere in se nobilitatem alterius rei, quam ad rem nobilem comparari extra se existentem. Unde voluntas et intellectus, si absolute considerentur, non comparando ad hanc vel illam rem, hunc ordinem inveniuntur

habere, quod intellectus eminentior est simpliciter voluntate.

"Sed contingit multo eminentius esse comparari ad rem aliquam nobilem per aliquem modum, quam ejus nobilitatem in se ipso habere; quando videlicet ilius rei nobilitas habetur multo inferiori modo quam eam habeat res illa in se ipsa. Si autem nobilitas illius rei insit alii rei vel aeque nobiliter, vel nobilius quam in re cujus est; tunc absque omni dubitatione nobilius erit quod in se nobilitatem rei alterius habebit, quam quod ad ipsam rem nobilem qualitercumque ordinatur. Rerum autem quae sunt anima superiores, formas percipit intellectus inferiori modo quam sint in ipsis rebus: recipitur enim aliquid in intellectu per modum sui. . . . Et eadem ratione earum quae sunt anima inferiores, sicut res corporales, formae sunt nobiliores in anima quam in ipsis rebus.

"Sic igitur tripliciter potest sumi comparatio intellectus ad voluntatem. Uno modo absolute et in universali, non respectu huius vel illius rei; et sic intellectus est eminentior voluntate; sicut habere id quod est dignitatis in re aliqua est perfectius quam comparari ad nobilitatem ejus. Alio modo per respectum ad res naturales sensibiles; et sic iterum intellectus est simpliciter nobilior voluntate, utpote intelligere lapidem quam velle lapidem; eo quod forma lapidis nobiliori modo est in intellectu secundum quod ab intellectu intelligitur, quam sit in re ipsa secundum quod a voluntate desideratur. Tertio modo in respectu ad res divinas, quae sunt anima superiores; et sic velle est eminentius quam

intelligere, sicut velle Deum et amare quam cognoscere: quia scilicet divina bonitas perfectius est in ipso Deo prout a voluntate desideratur, quam sit participata in nobis prout ab intellectu concipitur."—*De veritate*, q. 22: a. 11. c. (vol. ix. 328b *sq.*).

"Felicitas sive beatitudo in operatione consistit, et non in habitu,* ut Philosophus probat in 1 Ethic.; unde beatitudo hominis potest comparari ad aliquam potentiam animae dupliciter. Uno modo sicut *objectum* potentiae: et sic beatitudo praecipue comparatur ad voluntatem; nominat enim beatitudo ultimum finem hominis, et summum bonum ipsius. Finis autem et bonum sunt objectum voluntatis. Alio modo sicut *actus* ad potentiam: et sic beatitudo originaliter et substantialiter consistit in actu intellectus; formaliter† autem et completive in actu voluntatis; quia impossibile est ipsum actum voluntatis esse ultimum finem voluntatis. Ultimus enim finis hominis est id quod est primo desideratum.

* *in operatione . . . non in habitu* = in the actual doing or getting of the thing, not in the confirmed habit or disposition favourable thereto.

† The sense in which "formaliter" is here used is best illustrated by a passage in which Aquinas declares that an intellectual being must find its blessedness in the perfect operation of its characteristic intellectual function. But perfection depends on four things: 1. On its residing in the intellectual being himself, and being desired for its own sake and not for something it makes. 2. On its being the operation of the highest faculty. 3. On its object being the supremest possible to the faculty concerned:

"*Quarto*, ex forma operationis, ut scilicet perfecte, faciliter et delectabiliter operetur."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. i. cap. 100 (vol. v. 66b).

This sense of *formaliter* is apparently derived from the classical use of *forma* = "beauty." In the usual scholastic sense *formaliter* could not, of course, be contrasted with *essentialiter* and *substantialiter*.

Non autem potest esse quod primo volitum sit actus voluntatis. Prius enim est potentiam ferri in aliquod objectum, quam quod ferratur super actum suum; prius enim intelligitur actus alicujus potentiae quam reflexio ejus super actum illum; actus enim terminatur ad objectum; et ita quaelibet potentia prius fertur in objectum quam in actum suum; sicut visus prius videt colorem quam videat se videre colorem; et ita etiam voluntas prius vult aliquod bonum quam velit se velle; et sic actus voluntatis non potest esse primo volitum, et per consequens nec ultimus finis. Sed quotiescunque aliquod bonum exterius est desideratum quasi finis, ille actus noster est nobis quasi finis interior, quo primo perfecte attingimus ad ipsum; sicut dicimus, quod commestio finis est et beatitudo ejus qui ponit cibum finem suum, et possessio ejus qui finem suum ponit pecuniam. Finis autem nostri desiderii Deus est; unde actus quo ei primo conjungimur, est originaliter et substantialiter nostra beatitudo. Primo autem Deo conjungimur per actum intellectus; et ideo ipsa Dei visio, quae est actus intellectus, est substantialiter et originaliter nostra beatitudo. Sed quia haec operatio perfectissima est, et convenientissimum objectum; ideo consequitur maxima delectatio, quae quidem decorat operationem ipsam et perficit eam, sicut pulchritudo juventutem, ut dicitur 10 Ethic. (cap. 4); unde ipsa delectatio quae voluntatis est, est formaliter complens beatitudinem; et ita beatitudinis ultimae origo est in visione, complementum autem in fruitione."—*Quodlibet*, viii. q. 9: a. 19. c. (vol. ix. 584b).

But even with the explanation, or concession, that these passages give us, we may still retain the feeling that love does, after all, often precede knowledge and lead us to it, and that we may love intensely while we only know vaguely. How then (even in the case of immaterial things, when there can be no sense-cognition) can love be wholly and solely consequent upon knowledge? But to this question too Aquinas has his answer. *Amor* and *odium*, as we have seen, assume a pre-existent congruity or incongruity respectively between the subject and the object. A thing is not congruous with our nature because we love it, but we love it because it is congruous with our nature. This congruity exists, and constitutes a potentiality in the *anima*, independently of experience or any kind of contact; but the potentiality is actualised when, and only when, and in so far as, the congruous object is presented to the *anima*, waking *desiderium*, or is conjoined with it, producing *gaudium*. In the case of the *intelligibile* as opposed to the *sensibile*, it is the *intellectus* alone, and not any *sensus*, that can thus present the object to the subject or conjoin the two. When love seems to anticipate knowledge and to overflow its limitations, it is not really love of the unknown or imperfectly known object that we experience, but love of something else that we do know, and that we believe (whether by report or otherwise), to be associated with it. Thus a man may have an intense desire to study rhetoric, though he knows nothing of it, because he knows that oratory gives men power over their fellows. Or

more generally, an ignorant man's heart may be warmed with a yearning for knowledge because he has so often been told of its delights and its advantages. And in especial, a man may have an ardent love of God, with only a vague idea as to what God is. And indeed no one in this life does know with any clearness what God is, but many love him above all things, for they believe him to be the sum, and more than the sum, of all the good they know, possessed or unpossessed. But this love of the conclusive, all-embracing and unimagined Good necessarily partakes of the nature of *desiderium*, that is to say, of yearning or unsatisfied desire, and it is love as *delectatio* or *fruitio* that we are discussing. It is from the *visio Dei* alone, therefore, that the true love of God himself, not of something else that we believe to be divine, must flow:

"Ad hoc autem quod ipsa visio sit delectabilis requiritur . . . quod ipsum visibile sit conveniens, et quod sit conjunctum."—4 *Dist.*, xlix. q. 4: a. 5. sol. 1. (vol. vii. 1231a).

"Ille qui quaerit scientiam, non omnino ignorat eam: sed secundum aliquid eam praecognoscit, vel in universali, vel in aliquo eius effectu, vel per hoc quod audit eam laudari."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}–ii^{ae}. q. 27: a. 2. ad 1^{m} (Leon., vi. 193b).

Aquinas allows that, under some circumstances, a thing may be loved *perfecte* synthetically as its concrete self, without being known *perfecte* analytically:

"Aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis,

quod non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris. Cognitio enim ad rationem * pertinet, cuius est distinguere inter ea quae secundum rem sunt coniuncta, et componere quodammodo ea quae sunt diversa, unum alteri comparando. Et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur quod homo cognoscat singulatim quidquid est in re, sicut partes et virtutes et proprietates. Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quae respicit rem secundum quod in se est. Unde ad perfectionem amoris sufficit quod res prout in se apprehenditur, ametur. Ob hoc contingit quod aliquid plus ametur quam cognoscatur: quia potest perfecte amari, etiam si non perfecte cognoscatur: sicut maxime patet in scientiis, quas aliqui amant propter aliquam summariam cognitionem quam de eis habent: puta quod sciunt rhetoricam esse scientiam per quam homo potest persuadere, et hoc in rhetorica amant. Et similiter est dicendum circa amorem Dei."—*Ib.*, ad 2^{m} (*ib.*, 193b).

We must of course qualify this "similiter" by remembering that since God is supremely one and "simple," such knowledge of him as is analytical must for that very reason be imperfect, and therefore not such as the beatific vision gives.

And now at last we are in a position to advance to the examination of the theory of Aquinas as to how the *visio Dei* itself can be made possible to the creature. This examination is the subject of the following Excursus.

* Observe that the word here used is *ratio*, not *intellectus*; *cf.* p. 603.

EXCURSUS II

THE BEATIFIC VISION

The terminology of sight, the noblest of the senses, is metaphorically applied to any vivid perception, as of taste, smell, or touch:

"Sicut patet in nomine *visionis*, quod primo impositum est ad significandum actum sensus visus; sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem huius sensus, extensum est hoc nomen, secundum usum loquentium, ad omnem cognitionem aliorum sensuum (dicimus enim, *Vide quomodo sapit*, vel *quomodo redolet*, vel *quomodo est calidum*); et ulterius etiam ad cognitionem intellectus, secundum illud Matth. v. [8], *Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt.*'"—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 67: a. 1. c. (Leon., v. 163).

Thus the impress made upon our minds by any object of sense—that is to say, the immaterial counterpart in our consciousness of the material thing outside it—is called its *species* or "appearance," by whatever sense the impression is conveyed. The term, therefore, is by no means confined to visual impressions. And just as it is extended laterally to include all concrete sense-cognitions, so it is extended upwards to include abstract intellectual conceptions as well; and further yet, it is carried into regions of anticipated or imagined experience that transcend all earthly powers, whether of the senses or the intellect:

"Potest etiam ulterius attendi haec similitudo non solum quantum ad genus cognitionis, sed etiam ad modum cognoscendi. Modus autem quo sensus videt, est in quantum species visibilis in actu per lumen formatur in visu; unde transferendo nomen visionis ad intellectum, proprie intelligendo, 'videmus' quando per lumen intellectuale ipsa forma intellectualis fit in intellectu nostro; sive illud lumen sit naturale, sicut cum intelligimus quidditatem hominis, aut alicuius huiusmodi; sive sit supernaturale, sicut quo Deum in patria videbimus."—3 *Dist.*, xxiv. q. 1: a. 2. sol. 1. (vol. vii. 262b).

The accompanying table (which will be explained as we go along) will, it is hoped, be a help towards following the further analysis of what is involved in the *visio Dei*:

medium sub quo.	medium quo.	medium in quo.	objectum visionis.
lumen solis.	species sensibilis.	speculum (potest deesse).	hoc aliquid sensibile, *e.g.* hic lapis.
lumen intellectus agentis.	phantasmata rerum sensibilium.	deest.	species intelligibiles, *e.g.* longitudo s. quidditas hominis.
		effectus s. oppositum.	quidditas Dei (viatoribus).
similitudo Dei,* s. deiformitas animae (essentia Dei animam informante), s. lumen gloriae.	deest.	deest.	essentia Dei (comprehensoribus in patria).

* *I.e.* similitude of the soul *to* God.

A medium of cognition is anything that helps to bring the mind into relation or contact with the object of cognition. Thus (to take the typical case of ocular vision) if it is a stone that is seen, it is the light that makes it visible. The light, then, is the *medium sub quo* of vision. But again, it is the *species sensibilis* of the stone, in the mind, that enables the mind to see the material stone outside itself. This, then, is the *medium quo* of vision. Thus the mind, under the condition of light, and by the instrumentality of the *species sensibilis*, sees the stone itself.

In the case of such abstractions as a mathematical line, or the conception of "humanity," the abstraction itself is the object of cognition (*cf.* p. 404); the power of abstraction, that is to say, the *intellectus agens*, is the *medium sub quo*, analogous to the light; and the *phantasmata*, or records of past impressions that survive in the senses, are the *medium quo*, by means of which the mind is enabled to construct the *species intelligibiles* which are the direct objects of its contemplation.

In either case, though the mind naturally in the ordinary course of things is directly engaged with the stone or the abstract conception,* yet it can by an effort go back upon its own processes and examine the *species sensibiles* or the *phantasma*; or even behind these the mind may ponder on its own nature

* It is true that it can never quite shake off, or shed, the *phantasmata*. But in thinking we normally turn away from them as much as possible. It is only a Galton who makes us fish them up and directly contemplate them.

and its powers. Such reflex action, however, is secondary. The existence of the *medium sub quo* and the *medium quo* does not qualify the direct nature of the normal cognition of the stone, or the line itself:

"Cujuslibet potentiae animae virtus est determinata ad objectum suum; unde et ejus actio primo et principaliter in objectum tendit. In ea vero quibus in objectum tendit, non potest [tendere] nisi per quamdam reditionem; sicut videmus, quod visus primo dirigitur in colorem; sed in actum visionis suae non dirigitur nisi per quamdam reditionem, dum videndo colorem videt se videre. Sed ista reditio incomplete quidem est in sensu, complete autem in intellectu, qui reditione completa redit ad cognoscendum essentiam suam. Intellectus autem noster in statu viae hoc modo comparatur ad phantasmata sicut visus ad colores, ut dicitur in 3, *de Anima* (*com.* 39): non quidem ut cognoscat ipsa phantasmata, ut visus cognoscit colores; sed ut cognoscat ea quorum sunt phantasmata. Unde actio intellectus nostri primo tendit in ea quae per phantasmata apprehenduntur, et deinde redit ad actum suum cognoscendum; et ulterius in species et habitus et potentias et essentiam ipsius mentis."—*De veritate*, q. 10. a. 9. c. (vol. ix. 172b).

Note that in this passage the phrase *ea quorum sunt phantasmata* is used more loosely than is at all customary with Aquinas; for it means the abstract conceptions generalised *from* the *phantasmata*, as is clear both from the more careful phrase that immedi-

ately follows, *ea quae per phantasmata apprehenduntur*, and from the commentary on the passage in Aristotle referred to, which runs as follows:

"Dicit ergo primo, quod quia nulla res intellecta a nobis, est praeter magnitudines sensibiles, quasi ab eis separata secundum esse, sicut sensibilia videntur abinvicem separata: necesse est quod intelligibilia intellectus nostri sint in speciebus sensibilibus secundum esse, tam illa quae dicuntur per abstractionem, scilicet mathematica, quam naturalia, quae sunt habitus et passiones sensibilium.* Et propter hoc sine sensu non potest aliquis homo addiscere quasi de novo acquirens scientiam, neque intelligere, quasi utens scientia habita. Sed oportet, cum aliquis speculatur in actu, quod simul formet sibi aliquod phantasma. Phantasmata enim sunt similitudines sensibilium. Sed in hoc differunt ab eis, quia sunt praeter materiam. Nam sensus est susceptivus specierum sine materia. . . . Phantasia autem est motus factus a sensu secundum actum."†—*Commentary* on the *De anima*, lib. iii. cap. viii. sec. 3 [§ 39] (vol. xx. 131b).

But there is a third column in our table which has no application to the cases we have so far examined. We must now turn our attention to it.

An object may be behind us or round a corner so

* *habitus et passiones sensibilium* = τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη = the characteristics of sensible objects and the modifications they undergo.

† *phantasia . . . actum, i.e.* the *phantasmata* start not from an external object but from the potentialities lying stored in the sense-records and actualised by the *phantasia*.

that we cannot see it directly, but by means of a mirror we may bring it into view. The mirror in such a case is the *medium in quo*. In like manner we can, while on earth, have no direct vision of God; for to the question "What is God?" we can give no direct answer. We know his *quidditas* only indirectly, through his effects, or by considering what he is *not*. These *effectus* or *opposita* are analogous to the mirror (*cf.* Paul's *videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate*, 1 Cor. xiii. 12), and they constitute the *media in quibus* of our vision.

But this was not wholly so with Adam, and will not be so at all for the redeemed *in patria*. Adam, though he did not see by a *medium in quo*, saw by a *medium quo*, namely, an (imperfect) impression or similitude of God, divinely implanted in his consciousness, which similitude, however, was not the *essentia Dei* itself, but bore the relation to it of a *species* to the object of which it is the counterpart.

Here we must remember the distinction drawn (p. 404) between the *species intelligibiles* which are *made* by the human mind itself and are the direct objects of thought, and those which are *planted* in the mind (angelic, or human after death), and which turn it to spiritual beings outside itself as the direct objects of its cognition. Of this latter order, of course, was the *species* of God divinely implanted in the mind of Adam; but in this case the *species* was necessarily inadequate.

For blessed spirits that enjoy the *visio Dei* there

will be no such *medium quo*, for no *similitudo Dei* can be substituted for the actual *essentia Dei* in the vision of which beatitude consists.

For cognition of God, therefore, fallen man *in via* needs all three media, unfallen man needed only the two first, the redeemed *in patria* need only the first. God alone needs no *medium* at all:

"Homo igitur in statu post peccatum indiget ad cognoscendum Deum medio, quod est quasi speculum, in quo resultat ipsius Dei similitudo; oportet enim ut per ea quae facta sunt in invisibilia ejus veniamus, ut dicitur Rom. i. [20]. Hoc autem medio non indigebat homo in statu innocentiae; indigebat autem medio quod est quasi species rei visae; quia per aliquod spirituale lumen menti hominis influxum divinitus, quod erat quasi similitudo expressa lucis increatae, Deum videbat. Sed hoc medio non indigebit in patria; quia ipsam Dei essentiam per se ipsam videbit, non per aliquam ejus similitudinem, vel intelligibilem vel sensibilem, cum nulla creata similitudo adeo possit perfecte Deum repraesentare, ut per eam videns ipsam Dei essentiam cognoscere aliquis possit. Indigebit autem lumine gloriae in patria, quod erit quasi medium sub quo videtur, secundum illud *Psalm.* xxxv. 10 [A.V. xxxvi. 9]: *In lumine tuo videbimus lumen*, eo quod ista visio nulli creaturae est naturalis, sed soli Deo;* unde nulla creatura in eam ex sua natura potest pertingere; sed ad eam consequendam oportet quod

* Hence the possession of such light, or vision, constitutes a *similitudo Dei*, or likeness *to* God, in the creature it endows with it *Vide* the sequel of the citation, and the remarks on p. 630.

illustretur lumine divinitus emisso. . . . Patet igitur quod homo post peccatum triplici medio indiget ad videndum Deum; scilicet ipsa creatura [*i.e.* all that God has created, the *effectus* of God, being the *medium in quo*], ex qua in divinam cognitionem ascendit; et similitudine ipsius Dei, quam ex creatura accipit [his inferences, drawn from these *effectus*, analogous to *phantasmata*, being the *medium quo*]; et lumine . . . sapientiae [the enlightenment, or *medium sub quo*, that enables him to form these inferences within himself, and thereby directs his mind outside himself to God, seen in his works as in a mirror]. In statu vero ante peccatum indigebat duplici medio: scilicet medio quod est similitudo Dei; et quod est lumen elevans vel dirigens mentem. Beati autem uno tantum indigent medio, scilicet lumine elevante mentem. Ipse autem Deus se ipsum videt absque omni medio, ipse enim est lumen quo se ipsum videt."—*De veritate*, q. 18: a. 1. ad 1^{m} (vol. ix. 274b *sq.*).

It remains, then, to ask how we are to conceive the divine action by which the veritable *essentia Dei* can be "seen" by the human mind. Evidently, since this is beyond the natural powers of any created intelligence, it must be by something that elevates the mind above itself; and, since God alone can comprehend himself, it must be by God in some way entering the soul, so as to confer on it some likeness to himself, that he makes it capable of seeing him:

"Impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus per sua naturalia essentiam Dei videat. Cognitio enim contingit secundum quod cognitum est in cogno-

scente. Cognitum autem est in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis. Unde cujuslibet cognoscentis cognitio est secundum modum suae naturae. Si igitur modus essendi alicujus rei cognitae excedat modum naturae cognoscentis, oportet quod cognitio illius rei sit supra naturam illius cognoscentis."

"Relinquitur ergo quod cognoscere ipsum esse subsistens,* sit connaturale soli intellectui divino, et quod sit supra facultatem naturalem cujuslibet intellectus creati: quia nulla creatura est suum esse, sed habet esse participatum. Non igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per essentiam videre, nisi inquantum Deus per suam gratiam se intellectui creato coniungit, ut intelligibile ab ipso."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^a. q. 12: a. 4. c. (Leon., iv. 120b *sq.*).

"Omne quod elevatur ad aliquid quod excedit suam naturam, oportet quod disponatur aliqua dispositione quae sit supra suam naturam: sicut, si aer debeat accipere formam ignis, oportet quod disponatur aliqua dispositione ad talem formam. Cum autem aliquis intellectus creatus videt Deum per essentiam, ipsa essentia Dei fit forma intelligibilis intellectus. Unde oportet quod aliqua dispositio supernaturalis ei superaddatur, ad hoc quod elevetur in tantam sublimitatem. Cum igitur virtus naturalis intellectus creati non sufficiat ad Dei essentiam videndam, ut ostensum est, oportet quod ex divina gratia superaccrescat ei virtus intelligendi. Et hoc augmentum virtutis intellectivae illuminationem intellectus vocamus; sicut et ipsum intelligibile vocatur lumen vel lux. Et

* *ipsum esse subsistens* = "the absolute existence" = God.

istud est lumen de quo dicitur *Apoc.* xxi. [23], quod *claritas Dei illuminabit eam*, scilicet societatem beatorum Deum videntium. Et secundum hoc lumen efficiuntur deiformes, idest Deo similes; secundum illud 1 Joan. iii. [2], *cum aparuerit, similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti est.*"—*Ib.*, a. 5. c. (*ib.*, 123b).

Two points are to be noted here. In the first place, we have seen that it is not a *similitudo Dei* but the *essentia Dei* itself that is seen *in patria*; and we must therefore carefully distinguish between the objective *similitudo Dei*, or likeness *of* God, which is excluded from the *visio Dei*, and the *deiformitas*, the subjective *similitudo Dei*, or likeness *to* God in the glorified soul itself, which is the *medium sub quo* of the vision:

"Requiritur ergo ad videndum Deum aliqua Dei similitudo ex parte visivae potentiae, qua scilicet intellectus sit efficax ad videndum Deum.

"Sed ex parte visae rei, quam necesse est aliquo modo uniri videnti, per nullam similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest. . . .

"Dicendum ergo quod ad videndum Dei essentiam requiritur aliqua similitudo ex parte visivae potentiae, scilicet lumen gloriae, confortans intellectum ad videndum Deum; de quo dicitur in Psalmo xxxv. 10 [A.V. xxxvi. 9]: *in lumine tuo videbimus lumen.* Non autem per aliquam similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest, quae ipsam divinam essentiam repraesentet ut in se est."—*Ib.*, a. 2. c. (*ib.*, 116a).

And secondly, we must notice the special use of *forma* in the phrase *ipsa essentia Dei fit forma*

intelligibilis intellectus. "Matter" in itself is the potentiality of everything, but the actuality of nothing. A "form" determines it to some particular thing, and form and matter between them make up that thing, or "substance," itself. Now, a *species*, whether sensible or intelligible, determines the general potentiality of cognition in the *anima* to a definite act of cognition, and is therefore, in so far, like a "form," acting upon the undetermined potentiality of the soul as *materia*, and producing a determined act of cognition. In this case, however, the resulting actuality is not a thing (*substantia*) but a perfected *actus* of the mind. This secondary use of the word "form" must be kept carefully in mind. (*Cf.* pp. 634 *sqq.*).

And now we must make our final effort to understand the teaching of Aquinas as to the informing of the blessed spirits by the actual *essentia Dei* itself. It will perhaps involve a severer strain on the attention than we have yet required in the course of our investigations; and, moreover, it is with no small diffidence that I offer myself as a guide.

In the world of "substances" or objectively existing beings or things, it is obvious that no form, whether it is the form of a *compositum*, or is an immaterial existence, can itself become the form of another being. A material form is already determined by the matter of which it is the form, and it has no independent existence; whereas an angel, though a *forma existens*, is already determined by its existence. For although an angel is not compounded of form and

matter, yet there is a sense in which he is composite. The characteristics that make him *what* he is are his *quod est*. The fact *that* he is (=exists), is his *esse* or *quo est*, and is distinguishable in thought from his *quod est*. This actual existence he cannot participate with another; but he is not, like God, self-existent (*cf.* p. 635). His existence is derived. It is not inherent in his *quod est*.*

"Licet in angelo non sit compositio formae et materiae, est tamen in eo actus et potentia. Quod quidem manifestum potest esse ex consideratione rerum materialium, in quibus invenitur duplex compositio. Prima quidem formae et materiae, ex quibus constituitur natura aliqua. Natura autem sic composita non est suum esse, sed esse est actus eius. Unde ipsa natura comparatur ad suum esse sicut potentia ad actum. Subtracta ergo materia, et posito quod ipsa forma subsistat non in materia, adhuc remanet comparatio formae ad ipsum esse ut potentiae ad actum. Et talis compositio intelligenda est in angelis.* Et hoc est quod a quibusdam dicitur, quod angelus est compositus ex *quo est* et *quod est*, vel ex *esse* et *quod est*, ut Boetius dicit: nam *quod est* est ipsa forma† subsistens: ipsum

* Perhaps it may make it clearer to say that we know *what* a centaur is, and therefore know his *quod est*, but we do not know his *esse* or his *quo est*, for we do not know his existence, since he has none. We know (or shall know) both the *quod est* and the *esse* of an angel, but they are not identically the same thing.

† *I.e.* the angel is, *in himself* (that is, in his own nature), only *capable* of existing, his *actual* existence being due to the continuous sustaining act of God. But the angel is himself a pure *forma*.

autem esse est *quo* substantia est, sicut cursus est quo currens currit."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^a. q. 50: a. 2. ad 3^m (Leon., v. 6b).

The human soul, which stands on the horizon between material and immaterial, and is itself both a *forma* and a *hoc aliquid*, is in a certain sense an exception; for it is a form which can call the body into participation of its own existence. This is because, on the one hand, the soul in itself has not a complete and determined being, for it is determined only by reference to the very body of which it is the form; and, on the other hand, the body itself, for union with which the soul is created, has its proper existence only as receptive of the soul, in which it finds its *entelechy* or goal-fulfilment. This case is to be noted as emphasising the fact that though a form that exists in itself cannot, in general, become the form of any other existing thing, it is not because it is a form but because it is already determined to some existence, or *esse*, in which nothing else could participate without destroying it:

"Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae, non habet naturalem perfectionem nisi secundum quod est corpori unita."—*Ib.*, q. 90: a. 4. c. (Leon., v. 388b *sq.*).

And therefore, in speaking of an angel, *ipsa forma* is the equivalent of the more general *ipsa natura* that occurs a few lines before, where it is said that the *ipsa natura* may be regarded as a potentiality apart from *esse* or *actus*. Thus, in this particular case, *ipsa forma* stands for the angel regarded as a *potentialitas* of existence only, though in general *forma* is parallel to *actus*, and is opposed to the *potentialitas* of *materia*.

"Potest autem objici quod substantia intellectualis esse suum materiae corporali communicare non possit, ut sit unum esse substantiae intellectualis et materiae corporalis; diversorum enim generum est diversus modus essendi, et nobilioris substantiae nobilius esse.

"Hoc autem convenienter diceretur, si eodem modo illud esse materiae esset sicut esse substantiae intellectualis. Non est autem ita, est enim materiae corporalis ut recipientis et subjecti ad aliquid altius elevati; substantiae autem intellectualis ut principii et secundum propriae naturae congruentiam. Nihil igitur prohibet substantiam intellectualem esse formam corporis humani, quae est anima humana."—*Contra Gentiles*, lib. ii. cap. 68 (vol. v. 119b).

Now we have seen that *in genere intelligibilium* the word "form" takes a meaning distinct from that which it bears when contrasted with material, though analogous to it. In this sense the form is that which determines the vague or general potentiality of the *intellectus* to a definite intellectual act. Thus it informs the intellect, but does not become a single being with it. Such forms bring the intellect towards its goal-realisation or perfection just in so far as they bring it to the truth. What then, in the ordinary way, are these forms, *in genere intelligibilium?* A stone, as we have seen, does not itself enter into the mind at all. It is its *species sensibilis* that does so. This, then (though it is not the form *of the stone*, in the sense of being the actual physical qualities that make it a stone), is the "form," that is

the forming influence, *in the mind*, for it is what determines the consciousness to the definite cognition of the stone. And the same thing is true of the *species* of one angel in the consciousness of another. It is not the seen angel himself that is in the consciousness of the seeing angel, but the divinely implanted *species* of him; though, of course, it *is* the seen angel himself that the seeing angel is primarily conscious of, in virtue of this implanted *species*; for it is the *medium quo* of a direct vision. The only thing that can inform or perfect the intelligence is truth, and since the angel, though true, is not truth, he cannot himself enter the consciousness as a pure and unconditioned form, any more than a stone can. Hence the necessity of a *species*, which can enter the mind and which represents the substance that cannot enter it. But God is not only existent but existence, not only true but truth, not only actual but actuality. *That* he is (verb substantive) is identically included in *what* he is. Nor is his *esse* contracted by any closed and limited determination. It is therefore capable of being participated without loss of identity. Therefore *in genere intelligibilium* he alone represents pure form, and is *forma tantum*. Thus, too, in himself considered, God is the supremely intelligible, for he is intelligibility's self. It is only in so far as aught else participates imperfectly in his truth that it is intelligible at all, or can actualise and inform the intelligence in any way. Thus while the uncompleted nature of the human soul enables it, though itself a *hoc aliquid*, to call the body into participation

of its own existence, so the undetermined *esse* of God makes it conceivable that he should call any intelligence into participation of his own existence, which is his truth. Therefore there is no need for a *species* (which would in any case be utterly inadequate), since God himself can enter the soul *secundum essentiam* and so inform it. God, in his very essence, therefore, takes the place and performs the functions of a *species.*

We have already seen that what is thus actively possible, as from the side of God, is rendered receptively possible, as from the side of the soul, by the *lumen gloriae*, which lifts it into participation of the self-seeing *essentia* of God:

"Ad hujusmodi igitur intelligentiam veritatis considerandum est quod substantia quae est per seipsam subsistens, est vel forma tantum vel compositum ex materia et forma. Illud igitur quod est ex materia et forma compositum non potest alteri esse forma, quia forma in eo jam est contracta ad illam materiam ut alterius rei forma esse non possit. Illud autem quod sic est subsistens ut solum tamen sit forma potest alteri esse forma, dummodo esse suum sit tale quod ab aliquo alio participari possit, sicut ostendimus . . . de anima humana. Si vero esse suum ab altero participari non possit, nullius rei forma esse potest; sic enim per suum esse determinatur in seipso, sicut quae sunt materialia per materiam. Hoc autem, sicut in esse substantiali vel naturali invenitur, sic et in esse intelligibili considerandum est; cum enim intellectus perfectio sit verum, illud intelligibile erit

ut forma tantum, in genere intelligibilium, quod est veritas ipsa, quod convenit soli Deo; nam, cum verum sequatur ad esse, illud tantum sua veritas est quod est suum esse: quod est proprium soli Deo. . . . Alia igitur intelligibilia subsistentia non sunt ut pura forma in genere intelligibilium, sed ut formam in subjecto aliquo habentes; est enim unumquodque eorum verum, non veritas, sicut et est ens, non autem ipsum esse. Manifestum est igitur quod essentia divina potest comparari ad intellectum creatum ut species intelligibilis qua intelligit; quod non contingit de essentia alicujus alterius substantiae separatae. Nec tamen potest esse forma alterius rei secundum esse naturale; sequeretur enim quod simul cum aliquo unita constitueret unam naturam; quod esse non potest, cum essentia divina in se perfecta sit in sui natura: species autem intelligibilis unita intellectui non constituit aliquam naturam, sed perficit ipsum ad intelligendum: quod perfectioni divinae essentiae non repugnat."—*Ib.*, cap. 51 (*ib.*, 198a).

But though all the souls of the blessed see God in his *essentia*, they do not all participate in the *lumen gloriae* in equal measure; and their sight, therefore, is not equally perfect:

"Cum finis proportionaliter respondeat his quae sunt ad finem, oportet quod, sicut aliqua diversimodi praeparantur ad finem, ita diversimodi participent finem. Visio autem divinae substantiae est ultimus finis cujuslibet intellectualis substantiae. . . . Intellectuales autem substantiae non omnes aequaliter praeparantur ad finem; quaedam enim sunt majoris

virtutis et quaedam minoris; virtus autem est via ad felicitatem. Oportet igitur quod in visione divina sit diversitas, et quod quidam perfectius et quidam minus perfecte divinam substantiam videant. Hinc est quod, ad hanc felicitatis differentiam designandam, Dominus dicit: *In domo Patris mei mansiones multae sunt*, Joan. xiv. 2."

"Quia vero visio divinae substantiae est ultimus finis cujuslibet intellectualis substantiae . . . omnis autem res cum pervenerit ad ultimum finem, quiescit appetitus ejus naturalis, oportet quod naturalis appetitus substantiae intellectualis divinam substantiam videntis omnino quiescat. Est autem appetitus naturalis intellectus ut cognoscat omnium rerum genera et species et virtutes et totum ordinem universi; quod demonstrat humanum studium erga singula praedictorum. Quilibet igitur divinam substantiam videntium cognoscit omnia supradicta. . . .

"Si autem praemissa diligenter considerentur, patet quod, quodammodo videntes divinam substantiam omnia vident, quodam vero modo, non.

"Si enim per *omnia* illa intelligantur quae ad universi perfectionem pertinent, manifestum est ex dictis quod videntes divinam substantiam omnia vident. . . .

"Si vero per *omnia* intelligantur omnia quae Deus, suam essentiam videndo, cognoscit, nullus intellectus creatus omnia in Dei substantia videt."—*Ib.*, capp. 58, 59 (*ib.*, 202b *sqq.*).

Perhaps this is best brought out by the analogy of the clearer and dimmer sight, physical or intellectual,

of *videntes* who are looking at the same thing and see the same thing, neither of them making any mistake about it, but yet one seeing more than the other:

"Unus alio non potest aliquid idem magis intelligere, si locutio *magis* importat modum qui est ex parte intellecti. Non enim potest esse ut aliquis intelligat rem, nisi intelligendo rem habere illum modum quem habet; si enim alium modum rei attribuat, errat, et non intelligit. . . . Sed si locutio *magis* dicat modum qui est ex parte intelligentis, sic unus alio melius potest intelligere, inquantum est limpidior ejus cognitio de uno et eodem cognoscibili."

"Cum dicitur, 'Omnes sancti videbunt Deum sicut est,' locutio *sicut* importat modum qui est ex parte visi, non qui sit ex parte videntis. Quilibet enim videbit Deum esse eo modo quo est; sed tamen modus videntis non erit aequalis modo rei visae, sed in infinitum distans; et ita modus unius videntis potest esse minus distans quam modus alterius."—4 *Dist.*, xlix. q. 2: a. 4. ad 1^{m} and 4^{m} (vol. vii. 1205a).

Finally, in the material world, the *lumen solis* actualises both the visibility of the object and the faculty of vision in the eye, both of which are mere potentialities when it is dark. And so too the *lumen intellectus agentis* both makes the latent or potential intelligibility that lies within the *species sensibiles* or the *phantasmata* into the actual intelligibility of the *species intelligibiles*, and also wakes the potentiality of understanding in the soul into an actuality. But, in the case of the *visio Dei*, the *essentia Dei*, which

is the thing to be seen, is already nothing but actuality, with no admixture of unactualised potentiality in it at all. It is therefore always and in itself supremely intelligible, and it needs no *medium* to make it so:

"Cum unumquodque sit cognoscibile secundum quod est in actu, Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixtione potentiae, quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime cognoscibilis in se, alicui intellectui cognoscibile non est, propter excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum: sicut sol, qui est maxime visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione propter excessum luminis."—*Sum. Theol.*, i^{a}. q. 12: a. 1. c. (Leon., iv. 114b).

The *medium sub quo*, therefore, has only to actualise the vision of the seer and not the visibility of the seen as well. Thus the *essentia Dei*, itself deiforming the soul, thereby renders it capable of "seeing the light" (*essentia Dei*) "in the light" (*deiformitas animae*): Ps. xxxv. 10 [A.V. xxxvi. 9].

The following passage, which may serve as a summary of the whole analysis, brings out these points:

"In visione intellectiva triplex medium contingit esse. Unum *sub quo* intellectus videt, quod disponit eum ad videndum; et hoc est in nobis lumen intellectus agentis, quod se habet ad intellectum possibilem nostrum sicut lumen solis ad oculum. Aliud medium est *quo* videt; et hoc est species intelligibilis, quae intellectum possibilem determinat, et habet se ad intellectum possibilem sicut species

lapidis ad oculum. Tertium medium est *in quo* aliquid videtur; et hoc est res aliqua per quam in cognitionem alterius devenimus; sicut in effectu videmus causam, et in uno similium vel contrariorum videtur aliud; et hoc medium se habet ad intellectum sicut speculum ad visum corporalem, in quo oculus aliquam rem videt. Primum ergo medium et secundum non faciunt mediatam visionem: immediate enim dicitur aliquis videre lapidem, quamvis eum per speciem ejus in oculo receptam et per lumen videat: quia visus non fertur in haec media tanquam in visibilia; sed per haec media fertur in unum * visibile, quod est extra oculum. Sed tertium medium facit visionem mediatam: visus enim prius fertur in speculum sicut in visibile, quo mediante accipit speciem rei visae in specie [here, *species* = image] vel speculo: similiter intellectus cognoscens causam in causato, fertur in ipsum causatum sicut in quoddam intelligibile, ex quo transit in cognitionem causae. Et quia essentia divina in statu viae in effectibus suis cognoscitur, non videmus eam immediate; unde in patria, ubi immediate videbitur, tale medium penitus subtrahetur. Similiter etiam non est ibi medium secundum, scilicet aliqua species essentiae divinae intellectum informans: quia quando aliquid videtur immediate per speciem suam, oportet quod species illa repraesentet rem illam secundum completum esse suae speciei; alias non diceretur res illa immediate videri, sed quaedam umbra ejus; sicut si similitudo lucis in oculo fieret per modum coloris, qui est lux

* *Unum* is here merely the indefinite article "a."

obumbrata. Cum autem omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipiatur in eo per modum recipientis; impossibile est in intellectu creato similitudinem divinae essentiae recipi, quae eam perfecte secundum totam suam rationem repraesentet. Unde si per aliquam similitudinem talem essentia divina a nobis videretur, immediate non videremus essentiam divinam, sed quamdam umbram ejus.

"Restat ergo quod solum primum medium erit in illa visione, scilicet lumen gloriae, quo intellectus perficietur ad videndum essentiam divinam; de quo in Psal. xxxv. 10 [A.V. xxxvi. 9], *In lumine tuo videbimus lumen.* Hoc autem lumen non est necessarium ad hoc quod faciat intelligibile in potentia esse intelligibile in actu, ad quod est nobis necessarium lumen intellectus agentis; quia ipsa divina essentia, cum sit a materia separata, est per se actu intelligibilis; sed erit necessarium tantum ad perficiendum intellectum, ad quod etiam nunc lumen intellectus agentis valet. Praedictum autem lumen gloriae sufficienter perficiet intellectum ad videndum divinam essentiam, eo quod ipsa essentia divina totaliter lux intelligibilis est. Unde lumen gloriae ab ea in intellectum descendens facit hoc respectu divinae essentiae in intellectu quod [lumen intellectus agentis *] facit respectu aliorum intelligibilium, quae non sunt lux tantum, sed species rei intellectae simul, et lumen; sicut si lux per se existeret, ad ejus visionem sufficeret lumen oculum perficiens sine

* The words in square brackets are necessary to the sense, but are omitted in the editions.

aliqua similitudine."—*Quodlibetum*, vii. q. 1 : a. 1. c. (vol. ix. 553).

Albertus Magnus expounds a similar doctrine less elaborately :

"Ad hoc quod ulterius quæritur de *Theophaniis*, dicimus quod sicut in sensu duo sunt, scilicet, lux sub qua visibile perficitur ut videri possit, et visibile ipsum, sicut lapis, vel aliud quod videtur: et lux quidem facit actum [leg. *actu*] visum,* sed non distinguit ipsum, nec determinat ad hoc visibile, vel ad illud: et sicut in intellectu naturali est lux intellectus agentis qui facit actu possibilem,† non tamen determinate perficit et movet ipsum ad hoc intelligibile, vel illud: sed postea determinatur per intellectum hominis,‡ vel Angeli, vel alterius: et sicut fides est illuminans ad creditum, non tamen perducit determinate ad hunc articulum, vel illum: ita est in *Theophaniis*, quod est lumen descendens elevans intellectum, et non distinguens et determinans ipsum ad hoc, vel illud: sed id quod distinguit intellectum ut objectum, est divina substantia ipsa: et hoc est quod dicit Psalmista, Psal. xxxv. 10 [A.V. xxxvi. 9], *In lumine tuo videbimus lumen.* Unde videtur Deus sine medio quod sit similitudo et ratio visi, sive per quod visum conjungitur videnti, et non per substantiam : § sed tamen est ibi medium

* *facit actu visum* = actualises sight. *Visum* is the substantive.

† *facit actu possibilem* [sc. *intellectum*] = actualises the potential intelligence.

‡ *intellectum hominis* = "the concept of 'man.'"

§ *et non per substantiam*, to be taken parenthetically after the "quod" of the line above.

disponens et vires afferens intellectui, quo melius possit attingere Deum: et hoc medium lumen est divinae bonitatis, vel apparitionis, quod a sanctis vocatur *theophania.*"—1 *Dist.*, i. q. 1: a. 15, ad quaestiunculam (vol. xxv. 37a).

Aquinas, it will be seen, wholly excludes the possibility of anticipating the vision of God while we are yet in the body; for the organic connection of the soul with the (not yet glorified) body makes it dependent ultimately upon the *species sensibiles*, or *phantasmata*, supplied by the senses, from which it can never shake itself free *in via*:

"Oportet quod si Deus per essentiam videri debeat, per nullam creatam speciem videatur; sed ipsa eius essentia fiat intelligibilis forma intellectus eum videntis; quod fieri non potest nisi ad hoc intellectus creatus per lumen gloriae disponatur. Et sic in videndo Deum per essentiam, per dispositionem infusi luminis pertingit mens ad terminum viae, qui est gloria; et sic non est in via. Sicut autem divinae omnipotentiae subjecta sunt corpora, ita et mentes; unde, sicut potest aliqua corpora perducere ad effectus quorum dispositio in praedictis corporibus non invenitur, sicut Petrum fecit super aquas ambulare sine hoc quod ei dotem agilitatis* tribueret; ita potest

* On *agilitas*, *cf.* "Corporis gloriosi sunt quatuor dotes: . . . scilicet impassibilitas, agilitas, subtilitas et claritas," *Sum. Theol.* iii^{a}. q. 45: a. 1. ob. 3. (Leon., xi. 429a); and "Corpora gloriosa aliquando moveri necessarium est ponere: quia et ipsum corpus Christi motum est in ascensione; et similiter corpora sanctorum quae de terra

mentem ad hoc perducere ut divinae essentiae uniatur in statu viae, modo illo quo unitur sibi in patria, sine hoc quod a lumine gloriae perfundatur. Cum autem

resurgent, ad caelum empyreum ascendent," in 4 *Dist.*, xliv. q. 2 : a. 3. sol. 2. (vol. vii. 1095b).

On these *dotes* in general :

"Corpus gloriosum erit omnino subjectum animae glorificatae, non solum ut nihil in eo sit quod resistat voluntati spiritus, quia hoc fuit etiam in corpore Adae ; sed etiam ut sit in eo aliqua perfectio effluens ab anima glorificata in corpus, per quam habile reddatur ad praedictam subjectionem : quae quidem perfectio dos glorificati corporis dicitur. Anima autem conjungitur corpori non solum ut forma, sed ut motor ; et utroque modo oportet quod corpus gloriosum animae glorificatae sit summe subjectum. Unde sicut per dotem subtilitatis subjicitur ei totaliter, inquantum est forma corporis, dans esse specificum ; ita per dotem agilitatis subjicitur ei inquantum est motor, ut scilicet sit expeditum et habile ad obediendum spiritui in omnibus motibus et actionibus animae."—*Ib.*, sol. 1. (*ib.*, 1095a).

"Imago autem Dei primo et principaliter in mente consistit ; sed per quamdam derivationem etiam in corpore hominis quaedam repraesentatio imaginis invenitur, secundum quod oportet corpus animae esse proportionatum ; . . . unde etiam beatitudo vel gloria primo et principaliter est in mente, sed per quamdam redundantiam derivatur etiam ad corpus, ut beatitudo hominis secundum corpus dicatur, quod imperium animae Deo conjunctae perfecte exequitur. Unde sicut dispositiones quae sunt in anima beata ad perfectam operationem, qua Deo conjungitur, dicuntur animae dotes ; ita dispositiones quae sunt in corpore glorioso, ex quibus corpus efficitur perfecte animae subjectum, dicuntur corporis dotes."—*Ib.*, xlix. q. 4 : a. 5. sol. 2. (*ib.*, 1232a).

And again, in answer to the question whether *corpora gloriosa* must necessarily be visible to mortal eyes :

"In potestate animae glorificatae erit quod corpus suum videatur vel non videatur, sicut et quaelibet alia actio corporis in animae potestate erit : alias non esset corpus gloriosum instrumentum summe obediens principali agenti."—*Ib.*, xliv. q. 2 : a. 3. sol. 3. c. (*ib.*, 1099b).

It is noteworthy that these *dotes* were not inherent even to the body of Christ, before his resurrection :

hoc contingit, oportet quod mens ab illo modo cognitionis desistat quo a phantasmatibus abstrahit; sicut etiam corpus corruptibile, cum ei miraculose datur agilitatis actus, non est simul in actu gravitatis. Et ideo illi quibus hoc modo Deum per essentiam videre datur, omnino ab actibus sensuum abstrahuntur, ut tota anima colligatur ad divinam essentiam intuendam; unde et rapi dicuntur, quasi vi superioris naturae abstracti ab eo quod eis secundum naturam competebat.

"Sic ergo secundum communem cursum nullus in statu viae Deum per essentiam videt; et si aliquibus hoc miraculose concedatur, ut Deum per essentiam videant, nondum anima a carne mortali totaliter separata; non tamen sunt totaliter in statu viae, ex quo actibus sensuum carent, quibus in statu

"Claritas illa quam Christus in transfiguratione assumpsit, fuit claritas gloriae quantum ad essentiam, non tamen quantum ad modum essendi. . . . Nam ad corpus glorificatum redundat claritas ab anima sicut quaedam qualitas permanens corpus afficiens. Unde fulgere corporaliter non est miraculosum in corpore glorioso. Sed ad corpus Christi in transfiguratione derivata est claritas a divinitate et anima eius, non per modum qualitatis immanentis et afficientis ipsum corpus: sed magis per modum passionis transeuntis, sicut cum aer illuminatur a sole. Unde ille fulgor tunc in corpore Christi apparens miraculosus fuit: sicut et hoc ipsum quod ambulavit super undas maris. . . .

"Unde non est dicendum, sicut Hugo de Sancto Victore dixit, quod Christus assumpserit dotes claritatis in transfiguratione, agilitatis ambulando super mare, et subtilitatis egrediendo de clauso utero Virginis: quia dos nominat quamdam qualitatem immanentem corpori glorioso. Sed miraculose habuit ea quae pertinent ad dotes. Et est simile, quantum ad animam, de visione qua Paulus vidit Deum in raptu."—*Sum. Theol.*, iii^{a}. q. 45: a. 2. c. (Leon., xi. 430).

mortalis vitae utimur."—*De veritate*, q. 10 : a. 11. c. (vol. ix. 176b).*

The nature and conditions of this miraculous "rapture" are further expounded in the following passages, from which the conclusion may be drawn that one to whom this experience had been vouchsafed, on returning to the organic life, could only attempt to recall it, even to himself, under the limitations of the faculties of the *viator*, to which he would be again confined. Thus he would only be

* Moses and Paul are the only cases in point:

"Moyses ostenditur Deum per essentiam vidisse in quodam raptu, sicut et de Paulo dicitur 2 Cor. xii. ut in hoc Judaeorum legifer, et doctor gentium aequarentur."—*De veritate*, q. 10 : a. 11. ad 1 (vol. ix. 176b).

The view (expressed above) that their vision was not under the *lumen gloriae* is consistent with the general scheme of Thomas's thought (*cf.* note on preceding page); but in his actual commentary on 2 Cor. xii. 1 he takes the opposite view:

"Sciendum est autem, quod visio Dei per essentiam fit per lumen aliquod, scilicet per lumen gloriae. . . . Sed aliquod lumen communicatur alicui per modum passionis, alicui vero per modum formae inhaerentis: sicut lumen solis invenitur in carbunculo et in stellis ut forma inhaerens, idest connaturalis effecta; sed in aere invenitur ut forma transiens et non permanens, quia transit abeunte sole. Similiter et lumen gloriae dupliciter menti infunditur. Uno modo per modum formae connaturalis factae et permanentis, et sic facit mentem simpliciter beatam: et hoc modo infunditur beatis in patria, et ideo dicuntur comprehensores, et, ut ita dicam, visores. Alio modo contingit lumen gloriae mentem humanam, sicut quaedam passio transiens; et sic mens Pauli fuit in raptu, lumine gloriae illustrata: unde etiam ipsum nomen raptus ostendit transeundo hoc esse factum: et ideo non fuit simpliciter glorificatus, nec habuit dotem gloriae, cum illa claritas non fuerit effecta proprietas. Et propter hoc non fuit derivata ab anima in corpus, nec in hoc statu perpetuo permansit. Unde solum actum beati habuit in ipso raptu, sed non fuit beatus."—*Expositio in* 2 ad Cor., cap. xii. lect. 1 (vol. xiii. 368b).

able to remember anything he had experienced in his "rapture" in terms and under forms dependent upon *species* and *phantasmata*. This conception throws indirect light on many passages in mystic literature, and very direct light on many lines in Dante's *Comedy*:*

"Mens humana divinitus rapitur ad contemplandam veritatem divinam, tripliciter: uno modo, ut contempletur eam per similitudines quasdam imaginarias. Et talis fuit excessus mentis qui cecidit supra Petrum.—Alio modo ut contempletur veritatem divinam per intelligibiles effectus: sicut fuit excessus David

* Cf. *Paradiso*, i. 4–9:

"Nel ciel che più della sua luce prende
fu' io; e vidi cose che ridire
nè sa nè può chi di lassù discende;

perchè, appressando sè al suo disire,
nostro intelletto si profonda tanto,
che retro la memoria non può ire."

And xxxiii. 58–63:

"Qual è colui che sognando vede,
che dopo il sogno la passione impressa
rimane, e l'altro alia mente non riede;

cotal son io, chè quasi tutta cessa
mia visione, ed ancor mi distilla
nel cor lo dolce che nacque da essa."

Also 91–96 of the same canto:

"La forma universal di questo nodo
credo ch' io vidi, perchè più di largo,
dicendo questo, mi sento ch' io godo.

Un punto solo m' è maggior letargo,
che venticinque secoli alla impresa,
che fe' Nettuno ammirar l'ombra d'Argo."

And *Paradiso* passim.

dicentis: *Ego dixi in excessu meo: Omnis homo mendax.*—Tertio ut contempletur eam in sua essentia. Et talis fuit raptus Pauli: et etiam Moysi. Et satis congruenter: nam sicut Moyses fuit primus Doctor Iudaeorum, ita Paulus fuit primus *Doctor Gentium.*"—*Sum. Theol.*, ii^{a}. ii^{ae}. q. 175: a. 3. ad 1^{m} (Leon., x. 405a).

"Raptus est ab eo quod est secundum naturam in id quod est supra naturam, in vi superioris naturae, elevatio. In qua quidem definitione tangitur eius genus, dum dicitur elevatio; causa efficiens, quia vi superioris naturae; et duo termini motus, scilicet a quo, et in quem, cum dicitur ab eo quod est secundum naturam in id quod est supra naturam."

"Est autem triplex visio: scilicet corporalis, per quam videmus et cognoscimus corpora; spiritualis, sive imaginaria, qua videmus similitudines corporum; et intellectualis, qua cognoscimus naturas rerum in seipsis. Nam proprie objectum intellectus est quod quid est.* Hujusmodi autem visiones, si fiant secundum naturalem modum (puta si video aliquid sensibile, si imaginor aliquid prius visum, si intelligo per phantasmata), non possunt dici caelum. Sed tunc quaelibet istorum dicitur caelum quando est supra naturalem facultatem humanae cognitionis: puta, si aliquid vides oculis corporalibus supra facultatem naturae, sic es raptus ad primum caelum. Sicut Balthassar raptus est videns manum scribentis in pariete, ut dicitur Dan. v. Si vero eleveris per

* *quod quid est* = *quidditas*, *i.e.* the essential and constituent nature of the thing.

imaginationem vel per spiritum ad aliquid supernaturaliter cognoscendum sic est raptus ad secundum caelum. Sic raptus fuit Petrus, quando vidit linteum immissum de caelo, ut dicitur Act. x. Sed si aliquis videret ipsa intelligibilia et naturas ipsorum non per sensibilia nec per phantasmata, sic esset raptus usque ad tertium caelum.

"Sed sciendum est, quod rapi ad primum caelum est alienari a sensibus corporalibus. Unde cum nullus possit abstrahi totaliter a sensibus corporeis, manifestum est quod nullus potest dici simpliciter raptus in primum caelum, sed secundum quid,* inquantum contingit aliquando aliquem sic esse intentum ad unum sensum quod abstrahitur ab actu aliorum. Rapi ad secundum caelum est quando aliquis alienatur a sensu ad videndum quaedam imaginabilia: unde tales semper consueverunt fieri in extasi: et ideo Act. x., quando Petrus vidit linteum, dicitur quod factus fuit in extasi. Paulus vero dicitur raptus ad tertium caelum, quia sic fuit alienatus a sensibus, et sublimatus ab omnibus corporalibus, ut videret intelligibilia nuda et pura eo modo quo vident Angeli et anima separata; et quod plus est, etiam ipsum Deum per essentiam. . . .

"Sed numquid fieri potuisset Paulo, ut non raptus videret Deum? Dicendum, quod non. Nam impossibile est quod Deus videatur in vita ista ab homine non alienato a sensibus: quia nulla imago, nullum phantasma est sufficiens medium ad Dei essentiam ostendendam; ideo oportet quod abstra-

* *secundum quid* = in a relative or qualified sense.

hatur et alienetur a sensibus."—*Expositio in* 2 ad Cor., cap. xii. lectio 1 (vol. xiii. 367b *sq.*).

This insistence on the impossibility of the anticipation of the vision of God in this life, except by miracle, is highly characteristic of Aquinas, and is foreign to the mystics of the Platonic succession. The Platonists, whether with Plotinus they believe union with the Supreme to be possible, or with Erigena believe that God is in truth "inaccessible," or waver between the two opinions, in every case believe in a possibility of experiences on earth and in the body identical with or closely analogous to the experiences of the angels and the redeemed. But Aquinas holds firmly to the principles of the anti-mystic psychology of Aristotle as far as the natural and earthly life is concerned, and to the entirely supernatural character of mystic experience.

The passage is well known in which Porphyry claims for Plotinus that the supreme Deity had been intimately revealed to him four times during his, Porphyry's, period of familiar intercourse with him, and that he, Porphyry, had once had the same experience. *Οὕτως δὲ μάλιστα τούτῳ τῷ δαιμονίῳ φωτὶ πολλάκις ἀνάγοντι ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν πρῶτον καὶ ἐπέκεινα θεὸν ταῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐν τῷ συμποσίῳ ὑφηγημένας ὁδοὺς τῷ* Πλάτωνι *ἐφάνη ἐκεῖνος ὁ θεὸς ὁ μήτε μορφὴν μήτε τινὰ ἰδέαν ἔχων, ὑπὲρ δὲ νοῦν καὶ πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν ἱδρυμένος, ᾧ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ ὁ* Πορφύριος *ἅπαξ λέγω πλησιάσαι καὶ ἑνωθῆναι ἔτος ἄγων ἑξηκοστόν τε καὶ ὄγδοον. Ἐφάνη γοῦν τῷ* Πλωτίνῳ *σκοπὸς ἐγγύθι ναίων· τέλος γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ σκοπὸς ἦν τὸ ἑνωθῆναι καὶ πελάσαι τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ.*

Ἔτυχε δὲ τετράκις που, ὅτε συνήμην αὐτῷ, τοῦ σκοποῦ τούτου ἐνεργείᾳ ἀρρήτῳ καὶ οὐ δυνάμει.—Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus*. In the additions to Didot's *Diogenes Laertius*, Paris, 1862 (p. 116, ll. 33 *sqq.*).

Whether any of the Christian Neoplatonists would have gone so far as explicitly to assert that the supreme experience of the blessed could be actually anticipated on earth may be doubted; but it is certain that they do not draw the sharp line that Aquinas does between the capacity for the highest experiences of the soul when united to the body, and when separated from it. This may be seen from the following extracts, in which I have italicised the passages that especially indicate the belief (or, at the lowest, the feeling) that it was ideally possible for the actual experience which would be normal and continuous *in patria*, to be anticipated, momentarily, *in via*, without any miracle at all:

"Si cui sileat tumultus carnis, sileant phantasiae terrae et aquarum et aëris, sileant et poli, et ipsa sibi anima sileat, et transeat se non se cogitando; sileant somnia et imaginariae revelationes, omnis lingua et omne signum, et quidquid transeundo fit, si cui sileat omnino; quoniam, si quis audiat, dicunt haec omnia: 'non ipsa nos fecimus, sed fecit nos qui manet in aeternum.' His dictis si iam taceant, quoniam erexerunt aurem in eum, qui fecit ea, et loquatur ipse solus, non per ea, sed per se ipsum, ut audiamus verbum eius, non per linguam carnis, neque per vocem angeli, nec per sonitum nubis, nec per aenigma similitudinis, sed ipsum, quem in his

amamus, ipsum sine his audiamus, *sicut nunc extendimus nos, et rapida cogitatione adtigimus aeternam sapientiam super omnia manentem*; si continuetur hoc, et subtrahantur aliae visiones longe imparis generis, et haec una rapiat et absorbeat et recondat in interiora gaudia spectatorem suum, ut talis sit sempiterna vita, quale fuit hoc momentum intelligentiae, cui suspiravimus; nonne hoc est: 'Intra in gaudium Domini tui'?" — Augustine, *Confessiones*, lib. ix. cap. 10.

"Beatum dixerim et sanctum, *cui tale aliquid in hac mortali vita raro interdum, aut vel semel*, et hoc ipsum raptim, atque unius vix momenti spatio experiri donatum est. Te enim quodammodo perdere, tamquam qui non sis, et omnino non sentire te ipsum, et a temet ipso exinaniri, et paene annullari caelestis est conversationis, non humanae affectionis. Et *si quidem e mortalibus quispiam ad illud raptim interdum*, ut dictum est, *et ad momentum admittitur*, subito invidet saeculum nequam, perturbat diei malitia, corpus mortis aggravat, sollicitat carnis necessitas, defectus corruptionis non sustinet, quodque his violentius est, fraterna revocat caritas. Heu! redire in se, recidere in sua compellitur, et miserabiliter exclamare: 'Domine, vim patior, responde pro me.' Et illud: 'Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?'" *—Bernard, *De diligendo Deo*, cap. x. § 27.

* It may be noted that both Augustine and Bernard lay stress on a certain relative imperfection of the fruition realised by the disembodied souls of the blessed, as compared with that which they will attain to after the resurrection of the body. Aquinas

"Quintus modus divinae cognitionis supremum genus est contemplationis, quod vocatur gaudium felicissimae visionis. Felicissima visio est *qua per-*

too accepts this belief, and often mentions it; but it is not integral to his teaching in the sense in which the other point is:

"Sed si quem movet, quid opus sit spiritibus defunctorum corpora sua in resurrectione recipere, si potest eis etiam sine corporibus summa illa beatitudo praeberi; difficilior quidem quaestio est, quam ut perfecte possit hoc sermone finiri: sed tamen minime dubitandum est, et raptam hominis a carnis sensibus mentem, et post mortem ipsa carne deposita, transcensis etiam similitudinibus corporalium, non sic videre posse incommutabilem substantiam, ut sancti Angeli vident; sive alia latentiore caussa, sive ideo quia inest ei naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi, quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota intentione pergat in illud summum caelum, quamdiu non subest corpus, cuius administratione appetitus ille conquiescat."—Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, lib. xii. cap. 35, § 68 (vol. iii. pars. 1ª. 322).

"Quid autem iam solutas corporibus? Immersas ex toto credimus immenso illi pelago aeterni luminis, et luminosae aeternitatis. Sed si, quod non negatur, velint sua corpora recepisse, aut certe recipere desiderent et sperent, liquet procul dubio necdum a se ipsis penitus immutatas, quibus constat necdum penitus deesse de proprio, quo vel modice intentio reflectatur. Donec ergo absorpta sit mors in victoria, et noctis undique terminos lux perennis invadat et occupet usquequaque, quatenus et in corporibus gloria caelestis effulgeat, non possunt ex toto animae se ipsas exponere, et transire in deum, nimirum ligatae corporibus etiam tunc, etsi non vita vel sensu, certe affectu naturali, ita ut absque his nec velint, nec valeant consummari. Itaque ante restaurationem corporum non erit ille defectus animorum, qui perfectus et summus est ipsorum status: nec carnis iam sane consortium spiritus requireret, si absque illa consummaretur."—Bernard, *De diligendo Deo*, cap. xi. § 30.

"Beatitudinem sanctorum post resurrectionem augeri extensive quidem manifestum est; quia beatitudo tunc erit non solum in anima, sed etiam in corpore; augebitur et etiam ipsius animae beatitudo. Augebitur extensive, inquantum anima non solum gaudebit de bono proprio, sed de bono corporis. Potest etiam dici, quod etiam beatitudo animae ipsius augebitur intensive. . . . Sicut enim anima separata a corpore corruptibili perfectius potest operari quam

pauci in praesenti felices fruuntur, in qua, nimia divini gustus dulcedine rapti, Deum tantum contemplantur. . . . In hoc . . . animus splendore lucis æternæ totus illustratur, constanter et perfecte peccatum odit, mundum postponit, seipsum abjicit et totus, solus, nudus et purus, in Deum tendit, totus nunquam digrediens, sed uni Deo se totum uniens, solus a materia, nudus a forma, purus a circumspectione omnimoda. Hujus autem supremæ contemplationis tria sunt genera, a tribus designata theologis per tria nomina: a Job, per suspendium; a Joanne, per silentium; a Salomone, per somnium. A Job ita: *Elegit suspendium anima mea et mortem ossa mea.* A Joanne sic: *Factum est silentium in cœlo quasi media hora.* Per Salomonem in Canticis sponsa: *Ego dormio*, inquit, *et cor meum vigilat.*"—Hugh of S. Victor, *De Contemplatione et eius speciebus.* In the earlier edition (not in the later) of Haureau's *Hugues de Saint Victor*, 1859 (pp. 206 *sq.*).

"Has utique sex contemplationum alas, *soli perfecti in hac vita vix habere possunt.* Has omnes in futura vita electi omnes tam in hominibus quam in Angelis habituri sunt, ita ut de utraque natura veraciter possit dici quia sex alæ, uni, et sex alæ alteri."—Richard of S. Victor, *De Gratia Contemplationis*,

ei conjuncta; ita postquam conjuncta fuerit corpori glorioso perfectior erit eius operatio quam quando erit separata. Omne autem imperfectum appetit suam perfectionem et ideo anima separata naturaliter appetit corporis conjunctionem: et propter hunc appetitum ex imperfectione procedentem, ejus operatio quae in Deum fertur, est minus intensa."—Aquinas, 4 *Dist.* xlix. q. 1: a. 4. sol. 1. (vol. vii. 1194b).

lib. i. cap. x., fin. In his collected works, Rothomagi, 1650, p. 153b E *sq.*

Bonaventura, who, unlike these authors, was well versed in the Aristotelian psychology, is more cautious; but the following passage shows that he was in very near accord with the Platonists in this matter. The mercy seat, or *propitiatorium*, in his system stands for Christ himself. He proceeds:

"Ad quod propitiatorium qui aspicit, plenaconversione vultus aspiciendo ad eum in cruce suspensum, per fidem, spem, et charitatem, deuotionem, admirationem, exultationem, appretiationem, laudem, et iubilationem: pascha, hoc est transitum cum eo facit: ut per virgam crucis transeat mare rubrum, ab Ægypto intrans desertum: ubi gustet manna absconditum, et cum Christo requiescat in tumulo, quasi exterius mortuus, sentiens tamen quantum possibile est secundum statum viæ, quod in cruce dictum est latroni cohærenti Christo: Hodie mecum eris in paradiso. Quod etiam ostensum est B. Francisco, cum in excessu contemplationis in monte excelso (ubi hæc, quæ scripta sunt, mente tractavi) apparuit Seraph, sex alarum in cruce confixus: ut ibidem a socio eius (qui tunc cum eo fuit) ego, et plures alii audiuimus, ubi in Deum transiit per contemplationis excessum: et positus est in exemplum perfectæ contemplationis, sicut prius fuerat actionis, tanquam alter Jacob mutatus in Israel, ut omnes viros vere spirituales Deus per eum inuitaret ad huiusmodi transitum, et mentis excessum, magis exemplo quam verbo. . . . Si autem quæris quomodo

haec fiant? interroga gratiam, non doctrinam: desiderium, non intellectum: gemitum orationis, non studium lectionis: sponsum, non magistrum: Deum, non hominem: caliginem, non claritatem: non lucem, sed ignem totaliter inflammantem, et in Deum excessiuis unctionibus, et ardentissimis affectionibus transferentem. Qui quidem ignis Deus est, et huius caminus est in Hierusalem, et Christus homo hunc accendit in feruore suæ ardentissimæ passionis, quem solus ille vere percipit, qui dicit: Suspendium elegit anima mea, et mortem ossa mea. Quam mortem qui diligit, videre potest Deum, quia indubitanter verum est: Non videbit me homo et viuet. Moriamur ergo, et ingrediamur in caliginem, imponamus silentium solicitudinibus, concupiscentiis, et phantasmatibus, transeamus cum Christo crucifixo ex hoc mundo ad Patrem, ut ostenso nobis Patre dicamus cum Philippo: Sufficit nobis. Audiamus cum Paulo: Sufficit tibi gratia mea. Exultemus cum David, dicentes: Defecit caro mea, et cor meum, Deus cordis mei, et pars mea Deus in æternum."— Bonaventura, *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, cap. vii. (vol. vii. p. 134a E, b A, D, E. In the Lyons edition, 1668).

Erigena belongs to a different tradition, and follows another succession. The Greek Fathers, in whose school he studied, have indeed a doctrine of θέωσις which has analogies with Thomas's *deiformitas*, but Erigena would not find in them anything corresponding to the full Aquinian doctrine of the *visio Dei*; for Gregory of Nazianzus doubts whether the angels them-

selves can be said *θεὸν νοῆσαι*. He criticises Plato's dictum that God is hard to understand and harder to express, and would, for his part, say rather *φράσαι μὲν, ἀδύνατον, . . . νοῆσαι δὲ, ἀδυνατώτερον*. For in truth it is quite impossible to us on earth *τοσοῦτο πρᾶγμα τῇ διανοίᾳ περιλαβεῖν*. And he adds *οὐκ οἶδα δὲ, εἰ μὴ καὶ ταῖς ἀνωτέρω καὶ νοεραῖς φύσεσιν, αἳ διὰ τὸ πλησίον εἶναι Θεοῦ, κ.τ.λ.*—*Oration* xxviii. 4 (Benedictine edition, 1778, vol. i. p. 498 B–D). He speaks with the same reserve of the future state of the blessed. It is certain that we do not and cannot know God's nature now. Let who will speculate on what may be after this life. *Θεὸν, ὅτι ποτε μέν ἐστι τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, οὔτέ τις εὗρεν ἀνθρώπων πώποτε, οὔτε μὴν εὕρῃ, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν εὑρήσει ποτὲ, ζητείσθω τοῦτο, καὶ φιλοσοφείσθω παρὰ τῶν βουλομένων.*—*Ib.*, cap. 17 (vol. i. p. 508 D). His own opinion on this subject, based on S. Paul's saying in 1 Cor. xiii. 12, *τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην*, follows lines that might naturally lead up to the doctrine of Aquinas. But he appears not to have arrived at any defined dogma in the matter, nor to be acquainted with such.

Erigena is a more thoroughgoing agnostic even than his revered master. Nothing could be stronger than his conviction that God himself cannot be actually known, in his essence, by any created being, not even by the angels and the blessed; but he is explicit in his claim for the possibility of a vision for the righteous while still on earth, of the same essential quality as that enjoyed by the angels and the blessed:

"Eo enim modo et angelos Deum semper videre arbitror, justos quoque *et in hac vita*, dum mentis excessum patiuntur, et in futuro sicut angeli visuros esse. Non ergo ipsum Deum per semetipsum videbimus, quia neque angeli vident; hoc enim omni creaturae impossibile est; *solus* namque, ut ait Apostolus, *habet immortalitem, et lucem habitat inaccessibilem*: sed quasdam factas ab eo in nobis theophanias contemplabimur."—Erigena, *De divisione naturae*, lib. i. cap. 8 (448 B, C).

ADDENDA

Page 61.—The reference to Bernard's words was accidentally omitted from the notes. They occur in his *Epistola* cxcii. (vol. i. 185 F in the Benedictine edition of 1719):

"Cum de Trinitate loquitur, sapit Arium: cum de Gratia, sapit Pelagium, *et cet.*"

Page 408.—The passage of Augustine here referred to occurs in the *Soliloquia*, lib. 1, cap. 4, § 9 (vol. i. 359 F *sq.*). In answer to the question whether he perceives lines, spheres, *et cet.*, by the senses or the intellect, Augustine answers:

"Immo sensus in hoc negotio quasi navim sum expertus. Nam cum ipsi me ad locum quo tendebam pervexerint, ubi eos dimisi, et jam velut in salo positus, cœpi cognitione ista volvere, diu mihi vestigia titubarunt. Quare citius mihi videtur in terra posse navigari, quam geometricam sensibus percipi, quamvis primo discentes aliquantum adjuvare videantur."

My recollection of the passage, it will be seen, was substantially, but not literally, correct.

Page 470.—I have not yet been fortunate enough to recover the lost reference mentioned on this page, but the following expressions fairly cover the ground:

"Forma quae non recipit magis et minus, recipitur subito in subjecto: ut patet de formis substantialibus."

"Nam forma et dispositio ad formam completam et abjectio alterius formae, totum est in instanti." —*De verit.*, q. 28: a. 9. ob. 8. (not challenged) and c. (vol. ix. 443b, 444b).

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∴ *v.* = *vide* = "look at." *cf.* = *confer* = "take in connection with."

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* The article will serve to supplement and co-ordinate sundry passages in the body of this volume.

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
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